Chanukah 5783: The “Beloved” Mitzvah of Ner Chanukah

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "photograph of a lit menorah on a platform against a dark backdrop. camera is far away. center candle is taller than the other candles."

Chanukah 5783: The “Beloved” Mitzvah of Ner Chanukah

Rambam provides an unusual description of Ner Chanukah in Hilchos Megilah v’Chanukah 4:12:

The mitzvah of the Ner Chanukah is an exceedingly beloved mitzvah (mitzvah chavivah hee ad me’od), and a person must be careful with it in order to convey knowledge of the miracle and to increase the praise of God and thanksgiving to Him for the miracles He did. Even if a person is dependent on tzedakah for food, he must [nevertheless] beg [for money] or sell his clothing to buy oil and candles [so he can] kindle [the Ner Chanukah].

The Rav (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Mipninei ha’Rav pp. 187-188) asks: What makes Ner Chanukah more “beloved” than other mitzvos? If this is because of pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle), then Rambam’s characterization should extend to the other mitzvos of pirsumei nisa, such as the reading of Megilas Esther on Purim and the arbah kosos (four cups) and heseivah (reclining) on Pesach – yet, only Ner Chanukah is described by him as “beloved.”

The Rav answers based on a Gemara (Shabbos 22b) about the original miracle of the oil – not the miracle that occurred during Bayis Sheini which we commemorate on Chanukah, but the one that transpired on a more regular basis during Bayis Rishon and early Bayis Sheini. The Gemara begins with a rhetorical question: "Does [God] need the light [of the Menorah]?! Didn't the Children of Israel walk exclusively by His light for the entire forty years in the Wilderness?" The Gemara answers: "Rather, [the Menorah] is a testimony to mankind that the shechinah (divine presence) rests among Israel." The Gemara goes on to describe the miracle of the Ner Maaravi (western lamp of the Menorah). The Kohen would put an equal measure of oil into all the lamps of the Menorah, but whereas the other six would burn out at night, the Ner Maaravi would miraculously remain lit, allowing the Kohen to kindle from it again each evening. This miracle was not guaranteed. Rather, as Rashi (ibid.) explains, “as long as Israel was beloved (chaviv) [before Hashem, the Ner Maaravi] would be lit all day long, and that was its testimony.”  

In other words, the miracle of the Menorah's Ner Maaravi reflected Israel’s status as the Chosen Nation, and it was this selfsame “chosenness” that was imperiled by Greek Hellenism during the era of the Chashmonaim. Not only did Hashem save us from that threat, but He testified through the eight-day miracle of the oil that the shechinah continued to dwell in Israel. This, according to the Rav, is the meaning of Rambam’s characterization of Ner Chanukah as a “beloved” mitzvah: because Ner Chanukah is emblematic of our belovedness before Hashem.

But there remains one question which must be answered to fully appreciate the Rav’s idea: What do we mean by “shechinah”? Hashem is not physical and cannot “dwell” in any location, as Shlomo ha’Melech expressed in his tefilah at the dedication of Bayis Rishon: "Does God truly dwell on earth? Behold, the heavens and the highest heavens do not contain You, and surely not this Temple that I have built!" (I Melachim 8:27).

In his commentary on the pasuk: “I shall place My indwelling (mishkani) in your midst” (Vayikra 26:11), R’ Dovid Tzvi Hoffman (1843-1921) defines “shechinah” as “the manifest divine providence that determines the fate of Israel” (ha’hashgachah ha’elohis ha’geluyah she’kovaas es goral Yisrael). Although Israel’s fate is always under hashgachas Hashem (God’s providence), that hashgachah is not always manifest. But when we experience a miracle – whether an open miracle involving a suspension of the laws of nature, like the Ner Maaravi, or a hidden miracle, like our military victory over the Greeks – we refer to such a phenomenon as shechinah.

In light of this understanding of “shechinah,” we can appreciate a nuance in the Rav’s explanation of the Rambam. Ner Chanukah is “beloved” not only because it symbolizes shechinah, but also because it exemplifies shechinah. As Rabbi Yonatan Goldschmidt so eloquently expressed: “the miracle is not only that the light lasted eight days but that these [Chanukah] lights have lasted more than 2000 years.” The continued observance of Ner Chanukah by the Jewish people, despite everything that has happened, is the greatest manifestation of hashgachas Hashem.

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Chanukah 5781: Asking for Miracles on Chanukah

Note: most of my blog posts are written for general audiences, but this one required so much background in halachic practice and terminology that I decided to address it to those who are already familiar. For this reason, I've only translated and explained a small portion of the terms and halachic jargon. Had I attempted to maintain my usual style, the post would be cluttered and distracting.

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Chanukah 5781: Asking for Miracles on Chanukah 

Requesting Miracles at the End of Al Ha’Nissim 

On Chanukah we recite the Al ha’Nissim paragraph in the berachos of hodaah (thanksgiving) in the Shemoneh Esrei and Birkas ha’Mazon. The standard text of Al Ha’Nissim found in most Ashkenazic siddurim concludes with the following line: 

And they established these eight days of Chanukah to give thanks and to praise Your great name. 

However, there is another version of Al ha’Nissim which concludes in a radically different manner. Here is the conclusion of Al ha’Nissim in the Rambam’s [1] siddur: 

And You made for Yourself a great name in Your world, and for your people Israel you did a wonder and miracles. Just as You did miracles and mighty acts for them, so too, do miracles and mighty acts with us, at this time and season. 

We will henceforth refer to this bakashah (request) with the shorthand phrase k’shem (“just as”). This bakashah will likely seem strange to those who haven’t encountered it before. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the version of Al ha’Nissim with k’shem is more authentic than the version without it. 

The earliest written siddur was compiled by Rav Amram Gaon [2] (9th century). While the version of his siddur we have today is riddled with inaccuracies and later emendations, the Rishonim testify that his siddur included a version of the bakashah of k’shem. Here is what the critical edition of his siddur says: 

And they established these eight days of Chanukah with praise and thanksgiving to Your name. And just as You did a miracle with them, so too, do with us, Hashem our God, miracles and wonders at this time, and we will give thanks to Your great name, Selah. 

Likewise, the siddur of Saadia Gaon [3] (10th century) includes a version of the bakashah: 

And they established eight days of praise and thanksgiving to Your name. And just as You did miracles for the earlier [generations], so too, do [miracles] for the later [generations], and save us in these days like [You did] in those days. 

Indeed, it appears that the bakashah of k’shem dates back at least to the time that the “minor tractate” of Masechet Soferim was composed (estimated to be in the 8th century), as can be seen in 20:7: 

We say in [the berachah of] Thanksgiving: “and thanks for the wonders and salvation of Your Kohanim which You have wrought in the days of Matisyahu ben Yochanan Kohen Gadol, and the Chashmonaim, his sons. So too, do with us, Hashem our God and the God of our forefathers, miracles and wonders, and we will give thanks to Your name forever. 

The bakashah also appears in the writings of the majority of those Rishonim who recorded their views on the proper nusach ha’tefilah, such as the Machzor Vitry, Abudirham, Ri Bar Yakar, Rokeach, and Kol Bo. It is also found in the nuschaos of many other ancient communities around the globe, such as Yemen, Castile, Persia, Aram Zobah, and Rome. 

Not only is the inclusion of this bakashah rooted in the most authentic and authoritative versions of the nusach ha’tefilah, but it is also sanctioned by the leading halachic authorities followed by many Ashkenazic Jews today. Rav Yosef Karo [4], author of the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch, rules in both of his works that one may include this bakashah if one so desires, and the Rema [5], the leading halachic authority for Ashkenazim, does not dispute his ruling. The Mishnah Berurah [6] cites the Beit Yosef’s psak without providing any dissenting views from later Achronim. The Aruch ha’Shulchan [7] the inclusion of k’shem, saying that it was the custom in his community to say it. 

Considering the fact that the bakashah of k’shem enjoys the support of the majority of halachic authorities and likely reflects the original nusach ha’tefilah established by the Anshei Kneses ha’Gedolah, one must wonder: Why don't Ashkenazim say it? What does the opposition say?

The Leaders of the Opposition 

One of the earliest arguments against the inclusion of k’shem is advanced by the Maharam of Rothenberg [8] and the Sefer ha’Manhig [9] who write that one shouldn’t say it because “there shouldn’t be tefilah (i.e. requests) in hodaah (thanksgiving).” The middle berachos of the Shemoneh Esrei are the appropriate place for requests, but Modim is reserved for giving thanks, as the Gemara in Berachos 34a states: 

Rav Yehuda said: A person should never ask for his needs in the first three or the last three [berachos], but in the middle [berachos], for Rebbi Chanina said: the first three [berachos] are like a servant who arranges praises before his master, the middle [berachos] are like a servant who asks for a portion from his master, and the last three [berachos] are like a servant who has received a gift from his master and excuses himself and goes on his way. 

This line of reasoning is roundly attacked, both by those who disagree with their conclusion and even by those who agree. The Abudirham [10], who holds we should include k’shem, writes that “since it is for the needs of the many, one can say it.” He cites numerous examples where we do this: adding “u’khesov l’chayim tovim etc.” (“inscribe us for good life”) during the Aseres Ymei Teshuvah, incorporating “kein yegieinu etc.” (“so bring us”) into the blessing of hodaah at the end of the Magid section of the Haggadah, saying “kein techayeinu etc.” (“so bring us life”) in Modim de’Rabbanan. This same counterargument is echoed by the Meiri [11] who adds that “since the principal portion is hodaah, a little tefilah can’t hurt.” 

The Baalei Tosafos (Megilah 4a) are much harsher in voicing this same counterargument: 

There are those who don’t say k’shem because the Sages said, “a person may not ask for his needs in the first three or the last three berachos.” This is foolishness, since that reasoning only applies to someone who formulates an individual request, but anything on behalf of the community is permissible. 

They then go on to provide their own reasoning for not including k’shem: 

Rather, it seems that one shouldn’t say it because of another reason: since the Sages said (Pesachim 117b [12]) that everything pertaining to the future was established to be said [in reference to] the future, but hodaah pertains to the past, and [it is] because of this they established that Al ha’Nissim in [hodaah], which is about the past. 

The Tur mentions that some include the bakashah and some don’t. He cites the reason given by the Maharam and the Sefer ha’Manhig and the counterargument given by the Abudirham and the Meiri. After noting that Rav Amram’s siddur has it, the Tur says that his father, the Rosh, would not say it. 

It seems it is because of this small but influential band of Ashkenazic dissenters that most Ashkenazic siddurim did not end up including the bakashah, despite it being the majority view among the Rishonim. This may be regarded as another Chanukah-themed instance of “the many [being delivered] into the hands of the few.” 

Understanding the Disagreement 

What are we to make of this machlokess? The majority side has a strong counterargument. How can the Maharam and Manhig insist that Modim is not a place for this bakashah when there are so many exceptions to the rule, especially the seasonal bakashah of u’khesov l’chayim tovim? How can the Baalei Tosafos insist that k’shem has no place in Modim simply because the bakashah is about the future and Modim is about the past? And even though it is reasonable to assume that it is correct to include the bakashah of k’shem, the question is: Why was it instituted in the first place? Why are we asking Hashem to perform miracles for us as He did for them? Furthermore, how do we have the right to make such a request? 

Let us start with the Maharam and the Manhig. The Gemara’s analogy about the servant and master makes it easy to understand why inserting a bakashah into Modim would be inappropriate: it would constitute a pgam (blemish) in the act of hodaah. You should ask your master for something during the time when it is customary to ask your master for things, not during the time when you are supposed to be thanking him. In fact, if a servant did slip a request into his thanks, that might even throw the thanksgiving into question, making it seem like he had an alternative motive. (Think back to the last time someone gave you profusive thanks, then immediately asked you for a favor.) 

What about the exceptions to this “no bakashah during hodaah” rule mentioned by the Abudirham? Two of the exceptions – namely, the bakashah at the conclusion of Magid and the bakashah in Modim de’Rabbanan – are easy to dismiss on the basis that the restriction against adding a bakashah to hodaah applies specifically to modifying Modim in one’s actual Shemoneh Esrei. The difficult exception is u’kheskov l’chayim tovim. Perhaps the answer is that whereas k’shem is a bakashah for a specific good (i.e. miracles at this time), u’khesov is a bakashah for life itself. Such an essential request would not be a violation of protocol in the servant/master relationship because the very existence of the servant/master relationship depends upon the servant staying alive. Thus, it is not a problem for us to interrupt Modim by throwing ourselves at the mercy of our Master and asking Him to grant us life. It can even be argued that such a request is an expression of the hodaah we give him at the beginning of Modim when we refer to Him as the “Rock of our lives, shield of our salvation” and thank Him for “our lives, which are in Your hand, and our souls which are entrusted to You.” 

The Baalei Tosafos don’t care about the fact that k’shem is a bakashah, since they hold that only personal bakashos shouldn’t be added into Modim. All they care about is that “hodaah pertains to the past, and because of this they established that Al ha’Nissim in it, which is about the past,” whereas the bakashah of k’shem is about the future. At first glance, this sounds like irrelevant quibbling about tenses. Who cares that k’shem is about the future? 

In truth, I believe their objection is not about past versus future at all. Modim is about hodaah in general. Al ha’Nissim is about hodaah on a particular event. Thus, even though Al ha’Nissim deviates from the general theme of the berachah, it is still on topic insofar as it is still an expression of thanksgiving. But if within the added hodaah on a particular topic we also add a particular bakashah pertaining to the future – that would be too far removed from the theme of Modim, and would therefore be inappropriate. Imagine someone giving you a general account about their happy childhood. If in the midst of this account they segued into a nostalgic story about a pet dog they had growing up, you might regard this as a tangent, but you’ll still feel like it’s part of the conversation. But imagine if they conclude this story by asking you to come to the pet store with them later on this week to help them pick out a dog for their own child. You’d probably react by thinking: “Wait, what? I thought we were talking about your childhood!” A footnote with additional information? That’s fine. A non-informational footnote on an informational footnote introduces a completely new element? That’s too far afield. 

This leave us with our question on the majority view: Why are we asking Hashem to do miracles for us? Since when do we ask Hashem for miracles in tefilah? And why “at this time and season”? 

I believe the answer lies in an understanding of a fundamental theme of Chanukah. The Rambam [13] opens his discussion of Chanukah with the following: 

During the era of the second Beis ha’Mikdash, during the era of Malchus Yavan (the political sovereignty of Greece), they made decrees against Israel, abolished their religion, and did not allow them to be involved in Torah and mitzvos; the Greeks stretched forth their hands into Israel’s money and women; they entered into the Sanctuary, breached barriers, and rendered the pure impure; they caused Israel great distress and oppressed them exceedingly – until the God of our fathers had mercy on them and saved them from their hands. The Chashmonaim, the great Kohanim, overpowered them and killed them, and saved Israel from their hand. They appointed a melech (king) from the Kohanim, and the malchus (political sovereignty) returned to Israel for over 200 years until the destruction of the second Beis ha’Mikdash. 

It might look like the Rambam is just giving us some factual historical background to Chanukah, without engaging in any homiletics. However, take a look at the Rambam’s [14] very first description of Yemos ha’Moshiach (the Messianic Era) in the Mishneh Torah, in Hilchos Teshuvah: 

Because of this, all the Prophets and Wise Men of Israel desired the era of the Melech ha'Moshiach, so that they can gain relief from the evil malchus which does not allow them to be involved in Torah and mitzvos properly, so that they can find tranquility and increase their wisdom and merit life in Olam ha'Ba. 

In those days [of the Melech ha'Moshiach] there will be an increase of knowledge, wisdom, and truth, as it is stated, "For the entire world will be filled with knowledge of Hashem" (Yeshaya 11:9) … Yemos ha'Moshiach is Olam ha'Zeh, and the world will continue in its natural order - except that the malchus will return to Israel. The Early Sages said: "The only difference between Olam ha'Zeh and Yemos ha'Moshiach is shibude malchiyos (our subjugation to foreign political sovereignty) alone." 

The parallels are clear. During the events of Chanukah we were subjugated to a malchus which didn’t allow us to keep Torah and mitzvos properly, and which cut us off from the pursuit of knowledge, wisdom and truth. That malchus was uprooted and Malchus Yisrael (Jewish Sovereignty) was restored, granting us the opportunity to flourish in Torah once again … that is, until we lost our malchus again and our current exile began. In our current exile we find ourselves subjugated to a malchus which doesn’t allow us to keep Torah and mitzvos properly. This political subjugation, according to the Rambam, is the only difference between the current era and Yemos ha’Moshiach. One day the obstructive malchus will be uprooted and Malchus Yisrael will be restored permanently, enabling us to flourish in Torah like never before. 

In light of this, the appropriateness of k’shem is clear: by asking Hashem to save us as He saved them, we are acknowledging that the Chanukah salvation was not standalone event, but rather, was one step on the journey towards the ultimate redemption – a journey we are still on, and have been on for the nearly 2000 years since the Chanukah story ended. In fact, our inclusion of the bakashah of k’shem serves a dual role: (a) it contextualizes the events of Chanukah within the arc of Jewish history, stretching from the past through the present and into the future, thereby achieving the objective of pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle) by highlighting the fact that the Chanukah redemption was incomplete and has yet to reach its culmination; (b) the bakashah is a natural extension of the hakaras ha’tov (recognition of the good) central to Modim: our recognition of the true good of the Chanukah salvation moves us to ask Hashem to bring about the full version of that good in our lifetimes. 

To sum it up: 

- the Maharam and Sefer ha’Manhig object to including bakashah in hodaah because it’s a pgam in the hodaah (unless it’s a bakashah for life itself, which is the very premise of the hodaah) 

- the Baalei Tosafos object to this bakashah because its fundamentally different character, in content and tense, renders it too “off-script” to blend into the hodaah established by the Sages 

- everyone else holds that the bakashah is appropriate because it contextualizes what we’re thanking Hashem for and underscores our yearning for that good to come to fruition 

That’s all I’ve got! If you have a different or sharper explanation, I’m all ears! 

Asking for a Miracle on Chanukah 5781/2020 

As I mentioned before, the Shulchan Aruch, Rema, Mishnah Berurah, and Aruch ha’Shulchan all hold that a person may insert this bakashah if they so choose. I don’t know about you, but this year more than ever I think we are in need of miracles. If the poskim say it’s okay to insert k’shem, then it’s something we should at least consider. 

If you’re bothered by the audacity of asking Hashem to do miracles for us, considering His conservative stance on miracles and our assumed lack of merit, I’d like to quote from the commentary of the Bechor Shor [15] who addresses the question of whether we have the right to ask for a miracle in tefilah: 

Certainly an individual may not daven for a [personal] miracle, for who is to say that he is worthy? But if he davens that a miracle should be done on behalf of the many – like in the liturgy: “May the Merciful One do miracles for us” – then this is fine. Likewise, all the texts in the piyyutim (liturgical poems) which mention that we daven for a miracle – all of them are in the plural … 

Furthermore, we must differentiate between miracles that are done in a natural manner – such as the wars of the Chashmonaim, which were miracles done in a natural manner – which is not the case regarding the transformation of a female into a male [as described in the Gemara Berachos 60a in which Leah asked that the baby she was carrying be transformed from a male into a female], which is a miracle not done in a natural manner at all. [To daven for a miracle] like that would be a tefilas shav (a prayer in vain). [Therefore,] one must be careful not to daven that a miracle be done for him which is outside of the natural manner. 

According to the Bechor Shor, there are clear limitations on what types of miracles we may daven for. However, if we daven for miracles which (a) are not personal, but are “for the many,” and (b) are “hidden miracles” rather than supernatural miracles which overtly violate the laws of nature, then such a bakashah would be acceptable. And guess what makes a great paradigm for that category? The miracle of “the wars of the Chashmonaim” in the events of Chanukah! Perhaps this is why the Rambam’s version of Al ha’Nissim doesn’t mention the miracle of the oil, but only the miracle of the war: when, according to the Rambam, we say “just as You did miracles and mighty acts for them, so too, do miracles and mighty acts with us at this time and season,” we are asking Hashem to do non-supernatural miracles for the sake of the Jewish people at large – not supernatural miracles for our own personal benefit. 

When we look around us at all the suffering we have witnessed and experienced in 2020, there is ample need for non-supernatural miracles to help the public: miracles to bring a swift end to the pandemic, whether through expediency in science and technology or by other means; miracles to help the economy; miracles to minimize to minimize the damage being done by the government and its politicians; miracles to unite this fractured country; miracles to assure Israel’s safety in the face of shifting world powers; miracles to help us learn from the many mistakes made by so many people this year. It is miracles like these which are worth davening for at this time and in this season. 

But if we choose to insert the bakashah of k’shem, we must remember that the miraculous solutions we yearn for are a means to a very specific end: so that we can be involved in the good for its own sake, which is “an increase of knowledge, wisdom, and truth,” which will lead to the fulfillment of the prophecy: "For the entire world will be filled with knowledge of Hashem.” 

Just as Hashem did miracles and mighty acts for them, so too, may He do miracles and mighty acts with us, at this time and season. Have a happy and healthy Chanukah! 

Endnotes

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Ahavah, Sidur ha’Tefilah 

[2] Amram Gaon: Seder Rav Amram Gaon, Seder Chanukah (Haparnas, 1984) 

[3] Saadia Gaon: Sidur Rav Saadia Gaon (Reuven Mass) 

[4] Rav Yosef Karo: Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 682:6; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 682:3 

[5] Rav Moshe Isserless: Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 682:3 

[6] Rav Yisroel Meir ha’Kohen Kagan: Mishnah Berurah 682:8 

[7] Rav Yechiel Michel Ha’Levi Epstein: Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 682:2 

[8] Rabbeinu Meir ben Baruch of Rothenberg: Tshuvos, Psakim, u’Minhagim Chelek 1 Siman 612 

[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Nosson: Sefer ha’Manhig, Hilchos Megilah p.247 

[10] Rabbeinu David ben Yosef: Abudirham, Commentary on Al ha’Nissim 

[11] Rabbeinu Menachem ha’Meiri: Beis ha’Bechirah, Berachos 34a 

[12] The citation of Pesachim 117b is printed in the standard Tosafos, but I couldn’t find this exact quotation. Abraham Katz, in the Facebook group Passages of Rite: Exploring the History of Nusach Hatefilah, says that Tosafos is paraphrasing the Talmud Yerushalmi in Berachos (Perek 4 Daf 8 Line 1) which says: “Anything which [pertains to that which is] to come should be said in [the berachah of] Avodah, and anything which [pertains] to the past should be said in [the berachah of] Hodaah. And the mishnah said: 'one should give thanks for the past and cry out [in supplication] about the future.'" I subsequently took another look at Pesachim 117b and realized that the Gemara is dealing with particular differences in tense: “gaal Yisroel” vs. “goel Yisrael” and “kideshanu b’mitzvosecha” and “kadsheinu b’mitzvosecha.” Perhaps Tosafos is just drawing a universal principle from the cases mentioned there. The Meiri certainly seems to think so. To my mind, this weakens the argument of the Baalei Tosafos here, since those who include k’shem are not changing the text of Al ha’Nissim established by Chazal by adding the bakashah, but rather, they’re claiming that this bakashah was established by Chazal from the get-go. 

[13] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Chanukah 3:1 

[14] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 9:2 

[15] Rabbeinu Yosef ben Yitzchak (Bechor Shor), Commentary on Talmud Bavli Maseches Shabbos 21a

Parashas Behaalosecha: Moshe's View of Miracles

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Artwork: Flamewake Phoenix, by Min Yum
This is NOT the type of bird-meat that Hashem would provide. 

Parashas Behaalosecha: Moshe's View of Miracles

Introduction

The episode in the wilderness known as Kivros ha'Taavah (the Graves of Desire) begins with Bnei Yisrael's craving for meat, instigated by the Erev Rav (Mixed Multitude):

The multitude that was among them cultivated a craving, and the Children of Israel also wept once more, and said: "Who will feed us meat? We remember the fish that we ate in Egypt free of charge: the cucumbers, melons, leeks, onions, and garlic. But now, our life is parched, there is nothing; we have nothing to anticipate but the mahn!" (Bamidbar 11:4-6)

Moshe Rabbeinu responds to their outcry in an uncharacteristically agitated manner:

Moshe said to Hashem: "Why have You done evil to Your servant? Why have I not found favor in Your eyes, that You place the burden of this entire people upon me? Did I conceive this entire people or did I give birth to it, that You say to me, 'Carry them in your bosom, as a nurse carries a suckling, to the Land that You swore to its forefathers'? Where shall I get meat to give to this entire people when they weep to me, saying, 'Give us meat that we may eat'? I alone cannot carry this entire nation, for it is too heavy for me! And if this is how You deal with me, then kill me now - if I have found favor in Your eyes - and let me not see my badness!" (ibid. 11:11-15)

Clearly there is a LOT to understand here. A full analysis of Moshe's reaction is beyond the scope of this blog post. I refer you to Rav Soloveitchik's shiur (available here in audio and here as a transcript). In this post I intend to focus only on Moshe's dialogue with Hashem regarding Bnei  Yisrael's demand for meat.

The Question

After instructing Moshe to gather 70 elders to help him bear the burden of leadership, Hashem tells Moshe how He intends to address Bnei Yisrael's demand for meat:

[Hashem said to Moshe:] "To the people you shall say: 'Prepare yourselves for tomorrow and you shall eat meat, for you have wept in the ears of Hashem, saying: Who will feed us meat? for it was better for us in Egypt! So Hashem will give you meat and you will eat. Not for one day shall you eat, nor for two days, nor for five days, nor for ten days, nor for twenty days. Until an entire month of days, until it comes out of your nose, and becomes nauseating to you, because you have rejected Hashem Who is in your midst, and you have wept before Him, saying: 'Why did we leave Egypt?'" (ibid. 11:18-20)

Hashem responds by telling Moshe to inform Bnei Yisrael that He will provide them with more meat than they can handle, as a way of rebuking them for their underlying desire to return to Egypt. One might expect Moshe to accept this without any problems. Instead, he bemoans the logistics of Hashem's plan:

Moshe said: "Six hundred thousand foot-soldiers are the people in whose midst I am, yet You say I shall give them meat, and they shall eat for a month of days?! Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? Or if all the fish of the sea will be gathered for them, would it suffice for them?" (ibid. 11:21-22)

On the surface it seems as though Moshe doubts Hashem's ability to miraculously provide meat! This reading of Moshe's words is supported by Hashem response to Moshe's question:

Hashem said to Moshe: "Is the hand of Hashem limited? Now you will see whether My word comes to pass or not!" (ibid. 11:23)

Hashem then provides meat by causing the wind to blow quail from the sea: "A wind went forth from Hashem and blew quail from the sea and spread them over the camp, a day's journey this way and a day's journey that way, all around the camp, two cubits above the face of the earth" (ibid. 11:31-32).

This exchange between Moshe and Hashem is problematic. The pesukim make it sound as though Moshe doubted Hashem's ability to provide meat for Bnei Yisrael. Our question is: What was Moshe thinking? After all, this is Moshe Rabbeinu we're talking about - the greatest navi who ever existed, through whom Hashem performed the miraculous Ten Plagues, the splitting of the sea, the mahn in the Wilderness, and a number of other miracles and wonders. How could he express incredulity about Hashem's ability to perform this simple miracle of providing meat for the nation?

The Ran's Answer

The Ran [1] provides an eye-opening answer to this question in the eighth drashah of his Drashos ha'Ran. As is my custom, I will first present a translation of the relevant excerpt - with my own paragraph breaks for clarity - and then I will summarize and comment on each point. The Ran writes:

Hashem's desire and will is to maintain the natural order (minhago shel olam) as much as possible; nature (teva) is precious in His eyes, and He will only change it if there is an absolute necessity. 

It is because of this that Moshe said: "Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? etc." for Moshe thought that Hashem would not generate a miracle and a wonder in order to fill their bellies with something that is not necessary. He was astonished and wondered how, by natural means, he would be able to provide enough meat for those people.

And since the natural order is precious in Hashem's eyes and He desires it, as we have written, then sometimes, when it becomes necessary for Him to do a miracle and a wonder, He will intermingle it with a natural phenomenon which will serve as a basis for that miracle - even though that natural phenomenon is not sufficient to bring about that miracle, but is merely a support for it.

An example of this what Elisha said to that woman from among the wives of the prophets' disciples: "[Elisha said:] 'Tell me: what do you have in the house?' and she said: 'Your maidservant has nothing in the house except for a jar of oil'" (Melachim II 4:2) and he responded to her: "Go, borrow vessels for yourself from the outside, from all your neighbors - empty vessels; do not be sparing" (ibid. 4:3). [Elisha then went on to miraculously fill all of the empty vessels with oil from that single original jar.]

There is no doubt that it would have been impossible within the laws of nature to produce that much oil from that jar - as impossible as if there were no oil there at all. Nevertheless, the navi's request was in line with Hashem's will that this miracle should have a natural basis to lean on. 

The Ran makes four points, which we will now summarize and briefly analyze.

Point #1: Nature is Precious in Hashem's Eyes

Truthfully, this point deserves its own blog post, since it has so many implications, and there is so much evidence to support it. Instead of writing my own thoughts about this, I will quote an excerpt from the introduction to a well-known essay written by my Rosh ha'Yeshiva:

Judaism, as seen through the eyes of the scholars of the Talmud, has its own unique religious orientation. While basing itself on a cataclysmic event – revelation, it does not look to miracles as the source of its intimate relationship with God. God's revelation at Sinai was a one-time occurrence never to be repeated. This is expressed in Deuteronomy 5:19, “a great voice which was not heard again.” In the mind of the Talmudic scholar God continuously reveals himself not through miracles but through the wisdom of his laws. These laws manifest themselves in Torah –the written and the oral law – and in nature. 

The Psalmist expresses this view most clearly. He speaks freely of the wonders of nature and the awe-inspiring universe as in Psalm 8:4, "When I look at the heavens, the work of Your fingers; the moon and stars which you have established". Psalm 104, dedicated to the wonders of nature, climaxes with the exclamation, "How many are Your works, O Lord! You have made them all with wisdom." Regarding the sheer intellectual joy one derives from studying Torah, he states, "The Torah of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul, the testimony of the Lord is trustworthy, making wise the simple person. The precepts of the Lord are upright, rejoicing the heart, the commandment of the Lord is lucid, enlightening the eye. The statutes of the Torah are true; they are all in total harmony. They are more to be desired than gold, even fine gold, and they are sweeter than honey and the honeycomb." 

When speaking of man's search for God the Psalmist states: "The Lord, from heaven, looked down upon the children of man, to see if there were any man of understanding searching for God" (Psalms 14:2). Man discovers God only through understanding. Accordingly, the righteous are depicted as being constantly involved in this process of searching for and discovering God. "But only in the Torah of the Lord is his desire, and in His Torah he mediates day and night" (Psalms 1:2). Maimonides sharply criticizes those who consider themselves religious and search for God through the miraculous. "Say to a person who believes himself to be of the wise men of Israel that the Almighty sends His angel to enter the womb of a woman and to form there the fetus, he will be satisfied with the account; he will believe it and even find in it a description of the greatness of God's might and wisdom; although he believes that the angel consists of burning fire and is as big as a third part of the Universe, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tell him that God gave the seed a formative power which produces and shapes the limbs and he will turn away because he cannot comprehend the true greatness and power of bringing into existence forces active in a thing that cannot be perceived by the senses." 

While Judaism is based on a supernatural event, it is not oriented toward the supernatural. The essence of Judaism is not realized through religious fervor over the miraculous but through an appreciation of God's wisdom as revealed both in Torah and the natural world. A miracle, being a breach of God's law, does not contribute to this appreciation. This distinction is crucial since it gives Judaism its metaphysical uniqueness.

I believe that the view expressed by my Rosh ha'Yeshiva is what the Ran means when he says that nature is "precious in Hashem's eyes." He cannot mean that nature is "precious" to Hashem simply because He created it. This wouldn't warrant the word "precious," which implies that it is more valuable to Hashem (so to speak) than other things in His world. Rather, nature is "precious in Hashem's eyes" in that it provides the basis of man's relationship to Hashem - namely, the wisdom and beauty of the Divinely authored laws of nature. Nature is precious as a means of drawing closer to Hashem.

That, according to the Ran, is why Hashem is "reluctant" (so to speak) to do miracles, except when absolutely necessary. A miracle is a pgam (blemish) which mars the beauty of Hashem's wondrous laws of nature. 

Point #2: Conservation of Miracles

The Ran's second point is an explicit formulation of what I've heard some people refer to as "The Law of Conservation of Miracles." Hashem doesn't perform miracles gratuitously. Rather, He will only perform a miracle when it is "absolutely necessary." 

The Rambam [2] mentions an application of the Law of Conservation of Miracles in his discussion about nevuah (prophecy), emphasizing the point that all of Moshe's miracles were done out of practical necessity - not to establish his prophecy:

Israel did not believe in Moshe Rabbeinu because of the [miraculous] signs he performed, for one whose belief is based on miracles will have doubt in his heart, since it is possible that he did [these miracles] using illusions and trickery. Rather, all of the miracles he performed in the wilderness, he did out of necessity – not to bring a proof for his prophecy. He needed the Egyptians to be drowned – he split the sea and drowned them in it; we needed sustenance – he brought down the mahn; we were thirsty – he split the stone for them; the congregation of Korach denied him – he caused the earth to swallow them; and the same for all the other [miraculous] signs.

As a Chumash teacher I am often asked, "Why didn't Hashem solve such-and-such problem by miraculously doing such-and-such?" Although this question must be taken up on a case-by-case basis, the general answer can be boiled down to The Law of Conservation of Miracles: if a natural solution is possible, Hashem will not make recourse to miracles - and even when He does resort to miracles, He will minimize His intervention in the laws of nature as much as possible.

This is the basis of the Ran's answer to our question about Moshe's response to Hashem's proposed solution for the meat crisis ...

Point #3: Moshe's Response to the Meat Crisis

According to the Ran, Moshe's response ("Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them? etc.") did not stem from any disbelief in Hashem's ability to do miracles. Rather, Moshe was operating under the assumption that God wouldn't do a miracle in this particular case. He reasoned that Hashem wouldn't do a miracle since it wasn't absolutely necessary for Bnei Yisrael to eat meat. Therefore, he assumed that the solution to Bnei Yisrael's dissatisfaction would have to be found within the laws of nature, and that seemed to be an impossible task to him. 

(Indeed, the Chizkuni [3] learns that Moshe thought that the 70 elders were appointed to help him with all of the meat-slaughtering. Part of his question, "Can sheep and cattle be slaughtered for them and suffice for them?" was:  "How can 71 men slaughter enough meat for 600,000 men?")

According to the Ran, Hashem's response to Moshe ("Is the hand of Hashem limited?") was not intended to rebuke Moshe for thinking that the hand of Hashem is limited; rather, His response was intended to correct Moshe's mistaken assumption that the meat would be provided by his hand rather than Hashem's hand. The rhetorical formulation of Hashem's rebuke was intended to highlight Moshe's mistake about whose hand would provide the meat.

(Unfortunately, I do not know of any commentary by the Ran on the second part of Hashem's response: "Now you will see whether My word comes to pass or not!" which seems to imply that Moshe did have some doubt as to whether the word of Hashem would come to pass. Let me know if you find or think of anything on this remaining question!)

Point #4: Miracles Via Nature

The Ran's fourth and final point is related to his first point. Because nature is precious in Hashem's eyes, then even when it becomes necessary for Him to do a miracle, He will do it by using a natural phenomenon as a "support" in order to convey his "reluctance" (so to speak) to completely do away with nature. 

The examples of this principle are too numerous to recount here. I'll just mention a few:

• Hashem could have just miraculously protect Noach, his family, and the animals. Instead, He made Noach build an ark and gather a male and female of each species. Undoubtedly, this ALSO required miraculous intervention - but the miracle was done using nature as a "support."
• The flood, itself, is an example of this. Hashem could have instantaneously "zapped" all of the evildoers. Instead, He utilized a natural disaster of miraculous proportions.
• Hashem could have designed the Ten Plagues to be completely supernatural. Instead, He utilized natural phenomena and caused them to behave in unnatural ways.
• Hashem could have split the sea by causing the waters to levitate or miraculously move aside on their own. Instead, "Hashem moved the sea with a strong east wind all the night" (Shemos 14:21).

This principle answers many questions about why Hashem performed specific miracles in the manner that He did. As the Creator of the universe yesh me'ayin (ex nihilo), of course Hashem could do miracles in any way He desires - and yet, He opts to incorporate nature as much as possible into these miraculous interventions in order to convey to us how precious nature is in His eyes.

Concluding Thoughts

I think there is an important lesson we can learn by comparing the popular view of miracles to Moshe's view miracles, as explained by the Ran. The Rambam [4] articulates the popular view in his Maamar Techiyas ha'Meisim: 

I will explain to you that which brought me to this approach, and that is that our aim and the aim of every intelligent person among the select few is opposite to the aim of the masses of people. For the most cherished and beloved thing to the masses of Torah-observant people, because of their ignorance, is to consider the Torah and human intellect to be two opposite poles. Everything which is incomprehensible to the intellect they consider to be a miracle. They flee from explaining something as a natural phenomenon whether it pertains to something recorded in the past, or in regard to something which is discernible at the present time, or whether it relates to something which is written will happen in the future. We, on the other hand, strive to reconcile the Torah with human intellect and regard everything in its natural light wherever possible, unless it is self-evident therefrom that it is of miraculous connotation and cannot be interpreted at all; then we are forced to say it is a miracle.

The "masses of Torah-observant people" look for miracles everywhere. They are eager to posit a miracle whenever possible. In their eyes, the more "miraculous" the miracle is, the better. Many even believe that nature diminishes Hashem's greatness and detracts from our ability to relate to Him.

From Moshe Rabbeinu we see that the Torah encourages the opposite of this orientation towards miracles. Moshe didn't expect Hashem to do a miracle for him, even though it would have solved a lot of problems, since he knew that Hashem only does miracles when they are absolutely necessary. Moshe knew that even when Hashem does perform a miracle, He uses natural phenomena as a "support" in order to convey how "precious" nature is in His eyes. The reason for this is because nature exhibits the wisdom of the Creator, and is our greatest vehicle for relating to Him. As tempting as it might be to seek out the miraculous as a basis for our relationship to God, His preference is for us to seek Him by appreciating the wondrous wisdom of His natural law: "How great are Your works, Hashem! With wisdom You made them all; the earth is full of Your creations" (Tehilim 104:24).

Indeed, this is why the Torah presents us not only the historical account of the miracles that Hashem did, but also includes the information we need in order to learn how Hashem wants us to relate to His miracles. The challenge is to set aside our own preconceived notions, wishes, and fantasies about Divine intervention, and instead, to learn about the ways of Hashem from the words and teachings of Hashem in His Torah.

[1] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha'Ran #8
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 8:1
[3] Rabbeinu Chezkiah ben Manoach, Commentary to Sefer Bamidbar 11:21-23
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead; see my post entitled On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud for a further exploration of this view

On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud

Originally published in March 2013. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Counterspell, by Zack Stella - or an abstract rendition of Choni ha'Maagal

On Interpreting "Miracle Stories" in the Talmud

The author of the Haggadah quotes the last Mishnah in the first chapter of Berachos:

R' Elazar ben Azaryah said: I am like a seventy-year-old man, yet I did not merit [to prove that] the Exodus from Egypt must be mentioned at night until Ben Zoma expounded it [from the verse], as it is stated: “So that you will remember the day of your departure from Mitzrayim all the days of your life” (Devarim 16:3). “The days of your life” indicates the days. “All the days of your life” indicates the nights. The Sages say: “The days of your life” indicates this world. “All the days of your life” comes to include the Messianic Era.

R' Elazar ben Azaryah's statement is peculiar. Why does he say, "I am like a seventy-year-old man" and not simply, "I am a seventy-year-old man"?

The Gemara (Berachos 27b-28a) addresses this question. R' Elazar ben Azaryah was being considered as a candidate for the office of nassi, the head of the Sanhedrin (Supreme Court). He was hesitant about accepting the position, so he consulted his wife. She expressed her concern about his youthful appearance. The Gemara states: 

She said to him: “You have no white hair.” He was eighteen years old that day, and a miracle was done for him and eighteen rows of hair [on his beard] turned white. That is why R. Elazar ben Azaryah said: “Behold I am like a seventy-year-old man,” and he did not say, "I am a seventy year old man."

Most people take the Gemara's account at face value: a miracle was done for R' Elazar ben Azaryah, and his beard turned white. There doesn't seem to be anything objectionable about the Gemara's explanation.

The Rambam [1] begs to differ. In his commentary on that Mishnah he writes: 

Regarding the statement of R’ Elazar ben Azaryah, “Behold, I am like a seventy-year-old man” He didn’t say, “I am seventy years old” because he wasn’t seventy years old; he was but a young lad. However, he exerted himself in his learning and reading, day and night, until his bodily powers weakened and aged, and he became like a seventy-year-old man. He brought old age upon himself intentionally, as it is stated in the Talmud. For this reason he said, “In spite of my tremendous effort and my learning with other wise men, I did not merit to discover the allusion in the Written Torah for the obligation to read the paragraph of tzitzis at night until Ben Zoma expounded it.”

Not only does the Rambam explain R' Elazar ben Azaryah's elderly appearance in an entirely naturalistic way, but he cites our Gemara as his source! Even though Chazal go out of their way to ascribe R' Elazar ben Azaryah's transformation to a miracle, the Rambam doesn't see this as a sufficient reason to abandon a naturalistic explanation. 

The question is: How can the Rambam (seemingly) ignore Chazal's words? It would be one thing if the Gemara merely described a wondrous transformation in R' Elazar ben Azaryah's appearance without explicitly using the term "miracle" - but the Gemara does use the term "miracle"! What gives the Rambam the right to ignore the Gemara's plain meaning?

This isn't the first time we've seen a Rishon interpret such an event naturalistically in the face of Chazal's assertion that a miracle was involved. Several years ago I wrote a dvar Torah about Yocheved's age when she gave birth to Moshe. The Gemara (Bava Basra 119b) explicitly states that Yocheved was 130 years old when she gave birth to Moshe, and that this childbirth involved a miracle. Nevertheless, the Ibn Ezra and Ralbag disregard the Gemara's statement and offer a naturalistic interpretation. They, like the Rambam, seem to ignore Chazal's express statement that a miracle was done for Yocheved. 

Ralbag [2] goes even further than this. He writes that Chazal only said that Yocheved's childbirth was a miracle “for the benefit of the masses, to establish in their hearts the power of Hashem’s ability to do miracles.” In other words, Ralbag maintains that even Chazal didn't believe that Yocheved miraculously gave birth at the age of 130. Nevertheless, Chazal taught that a miracle was done for Yocheved in order to underscore the fundamental belief in miracles. 

Some might object to the Ralbag's statement, saying: "How can the Ralbag maintain that Chazal didn't mean exactly what they said? How can he say that Chazal believed one thing, but taught something else in public? Since when do Chazal conceal their opinions from the masses?" ... and that's when the objections start to break down. Anyone who is familiar with the way that the Rishonim approach midrashim knows that Chazal write cryptically. There are thousands of midrashim in which Chazal said things which they didn't intend to be taken literally, or made statements which contain "secret ideas" that were not intended for the masses. 

Indeed, Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam, in his essay on the drashos of Chazal [3], mentions "taking midrashic miracle stories literally" as an example of superficial approaches to the drashos of Chazal: 

[Those who study my essay on midrashim] will be saved from thinking that the [events recorded in midrashim involved] miraculous occurrences are like those which were done for the prophets, and that such miracles are done for every wise and pious person, and that there is no difference between the splitting of the sea for Moshe and the Jews who left Egypt or the parting of the Yarden for Elisha and Eliyahu, and the like. These conclusions are only necessary if you take these drashos literally, or based on a superficial reading.

R' Avraham ben ha'Rambam then goes on at length to demonstrate that Chazal used hyperbole in their midrashic teachings:

There are many incidents that actually happened but were exaggerated in the belief that no reasonable person would mistake their meaning. The Rabbis condoned the use of exaggeration, saying, "The Torah used overstatement, the prophets used overstatement, and the Sages used overstatement." 

The Torah used hyperbole, like in the verse, "Great cities fortified to the skies" (Deuteronomy 1:28). The prophets used hyperbole, like in the verse, "The people were playing flutes and rejoicing with great joy; the ground burst from their noise" (1 Melachim 1:40). The Sages exaggerated when they described the heap of ashes on the altar [saying that there were three hundred kor of ashes - an immense quantity - on the altar]; they exaggerated when they spoke of the golden vine [on which the people used to hang their gifts of gold for the Beis ha'Mikdash, saying that it took three hundred kohanim to collect those gifts]; and they exaggerated when they described the curtain that separated the Kodesh ha'Kodashim from the Sanctuary, [saying that it was so heavy that it took three hundred kohanim to immerse it in a mikveh] (Tamid 29a). 

These are just three examples in the Mishnah, but in the Gemara there are countless cases of exaggeration. To cite one example: Rabbah and R' Zeira had the Purim feast together. They became intoxicated, and Rabbah got up and slew R' Zeira. On the next day Rabbah prayed for R' Zeira and revived him (Megillah 7b). What it means is that Rabbah beat R' Zeira and wounded him so badly that R' Zeira was near death. The Gemara uses the phrase "he slew him" because the wound was life-threatening, or it might have been on the throat. And the word achyei [he revived him] means "he recovered." The term achyei is often used for that meaning. Many similar stories are found in the Talmud.

It is clear from these Rishonim that Chazal didn't intend for everything they wrote in their midrashim to be taken literally, and that they chose to formulate their teachings in this way for a variety of reasons. For instance Rambam states that one of the Sages in the Gemara "responded to his student incorrectly, in accordance with the student's inadequate understanding of the matter, as it is stated, 'Answer a fool according to his foolishness' (Mishlei 26:4)" (Introduction to Perek Chelek). 

Perhaps the most astounding example of this is provided by the Rashba. Rashba writes [4] that these drashos were often given in public. "[The Sages] would go on at length with beneficial, but the people would be sleeping. In order to wake them up, [the Sages] would say crazy things to shock them and rouse them from their sleep." He cites the following amusing example from Shir ha'Shirim Rabbah 1:3:

Rebbi was sitting and giving a drashah, and the congregation was dozing off; he wanted to wake them up, [so] he said: “There was one woman in Egypt who gave birth to 600,000 [babies] in a single pregnancy!” There was one student present whose name was Rebbi Yishmael b’Rebbi Yossi. He asked: “Who was she?” [Rebbi] responded: “This was Yocheved, who gave birth to Moshe, who was equal to 600,000 Jews!”

The upshot of all of this something that most of us have known all along: Chazal didn't intend for their all of their midrashic statements to be taken literally, and made many statements which were not meant to be accepted at face value. What we might not have realized is just how far to extend this principle. We might have thought that when it comes to midrashim like the story of R' Elazar ben Azaryah's beard, which appears to be a problem-free factual account of a miraculous event, we should accept it as literal truth. We see from the Rambam (et al.) that this is not necessarily the case. 

We've established that the Rambam "has a right" to dismiss a literal reading of Chazal's assertion that R' Elazar ben Azaryah's aging was the result of a miracle. One question remains: What prompted the Rambam to deviate from the plain pshat and take this naturalistic approach? 

The best answer to this question was given by the Rambam himself, in his Maamar Techiyas ha'Meisim [5]. The Rambam was faced with the task of defending his belief in the literal truth of techiyas ha'meisim (the resurrection of the dead). As a prelude to his explanation the Rambam provides a beautiful account of why he interprets so many other seemingly miraculous accounts in a naturalistic fashion: 

I will explain to you that which brought me to this approach, and that is that our aim and the aim of every intelligent person among the select few is opposite to the aim of the multitude of people. For the most cherished and beloved thing to the multitude of Torah-observant people, because of their ignorance, is to consider the Torah and human intellect to be two opposite poles. Everything which is incomprehensible to the intellect they consider to be a miracle. They flee from explaining something as a natural phenomenon whether it pertains to something recorded in the past, or in regard to something which is discernible at the present time, or whether it relates to something which is written will happen in the future. We, on the other hand, strive to reconcile the Torah with human intellect and regard everything in its natural light wherever possible, unless it is self-evident therefrom that it is of miraculous connotation and cannot be interpreted at all; then we are forced to say it is a miracle.

There you have it. According to the Rambam, the correct approach is to interpret everything as naturalistically as possible unless we are forced to interpret it as a miracle. 

It is reasonable to conclude that this is what led the Rambam to interpret the Gemara about R' Elazar ben Azaryah as he did. There are "miracle stories" in Gemara which we are forced to take literally, but this isn't one of them. The Rambam saw that R' Elazar ben Azaryah's aged appearance could be explained without making recourse to miracles. Since a naturalistic explanation was available to him, that is the explanation he preferred. 

It is also important to note that the Rambam's explanation is harmonious with the subject at hand. The Gemara was discussing R' Elazar ben Azaryah's qualifications for being appointed as nassi and the Mishnah was emphasizing R' Elazar ben Azaryah's superb chochmah. The Rambam's explanation - namely, that R' Elazar ben Azaryah devoted many years to intensive learning - completes the picture that these two sources aimed to paint. (Perhaps this also explains the strange detail added by the Gemara: that R' Elazar ben Azaryah was 18 years old, and 18 rows of hairs on his beard turned white - as if to say that he had fully devoted his number of years on this earth to perfecting his chochmah).

So next time you encounter a "miracle story" in the Talmud or midrashim, be sure to think twice. The words of Chazal are not always what they appear to be on the surface.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Berachos 1:9

[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Shemos 1:7

[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam, Essay on Aggadah

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Aderet (Rashba), Commentary on the Aggadic portion of Berachos 54b

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead

Parashas Bo: The Undogly Miracle

Here is another "newsletter" Dvar Torah, originally published in January 2014. As you'll see, I took a risk in what I wrote. I hope it paid off! 

Artwork: Watchwolf, by Kev Walker

Parashas Bo: The Undogly Miracle

Let us examine an often overlooked aspect of makkas bechoros (the plague of the firstborn), namely, the Miracle of the Quiet Dogs: 

Moshe said: Thus said Hashem, “At around midnight I shall go out in the midst of Mitzrayim. Every firstborn in the land of Mitzrayim shall die, from the firstborn of Paroh who sits on his throne to the firstborn of the maidservant who is behind the millstone, and all the firstborn of beast. There shall be a great outcry in the entire land of Mitzrayim, such as there has never been and such as there shall never be again. But against all of Bnei Yisrael, no dog shall whet its tongue (i.e. bark), against neither man nor beast, so that you shall know that Hashem will have differentiated between Mitzrayim and Yisrael” (Shemos 11:4-7). 

This “silencing of the dogs” was clearly a miracle. When people are dropping dead, the entire society is in a panic, and the slaves are escaping, the dogs tend to bark.

The question is: What was the purpose of this miracle? The pasuk seems to indicates that this miracle was intended to show that Hashem differentiates between Mitzrayim and Yisrael – but wasn't makkas bechoros, itself, a sufficient demonstration of this point? Was it really necessary for Hashem to kill every Egyptian firstborn and put their dogs on mute?

In Parashas Mishpatim we encounter another pasuk involving dogs. The pasuk says: “People of holiness shall you be to Me; you shall not eat flesh of an animal that was torn (treifah) in the field; to the dog shall you throw it” (ibid. 22:30). Halachically, this pasuk is the source of the Torah prohibition against eating treifah. Although the word “treifah” in the vernacular has come to refer to any non-kosher food, the halachic term “treifah” refers to meat from an animal which suffers a life-threatening physical defect, such as a mortal wound or a terminal illness. Even if such an animal receives a kosher shechitah (slaughter), its meat is considered “treifah” and is prohibited by Torah law. This pasuk teaches us that the Torah only prohibits us from eating the meat. We are permitted to derive other types of hanaah (benefit) from it. For this reason, the pasuk says that we are allowed to benefit from treifah by using it as dog food.

The question is: Why does the pasuk explicitly tell us to throw our treifah to the dogs? Halachically, we are permitted to dispose of our treifah in any number of other ways: by feeding it to other animals, selling it for profit, giving it to our non-Jewish neighbors, etc. Why dog food, specifically?

According to the plain pshat, this was the most common way to dispose of treifah. Rashi [1], however, cites a midrash which links the pasuk in Mishpatim to our pasuk in Bo: 

This teaches us that Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu doesn't withhold reward from any creature, as it is stated: “But against all of Bnei Yisrael, no dog shall whet its tongue.” Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu said, “Give [the dog] its reward.”

If we take this midrash at face value, we are confronted with a number of problems. First of all, there is no concept of sachar v’onesh (reward and punishment) in the animal kingdom [2]. Only a creature with a tzelem Elokim is subject to sachar v’onesh. That being said, how are we to understand the notion of Hashem “rewarding” the dogs with treifah? Secondly, the whole concept of sachar v’onesh only makes sense when dealing with beings who possess free will, and dogs don’t have free will! The dogs in Egypt didn't choose not to bark. Hashem miraculously stopped them from barking! Moreover, the dogs that get this “reward” of treifah aren't even the same dogs that obeyed Hashem in Mitzrayim! In fact, we didn't even receive the halachos of treifah until after Yetziat Mitzrayim! Last, but not least, this “reward” isn't very dependable in its structure. There isn't any halachic obligation to feed our treifah to the dogs – only a halachic suggestion.

The answer to all of these questions is ... I have no idea! That’s right: no answers this time. 

I’ll bet you thought that the purpose of this dvar Torah was to give you an idea on the parshah. In truth, the purpose of this dvar Torah was to teach an important lesson in Torah methodology, and that lesson is: you can’t always solve all of the problems the first time you learn through a sugya (topic of study).

We will conclude with some advice from the Rambam [3] on dealing with situations like this:

When you encounter a statement of Chazal which seems to conflict with reason, you will pause, consider it, and realize that this utterance must be a riddle or a parable. You will sleep on it, trying anxiously to grasp its logic and its expression, so that you may find its genuine intellectual intention and lay hold of a genuine concept. 

What else can a person do if the answers are not forthcoming? The Rambam writes [4]: 

If Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu removes the veil from the mind of the one whom He desires, the one who has toiled in his study, such a person will understand [the secrets of Torah] according to the strength of his intellect. Regarding the study of Torah and one’s endeavors therein, a person must direct his heart to Hashem and to pray before Him, and to supplicate that He grant him knowledge and help him and reveal to him the mysteries hidden in the holy writings. Such do we find by David ha'Melech, who did so when he said: “Uncover my eyes and I will behold wonders from Your Torah!" (Tehilim 119:18).

May Hashem grant us the insight to answer these questions and appreciate His infinite wisdom! And if any of you are zocheh (meritorious) to answer these questions, please email me your ideas!

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Shemot 22:30

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Guide for the Perplexed 1:2 and 3:16.

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin, Perek Chelek

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah

Parashas Shemos: Seventy Souls and Seventy Perspectives

Originally written as a "newsletter dvar Torah" for the general populace, and posted in January 2012.

Seventy Souls and Seventy Perspectives

The second chapter of Sefer Shemos begins with the birth of Moshe Rabbeinu: “A man went from the house of Levi and he took a daughter of Levi. The woman conceived and gave birth to a son.” [1] This woman is subsequently identified as Yocheved. [2] 

The birth of Yocheved poses a difficulty in light of an earlier pasuk: “All the people of Yaakov’s household who came to Egypt were seventy.” [3] The Gemara notes the difficulty that the Chumash only lists 69 individuals. The Gemara answers by identifying the 70th individual as Yocheved, explaining that her name was omitted from the list because she “came to Egypt” in her mother’s womb and was “born between the walls” as Bnei Yisrael entered Egypt. [4] 

This Gemara leads us to an astounding conclusion. Based on the timeline in the Chumash, it turns out that Yocheved was 130 years old when she gave birth to Moshe! [5]

Rashi and Ramban take this Gemara at face value, as literal fact. [6] They maintain that the birth of Moshe to the 130-year-old Yocheved was a miracle. Indeed, the Gemara itself refers to her birth as a miracle. [7] Ibn Ezra and Ralbag disagree. They argue that that if the Torah went out of its way to mention the miraculous birth of Yitzchak to the 90-year-old Sarah, then it certainly would have mentioned the miraculous birth of Moshe to a 130-year-old Yocheved. [8] Ralbag adds that the Torah’s makes it a point to publicize miracles by mentioning them explicitly, since miracles are a cornerstone of our belief in God. [9]

How, then, do Ibn Ezra and Ralbag explain the aforementioned Gemara, which openly states that Moshe’s birth was a miracle? Their answer is simple: they interpret this Gemara as a non-literal midrash. Ralbag theorizes that the midrash was written “for the benefit of the masses, to establish in their hearts the power of Hashem’s ability to do miracles.” How do they explain the fact that the Chumash asserts that 70 souls went down to Egypt, but the pesukim only list 69 names? – Their answer is simple: by including Yaakov himself in the total of 70. And what about Yocheved’s Age? – Ralbag explains that if we assume Yocheved was born at the end of Levi’s life, then she would have only been 58 years old when she gave birth to Moshe; while this might be a late age to have a child, it would not require us to posit a miracle.

This machlokes provides us with the opportunity for a valuable methodology lesson. People often invoke the principle of “shivim panim l’Torah” ("there are seventy faces/perspectives to the Torah") [10] when confronted by divergent views. Unfortunately, the application of this principle is often misunderstood. Some people use “shivim panim l’Torah” as a way of saying, “All views are equally valid.” In my opinion, this represents an incorrect understanding of the principle. Rather, “shivim panim l’Torah” means that it is possible to have multiple valid theories to explain a certain set of facts. In some subjects – such as halacha, and certain areas of ethics and politics – conflicting theories can be equally true. But in other subjects – such as science, philosophy, metaphysics, and history – there is only one truth, since there is only one reality.

Our machlokes serves as an example of the latter. Does “shivim panim l’Torah” mean that the opposing views of these Rishonim are both true? No. That would be impossible. Either Yocheved was 130 years old when she gave birth to Moshe, or she 58. Both cannot be true. Rather, “shivim panim l’Torah” means that both views are based on sound theories. Both theories are logical, both are supported by solid evidence and reasoning, and both offer valuable insights into Torah. It is in that sense that we can invoke “shivim panim la’Torah.” 

[1] Sefer Shemos 2:1-2
[2] ibid. 6:20; Bamidbar 26:59
[3] Sefer Bereishis 46:27
[4] Talmud Bavli: Maseches Bava Basra 123b
[5] Given that the Jews lived in Egypt for 210 years, and Moshe was 80 years old when he spoke to Paroh, he must have been born 130 after the arrival of Bnei Yisrael in Egypt. Thus, if Yocheved was born “between the walls” as Bnei Yisrael entered Egypt, she must have been 130 years old when she gave birth to Moshe.
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Shemos 2:1; Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 46:15, 26
[7] Talmud Bavli: Maseches Bava Basra 119b-120a
[8] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 46:27
[9] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Shemos 1:7