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| Artwork: Cast Into Darkness, by Clint Cearley |
Haftaras Masei: The Navi's Rebuke of Talmidei Chachamim
This week's
haftarah is the second of the three special
haftaros that we read during the Three Weeks between the
17th of Tammuz and
Tishah b'Av. It is the first of Yirmiyahu ha'Navi's many prophecies of rebuke directed towards the errant Jews in the period immediately preceding the destruction of the first Beis ha'Mikdash.
Towards this prophecy Yirmiyahu singles out four classes of leaders in Klal Yisrael and identifies a cheit (sin) for each one:
The Kohanim did not say, "Where is Hashem?"; those who grasp the Torah did not know Me; the shepherds rebelled against Me; the prophets prophesied by the Baal, and they went after that which do not yield benefit (Yirmiyahu 2:8).
The main question on this pasuk is simple: What, exactly, was the fault of each of these groups? The navi expresses each group's cheit in a concise manner. Our job is to "unpack" these terse statements and understand the nature of each problem.
Originally I had planned to write this post about all four groups. However, after I started writing, I found my thoughts drawn to the second group: "those who grasp the Torah." Although I am not audacious enough to include myself in this category, my role as an educator most closely matches this societal class, and I have seen in myself the flaws that Yirmiyahu points out in these people. For this reason, I have chosen to make them the focus of this blog post. [1]
We will examine three meforshim (commentators): the Malbim [2] and the Abravanel [3], both of whom take a similar approach, and the Radak [4], who takes a second approach. All three meforshim agree that "those who grasp the Torah" refers to talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars), but they differ in their understanding of the flaw that Yirmiyahu is highlighting.
Approach #1: Malbim and Abravanel
In the beur ha'milos (glossary) section of his commentary, the Malbim elucidates the nuances of Yirmiyahu's phraseology. He explains that the verb T.F.S. (ת.פ.שׂ.) in the term "tofsei ha'Torah" (תֹּפְשֵׂי הַתּוֹרָה) implies "grasping with the palm [of the hand]." It would seem that the best English translation would be "wield," based on the four examples provided by the Malbim: "tofes cherev" ("those who wield the sword"), "tofes keshes" ("those who wield a bow [and arrow]"), "tofes magal" ("those who wield a scythe"), "tofes kinor v'ugav" ("those who wield a harp and a pipe"). The Malbim holds that this terminology is being used here in reference to the talmidei chachamim "in a degrading manner ... as if the Torah, to them, is like a profession, and like a hatchet to chop with."
In the main portion of his commentary, the Malbim focuses on a different quality. He writes:
It would be proper for those who grasp the Torah to know Hashem, for this is the purpose of learning, but they did not know Me.
If we consider the two parts of his commentary together, it would appear that the Malbim learns as follows: because the talmidei chachamim relate to learning as a profession, or as a means of securing benefit, therefore their learning does not bring them to yedias Hashem (knowledge of God), which is the true purpose of learning.
The Abravanel takes a similar approach:
Those who grasp the Torah are the wise men; they didn’t learn lishmah, but rather, they learned by rote or to profit from of the Crown [of Torah]; it is as if “they do not know Me.”
Both the Malbim and the Abravanel fault "those who grasp the Torah" for relating to their learning in an improper manner. The Malbim holds that they regarded learning "as a profession," but he doesn't elaborate on what he means by this. The Abravanel suggests that these chachamim "learned by rote" or "learned for [material] profit."
Both the Malbim and the Abravanel hold that this type of learning would be considered "not knowing Me." The Malbim seems to maintain that their learning actually did not lead to yedias Hashem, whereas the Abravanel holds that their learning was "as if" they did not know Hashem.
The question is: How does learning "as if it were a profession" or "by rote" preclude learning as a means to "knowing Hashem"? We will return to this question after we examine the Radak's approach.
Approach #2: Radak
The Radak writes:
those who grasp the Torah – these are the wise men who learn Torah; they “did not know Me,” for they didn’t learn Torah lishmah (for its own saike) to fulfill what is written in it; rather, they learned [only] with their mouths and a divided heart; this is what it means by “they did not know Me,” because good thought and good actions constitute [real] “knowledge” – not learning [alone without action].
According to the Radak, the chachamim of the time compartmentalized their learning. They may have accumulated vast amounts of Torah knowledge, but this knowledge didn't culminate in action. This is what the Radak means by learning "with a divided heart": with one part of their heart they learned, but their actions stemmed from another part of their heart which was untouched by their learning.
This is what Yirmiyahu meant by "they did not know Me" - not that they lacked the ability to recite and explain the yesodei ha'Torah (the fundamental principles of Torah), but that this "knowledge" didn't affect the way they lived.
The Radak's interpretation of Yirmiyahu's rebuke here is reminiscent of the Rambam's interpretation of another statement of Yirmiyahu:
Thus says Hashem: "Let not the wise man glorify himself with his wisdom, nor let the mighty man glorify himself with his strength, nor let the rich man glorify himself in his wealth; but let him that glorify himself glory in this: understanding and knowing Me, that I am Hashem, Who does chesed (kindness), mishpat (justice), and tzedakah (righteousness) on earth, for in these is My desire" - the word of Hashem (Yirmiyahu 9:22-24).
Rambam
[5] concludes the Moreh ha'Nevuchim by explaining the implications of Yirmiyahu's words:
The prophet does not content himself with explaining that the knowledge of God is the highest kind of perfection: for if this only had been his intention, he would have said, "for only with this may one glorify himself - contemplating and knowing Me," and would have stopped there; or he would have said, "that he understand and know Me that I Am One,” or, "that I have not any likeness," or, "that there is none like Me," or a similar phrase. He says, however, that man can only glory in the knowledge of God and in the knowledge of His ways and attributes, which are His actions ...
The prophet thus, in conclusion, says, "for in these is My desire - the word of Hashem," i.e., My object [in saying this] is that you shall practice chesed, mishpat, and tzedakah on earth. In a similar manner we have shown (1:54) that the purpose of the enumeration of God's thirteen attributes is the lesson that we should acquire similar attributes and act accordingly. The objective of the above passage is therefore to declare, that the perfection, in which man can truly glory, is attained by him when he has acquired – as far as this is possible for man – the knowledge of God, the knowledge of His providence, and of the manner in which it influences His creatures in their production and continued existence. Having acquired this knowledge he will then be determined always to seek chesed, mishpat, and tzedakah, and thus to imitate the ways of God.
True learning - and true knowledge of Hashem - naturally leads to emulation of His ways. If a person's learning does not affect his or her actions, then it is lacking.
According to the Radak - and, by extension, the Rambam - the question is: In what sense is learning which doesn't culminate in action not considered "real" knowledge? It is easy to understand why this type of learning is inferior to learning which does culminate in action, but why is this learning considered to be worthy of tochachah (rebuke)? Doesn't it say in Pirkei Avos: "One who learns Torah in order to teach is granted the means to learn and to teach, but one who learns in order to do is granted the means to learn, to teach, to keep, and to do" (Avos 4:8)? Doesn't this imply that learning without the intent "to do," though not on the highest level, is at least worthy of "being granted the means to learn and to teach"? Moreover, don't Chazal teach us: "a person should always be involved in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah (not for its own sake), because from she'lo lishmah one comes to lishmah" (Pesachim 50b). These chachamim might not have been learning lishmah, but is their learning she'lo lishmah really that condemnable?
If so, how can Yirmiyahu - according to the Radak - condemn the talmidei chachamim of that generation for learning without the intention to fulfill their learning in action, she'lo lishmah? How can he say that such learning doesn't qualify as "knowledge"?
Conclusion of This Post
We concluded our summary of each approach with a question. Without answering these questions, we cannot fully understand the
cheit of the
tofsei ha'Torah. Without understanding the
cheit of the
tofsei ha'Torah, we - as a nation - cannot do
teshuvah for that
cheit, which
still persists today.
For this reason, I am not going to attempt to answer these questions here. I think that it would be more conducive to our
national teshuvah to contemplate these faults on our own, to see how we and the
talmidei chachamim in our society partake of them, and to use this knowledge to do
teshuvah.
I would love to discuss possible answers in the comments of this blog post, or
on Facebook. But for now, I think that it would be best to leave off with these questions.
[1] As I mentioned, I initially set out to write about all four groups. Midway through writing I decided that I wanted to devote this post exclusively to the category of talmidei chachamim. But since I had already started writing the part about Kohanim, I decided to relegate it to this footnote.
Radak explains:
We have explained this [as follows:] the Kohanim who are before Hashem (i.e. in the Beis ha’Mikdash) all day, [and who] bring sacrifices before Him, should have said to the nation that worships Baal, “Where is Hashem, such that you worship someone other than Him?”
Just as the bankers on Wall Street should have foreseen and warned people about the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble, and the engineers should have foreseen and taken measures to correct the inadequate preparations for Hurricane Katrina which resulted in nearly 2,000 deaths, so too, the Kohanim - the spiritual overseers of Bnei Yisrael who work at the spiritual center of the nation - should have recognized the extent to which avodah zarah had taken hold of their brethren and used their influence to return them to Hashem.
The Abravanel offers a different reason for why the Kohanim were held culpable:
“the Kohanim didn’t say, ‘Where is Hashem?’” In other words, they didn’t pay attention to the miracles that were done in the Beis ha’Mikdash and it wasn't proper for them to refrain from rebuking the nation over this, saying, “Where is Hashem? for we no longer have miracles as in the early days.”
Chazal teach us that "ten miracles were done for our forefathers in the Beis ha'Midkash" (Avos 5:4). These miracles ceased prior to the destruction of the first Beis ha'Mikdash. Since many of these miracles were easily discernible, and since the Kohanim spent their days in the Mikdash, surely they noticed this cessation. They should have immediately recognized that this withdrawal of the shechinah (divine presence) was a sign that things had gone awry within the nation, and they should have pointed this fact out to the rest of Bnei Yisrael, who wouldn't necessarily have noticed this phenomenon. Yet, the Kohanim didn't do this. They just carried on with business as usual.
[2] Ha'Rav Meir Leibush ben Yehiel Michel Wisser (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:8
[3] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:8
[4] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:8
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:54
