Sefer Mishlei’s Jargon-Filled Introduction (Mishlei 1:1-6)

The Torah content for this week has been sponsored by Ellis and Janice Cohen in memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l.

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Artwork: Secret Rendezvous, by Manuel Castañón

Sefer Mishlei’s Jargon-Filled Introduction (Mishlei 1:1-6)

The introduction of Sefer Mishlei (the Book of Proverbs) poses a unique difficulty for the beginner. To experience it yourself, read this:

The mashalim (proverbs, examples, allegories) of Shlomo, son of Dovid, king of Israel: la’daas (to know) chochmah (wisdom) and mussar (discipline), le’havin (to understand) statements of binah (understanding); lakachas (to take) mussar haskel (intelligent discipline), tzedek (righteousness), and mishpat (justice), and meisharim (uprightness); to give ormah (cunning) to pesaim (simpletons), to a naar (youth) daas (knowledge) and mezimah (scheming); a chacham (wise man) will hear and increase lekach (learning), and a navon (man of understanding) will acquire tachbulos (strategies); le’havin (to understand) mashal (parable) and melitzah (allegory), the words of the chachamim (wise) and their chidos (riddles).

The difficulty is that these pesukim are chock-full of Mishleic jargon! How is the beginner supposed to know what these terms mean? It is tempting to answer: “by making recourse to the commentators, who explain what each term means,” but that answer is problematic for several reasons. It is a stretch to assume that Shlomo ha’Melech intended for his words to only be understandable with the aid of commentaries, especially considering his explicit statement that this book is intended not only for a chacham (wise man) and a navon (man of understanding), but also for a pesi (simpleton) and a naar (youth). Furthermore, if you read through the commentaries, you’ll quickly see that there is no consensus on what these terms mean. Each commentator has his own set of definitions. How is the beginner to know on whom to rely? This also raises the question: How did the commentators, themselves, arrive at their own definitions? Presumably, by learning through the rest of the book to see how Shlomo uses these terms. But if these commentators were only able to decipher his terminology by learning through the entire book, then we’re back at square one: What does Shlomo expect the reader to do with this opening paragraph? Skip it, read the rest of the book, and then start from the beginning again? Unlikely.

Therefore, I would like to suggest that Shlomo’s intent was not for the novice to fully understand or precisely define these terms at this early stage of learning, but merely to identify them as desirable objectives and to be motivated on that basis to learn Mishlei as a means of achieving these objectives – despite not knowing exactly what they mean. For example, the average reader will not be able to define chochmah, but they’ll likely have an intuitive notion of what chochmah is and will know that it is a valuable asset. Tzedek and mishpat can be quite difficult to define – as Socrates demonstrated – yet, everyone knows that they are virtues. The beginner may not know exactly what type of tachbulos (strategies) are being promised, but he knows that having strategies is better than not having them, and if even a navon can learn strategies from this book, then it must be worth learning!

There is no other book of Tanach which explicitly states its goals from the get-go. Shlomo begins this way in order to convey to his readers that unlike the other books of Tanach, which contain a mix of theoretical and practical knowledge, Sefer Mishlei is primarily a practical book, and these are its practical objectives. As his readers make their way through the book, these explicitly stated objectives at the beginning will serve as beacons or goalposts which guide their learning, prompting them to search for chochmah, mussar, tzedek, ormah, etc. in every pasuk. Although they’ll begin with the most rudimentary grasp of these terms, their definitions will become clearer and clearer the more Mishlei they learn. Eventually, they’ll be able to develop working definitions of the terminology (as can be seen, for example, in my 2017 article The Mishleic Spectrum: A Glossary of Mishlei Personalities, which needs to be updated). Ultimately, they’ll formulate their own opinions, just as the commentators did.

And if this challenge proves too difficult, they may enlist the help of their teachers – whether living teachers or commentaries – and rely on their definitions as “training wheels” until they begin to form their own views.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

EFT (Episodic Future Thinking) Training: A Summer 2022 Experiment

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Judah and Naomi Dardik in loving memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt''l, who taught his students to pursue truth by asking questions, who modeled love of Torah and learning, and who exemplified living a life of the mind.

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Artwork: Future Sight, by Dan Scott

EFT (Episodic Future Thinking) Training: A Summer 2022 Experiment

My learning, my teaching, and my life (yes, I realize I just listed three synonyms) are shaped by the books I’m reading. Sometimes I can tell from the outset that a particular book will have a huge impact on my thinking. One of those books is Jane McGonigal’s Imaginable: How to see the future coming and feel ready for anything – even things that seem impossible today, published in 2022. I’m only halfway through, but I figured I should plan ahead by writing this prefatory article now.

McGonigal has the unique distinction of being both a future-forecaster and game designer. Her specialty is creating simulations that help people imagine the biggest global challenges we might face in the future. In 2008 she led a six-week future-forecasting simulation called Superstruct in which 10,000 people worldwide simulated living through five different threats, including a global respiratory pandemic that originated in China. The simulation was based entirely on the imagination of the participants: “we simply asked people to predict how they would feel and what they would do in their own lives during this kind of rapidly spreading outbreak.” Despite the fact that the simulation was entirely imagination-based, it yielded shockingly accurate predictions about the details of pandemic life during Covid-19.

McGonigal advocates a specific use of the imagination called episodic future thinking, or EFT. Here’s her description:

[Episodic future thinking is] the mental ability to transport yourself forward in time and pre-experience a future event. EFT is often described as a kind of “mental time travel” because your brain is working to help you see and feel the future as clearly and vividly as if you were already there. But EFT isn’t just thinking about the future; it’s simulating the future in your mind. It’s the difference between knowing that it’s probably going to rain tomorrow – a kind of “fact” or abstract thought about the future” – and vividly imagining yourself in the rain, trying to pre-feel the rain on your skin, and using everything you know about what tomorrow might be like to make the scenario more detailed and realistic. EFT might entail picturing where exactly you’ll be when it starts to rain, what you might be wearing, who might be with you, whether you’re likely to be annoyed by the rain or delighted by it, whether you’ll rush to get somewhere dry or stroll leisurely through it, and so on.

Her book is an eminently practical one, the full benefits of which can only be unlocked by readers who practice EFT on a regular basis. I’ve read enough to be sold on the power of EFT, and I’ve committed to practicing it every day for the next month. The main utility I hope to derive from my EFT practice can be summed up in Chazal’s definition of a chacham (wise person) as: “eizehu chacham? ha’roeh es ha’nolad” – “Who is wise? One who can see what the future will yield.” My rebbi, Rabbi Moskowitz zt”l, would note that Chazal didn’t say “one who knows the future” but rather “one who sees the future.” Chochmah (wisdom) is when the future is as real to the mind and the emotions as if it were perceived by the senses. How can we make our knowledge of the future real to our minds? By utilizing our imagination. In the introduction to his commentary on Mishlei, Saadia Gaon explains that this is the crux of Shlomo ha’Melech’s method:

Furthermore, sensory knowledge is easier and more real to the [minds of the] masses than intellectual knowledge since the sensory faculties exist in them from birth. Therefore, it is necessary to craft mashalim (examples and metaphors) for [the masses] in order to equate the dictates of the intellect with the dictates of the senses ... For this reason, when the intellect sees something detrimental or hears about something harmful and reveals it to the emotions and sees that they don’t trust it or accept it, [the intellect] should speak with them in a manner that they will understand.

This is why EFT needs to be vivid and detailed. The emotions don’t grasp abstractions and will not be moved by them. It’s not enough to tell the emotions that “the lazy man’s estate will deteriorate.” Instead, you need to say: 

“I passed by the field of a lazy man, the vineyard of a man who lacks understanding, and behold! it was all grown over with thistles, its face was covered with nettles, and the stone wall was broken down. And I beheld, and I applied my mind and took discipline: a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to recline, and your poverty will come like a traveler, and your lacking like an armed man” (Mishlei 24:31-34). 

The more details you imagine, the more your emotions will be impacted.

This article was just an intro. I hope to expand upon other benefits of EFT over the next few weeks. That is, in the future.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Mishlei 27:3 - The Weight of a Fool's Anger

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Artwork: Grindstone, by Greg Simanson

Mishlei 27:3 - The Weight of a Fool's Anger

משלי כז:ג

כֹּבֶד אֶבֶן וְנֵטֶל הַחוֹל וְכַעַס אֱוִיל כָּבֵד מִשְּׁנֵיהֶם:

Mishlei 27:3

The weight of a stone and the heft of sand – the anger of the fool is heavier than both of them.

There are four questions here:

1. What differentiates the anger of a fool from the anger of a non-fool? Clearly, the metaphors will address this in detail, but it's worth asking as its own question.
2. What are these metaphors? In what sense is the fool's anger comparable to both "the weight of stone" and "the heft of sand"? 
3. What does it mean to describe anger as "heavy"? There are a number of adjectives typically used to describe anger - such as "hot," "intense," "strong," "fierce," "unyielding" - but "heavy" isn't one of them.
4. Heavy for whom? Is the pasuk characterizing the fool's anger as heavy for the person who he's angry at, or for the person who is forced to confront the fool in his anger, or for the fool himself? 

Personally, I'm not bothered by the question of why the pasuk uses the word "koved" (weight) for a stone and "neitel" (heft) for sand. Either these are the two terms that are appropriate to use for their respective substances, or the pasuk is just using synonyms for stylistic reasons. 

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

A stone and a load of sand are both heavy, but for different reasons: the individual stone is an inherently heavy substance, whereas sand is light as a substance but heavy in large quantities. So too, the Mishleic fool, whose expects reality to always work out in his favor, is “weighed down” by his anger in two different ways: (1) since he takes reality personally, he will perceive each individual instance of reality not aligning with his desires as an intolerable hardship; (2) since the fool’s anger stems from his ego, he will experience a high volume of these “anger incidents,” the sheer quantity and frequency of which will be its own source of pain. In other words, the fool is burdened by the fact that he gets very angry, very often. This is one of the many reasons why the Mishleic chacham works on his expectations, striving to make them as realistic as possible. 

This would be a good place to review a methodology point that I've mentioned earlier. Chapter 25 begins a new section of Sefer Mishlei: "These, too, are the Mishlei of Shlomo ha'Melech, which were copied by the men of Chizkiyah, king of Judah" (25:1). This section continues through the end of Chapter 29. 

These pesukim are stylistically different than the "mainstream" Mishlei written by Shlomo ha'Melech in Chapters 10-24. Most of the pesukim are quite straightforward and unequivocal in their wording - as opposed to many of the pesukim in Chapters 10-24, which can be confusing and ambiguous to read and translate. The mashalim (metaphors) in Chapters 25-29 are also very direct, and tend to be stated simply as "X is like Y" or "as X is to Y, so is A to B." 

I was recently asked whether the ideas taught in Chapters 25-29 differ from the ideas taught in Chapters 10-24. I haven't noticed any difference. I would expect the pesukim in Chapters 25-29 to presuppose familiarity with the content of Chapters 10-24, since the latter were composed earlier, but I don't even know whether this is supposition is the case. 

Mishlei 17:12 - Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fool Scorned

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Artwork: Awaken the Bear, by Svetlin Velinov

Mishlei 17:12 - Hell Hath No Fury Like a Fool Scorned

משלי יז:יב

פָּגוֹשׁ דֹּב שַׁכּוּל בְּאִישׁ וְאַל כְּסִיל בְּאִוַּלְתּוֹ:

Mishlei 17:12

Better to for a man to confront a mother bear bereft of its cubs than a ksil (fool) in his eeveles (foolish rage).

This translation is based on R' Moshe Kimch (printed in the standard Mikraos Gedolos under the name "Ibn Ezra"), who explains that "shakool" means "deprived of its cubs." The Meiri, among others, adds that "shakool" implies a female bear. Although the second half of the pasuk says "than a fool in his foolishness," Rabbeinu Yonah explains it to mean "than a fool in his foolishness and his anger." Presumably, he gets this from the first half of the pasuk: a bear bereft of its cubs is "crazy enraged" rather than merely "crazy."

There are a few basic questions here:

1. How? Whenever Mishlei compares one thing to another, the question is: in what framework? "Better" in what sense? 
2. Really?! This pasuk seems to be an exaggeration. The Wikipedia article on bear attacks makes them seem pretty bad. 
3. What is unique about the eeveles (foolish rage) of a ksil (Mishleic fool)? All rage is destructive. What makes the rage of a ksil unique enough to single out in this pasuk?

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here's my MORE than four-sentence summary of the main idea:

A mother bear bereft of its cubs is in the grips of a powerful, unthinking, animalistic rage; the same is true of a fool whose ego (or false sense of security) has been threatened and whose anger has been awakened. However, the fool is much more dangerous than the bear for a number of reasons: 

(1) the bear has a very narrow range of activity, making it relatively easy to anticipate its attack and to take the necessary precautions; the fool, on the other hand, has a wide variety of retaliatory actions at his disposal and is willing to go to any lengths to get his revenge, making him unpredictable and difficult to guard against 

(2) the bear’s anger subsides within a short period of time, whereas the fool might harbor a grudge for days, months, years, or decades 

(3) the danger level of the bear is apparent to all, whereas the fool might appear to be totally harmless, when – in truth – he is just waiting for the right moment 

(4) no one in his right mind deludes himself into thinking that he can control an enraged bear, but when dealing with a fool, it is easy to fall prey to the illusion that one has more control than one actually has.  

For these reasons (and more), one should avoid provoking fools, and steer clear of fools who have already been provoked.

The reason why I allowed myself to summarize the main idea in more than four sentences is because this pasuk falls into the category of "list pesukim." I've already explained this methodological point elsewhere, but I'll repeat my explanation here for the sake of convenience.

Many pesukim in Mishlei state a specific consequence for a specific foolish behavior or bad decision. In contrast, "list-pesukim" simply identify the actions of the fool/rasha and leave it to the reader to figure out the consequences, of which there are many. "List pesukim," such as our pasuk, will typically make general reference to the consequences in vague or categorical terms, so as not to lead the reader to focus on a narrow set of consequences.

The phenomenon of "list pesukim" exemplifies one of the many differences between Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs and (for lack of a better term) "English proverbs." English proverbs are essentially spoon-fed truths which are instantly understandable: "the early bird catches the worm," "no pain no gain," "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." In contrast, the vast majority of Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs are not readily understandable; their ideas can only be accessed after thought and analysis.

I believe that the main reason for this is because Shlomo ha'Melech is trying to do more than just deliver content. His goal is for his students to train their minds and acquire a different way of thinking about life. By stating these ideas in cryptic language, he forces the student to explore the subject matter of each pasuk in-depth and try out different ways of learning. In the end, the students gains more from the analysis of the pasuk than a single idea.

"List pesukim" fit into this paradigm because there isn't even a specific idea that he's conveying. Instead, these pesukim are like Shlomo pointing to a certain behavior and saying, "Hey - check that guy out. What do you think is going to happen to him? What mistake(s) is he making?" The "lesson" of the pasuk ultimately comes from the student's own analysis, with zero spoon-feeding.

"List pesukim" are also consistent with Shlomo ha'Melech's brand of "mussar without 'should's and 'shouldn't's," which I wrote about here.

Mishlei 16:18 - Two Types of Arrogance

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Artwork: Tragic Slip, by Christopher Moeller
(color-adjusted using Google Photos)

Mishlei 16:18 - Two Types of Arrogance

משלי טז:יח

לִפְנֵי שֶׁבֶר גָּאוֹן וְלִפְנֵי כִשָּׁלוֹן גֹּבַהּ רוּחַ:

Mishlei 16:18

Arrogance comes before breaking, and haughtiness comes before stumbling.

The questions I had this time around are very straightforward:

1. What is the difference between gaon (arrogance) and govah ruach (haughtiness)? It's possible that the two halves of the pasuk are saying the same thing in different words, but the next question makes that assumption unlikely.
2. What is the difference between shever (breaking) and kishalon (stumbling)? These two terms seem quite different, but what do they mean? "Breaking" seems worse than merely "stumbling," but in what sense?
3. How does gaon cause "breaking," and govah ruach cause "stumbling"? The implication is that gaon leads to "breaking" specifically, as opposed to "stumbling," whereas govah ruach leads specifically to "stumbling" but not "breaking."

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea. Because I am not 100% clear about my answer to Question #1, I've erred on the side of wordiness:

Govah ruach (“haughty spirit”) is the opposite of “shfal ruach” (“lowly spirit”), and refers to arrogance as a character disposition (i.e. an accidental quality of the personality) – a psychological tendency to overestimate one’s own abilities and relative superiority; like other dispositions, the degree of govah ruach may fluctuate based on external circumstances or internal moods.

Gaon (“arrogance”) is the opposite of “anavah” (“humility”) and refers to arrogance as a fundamental temperament (i.e. an essential quality of the personality) – a view of oneself as intrinsically superior and inherently deserving of success; the quality of gaon is so deeply rooted in the individual’s character that it tends to remain at a constant heightened level, which only grows more severe with each accomplishment.

Govah ruach will result in “stumbling” – bad decisions from which the individual can recover; since govah ruach is merely an inclination towards overestimation of the self, it is possible (albeit unlikely) for the individual to experience a “wake-up call” after suffering the consequences of his misstep, provided he recognizes his hubris as the cause.

In contrast, gaon will ultimately lead to “breaking” – total destruction; the baal gaon’s unshakable conviction that he is destined for greatness will render him blind and deaf to anything which might lead him to question this fundamental egocentric premise, and he will continue to march forward in his megalomaniacal pursuits until he is utterly destroyed by the harsh reality which refuses to show him the favoritism to which he feels entitled.

The question I haven't answered is how to determine whether a particular individual suffers from gaon or merely govah ruach. In certain cases it seems pretty clear that a person suffers from a terminal case of gaon, but it other cases it will take a lot of data (i.e. instances of arrogant decisions and their aftermath) to be able to make this determination with any degree of certainty - and even then, I'm not sure whether it's possible to know for sure. 

A Note on Methodology: Reviewing Without Reviewing

Readers of this blog might have seen this post and thought to themselves, "Wait a minute - didn't he already write a post about this pasuk?" Yes, I did! I called it Mishlei 16:18 - Pride Goeth Before the Fall, published in June 2017.

I learn with my Mishlei rebbi almost every Friday. A few years ago we started Mishlei Chapter 12, and have continued pasuk by pasuk. This past Friday we arrived at Mishlei 16:18. If I know I've written about a pasuk before or learned or taught it within the past few years, I'll usually remember the idea I came up with. This time, however, I couldn't remember. This afforded me the valuable opportunity to relearn it from scratch, and possibly arrive at a different idea.

After I learned through this pasuk again with my Mishlei rebbi, I went back and reread my old post. I was delighted by the fact that not only did we come up with a different idea this time, but the questions we asked were quite different. Last time I was most bothered by the phrasing and ordering of the clauses in the pasuk, but that question didn't even occur to me this time around. This time my mind seized upon the differences between the first and second half, and viewed that as the primary question, whereas last time I was more bothered by the question of "Duh! This idea seems obvious!"

I am fortunate to have had a Mishlei rebbi who has a terrible memory, who almost never recalls ideas and explanations we've come up with in the past. Consequently, no matter how many times we've learned a pasuk in the past, we always learn it from scratch with him. This has shown me how valuable it is to approach the material with fresh eyes and a fresh mind. Sometimes this takes me to the same conclusions as before, but most often, it leads to new discoveries and deeper insights that I missed the first time around. This pasuk was a nice reminder of that, especially since I have a written record of my thought process the last time around!

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

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Artwork: Browbeat, by Chris Rahn

Mishlei 29:9 - The Fool's Dirty Debate Tactics

משלי כט:ט

אִישׁ חָכָם נִשְׁפָּט אֶת אִישׁ אֱוִיל וְרָגַז וְשָׂחַק וְאֵין נָחַת:

Mishlei 29:9

Raw Translation: A wise man who nishpat with a foolish man, and he rages and he laughs, and there is no satisfaction/rest.

I chose this pasuk for today's Mishlei post because it's a good example of how ambiguity in the wording can lead to multiple directions in the analysis. When I learned this pasuk with my Mishlei group this past Shabbos, we didn't have access to my mikraos gedolos (compendium of commentaries), and we were forced to work out the translation on our own. I'll include the difficulties in my list of questions on the pasuk:

(1) What does "nishpat" mean? The root SH.F.T. (ש.פ.ט.) typically denotes "to judge," but can also mean "to dispute" or "to argue." The use of the nifal (passive) form is also very strange. "is judged" makes sense, but "is disputed" or "is argued [with]" are also valid translations.

(2) Who "rages" and "laughs"? Is the chacham (wise man) raging and laughing at the eveel (foolish man), or is the eveel raging and laughing at the chacham? 

(3) What, exactly, is this "rage" and "laughter"? Is "rage" different than mere "anger"? Is the emphasis on his feeling of anger, or on his display of anger? The laughter is even vaguer than the rage. Is this talking about "laughter" that stems from humor? Is it laughter of mockery? Is it laughter of happiness and camaraderie? And why is this person raging and laughing? What is the relationship between the situation (i.e. arguing, disputing, or being judged) and these two reactions? Is it davka (specifically) these two reactions, or are these just examples from within a larger category?

(4) Who doesn't receive satisfaction - and why not? The answer to this question is dependent on the answer to Question #2, and maybe dependent on the answer to Question #3.

[Time to stop and think about the pasuk in light of these questions. Read on when ready.]

Before we can present the main idea of the pasuk, we need to settle on a translation. Here are the approaches taken by the various meforshim:

Rashi: A wise man who argues with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].

Ralbag: When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man].

Ibn Ezra: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man].

Metzudas David: A wise man who is judged with a foolish man may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction [for the wise man]. 

As I mentioned, we didn't have access to meforshim when we learned this pasuk. The translation we came up with happens to be one that none of the meforshim explicitly say:

Our Translation: When a wise man is judged with a foolish man, [the fool] may rage and laugh, but he will have no satisfaction.

For those of you who appreciate charts, here are the five translations side by side:

The fact that none of the meforshim proposed this translation doesn't bother me. I am not aware of any grammatical or syntactical problems, and our translation reflects the most straightforward reading, both in terms of the use of the passive "nishpat" (which literally means "he is judged") and in the conservative reading of the ambiguous pronouns (i.e. "the fool may rage and laugh, but there will be no satisfaction for the fool"). Plus, "raging" and "laughing" seem more like the actions of an eveel than the actions of a chacham, which is why we shied away from translating the pasuk like Rashi and Metzudas David.

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

When a chacham finds himself in a situation in which he is being judged alongside an eveel (e.g. two participants in a public debate, two businessmen competing for the same customers, two candidates vying for the same position), he should prepare himself to face the dirty tactics that the eveel will use. The fool will attempt to prevail by utilizing provocatively aggressive displays of emotion – such as rage and mocking laughter – in an effort to destabilize the chacham, and to make himself appear dominant in comparison. As long as the chacham remains visibly unshaken and unperturbed by the eveel's bombastic onslaught, and doesn’t give him the satisfaction of pushing his buttons, then these tactics will backfire. The audience (i.e. whoever is in a position to pass judgment) will observe the stark contrast between the chacham’s cool, levelheaded, objective disposition and the eveel’s heated, combative, immature bullying; this side-by-side comparison will simultaneously boost the ethos of the chacham and diminish that of the eveel. Chances are that the eveel, himself, will become frustrated with the chacham’s indifference to his assaults, which will destabilize him, making him feel even more frantic and less in control of himself; this, in turn, will make him appear desperate and pathetic in the eyes of the audience, thereby giving the chacham an edge - in addition to the substance of his arguments, which will inevitably be superior to the eveel's.

After we came up with this explanation, and I gained access to my meforshim, I saw that the Ri Nachmias gives a very similar explanation of our pasuk. The only difference is that he translates "nishpat" as "argues" instead of "is judged," like Rashi and Ralbag, in contrast to Ibn Ezra and Metzudas David. Nevertheless, he also learns - like we do - that there is an audience present in the situation, which practically means that the chacham and eveel are being judged. Here is the relevant excerpt from the Ri Nachmias's (much lengthier) explanation:

If a wise man who argues with a fool, [the fool] may rage and laugh ... Since this fool doesn't have much knowledge, he'll project self-images (oseh tzuros me'atzmo) to deceive the people who are there ... These are polemical techniques (darchei nitzuach) which [the eveel uses to] trick listeners [into thinking that he] knows what he doesn't [actually know].

The Ri Niachmias quotes a pasuk from elsewhere in Shlomo ha'Melech's writings which supports our interpretation: "The words of the wise are heard calmness (b'nachas) over the shouting of a ruler among fools" (Koheles 9:17). In the Rambam's description of how talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars) speak and behave, he borrows this phrase from Koheles:

A talmid chachamim shouldn't yell or shout when he speaks, like animals and wild beasts, nor should he raise his voice; rather, his speech with people should be calm. And when he speaks calmly, he should be careful not to distance himself, to the extent that he appears haughty.

In other words, this calmness in speech shouldn't be limited to situations involving a fool. Rather, "nachas" (in the sense of "calmness" rather than "satisfaction") should be the default mode of speech for talmidei chachamim.

The Ralbag would agree with the title of this post, but according to him, our pasuk focuses on a specific tactic used by the eveel in debates: interrupting the chacham. He translates our pasuk as: "When a wise man argues with a foolish man, [the fool] will rage and laugh, and there will be no rest [for the wise man]." Here is his explanation:

When a wise man argues with a foolish man, in a verbal back-and-forth, the eveel will not allow the chacham to speak and to finish his statements. Instead, sometimes he'll react angrily to what he hears the chacham say and will not allow him to complete his statements, and sometimes he'll laugh and mock what he hears [the chacham] say, and he will not give him a pause (nachas) which would enable him to complete what he intended to clarify. This pasuk is, as it were, a warning to the chacham not to argue with an eveel.

One of the best examples of our pasuk in action is the Canadian psychologist Jordan Peterson. I found a video which exemplifies all three interpretations - that of the Ralbag, the Ri Nachmias, and ours. I wanted to find a shorter video, but this is the best I could come up with.


It will not always be possible for a chacham to avoid debating with or being judged alongside an eveel. When such a situation arises, the chacham must keep the eveel's repertoire of tricks at the forefront of his mind, and not allow him to get the upper hand. 

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

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Artwork: The Mirari Conjecture, by James Arnold

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

Some of my students decided to start learning Mishlei on their own this summer. They recently contacted me and asked for my assistance in learning the pasuk: "Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" (Mishlei 3:19). They said that they had made some headway, but the ideas they came up with "didn't feel like Mishlei ideas."

I responded by affirming their observation: yes, the main idea of Mishlei 3:19 doesn't feel like a Mishlei idea, nor should it. Why not? Because this pasuk is from the first nine chapters of Mishlei, which serve a different purpose and are written in a different style than "regular Mishlei."

I wrote about this in my How to Learn Mishlei: A Step-by-step Guide. Chapters 1-9 constitute Shlomo ha'Melech's introductory discourse. The pesukim in chapters 1-9 were written to be learned paragraph by paragraph, sequentially. In contrast, the pesukim in chapters 10-29 are "standalone proverbs" which can be learned in any order, without any regard to their context within the sefer.

For this reason, I urge newer Mishlei students to skip chapters 1-9 and begin with chapters 10-29. These pesukim are easier to learn because they can be analyzed on their own. Moreover, it is also easier to approach chapters 1-9 after building up a basic "Mishleic intuition" from "standard Mishlei" pesukim, which will serve as a guide through the introductory material.

Although I usually write about standalone pesukim from chapters 10-29, I decided to switch it up for this week's Mishlei post and write about the pasuk that my students are learning, in order to illustrate just how different these introductory chapters can be.

The first step is to figure out the unit of which Mishlei 3:19 is a part. It's clearly not related to the pesukim before it, since that unit ends with the paragraph break at 3:18. It's also clear that 3:19 is connected to 3:20 at the very least, and the use of the pronoun "them" in 3:21 suggests that 3:19-20 is connected to 3:21-26. The pesukim after 26 seem to be their own thing.

Thus, the cluster of pesukim we'll be working with is this:

משלי ג:יט-כו

(יט) יְיָ בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד אָרֶץ כּוֹנֵן שָׁמַיִם בִּתְבוּנָה: (כ) בְּדַעְתּוֹ תְּהוֹמוֹת נִבְקָעוּ וּשְׁחָקִים יִרְעֲפוּ טָל: (כא) בְּנִי אַל יָלֻזוּ מֵעֵינֶיךָ נְצֹר תֻּשִׁיָּה וּמְזִמָּה: (כב) וְיִהְיוּ חַיִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ וְחֵן לְגַרְגְּרֹתֶיךָ: (כג) אָז תֵּלֵךְ לָבֶטַח דַּרְכֶּךָ וְרַגְלְךָ לֹא תִגּוֹף: (כד) אִם תִּשְׁכַּב לֹא תִפְחָד וְשָׁכַבְתָּ וְעָרְבָה שְׁנָתֶךָ: (כה) אַל תִּירָא מִפַּחַד פִּתְאֹם וּמִשֹּׁאַת רְשָׁעִים כִּי תָבֹא: (כו) כִּי יְיָ יִהְיֶה בְכִסְלֶךָ וְשָׁמַר רַגְלְךָ מִלָּכֶד:

Mishlei 3:19-26

(19) Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding. (20) With His knowledge the depths were cleaved, and the heavens drip dew. (21) My son – do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought, (22) and they will be life for your soul, and a graceful [ornament] for your neck. (23) Then you will walk securely on your path, and your foot will not falter. (24) When you lie down, you will not be afraid; you will lie down your sleep will be sweet. (25) Do not be afraid of sudden terror, nor the darkness of the wicked when it comes, (26) for Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement.

When learning "standard Mishlei" pesukim from chapters 10-29, we try to ask all the questions we can. If we did that on this paragraph, we'd easily be overwhelmed. Instead, it is advisable to focus on getting the main idea of the paragraph as a whole - much like we do in our approach to Sefer Tehilim - and then examine the details in light of that main idea.

The major questions on this paragraph as a whole are:

(1) What are the first two pesukim saying? This certainly doesn't seem to be a practical decision-making idea, since it's about Hashem's creation of the world. These pesukim seem to be more appropriate for Tehilim or Bereishis than Mishlei!

(2) What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? I am assuming that there is a connection because of how 21 begins: "Do not let them deviate from your eyes" - with the "them" referring to the chochmah, tevunah, and daas mentioned in 19-20.

(3) How do all of the benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21? In other words, how do these effects (i.e. "they will be life for your soul ... and He will guard your foot from ensnarement") result from these causes ("do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought")?

Before we move on to the main idea, I just want to underscore how different these questions are from the kinds of questions we normally ask. For example, if we approached pesukim 22-26 as we would approach "regular Mishlei" (i.e. chapters 10-29), then we'd focus on all of the specifics - but since our pesukim come from Chapters 1-9, we need to prioritize the main idea over the details. 

It's not always clear which questions are major and which are minor. For example, one could expand on Question #1 by asking: "What are the definitions of chochmah (wisdom), tevunah (understanding), and daas (knowledge)?" or "Why is chochmah associated to Hashem's founding of the earth, tevunah to His establishing the heavens, and daas to His causing them to drip with dew?" An argument could be made that these are major questions which are critical for understanding the main idea. However, my intuition tells me that these questions are minor. Pesukim 19-20 are basically saying "Hashem created the universe with knowledge," and the terms used are synonyms.

[Okay - now it's time to think! Continue reading when you're ready.]

Due to the difference in style between "regular Mishlei" and the introductory chapters, I think it's best if I answer each of the three questions individually, and then summarize the main idea in 1-4 sentences - much like I do in my posts on Tehilim.

Answer to Question #1: What are the first two pesukim saying? 

The Meiri [1] offers several explanations of these two pesukim, but his final explanation appeals to me the most:

There are those who explain that the phrase "with chochmah" here refers to the [design of the] earth, meaning to say that He created it in accordance with chochmah - that is, with [laws of] nature that do not deviate from their creation, and which are responsible for the establishment and continued existence of the earth, [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the orders of the moon and stars which provide light at night, etc.

Turns out that the Meiri was quoting the Sefer Chukah, [2] whose explanation is spelled out a bit more:

"Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" [means] that from the day He created them, they do not deviate from their ways, nor does any part of His design deteriorate, such that he would need to fix it - unlike human beings, who build a building, only to have it deteriorate years later and be in need of repair. The Creator (blessed is He) created all of His works with wisdom, and firmly established the earth through nature and [laws of] cause-and-effect - [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the order of the moon and the stars to provide light at night - and each and every one of them stands at its post and performs His commands. 

In other words, these two pesukim convey the idea that Hashem created the world and endowed it with lawful principles of cause and effect, which are consistent, perfect, and harmonious in their preservation of the universe, obedient to the will of the Creator. The terms chochmah, tevunah, and daas here all refer to the quality of intelligent lawfulness that is manifest everywhere in the universe. 

Answer to Question #2: What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? 

Mishlei's premise, as stated in Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei, is that man is unique on account of his tzelem Elokim (i.e. truth-seeking intellect), which allows him to comprehend abstract knowledge, and to make decisions based on long-term benefits and consequences. 

In light of this premise, and the premise stated in 19-20 that the universe operates by natural cause-and-effect, it follows that man should utilize his intellect to understand the lawfulness of the world around him, in order to align himself with it to the best of his ability to maximize long-term pleasure and minimize long-term pain (again, as Saadia Gaon wrote in his Introduction to Mishlei). 

This manifests itself in two ways: "guard[ing] wisdom," which refers to avoiding actions and decisions which lead to harmful consequences, and "strategic thought," which refers to using knowledge of the laws of nature to bring about benefits that one wouldn't have otherwise received. But these two things will only be possible if he exercises Mishleic vigilance, "not letting [wisdom, understanding, and knowledge] deviate from his eyes." 

This might also be why the emphasis is on the "eyes": it's not enough to know, in abstract, that the universe operates by lawful cause and effect; you need to be able to see opportunities to implement Mishleic thinking in the sensory particulars of everyday life. 

Answer to Question #3: How do all of the wonderful benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21?

These pesukim are a breakdown of the two general categories mentioned in the previous pasuk (i.e. "guarding wisdom and strategic design"). I don't know whether this is a comprehensive list or just a series of particular examples. Here's what my intuition tells me about each item on the list:

"they will be life for your soul" - If "soul" means your physical life, then this is a reference to all the ways that Mishlei literally prolongs your life by helping you make intelligent decisions to improve your physical health and to deter you from taking unwarranted risks and engaging in unhealthy practices or behavior. If "soul" means your mind, then this is referring to the enjoyment of Mishleic thinking, which will become the central pleasure of your life. (Judging by the rest of the list, I'd say that the first explanation is the correct one.) 

"and a graceful [ornament] for your neck" - If I recall correctly, "neck" in Mishlei refers to your larynx (a.k.a. vocal cords). [3] Mishlei will change the way you speak, the contents of your speech, and when you exercise your speech - all in a manner which will give you the quality of "grace" (i.e. people will naturally be drawn to you because of the benefits and pleasantness they derive from the effects of Mishlei on your personality, and the beneficial results of Mishlei in your life [4]). 

"you will walk securely on your path" - I think "your path" refers to the general direction you take in life (i.e. the goals you pursue), which will be "secured" by your intelligent decision-making. 

"your foot will not falter" - I doubt this means that you won't make mistakes, since that would be humanly impossible. Rather, I think it means that even when you do make mistakes, you will learn from them and benefit from the insight you gain. Thus, in the long run, even your mistakes will enhance the quality of your life. Either that, or it just means that you will make fewer mistakes than a person who doesn't learn Mishlei. 

"if you lie down, you will not be afraid" - As a student of Mishlei, you will have a healthy recognition and acceptance of what is in your control and what is not in your control; you will take all of the precautions to protect yourself from threats that are within your control, and you will accept that whatever is out of your control is out of your control, to the extent that when you go to sleep (i.e. a state of complete lack of control, and therefore, complete vulnerability), you will still feel secure that you have done everything in your ability to protect yourself from harm.

"when you lie down and your sleep will be sweet" - This physical security will also lead to an emotionally secure state of mind, which will enable you to have a restful sleep, free from those late-night bouts of stress, fear, and anxiety about the worries of the day. 

"do not be afraid of sudden terror, and the darkness of the wicked when it comes" - Even when unexpected catastrophes happen, whether natural ("sudden terror," such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.) or brought about by human beings ("darkness of the wicked," such as assaults, robbery, war, the Holocaust, etc.), you need not be afraid; as a student of Mishlei, you will use the same decision-making approach in these situations as you would under normal conditions, and will be sure to achieve the best results that are in your control to achieve. 

"Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement" - I believe that this pasuk is framed in terms of Hashem in order to chiastically conclude this cluster of pesukim as it began. How does one take security in Hashem? By aligning oneself with Hashem's chochmah, tevunah, and daas which constitute the fabric of His universe. To the extent that you trust in His will, as manifest in the laws of nature, you will feel secure, and not become ensnared in the consequences of bad decisions, or in the stress and anxiety that results from non-Mishleic thinking.

Having said all of that, here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

The basis of Mishleic security in Hashem is the recognition that He created the universe in accordance with laws of cause and effect – laws which are universal, consistent, and rational (i.e. they can be known and understood by human beings). The Mishlei student’s trust in Hashem is based on the reliability of His will as manifest in these laws of nature. By using wisdom and strategic thinking to align himself with these natural laws, thinking and speaking about them constantly and harnessing them to his advantage, he will achieve both physical and emotional security – physical security from making the best decisions within the realm of his control based on the best of his knowledge, and emotional security derived from his trust in Hashem’s will, and from his knowledge that he has done everything in his power to make the best decision he can. And even when he makes a mistake, which will inevitably happen, he will learn from it, and use the insights he gained to improve his decision-making in the future.

There you have it. See how different this feels from a "regular Mishlei" idea? It's far more general and less focused on particular practical decision-making strategies. I also hope you can see what I meant when I said that I encourage students not to learn these introductory chapters until after they've developed their Mishleic intuition by learning chapters 10-29 for a while.

[1] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 3:19

[2] Rabbeinu Yosef Kimchi, Sefer Chukah on Mishlei 3:19

[3] see, for example, Rabbeinu Yonah on Mishlei 1:9

[4] I heard a great example of this yesterday from my Mishlei rebbi, who recently spent nearly an entire week in the hospital. He told me that many nurses and doctors came up to him and told him that he is the best and most pleasant patient they've ever had. My Mishlei rebbi attributed this to the effects of Mishlei on his personality, which we spent a while discussing and analyzing.

Mishlei 17:13 - Mishleic Karma

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Mishlei 17:13 - Mishleic Karma

משלי יז:יג

מֵשִׁיב רָעָה תַּחַת טוֹבָה, לֹא תָמוּשׁ רָעָה מִבֵּיתוֹ:

Mishlei 17:13

If one repays good with bad, badness will not depart from his house. 

The questions on this pasuk are:

(1) How does this work? Our pasuk appears to be describing a karma-like effect. The problem is that karma - in the sense of "a mystical force of retribution" - isn't real. Since Mishlei deals with consequences within the laws of nature, how can we understand the phenomenon in our pasuk?

(2) What "badness" will not depart from his house? The term "badness" (raah) is as vague as can be. Is this the same type of "badness" as the "bad" in the first half of the pasuk? If not, what is it? And why was Shlomo ha'Melech so vague? 

(3) What does it mean when it says that the badness "will not depart from his house"? Why focus on the house instead of the person himself? And what are the implications of "will not depart"? This would seem to indicate that the "badness" was always there, and could have departed were it not for this guy's repaying of good with bad.

[Time to think! Read on when ready.]

Here is my four-sentence summary (with an extremely liberal definition of "sentence") of the main idea of this pasuk:

It is human nature to expect that the beneficiaries of good actions will (or should) repay these actions with good; consequently, the person who repays good with bad will be universally abhorred. Such an individual is exceedingly egotistical in that he believes he is entitled to be the recipient of good from others, but at the same time, feels that he doesn’t owe them anything; not only that, but he feels free to treat them however he pleases, as though they are nothing but his pawns who exist only to serve him. As a direct consequence of this insensitive, egocentric way of relating to others, the “house” (i.e. system) of such an individual will be continually “plagued by badness” in four ways: (1) the members of his household/system will resent him, and that resentment will yield harmful consequences; (2) they will not be willing to do good for him, and he will miss out on those benefits; (3) his sense of entitlement will cause him to be remiss in his responsibilities towards the members of his household/system; this will harm the household/system as a whole, and he – as a part of that household/system – will suffer as a consequence; (4) his egotism will generate excessive and unrealistic expectations of how others should relate to him, and these unfulfilled expectations will breed perpetual frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger. Although there is no such thing as actual Karma, the victim of this type of evil recompense can take solace in his knowledge of “Mishleic karma” and know with certainty that the perpetrator will suffer greatly as a “punishment” for the way he treats others. 

This is an example of what I call a "list-pasuk." Many pesukim in Mishlei state a specific consequence for a specific behavior. In contrast, "list-pesukim" simply identify the behavior of the fool/rasha and leave it to the reader to figure out the consequences, of which there are many. "List-pesukim," such as our pasuk, will typically make general reference to the consequences in vague or categorical terms, so as not to lead the reader to focus on a narrow set of consequences.

The phenomenon of "list-pesukim" exemplifies one of the many differences between Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs and (for lack of a better term) "English proverbs." English proverbs are essentially spoon-fed truths which are instantly understandable: "the early bird catches the worm," "no pain no gain," "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." In contrast, the vast majority of Shlomo ha'Melech's proverbs are not readily understandable; their ideas can only be accessed after thought and analysis.

I believe that the main reason for this is because Shlomo ha'Melech is trying to do more than just deliver content. His goal is for his students to train their minds and acquire a different way of thinking about life. By stating these ideas in cryptic language, he forces the student to explore the subject matter of each pasuk in-depth and try out different ways of learning. In the end, the students gains more from the analysis of the pasuk than a single idea.

"List-pesukim" fit into this paradigm because there isn't even a specific idea that he's conveying. Instead, these pesukim are like Shlomo pointing to a certain behavior and saying, "Hey - check that guy out. What do you think is going to happen to him? What mistake(s) is he making?" The "lesson" of the pasuk ultimately comes from the student's own analysis, with zero spoon-feeding. 

Mishlei 19:18 - Childish Parenting (and a Teaching Tip)

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Childish Parenting (and a Teaching Tip)

משלי יט:יח

יַסֵּר בִּנְךָ כִּי יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה, וְאֶל הֲמִיתוֹ אַל תִּשָּׂא נַפְשֶׁךָ:

Mishlei 19:18

Discipline your son, for there is hope; do not let yourself be swayed by his protest. 

This pasuk and its questions are fairly straightforward:

(1) Why does the reader of this pasuk need to be told "for there is hope"? Why would he or she think that there is no hope?  

(2) Similarly, why does this parent need to be told "do not let yourself be swayed by his protest"? Why would he or she be swayed by the child's protest? 

(3) What is the unifying idea of this pasuk? It is clear that the subject of our pasuk has something to do with the reasons why parents are reluctant to discipline their children. But are these to be understood as two "random" reasons why a parent might refrain from disciplining his or her child, or is there a more specific subject which dictates Shlomo ha'Melech's selection of specifically these two reasons? 

[Thinking time! There's a unique challenge presented by pesukim which seem obvious. It takes a certain amount of intellectual dexterity to see past the simplistic, surface-level message of the pasuk to uncover the deeper idea.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

There are only two reasons why parents who desire to discipline their children refrain from doing so: (1) the feeling that the child is already set in his or her ways, and there is no hope that he or she will change; (2) the negative feelings triggered by the prospect of causing pain and suffering to the child - especially when the protests and cries. Both deterrents stem from an extremely short-sighted – and therefore, childish – perspective. In truth, a young child is not set in his or her ways, and there is still hope that he or she can change, although things might seem hopeless at the present; the child’s behavior and personality can still be influenced in the long-run by the parent’s discipline or lack thereof, for better or for worse. The parent’s decision to discipline or not discipline the child should be based on the long-term benefits and consequences – not on the emotional state or reactions of the child at the present, since children are, by nature, immature, shortsighted, and resistant to any form of discipline which involves immediate pain and conflict; to cater to the child’s short-term perspective will only hinder his or her development and emotional maturation.

I am convinced of the truth of this interpretation, with the exception of one word: "only." If I omitted that word from my summary (i.e. "Two of the reasons why parents refrain from disciplining their children are etc."), I don't see how anyone could object to the idea. That being said, why did I choose to jeopardize my explanation by qualifying it with the word "only"?

I have two responses to this question. The first is that I was compelled to add the qualifier of "only" by Question #3. To my mind, if there were many reasons why a well-meaning parent would refrain from disciplining his or her child, then why would Shlomo ha'Melech focus only on these two? I find it intuitively dissatisfying to say, "He just chose these two as examples out of many candidates" or even "He thinks these are the two major reasons, but he would agree that there are others" To my mind, this type of explanation would dilute the chidush (novelty) quality of the main idea.

The second reason why I prefer the riskier "only" interpretation over the "safer," more open-ended explanation has more to do with my approach as a teacher of Mishlei than as a student of Mishlei. Consider how these two possible explanations of this pasuk would play out in a Mishlei class. If I taught my students that Shlomo ha'Melech was giving us two out of many rationalizations that parents use to justify their decision to not discipline their children, then it would be very easy for my students to nod their heads, accept this interpretation, and move on.

By qualifying my explanation with the word "only," this transforms my interpretation of the pasuk into a challenge. Now my students will be driven to debate the merits of the universal theory that I am claiming Shlomo ha'Melech held - something they couldn't do if we assumed that Shlomo ha'Melech was just giving us an idea about particulars. Now a student might object to my explanation, saying, "Wait a minute. What if a mother refrains from disciplining her son because her mother objects to this discipline! That doesn't fit into either of your two categories!" Another student might defend this by saying, "Maybe the 'do not let yourself be swayed by his protest' is actually a broader category, which includes anyone's protest - not just the child's." A third student might ask: "But what about a case in which a father is afraid to discipline his daughter because he has a meek, non-confrontational personality in general? That doesn't fit into either of your two categories either!" to which a fourth student might point out: "In that case, the obstacle is not the parent's belief that the child can't change, but rather, it is the parent's belief that his own personality can't be changed. Both stem from a stubborn view of the immutability of human nature."

As you can see, this type of discussion would lead to a deeper analysis of the subject than we would have reached through the more conservative explanation. Is it possible that my interpretation is wrong? Yes. And am I increasing my chances of being disproven by my students? Certainly. But will the students learn more if I give my more tentative explanation? OH YEAH!

I picked up this teaching tip from my Gemara rebbi. He once told us that he would prefer to give an inferior sevara (conceptual theory) in shiur (class) if that sevara would yield a greater benefit to his students in terms of methodology - even if he would have to retract that sevara later on. The same is true in my Mishlei class: sometimes I will take an approach that is more speculative and less certain if I know that it will lead to more depth, more discussion, more methodology, or more benefit of any kind. And sometimes I won't take such an approach due to the downsides of teaching a less-than-perfect idea to my students. Each situation is different.

Anyway, I thought this pasuk would be a good opportunity to share this methodology point.