Sameach b'Chelko as Unconditional Happiness

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Sameach b'Chelko as Unconditional Happiness

Ben Zoma (Avos 4:1) taught: “Who is wealthy? One who is sameach b’chelko (happy with his portion).” This is the type of idea that can easily become cliché if it is not reexamined, refreshed, and revised from time to time. The latest update came to me this morning. I just started reading Awareness: The Perils and Opportunities of Reality (1990), by Anthony de Mello. The author makes the seemingly outlandish claim: “You don’t want to be happy.” He clarifies his meaning a few pages later:

I was saying that we don’t want to be happy. We want other things. Or let’s put it more accurately: We don’t want to be unconditionally happy. I’m ready to be happy provided I have this and that and the other thing. But this is really to say to our friend or to our God or to anyone, “You are my happiness. If I don’t get you, I refuse to be happy.” It’s so important to understand that. We cannot imagine being happy without those conditions. That’s pretty accurate. We cannot conceive of being happy without them. We’ve been taught to place our happiness in them.

In other words, to be sameach b’chelko means to be unconditionally happy. Stated differently, so long as your idea of happiness includes particulars which you regard as indispensable, then you cannot be sameach b’chelko. Your chelek (portion) is determined by Hashem, not by your idea of what your chelek should be. It is He Who sets the conditions, not you. The only condition is His will.

After writing the first half of this article, I decided this would be a good time to skim the meforshim (commentators) on Ben Zoma’s statement in light of this new insight. To my surprise, I didn’t find a single one who explained sameach b’chelko along these lines. The Meiri’s commentary is representative of the approach that most (if not all) of them took. He writes: “the definition of wealth is to be content and not lust after excesses; anyone who has what he needs and doesn’t seek excess is truly wealthy.” Rabbeinu Yonah takes the same approach but expands on what is implied by “needs:”

Who is wealthy? One who is sameach b’chelko – [namely,] a person who says, “My chelek is sufficient for me, since I am able to support myself and my household and be involved in Torah. Why should I concern myself with someone else’s money, so long as I have what I need in order to uphold the word of Hashem?” For one who is not sameach b’chelko and not satisfied with what Hashem gave him is poor … Thus, it is an exceedingly good trait to be sameach b’chelko, and he is called “wealthy” because Hashem gave him what he needs to sustain himself and be involved in Torah and in mitzvos. For what profit is there for man in all his toil, but to fulfill Torah and mitzvos?

These meforshim do not explain sameach b’chelko as “being content with one’s portion, no matter what that portion is” but rather “being content with one’s portion, on the condition that one’s needs are sufficiently met to be involved in Torah and mitzvos.” Their sameach b’chelko is conditional.

This leaves me in a quandary. On the one hand, de Mello’s explanation rings true to me as a philosophical ideal. On the other hand, the meforshim on Ben Zoma’s statement are consistent with my understanding of Torah values. The simple answer is that they’re talking about different things: de Mello is talking about happiness and Ben Zoma is talking about wealth. And yet, the definition of wealthy as “sameach b’chelko” is predicated on a definition of simchah (happiness), which leaves me wondering what the relationship is between that simchah and de Mello’s. Tzarich iyun (this question needs further analysis).

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Vaeschanan: Avodah Zarah – Three Fundamental Premises

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Vaeschanan: Avodah Zarah – Three Premises

After recapping the event of the Revelation at Sinai, Moshe Rabbeinu warns Bnei Yisrael about the dangers of avodah zarah (idolatry): 

But you shall greatly beware for your souls, for you did not see any likeness on the day Hashem spoke to you at Horeb, from the midst of the fire, lest you act corruptly and make yourselves a carved image, a likeness of any shape; a form of a male or a female; a form of any animal on the earth; a form of any winged bird that flies in the heaven; a form of anything that creeps on the ground, a form of any fish that is in the water under the earth; and lest you raise your eyes to heaven and you see the sun, and the moon, and the stars – the entire legion of heaven – and you be drawn away and bow to them and worship them, which Hashem, your God, has apportioned to all the peoples under the entire heaven! … Beware for yourselves lest you forget the covenant of Hashem, your God, that He has sealed with you, and you make yourselves a carved image, a likeness of anything, as Hashem, your God, has commanded you. For Hashem, your God – He is a consuming fire – a jealous God. (Devarim 4:15-19, 23-24) 

It is difficult for the modern reader to relate to these severe warnings. We have a hard time understanding why our ancestors were tempted to make graven images, bow down to idols, and venerate the heavenly bodies. For this reason, the Torah’s campaign against avodah zarah can appear excessive, outdated, and irrelevant. It seems as though mankind has moved on, and the Torah’s hard-line anti-avodah zarah stance carries little to no meaning for most Jews today. 

The view of avodah zarah as irrelevant is incorrect. In this post I will present an overview of three fundamental premises about avodah zarah which, when considered together, demonstrate the central place that avodah zarah occupies in the Torah regimen. 

Fundamental Premise #1: Opposition to Avodah Zarah as the Essence of Torah 

There are 613 mitzvos. According to the Rambam, 51 of these mitzvos are thematically related to avodah zarah, the laws of which he codifies in Hilchos Avodah Zarah. Of these 51, only around 20 of them are practically relevant to most Jews today – and that’s a generous estimate. 

One might infer from the above that avodah zarah is merely an aspect or a component of Torah. This is inaccurate. In truth, the essential mission of the entire Torah is to uproot avodah zarah. There are many sources which express this concept. Here are a few: 

• Chazal [1] teach “anyone who believes [2] in avodah zarah is like one who denies the entire Torah, and anyone who denies avodah zarah is like one who believes in the entire Torah.” [3]
• Similarly, Chazal [4] say that “one who denies avodah zarah is called a Jew (Yehudi).” 
• The Rambam [5] states: “the purpose of the entire Torah and the center around which everything revolves is the removal and annihilation of every trace of avodah zarah.” 
• The Sefer ha’Chinuch [6] refers to the belief in Hashem’s existence as “the foundation of the religion,” but identifies avodah zarah as “the root of the entire Torah upon which all else depends.” 
• The Ramban [7] also calls avodah zarah “the root of all mitzvos.” 
• Halachically, a Jew who worships avodah zarah has the halachic status of non-Jew with regards to all matters. Likewise, a Jew who is an apostate to avodah zarah is considered to be an apostate to the entire Torah. [8]

It is clear from these statements that avodah zarah is not simply a part of Torah. Rather, opposition to avodah zarah is the essence of Torah. Thus, to say that avodah zarah is no longer relevant to our lives would be to say that the Torah, itself, has lost its relevance. 

Moreover, we see from here that in order to understand the centrality of avodah zarah, we must expand our definition of avodah zarah to encompass more than the limited set of halachically proscribed behaviors. This leads us to the second fundamental premise. 

Fundamental Premise #2: Philosophical vs. Halachic Avodah Zarah 

When Chazal and the Rishonim say that the Torah’s essential mission is to uproot avodah zarah, their comments not limited to the specific set of actions and beliefs halachically proscribed by the 51 mitzvos mentioned above, such as bowing down to idols, making offerings to other gods, believing in and worshipping other deities, etc. 

This brings us to the distinction between halachic avodah zarah and philosophical avodah zarah. Halachic avodah zarah refers to those acts which are legally prohibited within the technical parameters of the halachic system. In contrast, philosophical avodah zarah refers to any act which derives from the thoughts, feelings, and general worldview of avodah zarah. 

The easiest way to grasp this distinction is to consider cases which would not constitute halachic avodah zarah, but would still be considered philosophical avodah zarah. For instance, a person who passes all of his children through the ritual Molech-fire is not liable for violating the Torah’s prohibition of worshipping Molech. Why not? Because halachic avodah zarah is only prohibited if it was done b’derech avodasah (in the customary manner). For this reason a person is only halachically culpable for worshipping Molech if he passes some of his children through the ritual fire, since that is how Molech was customarily worshipped; passing all of one’s children through the fire was not a sanctioned practice in the cult of Molech, and would therefore not be prohibited according to Torah law. But is such a person culpable for philosophical avodah zarah? Absolutely! To believe in – and certainly to worship – any god other than Hashem constitutes philosophical avodah zarah, even if the worshipper’s actions would not qualify as halachic avodah zarah due to a technicality. 

Another example is Christianity. Some Rishonim, such as the Rambam [9], unequivocally maintain that Christianity is halachically avodah zarah on account of the doctrine of the Trinity. The god Christians worship is a triune deity, and is therefore not a legitimate form of monotheism – unlike Islam. Others, such as the Baalei Tosafos [10], classify the doctrine of the Trinity as shituf (“co-sovereignty”), which they maintain is not halachically prohibited for non-Jews. For this reason, the Baalei Tosafos hold that we do not treat Christians as idolaters. Nevertheless, despite this halachic disagreement, both the Rambam and the Baalei Tosafos would agree that the Christian worship of the Trinity constitutes philosophical avodah zarah, since they are worshipping a god other than Hashem. 

How is the distinction between halachic and philosophical avodah zarah relevant to our discussion? Because whereas halachic avodah zarah is confined to the 51 mitzvos in Hilchos Avodah Zarah and their technical laws, philosophical avodah zarah plays a role in a far broader range of mitzvos. For example: 

• Thematically and halachically, Shabbos is the antithesis of avodah zarah, as I wrote about in my article Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah. 
• Yetzias Miztrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) was orchestrated as a polemic against the avodah zarah of Egypt, as I wrote about in my article Chametz – Why So Serious? Thus, every holiday which commemorates an aspect of Yetzias Mitzrayim and every mitzvah which reminds us of Yetzias Mitzrayim is, by extension, related to avodah zarah. 
• According to the Rambam [11], the entire avodah (divine service) in the Mikdash (Temple) was designed to uproot avodah zarah. 
• There are numerous chukim (mitzvos whose reasons are not obvious) which the commentators explain to be aimed at uprooting specific avodah zarah beliefs and practices. These include mitzvos pertaining to kashrus, arayos (prohibited sexual relations), kilayim (prohibited mixtures), and more. 

The more one delves into the taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons or objectives of the commandments), the more one comes to realize the truth of the Ramban’s assertion that “avodah zarah is the root of all mitzvos” – but only if we understand this to be referring to philosophical avodah zarah, rather than halachic avodah zarah. 

And this is especially true in light of our third fundamental premise. 

Fundamental Premise #3: The Derech Avodah Zarah 

Avodah zarah has no basis in reality – that is, in the objective external world. Rather, it stems from the subjective internal world of the psyche. There are certain internal trends (instincts, feelings, beliefs, habits, urges, insecurities, neuroses) which give rise to both philosophical and halachic avodah zarah. These internal psychological trends may be characterized as the derech avodah zarah (literally, “the way of idolatry” or “idolatrous psychological tendencies”). 

For example, to attribute supernatural powers to a physical object is derech avodah zarah, even if one recognizes that such a belief is irrational and doesn’t act on it. To be frightened of the number 13 is derech avodah zarah, even if a person doesn’t change his or her decisions in order to avoid this “unlucky” number and knows that numbers can’t cause any harm. According to the Rambam, who maintains that all forms of magic, sorcery, and occult practices are false and ineffective, it would be the derech avodah zarah to believe that they are real, even if one doesn’t actually engage in such practices. 

One of my rabbeim described such superstitious thoughts and feelings as “the soil in which avodah zarah grows.” My Rosh ha’Yeshiva defined the derech avodah zarah as the tendency to “treat the products of the psyche as a reality.” In addition to eliminating halachic and philosophical avodah zarah, the Torah also endeavors to curb, uproot, and sublimate the derech avodah zarah. According to both the Rambam [12] and the Ramban [13], we are enjoined by Hashem to strive for this ideal in the statement: “tamim tihiyeh im Hashem Elokechah (you shall be whole with Hashem, your God)” (Devarim 18:13). This is a tall order – one which was asked of no less than Avraham Avinu: “He said to him, ‘I am E-l Sha-dai. Walk before Me and be whole” (Bereishis 17:1). The path to this state of temimus lifei Hashem (wholeness before Hashem) truly encompasses the entire Torah, with all of its mitzvos and teachings. 

It is for this reason that caution is needed with regards to the derech avodah zarah. Halachic avodah zarah is prohibited across the board. Philosophical avodah zarah is opposed in other ways. But the derech avodah zarah is so deeply rooted that it is not always addressed. Indeed, sometimes Chazal even sanctioned practices which are rooted in the derech avodah zarah. 

An example of this is given by the Meiri [14] in his explanation of Chazal’s treatment of zugos (literally “pairs”). In the olden days, people harbored superstitious feelings about doing things in “pairs.” This posed an obstacle to the mitzvah of the Four Cups on Pesach, since we drink the wine in pairs. The Gemara in Pesachim gives various reasons as to why drinking a pair of pairs of cups on Pesach will not result in harm (e.g. Pesach is described as “a night of guarding” in that it is guarded from harmful spirits; the fact that these cups have blessings recited over them negates the harm). The problem with these answers is that Chazal seem to be endorsing the derech avodah zarah! The Meiri answers this problem by explaining why they did this: 

In many places we have explained that in those days the people were drawn after folk superstitions, such as incantations and omens and folk practices. Anything which did not contain a habit of avodah zarah and darchei ha’Emori (“ways of the Amorites” – idolatrous customs which are prohibited by Torah), [the Sages] did not bother to uproot. Even more so regarding those matters which were accustomed to them. 

In other words, if a particular practice constituted actual avodah zarah, Chazal would have stopped it. But if people harbored superstitious feelings about something which was not actually avodah zarah, not only did Chazal refrain from uprooting them, but they even “catered” to them by providing explanations which indirectly validated the erroneous premises of these derech avodah zarah feelings. 

Nevertheless, one who seeks to attain the level of tamim tihiyeh will strive to understand the origins of avodah zarah within the human psyche, to develop a sensitivity to the derech avodah zarah in themselves, and to strive to counteract those derech avodah trends. 

Conclusion 

In light of these three premises we can see that the warnings about avodah zarah given by Moshe Rabbeinu before his death are relevant today just as they were 3,300 years ago. Avodah zarah is not an antiquated component of Torah, but its very foundation. Halachic avodah zarah may be limited in its scope, especially in a post-pagan era, but philosophical avodah zarah is alive and well. Overt acts of avodah zarah may be avoidable, but the derech avodah zarah is insidious, and continuous to plague us despite our sophistication. 

End Notes

[1] Sifre Devarim 11:28

[2] lit. “admits to” or “acknowledges [the validity of]” or “upholds.” 

[3] This statement is codified by the Rambam in Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:4 

[4] Talmud Bavli Maseches Megilah 13a 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:37 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch Mitzvah #26 

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Devarim 4:3 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:5 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avodah Zarah 1:3; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 9:4; Sefer Kedushah, Hilchos Maachalos Assuros 11:7 

[10] see Tosafos Sanhedrin 63b and Bechoros 2b; full disclosure – I have not learned Tosafos’s view firsthand. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:32 

[12] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:16 

[13] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Devarim 18:13 and Bereishis 17:1 

[14] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Beis ha’Bechirah Pesachim 109b

The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 2 of 2)

This is a sequel to The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 1 of 2). I'm going to pick up right where I left off, without reviewing the facts or the questions.

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The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood? (Part 2 of 2)

Three Disclaimers

Disclaimer #1: I realize now that I really should have written two other posts before tackling this "The Month of Av: Unlucky or Misunderstood?" series, in order to establish certain premises in a more efficient manner. As it stands, I'm too deep into the writing trenches now, so I'll just have to incorporate all of the ideas into this one post. As a result, my explanation is going to be a bit more round-about than my usual style, but I promise it'll come together at the end. 

Disclaimer #2: For the time being, I'm going to ignore the question about the "good mazal" during the month of Adar and focus exclusively on the "bad mazal" during the month of Av. If I succeed in clearly presenting my idea about Av, then you'll see what direction I would take in addressing the question about Adar. I just don't have it clear enough yet to write out. Maybe I'll take it up at Rosh Chodesh Adar later this year.

Disclaimer #3: I said this in Part 1 but it bears repeating here: this article is intended to be theoretical - not normative. Consult your rabbi before making any changes to your halachic practice. 

Diminishing Rejoicing, Avoiding Court Cases, and Bad Mazal

Let's start with the question: What does the Gemara mean when it says that the month of Av has "bad mazal"? The Ritva raises an objection to the premise of this question from the Gemara in Shabbos 156a which states: "there is no mazal for Israel." This would appear to contradict our Gemara in Taanis 29b, which indicates that the mazal of Av is bad for the Jews and the mazal of Adar is good for the Jews. 

The Ritva offers two resolutions to this contradiction: 

Even though "there is no mazal for Israel," that [statement] is only true of other days, but during these two months there is mazal, for such was decreed upon us from Heaven. Moreover, it is possible that [the term] "mazal" [in our Gemara about Av and Adar] is only a reference to the [Divine] decree, which is called "mazal" in common parlance. 

Both of the Ritva's answers explain that the special mazal of Av and Adar have to do with the Divine decree: either the mazal of Israel changes during these months because of the decree, or the decree itself is being called "mazal." 

The Baalei Tosafos on our Gemara agree with the Ritva's approach. They explain:

Rav Pappa said: Therefore, a Jew who has a court case with a non-Jew should avoid it during the month of Av, because its mazal is bad - the meaning of this is what was stated above: "liability is scheduled (lit. "rolled") for the day of liability" (Taanis 29a).

The Gemara cited by Tosafos addresses the question of how we know that both Batei ha'Mikdash (Holy Temples) were destroyed on the same day. After establishing that the first Mikdash was destroyed on the 9th of Av, the Gemara says:

From where do we know that the Second [Temple was also destroyed on the 9th of Av]? It was taught in a braisa: "merit is scheduled for the day of merit, and liability is scheduled for the day of liability."

According to Tosafos, "the mazal of Av is bad" doesn't have anything to do with the month being "unlucky," as we explained earlier. Rather, it means that Hashem decreed that the destruction of the second Mikdash should be scheduled for "the day of liability," the same day that the first Mikdash was destroyed. Thus, the statement "the mazal of Av is bad" simply means "Av was divinely ordained as a period of time designated for punishment." 

The question is: Why? What is the purpose or advantage of "scheduling" Klal Yisrael's punishments for a specific time period? The answer lies in the Rambam's opening remarks in Hilchos Taaniyos:

1:1 - It is a positive mitzvah of the Torah to cry out and to sound the trumpets on every tzarah (catastrophe) that befalls the community, as it is stated, “[When you wage war in your land] against the afflicter who afflicts you, you shall sound the trumpets, [and you shall be remembered before Hashem, your God, and you shall be saved from your enemies]” (Bamidbar 10:9), meaning to say: anything that afflicts you - such as drought, epidemic, locusts, and the like - cry out on them and sound [the trumpets].  

1:2 - This principle is one of the darchei teshuvah (ways of repentance), that at a time of the onset of an affliction, and [people] cry out and sound the trumpets, everyone will know that it was because of their evil conduct that this bad occurrence befell them, as it is written, “Your iniquities have turned away these things [to you], and your sins have withheld good from you” (Yirmiyahu 5:25), and this will cause them to remove the affliction from upon them.  

1:3 - But if they do not cry out and do not sound the trumpets, but instead say, “This is a natural event which befell us, and this affliction is a chance occurrence” - behold, this is a derech achzarius (way of cruelty), and will cause them to cling to their evil conduct, and [this] affliction and others will increase. This is what is written in the Torah, “[And if, with this, you do not listen to Me,] and you walk with me with chance, then I will walk with you in the fury of chance, [and I will also chastise you, seven times for your sins]” (Vayikra 26:26-28), meaning to say, when I bring an affliction upon you to cause you to do teshuvah, if you say that it is chance, then I will increase upon you the fury of that “chance.”

Chazal teach us that five tragedies happened on Tishah b'Av: (1) it was decreed that the generation of the Exodus would die in the Wilderness for their role in the Sin of the Spies, (2) the first Mikdash was destroyed, (3) the second Mikdash was destroyed, (4) the city of Beitar was besieged, and the Bar Kochba revolt led to many Jewish deaths, and (5) Jerusalem was razed to the ground. 

Since then, other terrible events have occurred on Tishah b'Av: the expulsion of Jews from England in 1290; the start of World War I in 1914, which directly led to World War II; the commencement of the Nazi's "Final Solution" in 1941; the start of the mass deportation of the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto to Treblinka in 1942. If we take into consideration the entire month of Av, more tragedies can be added to the list: the beginning of the crusades on the 24th of Av in 1096; the expulsion of Jews from France on the 10th of Av in 1306; the expulsion of Jews from Spain on the 7th of Av in 1492; and more.

According to the Gemara cited by Tosafos, these misfortunes could have happened at different times of the year. However, if they did, it would be far easier for us to dismiss these catastrophes as "natural events" and "chance occurrences." Therefore, Hashem-Elokim - the One Who is merciful even when executing judgment - decreed that the month of Av should have "bad mazal." According to Tosafos, this means that He "scheduled liability for the day of liability," causing all of these tragedies to happen during the same time period. This is "merciful" because it makes it easier for us to recognize that these events were orchestrated by hashgachah (Divine providence), and this recognition will (ideally) motivate us to do national teshuvah, thereby ending our exile and our suffering.

This explanation sheds a new light on the obligation to "diminish rejoicing at the onset of Av." We are not obligated to diminish our rejoicing as an expression of natural mourning over the effects of these tragedies, but rather, this halacha aims to promote national bemoaning of the causes of those tragedies - namely, the "evil conduct which caused these events to befall us" - as a catalyst for national teshuvah. 

I believe this is where Rav Pappa's halacha comes in. The mishnah said that we should diminish rejoicing at the onset of Av, and Rav Pappa added: "therefore, a Jew who has a court appointment at a non-Jewish court should try to avoid it during the month of Av because it has a bad mazal (i.e. because Hashem scheduled our punishments for Av in order to awaken us to do teshuvah)." Why did he single out this specific activity of avoiding court appointments with non-Jews? Because avoiding court appointments with non-Jews frames our recognition of the month of Av as a time period in which the non-Jews have historically prevailed over the Jews, not because of nature or chance, but because of the midas ha'din shel ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu (the meting out of Divine Justice). 

In other words, without Rav Pappa's halacha, it would be easy for us to enter the month of Av and diminish our rejoicing purely as an expression of national mourning over the losses suffered by the Jewish people at the hands of non-Jews during this month throughout our history. But when Rav Pappa comes along and says, "How should we diminish our rejoicing? By avoiding court cases with non-Jews," he is framing our conception of the interaction between Jew and Gentile, Israel and the Nations of the World, not in terms of chance, not in terms of social or psychological dynamics, not in terms of geopolitical trends and world events, but in terms of midas ha'din. The focus on the theater of the beis din shel mata (earthly court) reminds us of the reality of the beis din shel maalah (heavenly court). Rav Pappa's institution underscores the fact that our fate as a nation is determined by our standing vis a vis God's justice, and our only salvation lies in teshuvah. 

According to this explanation, there is no reason to avoid other "risky" activities specifically during the month of Av. To the contrary - the effort to do so would detract from the framework set up by Rav Pappa's halacha, which highlights the theme of midas ha'din.

Ketev Meriri: the Scourge of the Three Weeks

We will now turn our attention to the second halacha we cited from the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 551, which cautions us during the Three Weeks not to walk alone between the 4th and 9th hours of the day, and not to strike talmidim, all on account of the "Ketev Meriri." 

There are three questions we must answer: (1) What is the Ketev Meriri? (2) Why does the dominance of the Ketev Meriri during this time period make these specific activities hazardous? (3) Why is the danger of the Ketev Meriri present or increased during the Three Weeks?

The term Ketev Meriri is from Haazinu (Devarim 32:24). Here it is in context:

Hashem will see and be provoked by the anger of His sons and daughters, and He will say: "I shall hide My face from them and see what their end will be - for they are a generation of reversals, children whose upbringing is not in them. They provoked Me with a non-god, angered Me with their vanities; so shall I provoke them with a non-people, with a vile nation shall I anger them. For fire will have been kindled in My nostrils and blazed to the lowest depths. It shall consume the earth and its produce, and set ablaze what is founded on mountains. I shall accumulate evils against them, My arrows shall I use up against them; bloating of famine, battles of Reshef, Ketev Meriri, and the teeth of beasts shall I dispatch against them, with the venom of those that creep upon the earth. On the outside, the sword will bereave, while indoors there will be dread - even a young man, even a virgin, a suckling with the gray-haired man."

The word "ketev" means "cutting," and it is clear from the context that "Ketev Meriri" refers to some harmful and destructive phenomenon, but that's about all that's clear. Since this is the only place in Tanach where this phrase appears, the meforshim (commentators) struggle to understand what it means. Some associate it with a pasuk in Tehilim, which is the only other place in Tanach which uses this form of the word "ketev": "You shall not fear the terror of night, nor the arrow that flies by day, nor the pestilence that walks in gloom, nor the ketev yashud tzaharayim (the destroyer who lays waste at noon)" (91:5-6), but there is no clear indication of what the meriri is, or how it "cuts." 

There are two places in the aggadic midrashim which expound on the Ketev Meriri at length. I'm going to cite both sources in their entirety before commenting on either of them, beginning with the Gemara in Pesachim 111b, which appears within the context of a larger discussion about sheidim (demons). Although I usually translate the Gemara myself, I decided to rely primarily on Artscroll this time, due to the obscure terminology:

"ketev meriri" - There are two ketev demons: one [that lurks] before noontime, and one [that lurks] after noontime. The name of the one that lurks before noontime is Ketev Meriri, and it appears, in a jug of kamcha (or "kutach"- a dipping sauce made of sour milk, moldy bread crusts, and salt), as a whirling mixing spoon. The name of the one [that lurks] after noontime is Ketev Yashud Tzaharaim, and it appears amidst the horns of goats as a whirling sieve.

Abaye was once going along and Rav Pappa went on his right side and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua on his left side. He saw a Ketev Meriri coming towards his left side. [Abaye] then switched Rav Pappa to his left side and Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua to his right side. Rav Pappa said to [Abaye], "Why am I different such that [you] do not concern yourself with me?" [Abaye] said to him, "For you, the times are propitious (Rashbam: you are wealthy and blessed with good fortune and will not be harmed by the demon)." 

From the time of the first of Tammuz until the 16th, [the ketev demons] are certainly prevalent. From then on, it is uncertain whether or not they are prevalent. And they are found in the shadows of a chatzuva (a type of grass) that did not grow a cubit, and in the shadows of the morning and evening that are not a cubit long. And [they are found] predominantly in the shadows of a lavatory.

The second extensive aggadic treatment is in Midrash Eichah Rabbah 1:29:

Another interpretation of "all her pursuers have overtaken her trapped between the metzarim" is "days of misfortune," which are between the 17th of Tammuz and the 9th of Av, for during that time Ketev Meriri is prevalent, as it is said: "[you shall not fear] the pestilence that goes forth in the dark, nor from the ketev which lays waste at noon." 

Rebbi Abba bar Kahana and Rebbi Levi [discussed ketev meriri]. Rebbi Abba bar Kahana said: "It cuts down (i.e. wreaks havoc) during the passage of the noontime hours, from the beginning of the 6th hour [of daylight] through the end of the 9th hour." Rebbi Levi said: "It cuts down during the passage of the daylight hours, from the end of the 4th hour to the beginning of the 9th hour." It does not travel in the sunlight, nor in the shade, but in the shade that is adjacent to the sunlight.

Rebbi Yochanan and Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish [also discussed ketev meriri]. Rebbi Yochanan said: "It is full of eyes, made up of layers upon layers, and hair upon hair." Rebbi Shimon ben Lakish said: "One eye is situated on its heart, and if anyone sees it, he dies."

Rebbi Abahu was sitting and teaching in a certain synagogue in his place in Caesarea. He saw a man holding a stick about to hit his fellow man. He saw a demon standing behind him, holding a metal rod. Rebbi Abahu rose up and screamed, saying to the man, "Why do you want to kill your fellow man?" [The man] asked, "With [a stick like] this someone can kill his fellow man?" [Rebbi Abahu explained:] "But there is a demon right behind you holding a metal rod. If you hit your fellow with this [stick,] he (i.e. the demon) will hit him (i.e. you) with that [rod] and he (i.e. you) will die.

Rebbi Yochanan used to demand that the Scripture teachers and Mishnah teachers not hold up the strap to the children [to punish them] during these days [when ketev meriri is rampant]. Rebbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini used to demand that the Scripture teachers and Mishnah teachers release the youngsters [from school] during the four hours [when the ketev is rampant]. 

Instead of veering off on a lengthy tangent about Judaism's view of demons, I'll just quote the Meiri's commentary on: “A fool will believe anything, but a clever person will understand every step” (Mishlei 14:15). The Meiri writes: 

A fool will believe everything he hears, whether it’s possible or impossible, probable or improbable. But a clever person – one who investigates with his own mind – will understand every step. For example, if he hears something, he will investigate it with his own mind to see whether it is possible or impossible, probable or improbable. The Sages of Musar said: “If the speaker is a fool, then the listener should be clever.” Even though this is common sense advice, nevertheless, it is befitting for every intelligent person to analyze with his mind which ideas are proper to believe in.

The Meiri then goes on to provide examples in matters of Torah and in matters science which we are obligated to investigate in this manner, and not just blindly accept. As one of his examples of "scientific matters which are not contingent on matters of [Torah] belief," the Meiri lists "the existence or non-existence of demons." In other words, there is no "theological obligation" to believe in demons. Rather, each person must "investigate [the subject] with his own mind to see whether it is possible or impossible, probable or improbable." Similarly, Rav Hirsch wrote in his Letters on Aggadah:

In my opinion, the first principle that every student of Chazal's statements must keep before his eyes is the following: Chazal were sages of God's law - the receivers, transmitters, and teachers of His toros, His mitzvos, and His interpersonal laws. They did not especially master the natural sciences, geometry, astronomy, or medicine - except insofar as they needed them for knowing, observing, and fulfilling the Torah. We do not find that this knowledge was transmitted to them from Sinai.

Nowadays too it is enough for the non-specialist to know about any of these areas of knowledge whatever contemporary experts teach that is generally accepted as true. This applies to the lawyer vis-à-vis all other areas, to the mathematician and the astronomer regarding the natural sciences, and to the expert on flora regarding all other areas. We expect none of them to seek out the truth and satisfy his inclinations in any field other than his own specialty.

Moreover, even in the area where one is an expert, it is neither possible for him nor expected of him to know everything through personal investigation and experience. Most of his knowledge rests upon the investigation of others. If they have erred it is not his fault. It is sufficient and praiseworthy if his knowledge encompasses all that is accepted as true at his time and place and generation. The greatness of his wisdom is in no way belittled if in a later generation it is discovered that some of the things he maintained or accepted on the authority of others are unreliable. The same is true for Chazal in these areas. The greatest of them knew all the wisdom and science of all the great non-Jewish scholars whose wisdom and teachings became famous in their generations.

Having said that, there are three ways to understand these aggadic statements about the Ketev Meriri:

Approach #1: These statements of the Sages indicate their belief that the Ketev Meriri was a real physical threat, and they were correct. 

Approach #2: These statements of the Sages indicate their belief that the Ketev Meriri was a real physical threat, but we now know that they were incorrect.

Approach #3: These statements of the Sages were intended to be taken allegorically, and were written to teach us lessons in ethics, philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, etc.; they were never intended by their authors to be taken literally, as statements of scientific fact about a physical threat.

In my opinion, Approach #3 is the least likely. I have yet to see any meforshim who explain the Ketev references in Haazinu or Tehilim 91 allegorically, and I think it would be difficult to take most of the aggadic explanations of the Ketev Meriri in Pesachim and Midrash Eichah as metaphors. The fact that the Shulchan Aruch and Rema codify these precautionary measures as halacha show that they certainly didn't take these statements allegorically.

Approach #1 is also unlikely, but is more plausible than Approach #3. Don't worry: I don't think there's any basis for worrying about a demon "filled with eyes" who will kill you if you look at the eye in its heart, nor do I think there is a single scientist who believes that whirling spoon demons can be seen in sour dipping sauce or whirling sieve demons appear between goat horns.

However, there are grounds for saying that a person should take certain precautions when walking outside during the Three Weeks between the 4th and 9th hours. After all, these are the hottest days of the year, and the hottest times of day. Lest you think I'm being facetious, a number of Rishonim take this approach in their commentary on the reference to Ketev Meriri in Haazinu. The Ibn Ezra explains that Ketev Meriri refers to the damage caused "by the bitterness of the air." Ibn Caspi says that it refers to the severe sickness that comes about on account of "the unusually excessive heat that occurs during the summer days." The Ralbag provides a lengthy meteorological account of Ketev Meriri - one which I can't even claim to translate accurately. He says something about how "meriri" refers to "the lethal air that sometimes comes up from the earth at times of extreme heat." He theorizes how this air is a product of "the heat of the sun and stars combined with the phenomena in the belly of the earth which cause this harmful vapor to ascend." He also repeatedly mentions something about "putrefaction" or "mustiness," but I couldn't follow what he was saying.

Whether or not these proto-scientific explanations of Ketev Meriri are any more accurate than the belief in a literal havoc-wreaking demon, one thing is clear: these Rishonim understood the Ketev Meriri to be a reference to a natural, physical, environmental phenomenon, rather than as a spiritual force or supernatural creature (as most people think of when they hear the word "demon"). Moreover, they had no qualms about rejecting the validity of the Sages' descriptions provided in the aggadic midrashim cited above. One might argue that they weren't rejecting these statements, but merely interpreting them non-literally. Personally, I doubt it. It's a stretch to read those vivid and specific statements as referring to "hot air" or "musty vapor."

To my mind, Approach #2 is the most reasonable of the three. The Sages believed in the physical threat of something they called Ketev Meriri, which they associated with the references in Haazinu and Tehilim 91. Whether they thought it was a spiritual entity or a meteorological phenomenon, they genuinely believed that it could cause harm. They also thought that they had enough of an understanding of the nature of this threat to be able to lay down guidelines for how to avoid this harm. But they were wrong. After all, the Meiri said that we must investigate the question of whether such demons exist and reach our conclusions based on our own understanding. As far as I know, there is no scientific basis for believing in the reality of anything matching the Sages' detailed description of Ketev Meriri today. And, as Rav Hirsch said, this is not an indictment of the Sages' authority or intelligence. They were merely relying on the information that was available to them at the time, just as contemporary rabbis rely on the scientific data available to them today, even though today's science might be regarded as laughably false tomorrow.

Whichever of the three approaches you take, one thing is abundantly clear, and was the most shocking of my findings: the threat of Ketev Meriri has absolutely nothing to do with Tishah b'Av and the Three Weeks! The Gemara in Pesachim says that the threat of the Ketev Meriri is specifically during the first sixteen days of Tammuz, and it is uncertain whether we need to take precautions against the Ketev Meriri during the time period from the 17th of Tammuz until the 9th of Av. There is nothing in that Gemara or Midrash Eichah which makes reference to anything having to do with Tishah b'Av, Three Weeks, the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash, the prophecies of Yirmiyahu, or even the halachos of mourning and diminishing our rejoicing. The sole exception to this trend is the phrase "bein ha'metzarim," which is likely just a textual hook in the Midrash. Certainly the Rishonim who understood Ketev Meriri to be an environmental threat that is common during the hottest days of the year would not tie their explanations to the halachic institutions of the Three Weeks and Tishah b'Av. They would caution all people, Jews and non-Jews, to take these precautions against the Ketev Meriri, even before Tishah b'Av was instituted as a halacha. Likewise, they would tell people who live in colder climates not to worry at all about these guidelines.

Another thing is clear: according to the Gemara in Pesachim and Midrash Eichah, no matter which of the three approaches you take, there is no reason to avoid other "risky" behaviors. The Ketev Meriri works in very specific ways. The Sages even go so far as to identify the specific types of shrubbery and shadows in which the Ketev Meriri can be found. There is simply no basis in this original source material for claiming that other dangerous activities should be avoided - except, perhaps, other outdoor activities which might put you at risk for heat exhaustion or dehydration.

Conclusion

We initially set out to answer the question: Is there a basis for the widespread practice to avoid risky endeavors during the Nine Days or the Three Weeks, out of precaution?  The answer to this question is a resounding and unequivocal: NO!

Our findings may be summarized as follows:

At the onset of Av we diminish rejoicing, and the specific activity we avoid is scheduling court appointments with non-Jews. According to our explanation, this reinforces the proper teshuvah-framework (midas ha'din) for reflecting on the causes of the national tragedies which were scheduled to befall us during the month of Av.

Between the 17th of Tammuz and the 9th of Av, we refrain from walking alone outdoors between the halachic hours of 4 and 9, and we also avoid striking students - not because of anything having to do with the Three Weeks, the Nine Days, and Tishah b'Av, but because of the threat of the Ketev Meriri - a physical threat that is either real but limited to very specific parameters, or is not real at all.

Although I have stated in my disclaimer that this post is not intended to be normative, I can tell you that if you are the type of person who determines your halachic practice based on the rulings of the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, then feel free to schedule your wisdom-teeth surgery during this time period without worrying about increasing your risk for harm. There's no need to further diminish your joy on account of baseless fear. 

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

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Artwork: The Mirari Conjecture, by James Arnold

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

Some of my students decided to start learning Mishlei on their own this summer. They recently contacted me and asked for my assistance in learning the pasuk: "Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" (Mishlei 3:19). They said that they had made some headway, but the ideas they came up with "didn't feel like Mishlei ideas."

I responded by affirming their observation: yes, the main idea of Mishlei 3:19 doesn't feel like a Mishlei idea, nor should it. Why not? Because this pasuk is from the first nine chapters of Mishlei, which serve a different purpose and are written in a different style than "regular Mishlei."

I wrote about this in my How to Learn Mishlei: A Step-by-step Guide. Chapters 1-9 constitute Shlomo ha'Melech's introductory discourse. The pesukim in chapters 1-9 were written to be learned paragraph by paragraph, sequentially. In contrast, the pesukim in chapters 10-29 are "standalone proverbs" which can be learned in any order, without any regard to their context within the sefer.

For this reason, I urge newer Mishlei students to skip chapters 1-9 and begin with chapters 10-29. These pesukim are easier to learn because they can be analyzed on their own. Moreover, it is also easier to approach chapters 1-9 after building up a basic "Mishleic intuition" from "standard Mishlei" pesukim, which will serve as a guide through the introductory material.

Although I usually write about standalone pesukim from chapters 10-29, I decided to switch it up for this week's Mishlei post and write about the pasuk that my students are learning, in order to illustrate just how different these introductory chapters can be.

The first step is to figure out the unit of which Mishlei 3:19 is a part. It's clearly not related to the pesukim before it, since that unit ends with the paragraph break at 3:18. It's also clear that 3:19 is connected to 3:20 at the very least, and the use of the pronoun "them" in 3:21 suggests that 3:19-20 is connected to 3:21-26. The pesukim after 26 seem to be their own thing.

Thus, the cluster of pesukim we'll be working with is this:

משלי ג:יט-כו

(יט) יְיָ בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד אָרֶץ כּוֹנֵן שָׁמַיִם בִּתְבוּנָה: (כ) בְּדַעְתּוֹ תְּהוֹמוֹת נִבְקָעוּ וּשְׁחָקִים יִרְעֲפוּ טָל: (כא) בְּנִי אַל יָלֻזוּ מֵעֵינֶיךָ נְצֹר תֻּשִׁיָּה וּמְזִמָּה: (כב) וְיִהְיוּ חַיִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ וְחֵן לְגַרְגְּרֹתֶיךָ: (כג) אָז תֵּלֵךְ לָבֶטַח דַּרְכֶּךָ וְרַגְלְךָ לֹא תִגּוֹף: (כד) אִם תִּשְׁכַּב לֹא תִפְחָד וְשָׁכַבְתָּ וְעָרְבָה שְׁנָתֶךָ: (כה) אַל תִּירָא מִפַּחַד פִּתְאֹם וּמִשֹּׁאַת רְשָׁעִים כִּי תָבֹא: (כו) כִּי יְיָ יִהְיֶה בְכִסְלֶךָ וְשָׁמַר רַגְלְךָ מִלָּכֶד:

Mishlei 3:19-26

(19) Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding. (20) With His knowledge the depths were cleaved, and the heavens drip dew. (21) My son – do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought, (22) and they will be life for your soul, and a graceful [ornament] for your neck. (23) Then you will walk securely on your path, and your foot will not falter. (24) When you lie down, you will not be afraid; you will lie down your sleep will be sweet. (25) Do not be afraid of sudden terror, nor the darkness of the wicked when it comes, (26) for Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement.

When learning "standard Mishlei" pesukim from chapters 10-29, we try to ask all the questions we can. If we did that on this paragraph, we'd easily be overwhelmed. Instead, it is advisable to focus on getting the main idea of the paragraph as a whole - much like we do in our approach to Sefer Tehilim - and then examine the details in light of that main idea.

The major questions on this paragraph as a whole are:

(1) What are the first two pesukim saying? This certainly doesn't seem to be a practical decision-making idea, since it's about Hashem's creation of the world. These pesukim seem to be more appropriate for Tehilim or Bereishis than Mishlei!

(2) What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? I am assuming that there is a connection because of how 21 begins: "Do not let them deviate from your eyes" - with the "them" referring to the chochmah, tevunah, and daas mentioned in 19-20.

(3) How do all of the benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21? In other words, how do these effects (i.e. "they will be life for your soul ... and He will guard your foot from ensnarement") result from these causes ("do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought")?

Before we move on to the main idea, I just want to underscore how different these questions are from the kinds of questions we normally ask. For example, if we approached pesukim 22-26 as we would approach "regular Mishlei" (i.e. chapters 10-29), then we'd focus on all of the specifics - but since our pesukim come from Chapters 1-9, we need to prioritize the main idea over the details. 

It's not always clear which questions are major and which are minor. For example, one could expand on Question #1 by asking: "What are the definitions of chochmah (wisdom), tevunah (understanding), and daas (knowledge)?" or "Why is chochmah associated to Hashem's founding of the earth, tevunah to His establishing the heavens, and daas to His causing them to drip with dew?" An argument could be made that these are major questions which are critical for understanding the main idea. However, my intuition tells me that these questions are minor. Pesukim 19-20 are basically saying "Hashem created the universe with knowledge," and the terms used are synonyms.

[Okay - now it's time to think! Continue reading when you're ready.]

Due to the difference in style between "regular Mishlei" and the introductory chapters, I think it's best if I answer each of the three questions individually, and then summarize the main idea in 1-4 sentences - much like I do in my posts on Tehilim.

Answer to Question #1: What are the first two pesukim saying? 

The Meiri [1] offers several explanations of these two pesukim, but his final explanation appeals to me the most:

There are those who explain that the phrase "with chochmah" here refers to the [design of the] earth, meaning to say that He created it in accordance with chochmah - that is, with [laws of] nature that do not deviate from their creation, and which are responsible for the establishment and continued existence of the earth, [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the orders of the moon and stars which provide light at night, etc.

Turns out that the Meiri was quoting the Sefer Chukah, [2] whose explanation is spelled out a bit more:

"Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" [means] that from the day He created them, they do not deviate from their ways, nor does any part of His design deteriorate, such that he would need to fix it - unlike human beings, who build a building, only to have it deteriorate years later and be in need of repair. The Creator (blessed is He) created all of His works with wisdom, and firmly established the earth through nature and [laws of] cause-and-effect - [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the order of the moon and the stars to provide light at night - and each and every one of them stands at its post and performs His commands. 

In other words, these two pesukim convey the idea that Hashem created the world and endowed it with lawful principles of cause and effect, which are consistent, perfect, and harmonious in their preservation of the universe, obedient to the will of the Creator. The terms chochmah, tevunah, and daas here all refer to the quality of intelligent lawfulness that is manifest everywhere in the universe. 

Answer to Question #2: What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? 

Mishlei's premise, as stated in Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei, is that man is unique on account of his tzelem Elokim (i.e. truth-seeking intellect), which allows him to comprehend abstract knowledge, and to make decisions based on long-term benefits and consequences. 

In light of this premise, and the premise stated in 19-20 that the universe operates by natural cause-and-effect, it follows that man should utilize his intellect to understand the lawfulness of the world around him, in order to align himself with it to the best of his ability to maximize long-term pleasure and minimize long-term pain (again, as Saadia Gaon wrote in his Introduction to Mishlei). 

This manifests itself in two ways: "guard[ing] wisdom," which refers to avoiding actions and decisions which lead to harmful consequences, and "strategic thought," which refers to using knowledge of the laws of nature to bring about benefits that one wouldn't have otherwise received. But these two things will only be possible if he exercises Mishleic vigilance, "not letting [wisdom, understanding, and knowledge] deviate from his eyes." 

This might also be why the emphasis is on the "eyes": it's not enough to know, in abstract, that the universe operates by lawful cause and effect; you need to be able to see opportunities to implement Mishleic thinking in the sensory particulars of everyday life. 

Answer to Question #3: How do all of the wonderful benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21?

These pesukim are a breakdown of the two general categories mentioned in the previous pasuk (i.e. "guarding wisdom and strategic design"). I don't know whether this is a comprehensive list or just a series of particular examples. Here's what my intuition tells me about each item on the list:

"they will be life for your soul" - If "soul" means your physical life, then this is a reference to all the ways that Mishlei literally prolongs your life by helping you make intelligent decisions to improve your physical health and to deter you from taking unwarranted risks and engaging in unhealthy practices or behavior. If "soul" means your mind, then this is referring to the enjoyment of Mishleic thinking, which will become the central pleasure of your life. (Judging by the rest of the list, I'd say that the first explanation is the correct one.) 

"and a graceful [ornament] for your neck" - If I recall correctly, "neck" in Mishlei refers to your larynx (a.k.a. vocal cords). [3] Mishlei will change the way you speak, the contents of your speech, and when you exercise your speech - all in a manner which will give you the quality of "grace" (i.e. people will naturally be drawn to you because of the benefits and pleasantness they derive from the effects of Mishlei on your personality, and the beneficial results of Mishlei in your life [4]). 

"you will walk securely on your path" - I think "your path" refers to the general direction you take in life (i.e. the goals you pursue), which will be "secured" by your intelligent decision-making. 

"your foot will not falter" - I doubt this means that you won't make mistakes, since that would be humanly impossible. Rather, I think it means that even when you do make mistakes, you will learn from them and benefit from the insight you gain. Thus, in the long run, even your mistakes will enhance the quality of your life. Either that, or it just means that you will make fewer mistakes than a person who doesn't learn Mishlei. 

"if you lie down, you will not be afraid" - As a student of Mishlei, you will have a healthy recognition and acceptance of what is in your control and what is not in your control; you will take all of the precautions to protect yourself from threats that are within your control, and you will accept that whatever is out of your control is out of your control, to the extent that when you go to sleep (i.e. a state of complete lack of control, and therefore, complete vulnerability), you will still feel secure that you have done everything in your ability to protect yourself from harm.

"when you lie down and your sleep will be sweet" - This physical security will also lead to an emotionally secure state of mind, which will enable you to have a restful sleep, free from those late-night bouts of stress, fear, and anxiety about the worries of the day. 

"do not be afraid of sudden terror, and the darkness of the wicked when it comes" - Even when unexpected catastrophes happen, whether natural ("sudden terror," such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.) or brought about by human beings ("darkness of the wicked," such as assaults, robbery, war, the Holocaust, etc.), you need not be afraid; as a student of Mishlei, you will use the same decision-making approach in these situations as you would under normal conditions, and will be sure to achieve the best results that are in your control to achieve. 

"Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement" - I believe that this pasuk is framed in terms of Hashem in order to chiastically conclude this cluster of pesukim as it began. How does one take security in Hashem? By aligning oneself with Hashem's chochmah, tevunah, and daas which constitute the fabric of His universe. To the extent that you trust in His will, as manifest in the laws of nature, you will feel secure, and not become ensnared in the consequences of bad decisions, or in the stress and anxiety that results from non-Mishleic thinking.

Having said all of that, here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

The basis of Mishleic security in Hashem is the recognition that He created the universe in accordance with laws of cause and effect – laws which are universal, consistent, and rational (i.e. they can be known and understood by human beings). The Mishlei student’s trust in Hashem is based on the reliability of His will as manifest in these laws of nature. By using wisdom and strategic thinking to align himself with these natural laws, thinking and speaking about them constantly and harnessing them to his advantage, he will achieve both physical and emotional security – physical security from making the best decisions within the realm of his control based on the best of his knowledge, and emotional security derived from his trust in Hashem’s will, and from his knowledge that he has done everything in his power to make the best decision he can. And even when he makes a mistake, which will inevitably happen, he will learn from it, and use the insights he gained to improve his decision-making in the future.

There you have it. See how different this feels from a "regular Mishlei" idea? It's far more general and less focused on particular practical decision-making strategies. I also hope you can see what I meant when I said that I encourage students not to learn these introductory chapters until after they've developed their Mishleic intuition by learning chapters 10-29 for a while.

[1] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 3:19

[2] Rabbeinu Yosef Kimchi, Sefer Chukah on Mishlei 3:19

[3] see, for example, Rabbeinu Yonah on Mishlei 1:9

[4] I heard a great example of this yesterday from my Mishlei rebbi, who recently spent nearly an entire week in the hospital. He told me that many nurses and doctors came up to him and told him that he is the best and most pleasant patient they've ever had. My Mishlei rebbi attributed this to the effects of Mishlei on his personality, which we spent a while discussing and analyzing.

Parashas Shoftim: How to Say Tehilim for the Sick Without Violating Halacha

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Artwork: Devout Invocation, by David Palumbo
(Note: If this is what you think you're doing when you say Tehilm, then you're doing it wrong.)

Parashas Shoftim: How to Tehilim for the Sick Without Violating Halacha

Preface

Broadly speaking, there are two ways to say Tehilim (Psalms) for the sick: one which is halachically permitted and in line with Hashem's will, and the other which is halachically prohibited and is considered by Hashem to be an "abomination."

In Parashas Shoftim Moshe Rabbeinu warns Bnei Yisrael:

When you come to the Land that Hashem, your God, gives you, you shall not learn to act according to the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found among you one who causes his son or daughter to pass through the fire, a kosem kesamim (diviner), a meonein (astrologer), a menachesh (omen-reader), a mechashef (sorcerer), a chover chaver (one who recites incantations), one who inquires of Ov or Yidoni, or one who consults the dead. For anyone who does these is an abomination of Hashem, and because of these abominations Hashem, your God, banishes [the nations] from before you. You shall be whole with Hashem, your God. For these nations that you are possessing - they hearken to astrologers and diviners; but as for you - not so has Hashem, your God, given for you. (Devarim 18:9-14)

The Torah prohibition we will be discussing is chover chaver with a focus on its application to reciting Tehilim for the sick. In Part I we will examine the Sefer ha'Chinuch's treatment of the topic. In Part II we will summarize the various halacha l'maaseh (practical halacha) views.

Part I: Sefer ha'Chinuch on Chover Chaver

The Sefer ha'Chinuch [1] defines chover chaver as follows:

We are prohibited from making incantations about any matter. By this we are referring to a person who will recite words and tell people that those words cause benefit or harm in a certain matter. About this it is stated, “There shall not be found among you … a speaker of incantations” (Devarim 18:10-11). The Sifri says: “whether one charms a snake or a scorpion,” meaning to say, one who recites words upon them so that they will not bite him – according to his view. So too, if one recites words over an affliction in order to gain relief from the pain, etc.

According to this definition it would seem that if a person recites Tehilim and believes that the words themselves will have a beneficial effect on a choleh (sick person), then this would be a violation of chover chaver. 

The Sefer ha'Chinuch anticipates this question and addresses it head-on by citing a Gemara which ostensibly endorses the practice of reciting Tehilim in order to save a person from harm:

Now perhaps, my son, you will pose a question to me from what we read in the second chapter of the Talmud tractate Shevuos (15b): 

"The psalm against afflictions is with lutes and harps; and one says, 'He who dwells in the shelter of the Most High,' until 'For You, Hashem, are my refuge' (Tehilim 91); then he says, 'Hashem, how many are my foes,' until 'Salvation belongs to Hashem' (ibid. 3)." 

In other words, [the Talmud seems to indicate that] the recitation of these psalms works to provide protection from harm. And it was stated in the tractate Berachos (3a): "R. Yehoshua ben Levi would say these verses before going to bed [to protect himself from harm]."

The Sefer ha'Chinuch answers this difficulty by making a distinction. In doing so, he instructs us in how to say Tehilim in a manner which has a beneficial effect on our physical well-being without straying into chover chaver territory:

However, this matter is not similar to the matter of chover chaver that we mentioned, God forbid! Long ago, the Sages of blessed memory said in this regard (Shevuos 15b): "It is forbidden to heal oneself with words of Torah." Yet they mentioned to say these psalms since they contain words that inspire the soul that knows them to shelter in Hashem, to take security in Him, to establish a reverent fear of Him firmly in his heart, and to rely on His kindness and goodness. As a result of this inspiration, he will be protected from every harm, without a doubt. 

Therein lies the answer. If a person says Tehilim, believing that the words themselves will have a beneficial effect on the physical world, then - according to the Sefer ha'Chinuch - he or she has violated the Torah prohibition of chover chaver, and is considered on the basis of that act to be an abomination to Hashem, as the Torah unequivocally states: "for anyone who does these is an abomination of Hashem." However, if a person recites Tehilim, understands the meaning of what he is saying, and is inspired to trust, fear, and rely on Hashem, then he will not be in violation of halacha, and he will be protected from all harm.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch reinforces this distinction by quoting the Gemara's formulation of this same question, and the answer given there, which he explains in accordance with his view:

This is what was answered in the Talmud in this regard, for it was asked there: "But how could R. Yehoshua do this (i.e. recite these chapters of psalms against afflictions) when R. Yehoshua, himself, said it is forbidden to heal oneself with words of Torah?!" and the reply was given: "to protect is different." In other words, the Torah did not forbid a person to say words of Torah so as to inspire his soul in a good direction, so that this merit should shield him to protect him [but rather, the Torah only prohibited the recitation of words of Torah in order to heal].

The Rambam [2] codifies this distinction as halacha:

One who recites an incantation over a bodily affliction and reads a verse from the Torah, and likewise one who reads [Torah] over an infant so that he not be frightened, and one who places a Torah Scroll or tefilin on a child so that he will sleep – it is not enough that such people are included among the chovrim (incantation-sayers) and menachashim (omen-readers), but they [are also] included among the kofrim ba’Torah (the deniers of Torah), for they utilize words of Torah as remedies for the body, whereas they are truly only remedies for the soul, as it is stated, “[the words of Torah] shall be life for your soul” (Mishlei 3:22). But if a healthy person reads Scriptural verses and chapters from Tehilim so that the merit of their reading will protect him and save him from suffering and harm, this is permissible. 

It is reasonable to assume that the permissible type of Tehilim reading ("so that the merit of their reading will protect him") qualifies as using words of Torah as "remedies for the soul," as described by the Sefer ha'Chinuch. In other words, if a person reads Tehilim with the intention of "inspiring his soul in a good direction" and making an effort to internalize what he reads, then this will bring him merit, and save him from suffering and harm. 

Part II: Practical Halacha

While it is usually the policy of this blog to stay away from commenting on matters of halacha l'maaseh, I fear that some will read this post and feel at a loss about whether their own way of saying Tehilim constitutes a violation of halacha. They would then either cease saying Tehilim altogether, which would be detrimental insofar as this would deprive them of a means of connecting to Hashem, or else they would continue saying Tehilim, thereby running the risk of violating a Torah prohibition.

Thankfully, I found a tshuvah (responsa) by the Tzitz Eliezer [3] which summarizes six different views on how to (and how not to) recite Tehilim, in practice. Here is my summary of his summaries (i.e. I didn't go back and learn through all of the primary sources; I just paraphrased the conclusions as stated in his tshuvah). I've appended the psak (ruling) of my Rosh ha'Yeshiva to the end of this list, since this is the view I follow, and since it wasn't mentioned by the Tzitz Eliezer:

(1) Rambam / Shulchan Aruch [4]: It is prohibited to read Tehilim - indeed, any pesukim from Tanach - for the sake of healing a choleh, but it is permissible for a healthy person to read pesukim so that the merit of their reading will protect him (i.e. the healthy person) from harm.

(2) Meiri [5]: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if it is being relied upon as the primary remedy, but if the choleh is also taking medicine or undergoing medical treatment, then it is permissible to supplement this medical care with the recitation of Tehilim. 

(3) Maharsha [6] / Toras Chayim [7]: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if they are recited in the manner of an incantation, but if one uses Tehilim as a vehicle of tefilah (prayer) or learns Torah for the sake of learning, and requests from Hashem that the merit of this tefilah or learning should heal a choleh, then this is permitted. [8]

(4) Ritva [9] / Ohr Zarua [10] / Rabbeinu Yeshaya [11]: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if there is a physically manifest bodily affliction, but to relieve a non-manifest pain (e.g. a headache) is permitted. 

(5) Tzitz Eliezer #1: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if one selects specific Tehilim (or pesukim to say), but if one chooses Tehilim at random or follows one's normal routine (e.g. reciting Tehilim daily), then this is permitted.

(6) Tzitz Eliezer #2: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if said exclusively for a choleh, but if it is also said for the sake of those who are healthy, then this is permitted, since it demonstrates that the Tehilim are being said for the sake of merit and protection, as the Sefer ha'Chinuch described. 

(7) My Rosh ha'Yeshiva [12]: The recitation of Tehilim for healing is only prohibited if only Tehilim (and/or pesukim) are recited, but if one adds a tefilah (e.g. Mi she'Beirach) before or after the Tehilim, then this is permissible, since in this case, one is using the tefilah as a vehicle of beseeching God - as opposed to relying on the words of the Tehilim themselves. 

I hope that this list provides solace and guidance for those who choose to recite Tehilim for the sake of healing. While I advise those who plan on reciting Tehilim for the sick to consult their own posek (halachic decisor), that the Tzitz Eliezer can serve as a backup option for those who have not yet asked a shaila (halachic inquiry).

Concluding Thoughts

I think that the widespread practice of saying Tehilim for the sick is a good thing. I believe that most people relate to Tehilim exactly as they relate to tefilah, and that their recitation of Tehilim for the sick is in line with the view of the Maharsha and Toras Chaim cited above. 

Nevertheless, I think it is also important for people to be aware of the halachic and spiritual perils of relating to the recitation of Tehilim for the sick in the wrong way. There are definitely people out there who mindlessly recite Tehilim, in the manner of an incantation, without any idea what they're saying, and who relate to the Tehilim as a sort of magic charm. These are the people whom the Rambam condemned, and about whom Chazal said: "one who says an incantation over a wound has no portion in the World to Come" (Shevuos 15b; Sanhedrin 90a).

I believe it is important for all people - especially those just described - to be educated about the topic of chover chaver and to be informed of the Sefer ha'Chinuch's method of using Tehilim as a legitimate way to become closer to Hashem, in order to take refuge "in the [protective] shade of the Almighty" (Tehilim 91:1).

[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Mitzvah #512

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 11:6. It should be noted that whereas the Sefer ha'Chinuch defines chover chaver as "a person who will recite words and tell people that those words cause benefit or harm in a certain matter," the Rambam defines it as "a person who speaks words which do not belong to any language and have no meaning, but he – in his foolishness – imagines that those words produce a beneficial effect." And yet, the Rambam writes in our halacha that one who uses words of Torah to heal is included in the category of chover chaver. 

[3] Ha'Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer 17:30 

[4] Ha'Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 179:8

[5] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Beis ha'Bechirah: Shabbos 67a

[6] Ha'Rav Shmuel Eidels (Maharsha), Chidushei Aggados: Shabbos 67a

[7] Ha'Rav Abraham Hayyim ben ha'Rav Naftali Tzvi Hirsch Schor, Toras Chaim: Shevuos 15b

[8] The Tzitz Eliezer learns that this is also the view of the Sefer ha'Chinuch, who only differentiated between the manner in which the Tehilim are being said, but didn't distinguish between a healthy person and a sick person.

[9] Rabbeinu Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli (Ritva), citation not provided by the Tzitz Eliezer

[10] Rabbeinu Yitzchak ben Moshe (Ohr Zarua / Riaz), citation not provided by the Tzitz Eliezer

[11] Rabbeinu Yeshaya di Trani (I think?), citation not provided by the Tzitz Eliezer

[12] I heard this verbally, but do not know whether an audio or written source is available. However, the Tzitz Eliezer cited the Mishnas Yaakov as suggesting an answer along these lines.