Showing posts with label Rus (Ruth). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rus (Ruth). Show all posts

Thursday, June 9, 2016

Megilas Rus: A Different Kind of Stinginess

Here's my second post on Megilas Rus. When I set out to write this post I was fairly certain of the veracity of the theory I planned on writing about. But as I set up the problem, I realized that this needed more work. Thankfully, I was able to incorporate my uncertainty into the post and fully express the idea while leaving the question open. Let me know if you find a good answer!


Artwork: Pious Evangel // Wayward Disciple
(My image of Elimelech when he was living in Eretz Yisrael before the famine,
and after the famine, when he fled to Moav.)


Megilas Rus: A Different Kind of Stinginess

Megilas Rus begins with the flight of Elimelech and his family, and the tragedy that followed:
And it happened in the days when the judges judged, that there was a famine in the land, and a man went from Beis-Lechem in Yehuda to sojourn in the fields of Moav - he, his wife, and his two sons. The name of the man was Elimelech, the name of his wife Naomi, and the name of his two sons Machlon and Chilyon, Ephrathites of Beis-Lechem in Yehuda. They came to the field of Moav and there they remained. Elimelech, Naomi's husband, died; and she was left with her two sons. They married Moabite women; the name of the one was Orpah, and the name of the second was Rus, and they lived there for about ten years. The two of them, Machlon and Chilyon, also died; and the woman was left of her two children and of her husband.
In this post we will focus on two basic questions: (1) Why did Elimelech leave Eretz Yisrael? (2) Why did he die?

Rashi answers both questions in one shot:
a man went - [Elimelech] was a very wealthy man, and was a leader of his generation. [However,] he left Eretz Yisrael for Chutza la'Aretz because of his stinginess (tzarus ha'ayin); he was stingy when the poor people came to pressure him [to give money,] and this is why he was punished.
A cursory reading of Rashi might lead one to conclude that Elimelech was guilty of your "run-of-the-mill stinginess," just like any other person who is unwilling to give money to the poor. The Malbim helps us to appreciate the complexity of Elimelech's cheit by painting a more complete picture of the circumstances:
During the days of famine, the multitude of the poor would converge on the wealthy and compel them to provide bread and grain - and if not, they would take it by force, since there was no king to instill fear in them. This is what caused "[the] man to depart from Beis Lechem Yehuda to sojourn in the fields of Moav." Since he was a wealthy man, he was afraid that the poor people would seize upon him and loot everything that he had.
The Malbim almost does too good of a job explaining Elimelech's rationale for leaving. He makes it seem like Elimelech had a legitimate cause for concern, and that he wasn't necessarily wrong in leaving. But if we read further, we realize that this wasn't the case:
But even though this was a time of misfortune and despair, only [this] one man left [the country]; the other wealthy people did not join him in leaving Eretz Yisrael to outside of the land. Even the members of Elimelech's household didn't leave by their own volition, for they didn't want to abandon their beloved land; only his wife and his two sons, who were subordinate to him, were compelled to follow after him. 
If Elimelech's decision to leave Eretz Yisrael stemmed from a real concern, why was he the only one who left? Wouldn't the other rich people have taken similar precautions to protect their wealth? Furthermore, wouldn't the other members of Elimelech's family be on board with this decision if it were really in their best interests? Rather, it would seem that Elimelech's rationale for leaving was merely a pretext for stinginess.

Lastly, we turn to the midrash in Rus Rabbah, which adds one more layer of complexity to our analysis of Elimelech's cheit:
Why was Elimelech punished? Because he struck despair into the hearts of Israel. He was like a prominent man who dwelt in a certain country, and the people of that country depended upon him and said that if the years of drought came, he could supply the whole country with food for ten years. When the drought came, however, his maidservant went out and stood in the market place with her basket in her hand. And the people of the country said, "This is the man upon whom we depended that if a drought should come he would sustain us for ten years, and yet, here his maidservant stands in the marketplace with her basket in her hand!" So with Elimelech: he was one of the prominent members of his place and one of the leaders of his generation, but when the famine came he said, "Now all Israel will come knocking at my door, each one with his basket." He therefore arose and fled from them. This is the meaning of the verse, "And a certain man of Beis Lechem went."
According to the midrash, it would seem that Elimelech's stinginess differed from the norm. A regular stingy person never gives to charity. In contrast, Elimelech had built up such a reputation for generosity that the people of his generation felt they would be able to depend on him to sustain them if the need ever arose. It was only when the famine struck that Elimelech's stinginess kicked in, even to the point where his maidservant would be begging on the street.

So what was the nature of Elimelech's stinginess? Why was he willing to use his money for tzedakah before the famine, but not after?


Honestly, I can't say for sure. My chavrusas and I discussed a number of possibilities, but they were too speculative and/or problematic for us to be satisfied with our conclusions. However, I would like to present an idea about stinginess that we came up with in thinking about the question. Whether or not this idea has anything to do with Elimelech is an open question. 

In the final chapter of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim the Rambam writes about the four kinds of perfection that man can acquire:
The first kind, the lowest, which most people spend most of their days trying to acquire, is perfection of material possessions: the possession of money, garments, furniture, servants, land, and the like; the possession of the title of a great king also belongs to this class. There is no real connection between this possession and its possessor at all; it is a totally circumstantial relationship, and most of the pleasure derived from it is totally imaginary. By that I am referring to when a person says, “This is my house! This is my servant! This is my money! And these are my hosts and armies!” For when he examines himself he will find that all these things are external, and their qualities are entirely independent of the possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases, he who has been a great king may one morning find that there is no difference between him and the lowest person, and yet no change has taken place in the things which were ascribed to him. The philosophers have shown that he whose sole aim in all his exertions and endeavors is the possession of this kind of perfection, only seeks perfectly imaginary and transient things; and even if these remain his property all his lifetime, they do not give him any perfection.
The wealthy individual can easily fall into the trap of regarding his wealth as a quality of himself, rather than a feature of his circumstances. People say "I am rich" when they really mean "I have wealth." In truth, the connection between themselves and their wealth is purely imaginary.

We need not elaborate on how destructive this mentality can be. Not only does it inflate the wealthy person's ego and sense of entitlement, but it renders him even more vulnerable to the fallacy of "kochi v'otzem yadi," and all of its consequences.

At the same time, this distorted view of wealth can serve as a beneficial lo lishmah (ulterior motive) for mtizvos and maasim tovim (good deeds). There are many philanthropists out there who get an ego-boost from giving tzedakah, and whose charity is fueled by the feeling that they - not Hashem - are the sustainers of the poor. When they give, they think to themselves, whether consciously or unconsciously, "Look at how I am benefiting the poor!" "See how dependent they are on me!" Sure, these aren't the most noble motives, but like any lo lishmah, they're good insofar as they get the mitzvah done.

Now, imagine a wealthy person who is operating under this type of lo lishmah. So long as the poor people continue to look favorably upon him and enable him to feel good about his generosity, then his lo lishmah will remain intact, and he will continue to give.

But when famine strikes and the people become desperate, things change. When our hypothetical philanthropist hears the mob threatening to break down his door, and when he sees the hunger and need in their eyes, then the truth stated by the Rambam becomes undeniably apparent: "there is no real connection between this possession and its possessor at all." He realizes: "These people don't need me; they need my money ... and if push comes to shove, they'll be willing to cast me aside in order to take what they need by force."

This realization totally shatters the lo lishmah. No longer can the philanthropist derive ego-gratification from thinking about how he is needed by so many people. Once he realizes that he is nothing but an obstacle between the mob outside of his door and the money in his vaults, his motivation for giving tzedakah completely dissolves.

This, I believe, is a plausible explanation for how a person might be exceedingly charitable when times are good, but become tightfisted when the tides turn.

Did Elimelech, himself, succumb to this trap? Is this why he was so willing to give of his money under normal circumstances, but panicked and became overly protective of his money the famine struck? Is this the type of cheit that would be worthy of death, as the midrashim seem to imply? I cannot say. A lot of this depends on how high of a level one assumes that Elimelech was on, and how the hashgachah relates to people in his position.

But even if we haven't explained the cheit of Elimelech, at least we have come away with an insight into this peculiar type of foul-weather stinginess. 

Tuesday, June 7, 2016

Megilas Rus: Judging the Judges

My chavrusa and I have been delving into Megilas Rus for the first time this year. So far we haven't yet uncovered any fundamental themes or approaches to the sefer - just individual ideas here and there. I'm going to try to write up a few of them before and after Shavuos. Note: I've been sick since Shabbos and have been feeling quite out of it today. Still, I tried finishing this post in time to meet my daily blogging schedule. Pardon me if it's not up to my usual standards. 

Artwork: Council's Judgment, by Kev Walker


Megilas Rus: Judging the Judges

Rus opens with the following pasuk
"And it happened in the days when the judges judged that there was a famine in the land, and a man went from Beis-Lechem in Yehuda to sojourn in the fields of Moav  - he, his wife, and his two sons" (Rus 1:1).
According to the plain pshat, this pasuk is establishing the historical context in which the events of the Megilah took place. Rashi fills us in on the details: "And it happened in the days when the judges judged - before the monarchy of King Shaul, during which the generations were governed by the judges; and this was in the days of Ibtzan." 

Chazal are bothered by the seemingly redundant phrase "And it was in the days when the judges judged" (bi'ymei shefot ha'shofetim). The pasuk could have simply said, "And it was in the days of the judges." Why the extra word?

Moreover, we know that whenever a calamity befalls the Jewish community, it is the result of a communal cheit (sin). [1] This was especially true during the period of the Shoftim, when there was a more direct correlation between the hashgachah and righteousness/sinfulness of the people. [2] In light of this we may ask: What was the cheit of this generation? Furthermore, why did this cheit warrant the severe punishment of famine?

The Gemara (Bava Basra 15b) answers both questions in one shot:
R' Yochanan said: What meant by the words, "And it was in the days of shefot ha'shofetim"? - It was a generation which judged its judges. If the judge said to a man, "Take the splinter from between your teeth," he would retort, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" If the judge said, "Your silver is dross," he would retort, "Your liquor is mixed with water!"
By interpreting phrase "shefot ha'shofetim" not as "when the judges judged" but "during the judging of the judges," this midrash identifies the cheit of the generation which caused the famine. But this still needs clarification. What, exactly, was the cheit of "judging the judges"? 

From the examples provided by the Gemara it would seem that the cheit beloged to the judges themselves. Indeed, this is how Rashi interprets our Gemara:
[a generation] which judges its judges - for the judges, themselves, were corrupt; this [corruption] gave the defendant an opening to rebuke his rebuker, for if the judge said to him, "Take the splinter from between your eyes" - remove and separate yourself from the small sin that you have done - he could say back, "Take the beam from between your eyes!" - separate yourself from the major sin that you have done. [3]
The Baalei Tosafos disagree with this interpretation:
a generation which judges its judges - The Ri was astounded by this, for it said in [the first chapter] of Temurah (15b): "All of the 'grape-clusters' (i.e. righteous leaders) who arose for Israel from the time of Moshe until the death of Yosef ben Yoezer were free from the blemish [of sin]." 
The Ri is bothered by Gemara's implication that the judges were corrupt, since Chazal say that the judges were righteous during this time. The Chasam Sofer also rejects Rashi's interpretation, and offers an interpretation of his own:
Heaven forbid that the judge [in the days of Rush] sinned! For we find that Osniel ben Kenaz, Boaz, Eli ha'Kohen, and Shmuel ha'Navi were among them; and even Yiftach and Gideon were "grape-clusters." Heaven forbid that Hashem's spirit would be driven by transgressors! 
Rather, [the meaning of the Gemara is that the judges] didn't watch over Israel in the proper manner, as Chazal said about the Elders who did not rebuke the nobles, and the righteous Eli, who didn't rebuke his sons. This is the meaning of "from between your eyes" - namely, the eyes of the congregation, who were supposed to be watched over.
Personally, I don't know enough about the period of the Shoftim to assess how righteous or corrupt the judges were at that time; I'll leave that argument up to Rashi and Tosafos.

What inclines me to the side of Tosafos is the Gemara's characterization of this problem as a cheit of the generation - not as a cheit of the judges themselves. If the judges were corrupt, the Gemara should have interpreted "shefot ha'shofetim" as "[a generation] in which the judges were judged [by God]" rather than "[a generation] which judged its judges," or something to that effect. Chazal's attribution of the cheit to the people of the generation leads me to believe that the judges were blemish free, as is indicated by the Gemara cited by Tosafos. 

What, then, do we make of the Gemara's examples of the typical dialogue that would take place between the judge and the defendant?

Perhaps we can interpret this dialogue as an expression of the corrupt mindset that plagued the people of that generation. There is a well-known idiom which comes to mind here: "the pot calling the kettle black." The formal name for this is the tu quoque (or "appeal to hypocrisy") fallacy, which Wikipedia defines as "an attempt [to discredit the validity of the opponent's logical argument by asserting the opponent's failure to act consistently in accordance with its conclusion(s)." According to this fallacy, Reuven has no right to point out a flaw in Shimon if Reuven partakes of a similar flaw. While there might be a psychological truth at play here (i.e. people tend not to listen to someone if they view that person as a hypocrite), this way of thinking has little relevance in matters of law, mussar, or practical advice.

For example, if Reuven the Judge convicts Shimon the Defendant of selling dross labeled as "pure silver," Shimon can accuse Reuven all day long for diluting his liquor with water, but that accusation will not change Shimon's liability in a court of law. True, Shimon might be less willing to accept a ruling from a judge whom he feels is also guilty of a crime, but that has no bearing on the reality of what Shimon did, nor does it exempt him from the legal consequences of his actions. This is true even if Reuven were guilty of a crime - and certainly if Reuven is guilt-free, as Tosafos and the Chasam Sofer would say about the Shoftim in our case.

Likewise, if Reuven - a nutritionist who happens to be obese - advises Shimon to cut back on his excessive consumption of sugar and trans fats because they're bad for his health, and Shimon responds, "Oh, look at the pot calling the kettle black!" who is really acting foolishly here? True, Shimon might feel uncomfortable trusting Reuven's health advice if Reuven doesn't live a healthy lifestyle, but that discomfort doesn't in and and of itself undermine the scientific validity of Reuven's advice. Reuven's expert pronouncement stands on its own merit, regardless of Reuven's personal decisions.

It seems that this was the cheit of the generation at the time of Rus: they viewed halacha as the subjective imposition of human will, rather than an objective system of divine law. We maintain that the Torah's laws are objectively true and real - just as real as the laws of nature. It is evident from the examples mentioned in the Gemara that this generation did not regard the Torah's laws as objective reality, nor did they regard the judges as the knowers and adjudicators of that law. Instead, they relegated the judges' verdicts to the realm of human opinion, such that they could be dismissed on the basis of hypocrisy - whether real or imagined.

Perhaps this sheds light on Rav Avigdor Kohen Tzedek's explanation of the famine:
and there was a famine in the land - Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said to them: "You stood  [in opposition] against your judges, [so] I will set for you a judge against whom you will not be able to stand. Which [judge] is this? - The plague of famine, which is called "judge," as it is stated: "How much more when I send My four terrible judges: sword, famine, ferocious beast, and pestilence" (Yechezkel 14:21).
This was a midah kneged midah punishment: Bnei Yisrael brushed off the judgments of their judges as subjective impositions of human will; in response, Hashem sent forth an objective "judge," whose sentence could not be brushed off so easily. It is easy to dismiss a human judge's verdict as mere opinion, but it is much more difficult to do the same with the verdict of the True Judge.

Rav Avigdor adds that the gematria of "ויהי בימי שפוט" ("and it was in the days of judging") is equivalent to the gematria of "ילדים שפטו" ("children judged"). If we take this gematria in tandem with Rav Avigdor's earlier citation of our Gemara in Bava Basra, we can clerly see how the people at the time of the Shoftim were behaving like children. The response of, "Oh yeah? Remove the beam from between your eyes!" smacks of the infantile reaction of "Oh yeah? You're not the boss of me!" This is a fine way for a child to retort to the bully on the playground, but if a patient responded this way to his doctor's prescription or a contractor used this statement to deflect an architect's counsel, then disaster is sure to follow. The same is true for those who childishly ignore halachic rulings out of a similarly misguided sentiment of, "Who does that rabbi think he is telling me what to do?"

Unfortunately, this same distortion prevails among Jews today. There are many modern Jews who are willing to disregard the rulings of rabbeim as nothing but biased predilections of men, rather than as objective dictates of the Creator. Even worse is the fact that the members of the rabbinate are guilty of this charge, in certain sectors. Unfortunately, there are rabbis who abuse their positions of authority and allow their personal feelings to influence their adjudication of halacha.

As we prepare for the celebration of the Giving of our Torah, it behooves us to assess our own relationship with the law. To what extent do we regard halacha as a regimen for human success, and to what extent do we relate to it as the imposition of an psychological authority figure's whims upon our own will?

The Torah was given to us by God, but how we receive it is up to us.

[1] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 1:1-1
[2] See Sefer Shoftim, Chapter 2
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[4] Tosafos, Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[5] Rav Moshe Schreiber (Chasam Sofer), Commentary to Talmud Bavli: Bava Basra 15b
[6] Rabbeinu Avigdor ben Eliyahu ha'Kohen, Commentary to Megilas Rus 1:1