Behaalosecha: Moshe’s Mysterious Marriage

For an response to the view of Ibn Kaspi as presented in this post, see Rabbi Yaakov Trachtman's enlightening article Moshe's Disguised Divorce - a Response to Ibn Caspi.

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Artwork: Autumn's Veil, by Kekai Kotaki

Behaalosecha: Moshe's Mysterious Marriage

The Question 

Parashas Behaalosecha marks the turning point in Sefer Bamidbar from the hopeful to the nopeful.[1] Bnei Yisrael are marching towards Eretz Yisrael with the Ark of Hashem in their midst, poised to bring the Redemption from Egypt to a close with the establishment of a Torah society in the land promised to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. Then tragedy strikes. A series of missteps by the nation and by individuals culminates in the sin of the spies, resulting in 40 years of wandering the Wilderness, and the death of the generation that left Egypt. 

Our parashah concludes with one such misstep: the sin of Miriam and Aharon. The sin itself is recorded in a single pair of pesukim (verses): 

Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite [2] woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. They said, “Was it only to Moshe that Hashem spoke? Didn’t He also speak with us?” and Hashem heard. (Bamidbar 12:1-2). 

What, exactly, happened here is murky, to say the least. We are told that Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe “regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married” – yet, the statement attributed to them is entirely about prophecy, as is Hashem’s focus when He subsequently reprimands them. What does this have to do with “the matter of the Kushite woman that he married”? Furthermore, how are we to understand the seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman”? What is this intended to add or explain? 

But perhaps the most basic question of all is: Who is this Kushite woman? She is not identified by name and is not mentioned anywhere else in Tanach. This is the question we will focus on. We will not aim to explain the sin of Miriam and Aharon in full. Instead, we will focus on the three methodological approaches taken by the commentators. 

A survey of the commentators reveals that there are essentially two camps. One camp maintains that the Kushite woman is Tziporah, the daughter of Yisro whom Moshe married in his youth after fleeing Egypt as a fugitive. The second camp maintains that the Kushite is some other woman, aside from Tziporah. 

Camp “Tziporah” 

According to the Tziporah camp, there are two questions which must be addressed. The first question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman”? After all, Tziporah has been mentioned by name three times prior to this incident. Why not call her by name here? The second question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman” if she was, in fact, not Kushite, but Midianite? 

Onkelos, the Aramaic translator of the Torah, often deviates from a literal translation of the Hebrew in order to address certain issues in the pshat (straightforward meaning of the verse). In this case he is bothered enough by our questions that he makes two rather radical changes. 

Original Hebrew: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. 

Onkelos’s Aramaic: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the beautiful woman that he married, for the beautiful woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned. 

Rashi, following Onkelos’s lead, answers both of our questions by explaining that “Kushite” is a euphemism for Tziporah’s beauty – either her physical beauty or the beauty of her deeds. How does “Kushite” function as a euphemism? Rashi explains: “just as the skin-color of a Kushite is universally acknowledged, so too was Tziporah’s beauty universally acknowledged.” [3] Apparently, it was deemed uncouth, immodest, or somehow inappropriate to explicitly speak about Tziporah’s beauty – hence the need for circumlocution. Rashi adds that the gematria (numerical value) of the word “Kushite” equals that of the phrase “beautiful appearance.” 

Onkelos maintains that the phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” actually means that Moshe “abandoned the beautiful woman he had married.” It is unclear whether “abandoned” means that Moshe separated from Tziporah, or whether he actually divorced her. The question is: How did Miriam know that Moshe separated from Tziporah, and why was she talking about this now? Rashi [4], citing a midrash of Chazal [5], fills us in with the backstory: 

From where did Miriam know that Moshe separated from his wife? Rebbi Nosson says: Miriam was next to Tziporah at the time when it was said to Moshe: “Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp!” (Bamidbar 11:27). Upon hearing this, Tziporah exclaimed: “Woe unto the wives of these [men] once they are needed for prophecy, for they will have to separate from their wives in the same way that my husband separated from me!” From there Miriam knew [about Tziporah’s separation from Moshe] and told it to Aharon. And if Miriam didn’t intend to degrade Moshe and was punished thus, kal va’chomer (all the more so) one who speaks in order to degrade his friend! 

There you have it: “Camp Tziporah” answers our questions by positing that “the Kushite woman” is Tziporah, by explaining “for he had married a Kushite woman” to be a veiled reference to their separation, and by filling in the back-story explaining why Moshe and Tziporah separated and why Miriam only brought this up now. 

Camp “Other Woman” 

The Rashbam is known for his pshat explanations. He rarely cites midrash and prefers to answer questions conservatively, based on the principles of Hebrew grammar and the information provided in the text. It is not surprising that he rejects Rashi’s midrashic explanation. What is surprising is that he bases his answer on an obscure “outside text” entitled Divrei ha’Yamim Shel Moshe Rabbeinu (loosely translated as The Moses Chronicles in English). 

This non-canonical text is controversial, to say the least. Those who hold by its authenticity, such as the Rashbam, treat it as a historical account of “the missing years” of Moshe’s life which are not recorded in the Torah. Those who question or reject its authenticity, such as the Ibn Ezra [6], treat it as little more than “Moshe Rabbeinu fan-fiction,” and regard it as worthless. 

Nevertheless, the Rashbam [7] cites this text to explain who Moshe married, supporting his answer with the second question we raised on the position of Camp Tziporah: 

It is written in The Chronicles of Moshe Rabbeinu that he ruled as king in Ethiopia for 40 years and married an [Ethiopian] queen but didn’t sleep with her, as it is written there – but [Miriam and Aharon] didn’t know when they spoke about [Moshe] that he didn’t sleep with her. This is the essential pshat, for if they were speaking about Tziporah, what need was there to explain “for he married a Kushite woman”? Did they not know until now that Tziporah was a Midianite? Another objection is as follows: she wasn’t Kushite! Kush was one of the suns of Cham, but Midian was one of the children of Keturah who was descended from Avraham. 

Unlike Rashi, the Rashbam does not elaborate on why Miriam saw fit to bring this up to Aharon now, nor does he explain why the subsequent dialogue focuses on prophecy rather than on Moshe’s marriage to this Ethiopian queen (whom the Torah doesn’t bother to mention). 

But there is another pshat commentator who answers our question based on the text, and he has quite a lot to say. I am speaking of R’ Yosef ibn Kaspi. Allow me to preface my citation of his commentary with a confession: the whole reason I wrote this article was as an excuse to bring up this excerpt from ibn Kaspi’s commentary. It is one of the most scathing indictments of Rashi’s midrashic approach that I have ever encountered. My jaw dropped as I read it. 

Here is a full translation of what ibn Kaspi had to say, with my own paragraph divisions: 

I am astounded by the early [commentators], who were all more perfect than I am – I who couldn’t even reach their heel. How did they always fall into their own imagination, explaining the Torah to be the opposite of what is written, whether by substituting one word for the opposite word, or adding words with the opposite meanings? 

I am referring to the well-known commentary of Onkelos, about whom the Rambam said, “Onkelos ha’Ger was a great chacham (wise man)!” From where did [Onkelos] get the idea to explain “Kushite” as “beautiful,” [two words] which are as opposite as black and white? [8]

Furthermore, where did he get the idea to add opposite words after “for he married a Kushite woman” as though it was written in the Torah that “the Kushite woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned” or “distanced himself from.” If this were the intent of the Giver of the Torah, why didn’t He write this, and why did He write its opposite? 

Furthermore, who permitted us to do this? Who gave Onkelos so much power, or the Sages of the Talmud, or the Ibn Ezra – all of whom agree on this? Why can’t we do something like this, each man doing what is upright in his own eyes, to the point where we invert, “and you shall love Hashem, your God” to say – God forbid – “you shall hate Hashem, your God,” or “the one whom Hashem loves” to “the one whom He hates.” 

And if you’ll say, “The Torah was received at Sinai and transmitted to Yehoshua, who taught us [as part of the] Oral Torah that this is the explanation of this verse” – the answer is what we responded to the initial claim: Why wasn’t the matter written out as it actually was, rather than writing a word which has the opposite meaning? Is the substitution of a word for its opposite worthy of being called an “explanation”? Rather, an “explanation” is what we call something which explains the words in accordance with their meaning in some way, as [the Sages] explained, “you shall not kindle a fire,” and “you shall not eat over the blood” with deep explanations which fit into what is written, and which certainly do not reverse its meaning. Anything other than this we call “an exchange” or “a reversal” or “an erasure” or “a revision” or “an uprooting.” And this is true in every language whatsoever. [According to the approach of Onkelos et al.,] why shouldn’t we say that “Hashem took you” really means “[Hashem] abandoned [you]”? Similarly, “he and his neighbor should take” [can be interpreted to mean, “he and his neighbor should leave”]. What advantage is there of this over this? 

As Hashem lives, this method – which is unanimously accepted by all of the early Sages, the pillars of the world and of faith and of strength to the Torah of Moshe – is so beyond me that I cannot accept it. God forbid I should do something like this, [which would be tantamount to] completely abandoning the Torah of Moshe and believing that a New Testament was made – God forbid! 

Let us pause here to process the ibn Kaspi’s objection to the approach taken by Onkelos, Rashi, and Chazal. He vehemently objects to those commentators who “interpret” the term “Kushite” as “beautiful,” based on his premise that the two terms are opposites. He refuses to accept the notion that this explanation is “part of the Oral Torah,” and he is so dedicated to the pshat that he implicitly equates the midrashic explanation to pledging allegiance to a New Testament! To be fair, his objection is not to midrash per se, but to midrashic explanations which go against the plain meaning of the text. This will be apparent from what follows. 

After this diatribe, he offers his own explanation: 

Therefore I say that the explanation of what is written here is according to what is necessarily understood from the Hebrew language, namely, that “Kushite” means a woman from the Land of Kush, and the meaning of “because he L.K.CH. [9] a Kushite woman” is that he took her [in marriage], for this is the explanation of the root L.K.CH. as opposed to A’.Z.V. All of this [is based on] the conventional use of the language. 

Accordingly, after Moshe married Tziporah, he married a Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for a reason that he (peace be upon him) knew. One shouldn’t question the motives of his actions, for he undoubtedly did this out of wisdom. We don’t know the time period in which he married her, whether now when they were traveling or beforehand, because this hadn’t been mentioned in the Torah until this point, just as the Torah didn’t record many of the events that transpired. 

Because this wasn’t mentioned until now, then in order [that the reader] not be confused when it said “regarding the Kushite woman he married,” which we haven’t ever heard about, it said after this, “for he married a Kushite woman” – as if to say, “you should know that he married a Kushite woman, even though this hasn’t been mentioned yet, and this is what [Miriam and Aharon] were speaking about.” 

Because the reason for this additional marriage was hidden from them – perhaps Tziporah fell ill, or maybe she disobeyed him, or maybe it was some other reason we don’t know, or maybe they knew her reason, but they didn’t know [his] secret and the wisdom in this – therefore, they spoke about Moshe’s marriage to an additional wife, because one wife should have been enough for this perfected person. 

To summarize: ibn Kaspi maintains that Moshe married an ethnically Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for reasons that were unknown to Miriam and Aharon, and undisclosed to us. The seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” is intended to validate the reader’s confusion upon learning of this fact, as if to say, “yes, this is a thing Moshe did, even though the Torah didn’t mention it until now.” 

Ibn Kaspi then goes on to explain the connection between Miriam’s statement and the subsequent discussion of prophecy. Miriam and Aharon reasoned that they were on a high enough level of prophecy to be “let in” on Moshe’s reasons for his unconventional decision to take a second wife. Because they overestimated the level of their own prophecy in relation to that of their brother, Hashem rebuked them and explained just how categorically superior Moshe’s prophecy was. And as for the “secret” reasons behind Moshe’s second marriage, Hashem’s silence on the matter indicates that it was really none of their business. 

Methodological Take-aways 

We have seen three approaches taken by the commentators to these two cryptic pesukim: 

(1) Onkelos and Rashi opt for a midrashic explanation which neatly answers all of the questions and fills in the gaps with an elaborate narrative. The weakness of this approach is that it puts a heavy strain on a literal reading of the text. 

(2) Rashbam rejects the midrashic approach and explains the text by making recourse to an outside source. The benefit of this approach is that it supplies us with missing information. This approach is very similar to the academic method employed by modern day Bible scholars. The weakness of this approach lies in the credibility of his source. Moreover, according to the Rashbam, what did Hashem intend for the reader of Torah to make of this episode? Did He expect everyone to have read The Chronicles of Moses? 

(3) Ibn Kaspi also rejects the midrashic approach – not only as false, but as a perversion of God’s word and the Hebrew language. Instead, he relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the text and conservatively infers a larger narrative from the minimal information provided in the pesukim. The downside of this approach is that it completely rejects the wisdom offered in the midrashic literature. 

Each of these three approaches has its pros and cons. Students of Chumash will likely be drawn towards one approach or the other. I, myself, favor the third, but recognize the value – and sometimes, the necessity – of the other two. 

This multiplicity of approaches is part of what makes the study of Chumash such an enjoyable and rich experience. 

Footnotes:

[1] I began writing this article on two hours of sleep, and the conclusion of this first sentence was the amusing result. I was going to change it, but my friends convinced me to leave it in – perhaps as a memorial to my folly. 

[2] The word “Kushite” is traditionally translated as “Ethiopian,” but is often used to refer to people from sub-Saharan Egypt, in general. 

[3] Talmud Bavli, Moed Katan 16b 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 

[5] Midrash Tanchuma, Tzav 13 

[6] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Long Commentary on Sefer Shemos 4:20 

[7] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Meir (Rashbam), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 

[8] This statement will undoubtedly strike the modern reader as strange, inappropriate, or false. Others will deem it to be offensive, racist, and condemnable. Like it or not, the fact of the matter is that certain Rishonim (medieval commentators) regarded Kushites as unattractive, and maintained that the same aesthetic valuation was held by the figures in Tanach whose words and actions they aimed to decipher. Whether Miriam and Aharon actually found Kushites to be unattractive is a question for the historians and anthropologists. Our task as students of these Rishonim is to set aside our personal views in an attempt to understand what insight these commentators intended to convey through their explanations, regardless of whether or not we agree with the premises on which these explanations were based. (I would like to thank the members of the Facebook group “Orthodox Jews Against Discrimination and Racism” for reviewing this footnote to ensure that it was worded in a sensitive manner.) 

[9] Here the Ibn Kaspi actually spells out each letter of the three-letter root – presumably for snark value.

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

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Artwork: Visions of Beyond, by Terese Nielsen

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

The Question

My students have, on numerous occasions, asked me questions about ruach ha'kodesh (lit. "the holy spirit"), such as: "Is it true that Rashi had ruach ha'kodesh?" or "Didn't the meforshim get their explanations from ruach ha'kodesh?" or "How can the rabbis be wrong if they had ruach ha'kodesh?" 

On the one hand, it seems as though my students view ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah (prophecy) as interchangeable terms. On the other hand, if I asked them point blank: "Are you under the impression that Rashi was a navi?" or "Is the Ramban's commentary on Chumash an example of nevuah?" they would most certainly say "no." And yet, if I asked them to define or explain the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah, they would be at a loss.

I do not believe my students are alone in this regard. I suspect that many Jews are unfamiliar with the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. I certainly was until I looked into the matter. I also don't blame anyone for their lack of clarity on these topics. Not only are the concepts themselves extremely deep and lofty, but it's even difficult to track down the relevant sources! And, to make things even more difficult, sometimes the term "ruach ha'kodesh" is used to describe nevuah! I can understand why people are confused. 

The purpose of this post is not to provide the answer to the question in the title. I'm not even going to attempt to present a comprehensive digest of all - or even most - of the shitos (views), since I've barely scratched the surface of this subject in my own learning. 

Instead, I'm going to present the answer that I give to my own students, which is based on the writings of the Rambam. My goal is to provide them with enough information about nevuah and ruach ha'kodesh to be able to differentiate the two concepts in their minds.

What is Nevuah?

If I am not mistaken, the first time the Rambam defines nevuah is in his presentation of the Thirteen Ikkarim (fundamental principles) in his Introduction to Perek Chelek: [1] 

The Sixth Fundamental Principle is nevuah, namely, to know that within this human species there exist men who possess highly developed traits and great perfection, whose souls develop the capacity to receive the form of the intellect, and their human intellects join with the Active Intellect, and it emanates over them in abundant emanation - these are the neviim, this is nevuah, and this is its concept. And the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy, and our goal is not the explanation of the particulars of each of these fundamental principles and an elucidation of the method of knowing them, for this would encompass all of branches of knowledge. Rather, we shall only mention them for informational purposes. And there are many verses which testify to the prophecy of the prophets.

If your reaction to reading this is, "Say what?" then don't worry. Like I said, our goal here is not to fully understand what nevuah is, but to know enough to be convinced that ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah are not the same thing.

The Rambam's treatment of nevuah in the Mishneh Torah [2] spans four chapters, and is too long to even attempt to summarize here. Instead, I've selected a few halachos from those four chapters which flesh out the concept of nevuah: 

7:1 – One of the fundamentals of the religion is to know that God prophetically communicates to mankind …when the spirit [of nevuah] rests upon him, his soul mingles with the level of angels which are called “ishim” and he becomes another person, and he understands with his mind that he is not as he once was, but that he has ascended above the level of other chachamim …

7:2 – … When [neviim] prophesy, their limbs quake, their bodily power weakens, their thoughts become scrambled, and their mind becomes free to contemplate what they see …

7:3 – The matters that are made known to the navi in a prophetic vision are conveyed to him by way of mashal (allegory), and immediately the interpretation of the mashal becomes engraved in his mind in the prophetic vision, and he knows what it is …

7:7 – It is possible that the navi’s nevuah is for him alone, to expand his mind and increase his knowledge, until he knows things that he didn’t know from those great things (i.e. physics and metaphysics), and it is possible that he is sent to a segment of the population – to the residents of a city or a kingdom – to prepare them and to inform them what to do, or to prevent them [from continuing] the evil actions in their hands – and when [the navi] is sent [for this reason], he is given a sign and wonder in order to make known to the people that God sent him in truth.

10:3 – … all the words of a navi are fulfilled, as it is stated: “for no word of Hashem will fall to the earth” (II Melachim 10:10); likewise it is stated: “The [false] prophet with a dream tells [his] dream, but the one with my word speaks My word of truth. How can the chaff compare to the kernel? – the word of Hashem” (Yirmiyahu 23:28) – in other words, the words of sorcerers and dreamers are like chaff mixed in with a little bit of grain, whereas the word of Hashem has no chaff at all.

The Rambam further elucidates nevuah by differentiating the nevuah of a regular navi from the nevuah of Moshe Rabbeinu. I'll cite his presentation of these differences in the Introduction to Perek Chelek, with all of the details and proofs omitted, for the sake of brevity:

The prophecy of Moshe, our master, differs from the prophecy of the other prophets in four ways:  

The first difference is that each and every navi was only spoken to by Hashem by way of an intermediary, but Moshe was without an intermediary ... 

The second difference is that every navi only receives his nevuah vision while asleep ... or during the day after the prophet falls under a trance into a state in which all of his senses have been suspended and his mind is blank just like in sleep ... but the word came to Moshe in the daytime when he was standing ... 

The third difference is that when a navi receives a nevuah, even though it is through a vision and by means of an angel, his powers weaken and his bodily frame becomes disarranged and an overpowering fear falls upon him as if he were going to die ... but this was not the case with Moshe. Rather, the word came to him and no weakness occurred in him at all ...

The fourth difference is that the vision does not come to all the prophets at their own desire but only at the will of Hashem ... However, Moshe, our master, was able to say at any time that he wished ...

To summarize: nevuah is a type of knowledge conveyed from Hashem to the mind of the navi (via angels) in mashal form. As the Rambam said, "the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy" and a full explanation "would encompass all of branches of knowledge." Nevertheless, the basic information here is sufficient for our purposes. 

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh?

Now let's turn to the Rambam's definition of ruach ha'kodesh, as stated in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim.[3] I'm only going to cite the first part of this chapter, with my own paragraph breaks and underlines: 

After the preceding explanation of the true reality of nevuah according to the requirements of philosophical speculation combined with the explanation supplied by our Torah, it behooves me to mention to you the degrees of nevuah according to these two sources. 

Now not everybody who is found in one of the degrees, which I call the degrees of nevuah, is a navi. For the first and second degree are steppingstones toward nevuah, and someone who has attained one of them is not to be considered as a navi belonging to the class of neviim discussed in the preceding chapters. And even though he may sometimes be called a navi, this term is applied to him in a general sort of way, because he is very close to the neviim …

1st Degree – Ruach Hashem: The first of the degrees of nevuah consists in the fact that an individual receives or is accompanied by a divine help that moves and activates him to an exceedingly good and valuable act – such as the saving of a community of virtuous people from a community of evildoers, or the saving of a virtuous and great man, or the conferring of benefits on numerous people. The individual in question finds in himself something that moves and incites him to the action, and that is called “ruach Hashem” (“the spirit of Hashem”). And it is said of the individual who was in such a state that “the spirit of Hashem was upon him” or that “the spirit of Hashem clothed him” or that “the spirit of Hashem rested upon him” or that “Hashem was with him,” or other similar expressions are applied to him. That is the level of all the judges of Israel, of whom it is said in general that: “And when Hashem raised them up as judges, then Hashem was with the judge, and delivered them” (Shoftim 2:18) … 

Know that such a force did not abandon Moshe Rabbeinu from the moment he reached the age of maturity. It was because of this that he was moved to slay the Egyptian and to reprove the one who was in the wrong among the two men that struggled. The strength of this force in him shows in the fact that when – after having been filled with fear and having fled – he came to Midian as a stranger full of fear and saw some wrong that was done, he could not refrain from putting an end to it and was incapable of patience with regard to it … 

Such a ruach Hashem by no means caused one of these people to speak of anything; rather its object was to move the one strengthened by it to a certain action: not to any chance action, but to an action that provides assistance a wronged one – whether it be one great man or a community – or to an action that leads to that result. 

And just as not everyone who has seen a true dream is a navi, not everyone who has received [divine] assistance in some chance matter – such as the acquisition of property or the achievement of an end that concerns him alone – can be said to have been accompanied by ruach Hashem, or that “Hashem is with him,” or to have done what he has done “through ruach ha’kodesh.” We only say this about one who has performed a good action of capital import or an action that leads to that result; as, for instance, the success of Joseph in the house of the Egyptian, which was, as is clear, the first cause for great things that occurred afterwards.

2nd Degree – Ruach ha’Kodesh: It consists in the fact that an individual finds that a certain thing has descended upon him and that another force has come upon him and has made him speak, so that he talks in words of wisdom, or praise, or in beneficial statements of rebuke, or concerning political or divine matters – and all this while he is awake and his senses function as usual. Such an individual is said to speak through ruach ha’kodesh (“holy spirit”). 

It is through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh that David composed Tehilim, and Shlomo composed Mishlei and Koheles and Shir ha’Shirim. Daniel and Iyov and Divrei ha’Yamim and all the other Kesuvim (Writings) have likewise been composed through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh. For this reason people call them Kesuvim, meaning thereby that they are written through ruach ha’kodesh.

As you can see from this source, in light of the other sources, the Rambam is very explicit in differentiating ruach ha'kodesh from nevuah. Here is a list of differences:

• nevuah is nevuah, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is "a steppingstone to nevuah" which is merely called nevuah
• in this sense it may be said that ruach ha'kodesh is "on a lower level" than nevuah
• in nevuah there is actual content conveyed from Hashem to man, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is a force which moves a person to speak profound statements of his own
• nevuah can only be received while asleep or in a trance, whereas a person receives ruach ha'kodesh while awake and in full possession of his sensory faculties
• nevuah comes in the form of mashal, whereas ruach ha'kodesh produces words
• in Nach, the books classified in Neviim contain words of nevuah whereas the books classified in Kesuvim contain words of ruach ha'kodesh

These differences are stark. Ruach ha'kodesh is not nevuah.

Support from the Sefer ha'Ikkarim

While I don't know enough to say that the Sefer ha'Ikkarim's [4] view of ruach ha'kodesh is identical to that of the Rambam, it certainly seems to be in the same vein. He begins with a description of the four levels of intellect. Level 5 is ruach ha'kodesh, and Level 6 is the first degree of nevuah. Again, I will not cite the entire chapter, but only enough to provide context for his treatment of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. The paragraph breaks, paragraph titles (including level numbers), and underlines are mine:

We must now explain the existence of prophecy and its various grades, so that believers may find it easier to understand the existence of prophecy and the different degrees thereof.

Level 1 - Senses: At the moment of birth the individual is devoid of all understanding. The first things that are formed in him are the five external senses, touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight. The individual does not get these all at once, but one at a time. At the moment of his appearance in the outer world he perceives only with the coarsest of the senses, that of touch. The objects of his perception at this stage are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, softness and hardness, roughness and smoothness and the like. After a further interval of time after birth, he perceives a finer and more ‘important class of objects, namely tastes, like sweet, bitter, sour, astringent, sharp, and so on. Later on he perceives another class of things still finer, namely the odors, the agreeable and the disagreeable, etc. Later still he perceives with the sense of hearing a class of objects that is still finer than those of the sense of smell, and that may be perceived at a greater distance, such as sounds and tones, and their various kinds, etc. Still later he perceives with the sense of sight another class of existents finer than all the rest, which can be perceived at a greater distance than the others, such as colors and forms according to their various kinds, and so on. One of these five senses cannot perceive the objects of the others. Thus, the sense of sight cannot perceive sounds, or tones or odors; nor can the senses of smell and taste perceive colors and sounds.

Level 2 - Memory: After he has advanced a considerable time and has become habituated to the five senses, he rises to a higher degree than that of perceiving the objects of the various senses. He now has the power of recognizing a thing when it is no longer actually perceived. He recognizes what he has once perceived when he sees it again, and though the thing has disappeared he remembers the knowledge which is impressed on his imagination and recognizes the object. This power of apprehension he acquires through the medium of the first faculty.

Level 3 - Intellectual Apprehension: As he grows older still, he attains to a higher degree by means of the first powers, a new gate opens before him, and he acquires the power of intellectual apprehension. He strips the sensible object of its particular qualities and apprehends the general essence. For example, he takes animality and rationality in a human being and judges that these are common to the whole species and are different from those particular qualities which differ in different individuals.

Level 4 - Intellectual Comprehension: As he advances further in years and acquires information, another gate opens before him which he has not entered hitherto. He now makes a distinction between substance and accident, and between the necessary, the possible and the impossible. He combines rational principles not based upon sense perception with each other, and acquires all the sciences, which he could not have acquired by means of the powers mentioned before.

These four stages form the limit of the human intellect, beyond which it cannot go. Some individuals do not reach the highest stage, but stop with the second or the third. These then are the powers which the generality of men have.

Level 5 - Ruach ha'Kodesh: But it is possible that in addition to these powers, still another gate may open to a person and still another degree may be attainable by him of which he has no idea. For just as, if a person who has never seen them were told about lights and colors, he would not be able to imagine them and would not understand the different colors, as a eunuch cannot imagine the pleasure of sexual intercourse, so it is possible that though by the custom of nature man does not attain a greater degree than the four mentioned, nevertheless the mind may conceive of a higher degree. And experience testifies to this. For we see that beyond the four degrees above mentioned, a new gate opens before a given person which his own nature never imagined, and he speaks words of wisdom or words of song and praise to God in pure and fluent style such as he was incapable of hitherto. Everyone who hears him wonders at his knowledge and the manner of his expression, while he himself does not know whence this power came to him, as a child learns to speak without knowing whence the power came. But everybody recognizes his superiority in this respect. This degree is called ruach ha’kodesh.

Level 6 - Developed Imagination: Now just as the human intellect stops at the four degrees above mentioned and does not pass beyond, so there are persons who stop at the degree of ruach ha’kodesh and do not pass beyond it. There are persons whose imagination is strong by nature or who do certain things to strengthen it, like the practices of the diviners or the woman with the familiar spirit. As a result of this they have imaginative visions. There are others who have true dreams, like Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, the chief butler and the chief baker. By reason of these powers some of them think they are prophets. They are the persons of whom the prophet in Scripture says that they “prophesy out of their own heart.” For though they sometimes speak the truth, they are bound sometimes to speak falsehood. Thus Ezekiel says, “Woe unto the vile prophets, that follow their own spirit, … They have seen vanity and lying divination, that say: The Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them, yet they hope that the word would be confirmed.” The intimation is that it is impossible, for though their words may be partly true, they can not but be partly false, for such is the nature of the power of imagination, the source of dreams. Our Rabbis say: As there is no wheat without straw, so there is no dream without foolishness.

Level 7 - 1st Degree of Nevuah: When, however, the rational power prevails over the imagination, then the person sees true dreams without foolishness. The explanation is given by the Rabbis: “Raba asked the question, How reconcile the statement, ‘And the dreams speak falsely,’ with the expression, ‘I do speak with him in a dream?’ His answer is, the two passages are not incompatible. The one passage refers to dreams that come through the medium of an angel, the other to those that come through the medium of a demon.” Angel stands for the rational power, demon for the power of imagination. If the rational power prevails over the power of imagination, the person sees true dreams or visions which communicate to him information he never had before. In the measure in which the rational power prevails over the imagination is the person better or less well prepared for nevuah. There are persons whose rational power is stronger than the imagination, but the superiority is not great, and hence the power of imagination maintains its strength. And therefore though the rational power is prepared to receive the nevuah, yet on account of the strength of the imagination and its opposition to the rational power, the person receives the [prophetic] overflow in trembling and pain. His limbs shake, his sinews tend to dissolve, and a great trembling comes over him, that his soul almost leaves him. And after all that pain the nevuah comes to the rational power in a dream or vision of the night, and the person dreams prophetic dreams and learns things he has never known before — ideas about the separate substances, or particular notions, or universal ideas of existence, and the like. This is the first degree of nevuah.

Similar to the Rambam, ruach ha'kodesh is identified as a level of intellection which is prior to nevuah, and the descriptions of each phenomenon mirror what the Rambam wrote.

Concluding Thoughts

So when my students ask me whether Rashi or the other meforshim had ruach ha'kodesh, I summarize the definitions of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah presented here, making sure that they at least walk away with an awareness that the two phenomena are distinct. Then I answer their question by saying that it is entirely possible that chachamim (wise people) throughout the ages spoke or wrote with ruach ha'kodesh, even after the time that nevuah ceased. 

However, I do not think this has any ramifications on how we learn. Even if, for example, the Raavad [5] claims that his critique of the Rambam's shitah (view) is backed by ruach ha'kodesh, that doesn't mean that the Rambam needs to abandon his opinion, nor does it necessitate that we side with the Raavad.

Similarly, this does not mean that Chazal - and certainly the Geonim, Rishonim, and Achronim - were infallible. One need look no further than Vayikra Chapter 4 (about the sin-offerings brought by a Sanhedrin that errs) or the story of the Achnai Ovens (Bava Metzia 59b) to see that Chazal can err - despite the fact that they were inevitably moved by ruach ha'kodesh.

That pretty much exhausts my knowledge of ruach ha'kodesh. Perhaps one day we will explore views of ruach ha'kodesh which differ from that of the Rambam. 

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin Chapter 10, Introduction

[2] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapters 7-10

[3] ibid. Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:45; the paragraph breaks are mine

[4] Rabbeinu Yosef Albo, Sefer ha'Ikkarim 3:10; ordinarily I would translate this on my own, but I'm pressed for time, so I've decided to use the translation on www.sefaria.org (Jewish Publication Society of America: 1929)

[5] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Daud, Critiques on Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Shofar, v'Sukkah, v'Lulav 8:5

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Who is to Blame?

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Artwork: Memorial to Folly, by Sung Choi

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Who is to Blame?

This week we conclude our reading of Sefer Bamidbar. I taught Sefer Bamidbar for seven years, and there is one sentiment I encountered among my high school students every time: anger at Bnei Yisrael. Whenever we’d learn an episode of Bamidbar in which Bnei Yisrael sinned and were punished, my students would grow frustrated and exclaim: “How could Bnei Yisrael be so stupid?!” “They’re so childish and immature!” “Why do we have to suffer for their sins?” 

As tempting as it is to place the blame entirely on Bnei Yisrael for their sins, that is not the approach that Moshe Rabbeinu takes in our parashah, nor is it the approach that Yirmiyahu takes in our haftarah. 

Parashas Mattos begins with Hashem commanding Bnei Yisrael to wage war with the Midianites. The Jewish men lead the battle, killing the Midianite kings and male soldiers, and taking the women, children, livestock, and wealth as spoils. 

Moshe becomes enraged. [1] However, his anger is not directed at the soldiers who engaged in the looting, but at the commanding officers who were appointed over them. Rashi, [2] citing Sifre, [3] explains why: 

and Moshe became enraged at the appointed of the soldiers – [namely,] those who were appointed over the soldiers; [the pasuk says this] in order to teach you that every deterioration of the generation is contingent on the gedolim (leaders), since they have the ability to protest. 

The Rambam codifies this principle in two places in the Mishneh Torah. The first is in Hilchos Deos,[4] in his exposition of the mitzvah of hocheach tochiach (“you shall surely rebuke a member of your people”): 

One who sees his friend who sinning or following a path that is not good is commanded to return him to the good, and to inform him that he is sinning against himself with his bad decisions, as it is stated: "You shall surely rebuke [the member of] your people" (Vayikra 19:17) … and one who has the ability to rebuke but refrains from rebuking is included in the sin of those [sinners], so long as he had the ability to rebuke them. 

The second instance is in Hilchos Teshuvah, [5] in his list of sins which impede teshuvah: 

There are four sins which are so severe that if a person does one of them, Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu will not provide him with the ability to do teshuvah, due to the magnitude of the sin. They are:  

1. one who causes the masses to sin; included in this is one who prevents the masses from doing a mitzvah  

2. one who turns his friend from a good path to a bad path, such as a meisis (one who leads a person to worship avodah zarah) or a mediach (one who leads a city to worship avodah zarah)  

3. one who sees his son with a bad crowd and doesn’t protest: since his son is under his dominion, then he is like a person who causes him to sin; included in this is anyone who has the ability to protest against others – whether a multitude or a few individuals – and doesn’t protest, but leaves them with their stumbling block  

4. one who says, “I will sin and then I will do teshuvah”; included in this is one who says, “I will sin and Yom ha’Kippurim will atone.” 

This does not mean that such sins are entirely the fault of the leaders, and that the sinners themselves are free from blame. The foundational principle of Torah is that that every human being has free will, and is the cause of his or her own actions. At the same time, the Torah recognizes that leaders hold a great sway over the parameters of their followers’ free will. Thus, if a leader fails to use his position of influence to save or prevent his followers from sinning, then he is considered to be partially at fault, and shares in the culpability of the sinners. 

For example, every Nazi in Hitler’s Germany had free will, and could have chosen not to align himself with the forces of evil. Yet, it is clear that a Nazi soldier raised by a Nazi family, educated in a Nazi school, and surrounded by Nazi ideas, Nazi patriotism, and Nazi ascendancy – such an individual has far more impediments to exercising his free will for the good than his American counterpart among the Allies. There are many paths of choosing the good which are clear and unobstructed for the American, but blocked or obscured in darkness for the Nazi. However, if Hitler and the upper echelon of Nazi leaders radically changed their view of their “enemies” – just as Japan and its citizens changed their view of Americans after World War II – then it would be far easier for the individual Nazi to exercise his free will and choose good over evil. Freedom of choice is universal, but it is not equal in mankind, nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is a tenuous thing, subject to external disturbances – like a flickering candle on a blustery night, in need of protective hands to shield it and prevent it from being extinguished. 

Yirmiyahu follows Moshe’s approach in his rebuke of Bnei Yisrael, but is even more explicit in ascribing blame to the leaders of the nation. He begins with a general message to the nation: 

Hear the word of Hashem, O House of Jacob, and all families of the House of Israel: Thus said Hashem: "What wrong did your fathers find in Me that they distanced themselves from Me, and they went after nothingness and they became nothingness? And they did not say, ‘Where is Hashem Who brought us up from the Land of Egypt, Who led us in the Wilderness, in a land of desert and pit, in a land of waste and the shadow of death, in a land through which no man passed and no person settled there?’ I brought you to a fruitful land to eat its fruit and its goodness; but you came and you contaminated My land, and My inheritance you made into an abomination.” (Yirmiyahu 2:4-7) 

But then he turns his rebuke to the leaders, specifying how each group of leaders is culpable: 

“The Kohanim didn’t say, ‘Where is Hashem?’ and those who grasp the Torah (tofsei ha’Torah) didn’t know Me, and the shepherds rebelled against Me, and the [false] prophets prophesied by the Baal, and went after that which has no benefit. Therefore, I will continue to quarrel with you,” the word of Hashem, "and with your grandchildren I will quarrel." (ibid 2:8-9) 

The Radak [6] explains how each of these groups was at fault for the sins of the nation: 

the kohanim [didn’t say,] “Where is Hashem?” – we have explained this [as follows:] the Kohanim who are before Hashem (i.e. in the Beis ha’Mikdash) all day, bringing sacrifices before Him, should have said to the nation that worships Baal, “Where is Hashem, such that you worship someone other than Him?” 

those who grasp the Torah – these are the wise men who learn Torah; they “did not know Me” in that they didn’t learn Torah for its own sake, to fulfill what is written in it, but learned only with their mouths and a divided heart; this is what it means by “they did not know Me,” because good thought with good actions is [real] “knowledge [of God]” – not [mere] learning.

the shepherds – these are the kings who shepherd the nation, just like shepherds shepherd sheep.

and the prophets – these are the false prophets. 

If these religious and political leaders had stepped up to the plate, they could have halted the downward spiral of Bnei Yisrael, thereby preventing the destruction of the Beis ha’Mikdash (Holy Temple) and the galus (exile), or at least diminishing the severity of the catastrophe and suffering.[7] The people of the nation, themselves, are – as the navi said – like a flock of sheep. Each sheep has its own agency, but that agency is contingent on the decisions of the shepherd. If the shepherd leads his sheep to lush meadows, they will freely roam and graze; if he leads them within proximity of the wolves, they will have little choice but to flee for survival. 

I believe that this perspective on the sins of our ancestors has a bearing on the way we view the faults in our fellow Jews today. The Jewish world is split into so many different factions, religiously, politically, culturally, racially, socio-economically. Each faction has its own problems, errors, and transgressions. Some of these flaws are recognized by all; others fester, unnoticed. 

It would be easy to blame each of these groups of Jews for their own problems, but it would also be wrong. The bulk of the blame lies with the leaders – those in the remote past, the recent past, and the present. It is the leaders who have the power to protest and to put a stop to the problems which plague their people. It is the leaders who can articulate a vision of the good and formulate a plan to bring it about in action. The blame lies with them. 

But here’s the catch: by “leaders” I’m not just referring to those at the top of their respective spheres of influence; I’m talking about “anyone who has the ability to protest against others – whether a multitude or a few individuals – and doesn’t protest, but leaves them with their stumbling block.” By this definition, “leaders” include kings and fathers, roshei yeshiva and school-teachers, statesmen and neighbors, elders and older brothers, those who are respected for their wealth or for their wisdom. And yes, “leaders” include ourselves. 

Today is Rosh Chodesh Av. Nine days from now we will observe Tishah b’Av, one of the public fast days. These days have a common mission, as the Rambam articulates in Hilchos Taaniyos: [8] 

There are days on which all of Israel fasts because of the catastrophes that occurred on them, in order to awaken the hearts [of the people] and to open the paths of teshuvah. This will be a remembrance of our corrupt actions and the corrupt actions of our fathers that were like our actions today, which ultimately reached the point that [these corrupt actions] caused these catastrophes for them and for us. Through the remembrance of these things we will return to do good, as it stated, “they will confess their sins and the sins of their fathers” (Vayikra 26:40). 

Our national teshuvah has to start somewhere, but it is hard to begin if we don’t know where or with whom to place the blame. It is, after all, human nature to assign blame whenever something goes wrong. 

According to the implications of what we’ve written about today, the blame lies with ourselves, to the extent that each of us is a leader with a sphere of influence, however large or small that sphere may be. 

Perhaps, by recognizing the interconnectivity of Klal Yisrael, and by appreciating the weight of the power we have to shape the paths of the people within our daled amos (four cubits), we will, as a nation, begin anew the long process of returning to the good. 

[1] It’s unclear from the pesukim why Moshe got angry; see Ramban on Bamidbar 31:6 for an explanation. 

[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 31:14 

[3] Sifre 42 

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Deos 6:7 

[5] ibid. Hilchos Teshuvah 4:1 

[6] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:8 

[7] Truthfully, according to my understanding, by the time Yirmiyahu’s prophetic career began, Bnei Yisrael had reached the point of no return. If they responded positively to his message and did teshuvah, the Beis ha’Mikdash would still be destroyed, and the exile still would have happened, but it wouldn’t have been as severe. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Taaniyos 5:1

How Thomas Paine Forgot Sinai

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Artwork: Portrait of Thomas Paine, by Laurent Dabos

How Thomas Paine Forgot Sinai

In 1794 Thomas Paine published his pro-Deism anti-religion book, The Age of Reason. Quite early on in the book he sets forth his refutation of "Divine revelation." He begins by affirming the centrality of revelation in the three major religions. 

Every national church or religion has established itself by pretending some special mission from God, communicated to certain individuals. The Jews have their Moses; the Christians their Jesus Christ, their apostles and saints; and the Turks their Mahomet, as if the way to God was not open to every man alike. 

Each of those churches show certain books, which they call revelation, or the word of God. The Jews say, that their word of God was given by God to Moses, face to face; the Christians say, that their word of God came by divine inspiration: and the Turks say, that their word of God (the Koran) was brought by an angel from Heaven. Each of those churches accuse the other of unbelief; and for my own part, I disbelieve them all. 

So far, so good. Next, he defines the term "revelation" and, on the basis of this definition, states that something can only be considered a "revelation" by the direct recipient of the communication.

As it is necessary to affix right ideas to words, I will, before I proceed further into the subject, offer some other observations on the word revelation. Revelation, when applied to religion, means something communicated immediately from God to man. 

No one will deny or dispute the power of the Almighty to make such a communication, if he pleases. But admitting, for the sake of a case, that something has been revealed to a certain person, and not revealed to any other person, it is revelation to that person only. When he tells it to a second person, a second to a third, a third to a fourth, and so on, it ceases to be a revelation to all those persons. It is revelation to the first person only, and hearsay to every other, and consequently they are not obliged to believe it. 

It is a contradiction in terms and ideas, to call anything a revelation that comes to us at second-hand, either verbally or in writing. Revelation is necessarily limited to the first communication — after this, it is only an account of something which that person says was a revelation made to him; and though he may find himself obliged to believe it, it cannot be incumbent on me to believe it in the same manner; for it was not a revelation made to me, and I have only his word for it that it was made to him.

Also good. This is why we reject the authority of any religion based on one, two, or several individuals who claim to have received a divine revelation. There is no way to verify such a claim, and no reason to trust those who make it.

But then he makes an egregious factual error about Judaism's revelation claim:

When Moses told the children of Israel that he received the two tables of the commandments from the hands of God, they were not obliged to believe him, because they had no other authority for it than his telling them so; and I have no other authority for it than some historian telling me so. The commandments carry no internal evidence of divinity with them; they contain some good moral precepts, such as any man qualified to be a lawgiver, or a legislator, could produce himself, without having recourse to supernatural intervention.

Thomas Paine completely missed the one claim which sets Judaism apart from all other religions: the claim of public revelation - that the entire nation of Israel heard God speak to Moshe at Sinai. 

The Torah explicitly makes this claim in a number of places:

Hashem said to Moshe, "Behold! I will come to you in the thickness of the cloud, in order that the people hear when I speak with you, and they will also believe in you forever." (Shemos 19:9)

Only beware for yourself and greatly beware for your soul, lest you forget the things that your eyes have beheld and lest you remove them from your heart all the days of your life, and make them known to your children and your children’s children – the day that you stood before Hashem, your God, at Horeb, when Hashem said to me, “Gather the people to Me and I shall let them hear My words, so that they shall learn to fear Me all the days that they live on the earth, and they shall teach their children” So you approached and stood at the foot of the mountain, and the mountain was burning with fire up to the heart of heaven, darkness, cloud, and thick cloud. Hashem spoke to you from the midst of the fire; you were hearing the sound of words, but you were not seeing a likeness, only a sound. He told you of His covenant that He commanded you to observe, the Ten Declarations, and He inscribed them on two stone Tablets. (Devarim 4:9-13) 

For inquire now regarding the early days that preceded you, from the day when God created man on the earth, and from one end of heaven to the other end of heaven: Has there ever been anything like this great thing or has anything like it been heard? Has a people ever heard the voice of God speaking from the midst of the fire as you have heard, and survived? Or has any god ever miraculously come to take for himself a nation from amidst a nation, with challenges, with signs, and with wonders, and with war, and with a strong hand, and with an outstretched arm, and with greatly awesome deeds, such as everything that Hashem, your God, did for you in Egypt before your eyes? You have been shown in order to know that Hashem, He is the God! There is none beside Him! From heaven He caused you to hear His voice in order to teach you, and on earth He showed you His great fire, and you heard His words from the midst of the fire, because He loved your forefathers, and He chose his offspring after him, and took you out before Himself with His great strength from Egypt; to drive away from before you nations that are greater and mightier than you, to bring you, to give you their land as an inheritance, as this very day. (ibid. 4:32-37) 

These words Hashem spoke to your entire congregation on the mountain, from the midst of the fire, the cloud, and the thick cloud – a great voice, never to be repeated – and He inscribed them on two stone Tablets and gave them to me. It happened that when you heard the voice from the midst of the darkness and the mountain was burning in fire, that you – all the heads of your tribes and your elders – approached me. They said, “Behold! Hashem, our God, has shown us His glory and His greatness, and we have heard His voice from the midst of the fire; this day we saw that Hashem will speak to a person and he can live. But now, why should we die when this great fire consumes us? If we continue to hear the voice of Hashem, our God, any longer, we will die! For is there any human that has heard the voice of the Living God speaking from the midst of the fire, as we have, and lived? You should approach and hear whatever Hashem, our God, will say, and you should speak to us whatever Hashem, our God, will speak to you – then we shall hear and we shall do.” (ibid. 5:19-23)

So I made an Ark of cedarwood and I carved out two stone Tablets like the first ones; then I ascended the mountain with the two Tablets in my hand. He inscribed on the Tablets according to the first script, the Ten Statements that Hashem spoke to you on the mountain from the midst of the fire, on the day of the congregation, and Hashem gave them to me. I turned and descended from the mountain, and I placed the Tablets in the Ark that I had made, and they remained there as Hashem had commanded me. (Devarim 10:3-5) 

This was my first reading of Paine's The Age of Reason, and I must say that he severely undermined his own credibility by not even bothering to do a fact-check on the source-text of the religion he intends to debunk! He even stated earlier that "the Jews say, that their word of God was given by God to Moses, face to face." Apparently, he didn't believe that we take our own claim seriously!

But it gets better! In the next chapter Paine sets up an argument about the evidence needed to believe in miracles. As we'll see, if he applied this line of reasoning to what Judaism actually claims, this would lead him to the conclusion that the Torah was given at Sinai. Paine writes:

When I am told that the Koran was written in Heaven and brought to Mahomet by an angel, the account comes too near the same kind of hearsay evidence and second-hand authority as the former. I did not see the angel myself, and, therefore, I have a right not to believe it. 

When also I am told that a woman called the Virgin Mary, said, or gave out, that she was with child without any cohabitation with a man, and that her betrothed husband, Joseph, said that an angel told him so, I have a right to believe them or not; such a circumstance required a much stronger evidence than their bare word for it; but we have not even this — for neither Joseph nor Mary wrote any such matter themselves; it is only reported by others that they said so — it is hearsay upon hearsay, and I do not choose to rest my belief upon such evidence ... 

The wretched contrivance with which this latter part is told exceeds every thing that went before it. The first part, that of the miraculous conception, was not a thing that admitted of publicity; and therefore the tellers of this part of the story had this advantage, that though they might not be credited, they could not be detected. They could not be expected to prove it, because it was not one of those things that admitted of proof, and it was impossible that the person of whom it was told could prove it himself. 

But the resurrection of a dead person from the grave, and his ascension through the air, is a thing very different as to the evidence it admits of, to the invisible conception of a child in the womb. The resurrection and ascension, supposing them to have taken place, admitted of public and ocular demonstration, like that of the ascension of a balloon, or the sun at noon-day, to all Jerusalem at least. A thing which everybody is required to believe, requires that the proof and evidence of it should be equal to all, and universal; and as the public visibility of this last related act was the only evidence that could give sanction to the former part, the whole of it falls to the ground, because that evidence never was given. Instead of this, a small number of persons, not more than eight or nine, are introduced as proxies for the whole world, to say they saw it, and all the rest of the world are called upon to believe it. But it appears that Thomas did not believe the resurrection, and, as they say, would not believe without having ocular and manual demonstration himself. So neither will I, and the reason is equally as good for me, and for every other person, as for Thomas. 

It is in vain to attempt to palliate or disguise this matter. The story, so far as relates to the supernatural part, has every mark of fraud and imposition stamped upon the face of it. Who were the authors of it is as impossible for us now to know, as it is for us to be assured that the books in which the account is related were written by the persons whose names they bear; the best surviving evidence we now have respecting that affair is the Jews. They are regularly descended from the people who lived in the times this resurrection and ascension is said to have happened, and they say, it is not true. It has long appeared to me a strange inconsistency to cite the Jews as a proof of the truth of the story. It is just the same as if a man were to say, I will prove the truth of what I have told you by producing the people who say it is false.

To summarize, Paine's criteria for believing in a miraculous phenomenon are three in number:

(1) the miracle would have to be publicly visible ("admitting to public and oracular demonstration ... like that of the ascension of a balloon, or the sun at noon-day") 

(2) it would have to have been witnessed by a large group of people (not "a small number of persons, not more than eight or nine ... introduced as proxies for the whole world" and "to all Jerusalem at least") 

(3) these witnesses would have to be identifiable (not "impossible for us to now know"), so that their testimony could be corroborated by non-witnesses 

Paine even acknowledges that the descendants of the alleged witnesses to a public miracle would be sufficient to establish its historicity, writing that "[the Jews] are regularly descended from the people who lived in the times this resurrection and ascension is said to have happened, and they say it is not true" - implying that if they did say that these miracles happened, then we would believe them.

Guess which miraculous event meets these three criteria? The Giving of the Torah at Sinai! If you haven't yet read the entitled Torah from Sinai, then I recommend you drop everything and read it as soon as possible. For those who have read it, I will quote the passage that speaks most directly to Thomas Paine:

We are now in a position to determine what [sort of miraculous] event could be performed that would retain its validity for future generations. Since future generations cannot observe the event directly, it would have to be an event that rules out in its process of communication the causes of doubt due to the ignorance of the communicators and due to fabrication. A simple event grasped easily by the senses that occurs before a mass of people who later attest to its occurrence would fulfill the requirements. Such an event would have all the credibility of the most accepted historical fact. If we doubt either a simple event attested to by masses of people or a complex event attested to by qualified individuals, we would ipso facto have to doubt almost all the knowledge we have acquired in all the sciences, all the humanities, and in all the different disciplines existing today. Moreover we would have to desist from consulting with physicians, dentists, lawyers, mechanics, plumbers, electricians, or specialists in any field who work from an accepted body of knowledge. 

The event at Sinai fulfills the above requirements. The events witnessed as described were of a simple perceptual nature so that ordinary people could apprehend them. The event at Sinai was structured with the same built-in ingredients that cause us to accept any historical fact or any kind of secondhand knowledge ...

Someone may ask how we know that these events were as described in the Torah, clearly visible, and that they transpired before the entire nation. Perhaps this itself is a fabrication? The answer to this question is obvious. We accept a simple fact attested to by numerous observers because we consider mass conspiracy absurd. For the very same reason no public event can be fabricated, for we would have to assume a mass conspiracy of silence with regard to the occurrence of that event. If someone were to tell us that an atomic bomb was detonated over New York City fifty years ago, we would not accept it as true because we would assume that we would have certainly heard about it, had it actually occurred. The very factors which compel us to accept as true an account of an event of public proportion safeguards us against fabrication of such an event. 

Were this not so all of history could have been fabricated. Had the event at Sinai not actually occurred anyone fabricating it at any point in time would have met with the stiff refutation of the people, "had a mass event of that proportion ever occurred we surely would have heard of it." Fabrication of an event of public proportion is not within the realm of credibility. 

History corroborates this point. In spite of the strong religious instinct in man, no modern religion in over two thousand years has been able to base itself on public revelation. A modern religion demands some kind of verifiable occurrence in order to be accepted. For this reason the two major Western religions, Christianity and Islam, make recourse to the revelation at Sinai. Were it not for this need and the impossibility of manufacturing such evidence, they certainly would not have based their religions on another religion's revelation. 

[I cannot emphasize this enough: if you haven't read the aforementioned essay - or this version of the same argument, or this one - then I urge you to do so.]

This isn't the first time we've seen a great mind spell out the Torah mi'Sinai argument step by step, only to stop short of the logical conclusion which follows. Several years ago we wrote about how Sigmund Freud did just that in his Introductory Letters on Psychoanalysis (1916). Just this summer we wrote about how Mortimer Adler also glossed over Judaism's unique revelation claim in his Truth in Religion (1992).

I guess this just goes to show that just because someone is great thinker who lives in The Age of Reason and advocates for a Life of Reason doesn’t necessarily mean that he will reach the conclusions dictated by Reason.

Parashas Behaalosecha: Moshe's View of Miracles

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Artwork: Flamewake Phoenix, by Min Yum
This is NOT the type of bird-meat that Hashem would provide. 

Parashas Behaalosecha: Moshe's View of Miracles

Introduction

The episode in the wilderness known as Kivros ha'Taavah (the Graves of Desire) begins with Bnei Yisrael's craving for meat, instigated by the Erev Rav (Mixed Multitude):

The multitude that was among them cultivated a craving, and the Children of Israel also wept once more, and said: "Who will feed us meat? We remember the fish that we ate in Egypt free of charge: the cucumbers, melons, leeks, onions, and garlic. But now, our life is parched, there is nothing; we have nothing to anticipate but the mahn!" (Bamidbar 11:4-6)

Moshe Rabbeinu responds to their outcry in an uncharacteristically agitated manner:

Moshe said to Hashem: "Why have You done evil to Your servant? Why have I not found favor in Your eyes, that You place the burden of this entire people upon me? Did I conceive this entire people or did I give birth to it, that You say to me, 'Carry them in your bosom, as a nurse carries a suckling, to the Land that You swore to its forefathers'? Where shall I get meat to give to this entire people when they weep to me, saying, 'Give us meat that we may eat'? I alone cannot carry this entire nation, for it is too heavy for me! And if this is how You deal with me, then kill me now - if I have found favor in Your eyes - and let me not see my badness!" (ibid. 11:11-15)

Clearly there is a LOT to understand here. A full analysis of Moshe's reaction is beyond the scope of this blog post. I refer you to Rav Soloveitchik's shiur (available here in audio and here as a transcript). In this post I intend to focus only on Moshe's dialogue with Hashem regarding Bnei  Yisrael's demand for meat.

The Question

After instructing Moshe to gather 70 elders to help him bear the burden of leadership, Hashem tells Moshe how He intends to address Bnei Yisrael's demand for meat:

[Hashem said to Moshe:] "To the people you shall say: 'Prepare yourselves for tomorrow and you shall eat meat, for you have wept in the ears of Hashem, saying: Who will feed us meat? for it was better for us in Egypt! So Hashem will give you meat and you will eat. Not for one day shall you eat, nor for two days, nor for five days, nor for ten days, nor for twenty days. Until an entire month of days, until it comes out of your nose, and becomes nauseating to you, because you have rejected Hashem Who is in your midst, and you have wept before Him, saying: 'Why did we leave Egypt?'" (ibid. 11:18-20)

Hashem responds by telling Moshe to inform Bnei Yisrael that He will provide them with more meat than they can handle, as a way of rebuking them for their underlying desire to return to Egypt. One might expect Moshe to accept this without any problems. Instead, he bemoans the logistics of Hashem's plan:

Moshe said: "Six hundred thousand foot-soldiers are the people in whose midst I am, yet You say I shall give them meat, and they shall eat for a month of days?! Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? Or if all the fish of the sea will be gathered for them, would it suffice for them?" (ibid. 11:21-22)

On the surface it seems as though Moshe doubts Hashem's ability to miraculously provide meat! This reading of Moshe's words is supported by Hashem response to Moshe's question:

Hashem said to Moshe: "Is the hand of Hashem limited? Now you will see whether My word comes to pass or not!" (ibid. 11:23)

Hashem then provides meat by causing the wind to blow quail from the sea: "A wind went forth from Hashem and blew quail from the sea and spread them over the camp, a day's journey this way and a day's journey that way, all around the camp, two cubits above the face of the earth" (ibid. 11:31-32).

This exchange between Moshe and Hashem is problematic. The pesukim make it sound as though Moshe doubted Hashem's ability to provide meat for Bnei Yisrael. Our question is: What was Moshe thinking? After all, this is Moshe Rabbeinu we're talking about - the greatest navi who ever existed, through whom Hashem performed the miraculous Ten Plagues, the splitting of the sea, the mahn in the Wilderness, and a number of other miracles and wonders. How could he express incredulity about Hashem's ability to perform this simple miracle of providing meat for the nation?

The Ran's Answer

The Ran [1] provides an eye-opening answer to this question in the eighth drashah of his Drashos ha'Ran. As is my custom, I will first present a translation of the relevant excerpt - with my own paragraph breaks for clarity - and then I will summarize and comment on each point. The Ran writes:

Hashem's desire and will is to maintain the natural order (minhago shel olam) as much as possible; nature (teva) is precious in His eyes, and He will only change it if there is an absolute necessity. 

It is because of this that Moshe said: "Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? etc." for Moshe thought that Hashem would not generate a miracle and a wonder in order to fill their bellies with something that is not necessary. He was astonished and wondered how, by natural means, he would be able to provide enough meat for those people.

And since the natural order is precious in Hashem's eyes and He desires it, as we have written, then sometimes, when it becomes necessary for Him to do a miracle and a wonder, He will intermingle it with a natural phenomenon which will serve as a basis for that miracle - even though that natural phenomenon is not sufficient to bring about that miracle, but is merely a support for it.

An example of this what Elisha said to that woman from among the wives of the prophets' disciples: "[Elisha said:] 'Tell me: what do you have in the house?' and she said: 'Your maidservant has nothing in the house except for a jar of oil'" (Melachim II 4:2) and he responded to her: "Go, borrow vessels for yourself from the outside, from all your neighbors - empty vessels; do not be sparing" (ibid. 4:3). [Elisha then went on to miraculously fill all of the empty vessels with oil from that single original jar.]

There is no doubt that it would have been impossible within the laws of nature to produce that much oil from that jar - as impossible as if there were no oil there at all. Nevertheless, the navi's request was in line with Hashem's will that this miracle should have a natural basis to lean on. 

The Ran makes four points, which we will now summarize and briefly analyze.

Point #1: Nature is Precious in Hashem's Eyes

Truthfully, this point deserves its own blog post, since it has so many implications, and there is so much evidence to support it. Instead of writing my own thoughts about this, I will quote an excerpt from the introduction to a well-known essay written by my Rosh ha'Yeshiva:

Judaism, as seen through the eyes of the scholars of the Talmud, has its own unique religious orientation. While basing itself on a cataclysmic event – revelation, it does not look to miracles as the source of its intimate relationship with God. God's revelation at Sinai was a one-time occurrence never to be repeated. This is expressed in Deuteronomy 5:19, “a great voice which was not heard again.” In the mind of the Talmudic scholar God continuously reveals himself not through miracles but through the wisdom of his laws. These laws manifest themselves in Torah –the written and the oral law – and in nature. 

The Psalmist expresses this view most clearly. He speaks freely of the wonders of nature and the awe-inspiring universe as in Psalm 8:4, "When I look at the heavens, the work of Your fingers; the moon and stars which you have established". Psalm 104, dedicated to the wonders of nature, climaxes with the exclamation, "How many are Your works, O Lord! You have made them all with wisdom." Regarding the sheer intellectual joy one derives from studying Torah, he states, "The Torah of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul, the testimony of the Lord is trustworthy, making wise the simple person. The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart, the commandment of the Lord is lucid, enlightening the eye. The statutes of the Torah are true; they are all in total harmony. They are more to be desired than gold, even fine gold, and they are sweeter than honey and the honeycomb." 

When speaking of man's search for God the Psalmist states: "The Lord, from heaven, looked down upon the children of man, to see if there were any man of understanding searching for God" (Psalms 14:2). Man discovers God only through understanding. Accordingly, the righteous are depicted as being constantly involved in this process of searching for and discovering God. "But only in the Torah of the Lord is his desire, and in His Torah he mediates day and night" (Psalms 1:2). Maimonides sharply criticizes those who consider themselves religious and search for God through the miraculous. "Say to a person who believes himself to be of the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the womb of a woman and to form there the fetus, he will be satisfied with the account; he will believe it and even find in it a description of the greatness of God's might and wisdom; although he believes that the angel consists of burning fire and is as big as a third part of the Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes the limbs and he will turn away because he cannot comprehend the true greatness and power of bringing into existence forces active in a thing that cannot be perceived by the senses." 

While Judaism is based on a supernatural event, it is not oriented toward the supernatural. The essence of Judaism is not realized through religious fervor over the miraculous but through an appreciation of God's wisdom as revealed both in Torah and the natural world. A miracle, being a breach of God's law, does not contribute to this appreciation. This distinction is crucial since it gives Judaism its metaphysical uniqueness.

I believe that the view expressed by my Rosh ha'Yeshiva is what the Ran means when he says that nature is "precious in Hashem's eyes." He cannot mean that nature is "precious" to Hashem simply because He created it. This wouldn't warrant the word "precious," which implies that it is more valuable to Hashem (so to speak) than other things in His world. Rather, nature is "precious in Hashem's eyes" in that it provides the basis of man's relationship to Hashem - namely, the wisdom and beauty of the Divinely authored laws of nature. Nature is precious as a means of drawing closer to Hashem.

That, according to the Ran, is why Hashem is "reluctant" (so to speak) to do miracles, except when absolutely necessary. A miracle is a pgam (blemish) which mars the beauty of Hashem's wondrous laws of nature. 

Point #2: Conservation of Miracles

The Ran's second point is an explicit formulation of what I've heard some people refer to as "The Law of Conservation of Miracles." Hashem doesn't perform miracles gratuitously. Rather, He will only perform a miracle when it is "absolutely necessary." 

The Rambam [2] mentions an application of the Law of Conservation of Miracles in his discussion about nevuah (prophecy), emphasizing the point that all of Moshe's miracles were done out of practical necessity - not to establish his prophecy:

Israel did not believe in Moshe Rabbeinu because of the [miraculous] signs he performed, for one whose belief is based on miracles will have doubt in his heart, since it is possible that he did [these miracles] using illusions and trickery. Rather, all of the miracles he performed in the wilderness, he did out of necessity – not to bring a proof for his prophecy. He needed the Egyptians to be drowned – he split the sea and drowned them in it; we needed sustenance – he brought down the mahn; we were thirsty – he split the stone for them; the congregation of Korach denied him – he caused the earth to swallow them; and the same for all the other [miraculous] signs.

As a Chumash teacher I am often asked, "Why didn't Hashem solve such-and-such problem by miraculously doing such-and-such?" Although this question must be taken up on a case-by-case basis, the general answer can be boiled down to The Law of Conservation of Miracles: if a natural solution is possible, Hashem will not make recourse to miracles - and even when He does resort to miracles, He will minimize His intervention in the laws of nature as much as possible.

This is the basis of the Ran's answer to our question about Moshe's response to Hashem's proposed solution for the meat crisis ...

Point #3: Moshe's Response to the Meat Crisis

According to the Ran, Moshe's response ("Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? etc.") did not stem from any disbelief in Hashem's ability to do miracles. Rather, Moshe was operating under the assumption that God wouldn't do a miracle in this particular case. He reasoned that Hashem wouldn't do a miracle since it wasn't absolutely necessary for Bnei Yisrael to eat meat. Therefore, he assumed that the solution to Bnei Yisrael's dissatisfaction would have to be found within the laws of nature, and that seemed to be an impossible task to him. 

(Indeed, the Chizkuni [3] learns that Moshe thought that the 70 elders were appointed to help him with all of the meat-slaughtering. Part of his question, "Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them?" was:  "How can 71 men slaughter enough meat for 600,000 men?")

According to the Ran, Hashem's response to Moshe ("Is the hand of Hashem limited?") was not intended to rebuke Moshe for thinking that the hand of Hashem is limited; rather, His response was intended to correct Moshe's mistaken assumption that the meat would be provided by his hand rather than Hashem's hand. The rhetorical formulation of Hashem's rebuke was intended to highlight Moshe's mistake about whose hand would provide the meat.

(Unfortunately, I do not know of any commentary by the Ran on the second part of Hashem's response: "Now you will see whether My word comes to pass or not!" which seems to imply that Moshe did have some doubt as to whether the word of Hashem would come to pass. Let me know if you find or think of anything on this remaining question!)

Point #4: Miracles Via Nature

The Ran's fourth and final point is related to his first point. Because nature is precious in Hashem's eyes, then even when it becomes necessary for Him to do a miracle, He will do it by using a natural phenomenon as a "support" in order to convey his "reluctance" (so to speak) to completely do away with nature. 

The examples of this principle are too numerous to recount here. I'll just mention a few:

• Hashem could have just miraculously protect Noach, his family, and the animals. Instead, He made Noach build an ark and gather a male and female of each species. Undoubtedly, this ALSO required miraculous intervention - but the miracle was done using nature as a "support."
• The flood, itself, is an example of this. Hashem could have instantaneously "zapped" all of the evildoers. Instead, He utilized a natural disaster of miraculous proportions.
• Hashem could have designed the Ten Plagues to be completely supernatural. Instead, He utilized natural phenomena and caused them to behave in unnatural ways.
• Hashem could have split the sea by causing the waters to levitate or miraculously move aside on their own. Instead, "Hashem moved the sea with a strong east wind all the night" (Shemos 14:21).

This principle answers many questions about why Hashem performed specific miracles in the manner that He did. As the Creator of the universe yesh me'ayin (ex nihilo), of course Hashem could do miracles in any way He desires - and yet, He opts to incorporate nature as much as possible into these miraculous interventions in order to convey to us how precious nature is in His eyes.

Concluding Thoughts

I think there is an important lesson we can learn by comparing the popular view of miracles to Moshe's view miracles, as explained by the Ran. The Rambam [4] articulates the popular view in his Maamar Techiyas ha'Meisim: 

I will explain to you that which brought me to this approach, and that is that our aim and the aim of every intelligent person among the select few is opposite to the aim of the masses of people. For the most cherished and beloved thing to the masses of Torah-observant people, because of their ignorance, is to consider the Torah and human intellect to be two opposite poles. Everything which is incomprehensible to the intellect they consider to be a miracle. They flee from explaining something as a natural phenomenon whether it pertains to something recorded in the past, or in regard to something which is discernible at the present time, or whether it relates to something which is written will happen in the future. We, on the other hand, strive to reconcile the Torah with human intellect and regard everything in its natural light wherever possible, unless it is self-evident therefrom that it is of miraculous connotation and cannot be interpreted at all; then we are forced to say it is a miracle.

The "masses of Torah-observant people" look for miracles everywhere. They are eager to posit a miracle whenever possible. In their eyes, the more "miraculous" the miracle is, the better. Many even believe that nature diminishes Hashem's greatness and detracts from our ability to relate to Him.

From Moshe Rabbeinu we see that the Torah encourages the opposite of this orientation towards miracles. Moshe didn't expect Hashem to do a miracle for him, even though it would have solved a lot of problems, since he knew that Hashem only does miracles when they are absolutely necessary. Moshe knew that even when Hashem does perform a miracle, He uses natural phenomena as a "support" in order to convey how "precious" nature is in His eyes. The reason for this is because nature exhibits the wisdom of the Creator, and is our greatest vehicle for relating to Him. As tempting as it might be to seek out the miraculous as a basis for our relationship to God, His preference is for us to seek Him by appreciating the wondrous wisdom of His natural law: "How great are Your works, Hashem! With wisdom You made them all; the earth is full of Your creations" (Tehilim 104:24).

Indeed, this is why the Torah presents us not only the historical account of the miracles that Hashem did, but also includes the information we need in order to learn how Hashem wants us to relate to His miracles. The challenge is to set aside our own preconceived notions, wishes, and fantasies about Divine intervention, and instead, to learn about the ways of Hashem from the words and teachings of Hashem in His Torah.

[1] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha'Ran #8
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 8:1
[3] Rabbeinu Chezkiah ben Manoach, Commentary to Sefer Bamidbar 11:21-23
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead; see my post entitled On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud for a further exploration of this view