Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

This is half of a blog post. I wasn't able to finish writing the full blog post in time, and I figured it would be better to publish half of it than allow it to languish in my drafts folder for who knows how long. 

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Artwork: Rest in Peace, by Jarel Threat

Shoftim: Atonement for the Dead (Part 1 of 2)

Parashas Shoftim concludes with the mystifying mitzvah of Eglah Arufah (the Decapitated Heifer). When the corpse of a slain person is found outside of a nearby city, the elders and judges of that city perform a ritual involving an uncharacteristically gruesome slaughter of a heifer. The ceremony concludes with a declaration and petition made by the Kohanim: 

“Our hands did not shed this blood, and our eyes did not see. Atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed, Hashem, and do not put innocent blood in the midst of Your people Israel, and let the blood be atoned for them.” (Devarim 21:6-8) 

The question is: Why does the pasuk (verse) say “atone for Your people Israel whom You redeemed” rather than “atone for Your people Israel” full stop? The Sifre [1] answers: 

“atone for Your people” – these are the living; “whom You redeemed” – these are the dead, which teaches that the dead need kaparah (atonement); consequently we learn that one who sheds blood sins [retroactively] until the Exodus from Egypt. 

Although the Sifre explains the apparent redundancy in the pasuk, it raises a number of additional problems: 

1. Why is this act of murder reckoned as a sin for the Yotzei Mitzrayim (the generation that left Egypt), such that they would require kaparah? The person who committed the murder certainly sinned. The elders and judges of the nearby city sinned, insofar as they didn’t do their part as leaders to foster a society in which such murders don’t happen. But how is this considered to be a sin for the generation that left Egypt hundreds or thousands of years ago? They didn’t do anything! Why do they need kaparah? 

2. How is it fair to hold anyone responsible for a sin they didn’t commit? According to the Rambam [2], the eleventh of the Thirteen Fundamental Principles of Torah is that Hashem rewards each person for the mitzvos they have done and punishes each person for the transgressions they have committed. Hashem does not reward people for doing mitzvos that they didn’t do, nor does He punish people for transgressions they didn’t commit. The Yotzei Mitzraim lived their own lives, and had their own mitzvos and sins. Ostensibly, it would be unjust to hold them accountable for the sins of their offspring. As Avraham Avinu asked: “Heaven forfend doing something like this! … Will the judge of all the earth not enact justice?” (Bereishis 18:25). 

3. How is it halachically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? The Gemara (Zevachim 9b) openly states “there is no kaparah for the dead” and the Rambam [3] rules in accordance with this view. Rashi [4] explains that “there is no kaparah for the dead because their death atoned for them.” In other words, there is no kaparah for the dead because the dead don’t need kaparah. The Baalei Tosafos [5] point out the halachic ramifications: if it were possible for the dead to receive kaparah, their surviving relatives would be responsible for bringing a korban (sacrifice) to atone on their behalf. Likewise, if a person designated a korban as a sin-offering and then died, then there would be even more of a reason for his relatives to offer it in order to bring about post-mortem kaparah. These sources indicate that kaparah for the dead is a halachic impossibility. [6]

4. How is it metaphysically possible for the dead to receive kaparah? Once a person dies, and their soul separates from their body, it is impossible for the soul to undergo further change, for good or for bad. This is why Chazal urge us to do mitzvos and teshuvah in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), since there’s no way to elevate the soul after death, as the Rambam [7] states: “for if one does not acquire wisdom and good deeds here, then he will have nothing by which he merits.” On the basis of this principle, the Ran questions the entire notion of punishments in Olam ha’Ba. At the beginning of his tenth derashah the Ran [8] sets forth the premise that all of Hashem’s punishments in Olam ha’Zeh are for our benefit, “either to improve the sinner himself so that he does teshuvah from his evil path” or “to improve others, so they will not be evil like him.” He then raises the question about Olam ha’Ba: “it is impossible for the punishments of Olam ha’Ba to be like this, since the soul cannot be improved there; rather, it will forever remain in the state it was in when it left the body.” If that is the case, then how would it be possible for someone to receive kaparah after death? Moreover, how would it be possible for the sin of the slain victim to necessitate kaparah for the soul of a dead person? 

I have an approach but I haven't fully worked it out yet. Let me know if you think of anything!

End Notes

[1] Sifre Devarim: Piska 210; as usual I’ve chosen to translate the version cited by the Torah Temimah 

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin, Introduction to to Perek Chelek 

[3] see Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Psulei ha’Mukdashim 15:9 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Me’ilah 10b 

[5] Tosafos, Temurah 15b 

[6] Over the course of my research I did encounter some arguments which attempted to reconcile the implications of the Sifre with these halachos, but I found them to be contrived and didn’t think they warrant being addressed here. If you do find a compelling argument, I would love to hear it. 

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 9:1

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven (Ran), Drashos ha'Ran: Drashah #10

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

This week I'd like to give a special shout-out to the Abravanel, who did all of the research for me and enabled me to write this dvar Torah on the plane with only his commentary on hand!

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Artwork: Scour from Existence, by Clint Cearley

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

In Parashas Shelach, in the section detailing the various sin-offerings, the Torah mentions the onesh (punishment) commonly referred to as “kareis”: 

But the soul that acts with a high hand, whether the native or the convert – he has blasphemed Hashem; and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he has despised the word of Hashem, and has violated His commandment; that soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity is upon him (Bamidbar 15:30-31).

The question is: What is kareis? The root of the word kareis (כ.ר.ת.) literally means “to cut” or “to cut off.” This verb is easy to understand if you’re talking about a carrot or a tree branch, but what does it mean for a nefesh (soul) to be “cut off from among its people” or “utterly cut off”? 

Thankfully, the Abravanel does us a tremendous favor by summarizing and critiquing the views of all his predecessors on the matter, and concludes by presenting his own theory [1] Although my usual practice on this blog is to present translations of the meforshim (commentaries) rather than summaries, the Abravanel’s comments here are far too lengthy. For this reason, I will provide my own summary of the Abravanel’s summaries, but I will try to stick to his words as closely as possible. 

For the sake of brevity, I will NOT include the questions and difficulties that the Abravanel raises on each of the views, nor will I include my own analysis. I will leave it to you, the reader, to conduct further research, and to arrive at your own conclusions. 

(1) Saadia Gaon [2] and Ibn Ezra [3]

Both Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra learn that the term nefesh in the context of kareis refers to a person’s physiological vitality, rather than the intellect, or the spiritual part of man. Therefore, they interpret kareis as premature death – the “cutting short” of a person’s life. According to this view, there is no difference between kareis and the other divinely enacted punishment of misah b’ydei shamayim (death by the hands of heaven). 

(2) Rashi [4]

Rashi holds that kareis refers to the premature death of the sinner AND the premature death of his or her children. This latter feature is what differentiates kareis from misah b’ydei shamayim. However, according to Rashi, there is no difference between kareis and the divinely enacted punishment of ariri (childlessness), which is incurred by certain arayos (prohibited sexual relations). [5]

(3) Tosafos [6]

Like Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra, the Baalei Tosafos maintain that kareis refers to premature death. They differentiate between kareis and misah b’ydei shamayim on the basis of when the sinner dies. They hold that someone who is liable for kareis will die before reaching the age of 50, whereas a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die before reaching the age of 60.

(4) Tosafos [7]

The Baalei Tosafos offer a second explanation of kareis: that a person will die from an illness, on the third day of that illness. According to this explanation, misah b’ydei shamayim affects the length of a person’s lifespan, whereas kareis affects the duration of (what will turn out to be) a person’s terminal illness. 

(5) Rambam [8]

Unlike the four Rishonim mentioned above, who maintain that kareis affects a person’s physical existence in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), the Rambam maintains that kareis affects a person’s non-physical soul in the purely spiritual Olam ha’Ba (The World to Come). According to the Rambam, kareis refers to the excision and annihilation of the soul after death. The existence of the sinner who incurred kareis will come to an end with his physical demise, just like an animal. Thus, he will be deprived of the everlasting spiritual bliss of Olam ha’Ba, which is the ultimate reward. In contrast, a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die prematurely, but his death will provide kaparah (atonement) for him, and his soul will merit existence in Olam ha’Ba. 

(6) Ramban [9]

The Ramban’s view is the most complex of them all. Whereas all of the Rishonim mentioned thus far hold that all instances of kareis are uniform (i.e. the same in every case, no matter who the sinner and no matter what the sin), the Ramban maintains that there are three levels of kareis:

• If a person’s merits outweigh his iniquities, then he will receive a physical kareis in the form of a premature death; his soul, however, will remain untouched in the purely spiritual Gan Eden and in the Messianic Era of Olam ha’Ba after Techiyas ha’Meisim (Resurrection of the Dead). [10] This form of kareis is practically identical with kareis as understood by Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra.
• If a person’s iniquities outweigh his merits, then he will receive a spiritual kareis in the form of his soul being cut off from eternal life in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba. This type of kareis is similar to kareis as explained by the Rambam, but whereas the Rambam maintains that the afterlife is purely spiritual, the Ramban maintains that it is a combination of the physical and the spiritual. 
• The most severe form of kareis is reserved for those who worship avodah zarah (idolatry) and for those who commit the transgression of blasphemy; these individuals die prematurely in this world AND their souls are cut off from existence in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba.

(7) Abravanel

The Abravanel holds that kareis affects the sinner in Olam ha’Zeh AND in Olam ha’Ba: in Olam ha’Zeh his life is cut short, and in Olam ha’Ba, his soul is “distanced from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence),” which is its source of spiritual pleasure and reward. The Abravanel maintains that kareis is subject to degrees, based on the severity of the sin. Unlike the Rambam, the Abravanel holds that the soul is never fully cut off from Olam ha’Ba, since it is a “spiritual essence” which, by its very nature, does not deteriorate. The Abravanel holds that kareis causes spiritual “pain” to the soul, but after it receives its punishment, it will be restored to a state of pleasure and reward. 

There you have it: a seven-way machlokess (disagreement) on what kareis is. And these are just the opinions of the Rishonim cited by the Abravanel. I would not be surprised if there are other views to be found in other meforshim.

To my mind, this multiplicity of views raises another question: Why is the Torah’s presentation of kareis so vague? 

Perhaps you will dismiss this question. After all, there are many subjects in Torah on which there is a lot of machlokess, and one might ask the same question in each of these cases. Why ask this question here as opposed to any of those cases?

The reason I believe this question is justified here is based on my understanding of why the Torah mandates onshim (punishments) altogether, which I wrote about in another post. There are seven levels of onshim. In order, from most severe to least severe, they are: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), chenek (strangulation), kareis, misah b’ydei shamayim, and malkos (lashes). According to the Rambam, these onshim are designed to indicate the severity of the transgression and to deter the would-be sinner from sinning. When it comes to skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, and malkos, we know exactly what each onesh entails. The same goes for misah b’ydei shamayim; although there might be some machlokess on the particulars, everyone agrees that this refers to premature death. And yet, when it comes to the onesh of kareis, there is no consensus on what the Torah means. This is an anomaly among onshim, and poses a problem if one maintains that the purpose of onshim is to serve as a deterrent. How can one be deterred by kareis if the meaning of kareis is so unclear? 

The way I see it, we are forced draw one of two conclusions: either (1) there was once a clear and unanimous understanding of kareis which was lost over time, which eventually gave rise to wide-ranging machlokess, or (2) the Torah’s formulation of kareis was intentionally left vague, and that is why there is an inordinate degree of machlokess. 

If the former is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on the teruah-blast of the shofar: the Torah was clear about it, but the mesorah (transmission of teaching) was lost over time, and machlokess developed as a result. If the latter is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on how the messianic era will come to be, about which the Rambam [11] writes: 

All of these matters and those that are like them … even the Sages did not have a tradition in these things, but rather, [they theorized] based on the implications of the pesukim, and that is why there is machlokess.

If the answer is (1), then there is nothing more to say. Somehow, sometime, the understanding of kareis was lost, and machlokess developed, just as it has in other areas of Torah. But if the answer is (2), then we are left with our question: Why did the Torah intentionally present kareis in such a vague manner?

The most I can offer at this point is a speculative answer – one which only works for those who hold that kareis affects the soul (i.e. Rambam, Ramban, Abravanel) and not just the body (i.e. Saadia Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Rashi, Tosafos). The Rambam [12] at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah writes:

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its chochmah in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in the World to Come,” “and I will distance myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from the World to Come.” 

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the chachamim. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are ignorant men, women, and children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love. 

Hashem does not want us to serve Him out of yirah (fear). Although it is necessary to begin by serving Him that way, and we encourage people to do so in the initial stages of their learning, this is not an ideal state. The Rambam even goes so far as to say about the various yirah-based motives, “All of this is despicable; however, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human mind/psyche.” The goal is to gradually wean ourselves from serving God out of yirah and develop the ability to serve Him out of ahavah. This is a slow and delicate process which must progress in step with each person's development, as the Rambam writes:

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of yirah and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of ahavah. 

The onshim of the Torah clearly belong to the framework of yirah. All of the other onshim (skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, malkos) are things which happen in this world. Fear of them is rooted in observation and experience. Kareis, on the other hand, is not – at least, not according to the Rambam, the Ramban, or the Abravanel. To understand kareis requires knowledge of deep, abstract concepts, such as the nature of the soul, how the soul exists after death, what Olam ha'Ba is, how it relates to techiyas ha'meisim, how we are rewarded and punished after death, etc. These concepts take decades of learning to be able to begin to understand, since they are metaphysical phenomena that are out of this world. Not only that, the imagination is quick to latch onto its own "counterfeit" versions of these ideas, which are rooted in psychological fears and insecurities, and not reality.

Thus, the Torah in a bind. On the one hand, kareis is a reality which has relevance in the halachic system; as such, it must be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. On the other hand, kareis is an exceedingly lofty concept, and any attempt to explain it would only provide the imagination with more fuel for its fantasy-based fear, and threaten to lock a person in yirah-mode.

How did the Torah solve this dilemma? By intentionally speaking about kareis in vague terms. On its most basic level, "to be cut off" is intuitively bad-sounding, even if one doesn't know exactly what that means. Those who are prone to filling in the gaps with their imagination will do so anyway, but at least the Torah will not be lending credence to these detrimental chimerical notions. And since the Torah's formulation of kareis is so vague, it will remain open to reexamination and reevaluation as the individual learns and develops.

I can't say I find this answer to be 100% satisfactory, but I do think it is a fruitful approach. At the very least, I hope you gained from the Abravanel's overview of kareis, and that I've left you with a nice question to think about!

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[2] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 6 

[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Ezra (Ibn Ezra), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben YiTzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 17:14; Vayikra 17:9 

[5] Vayikra 20:20-21 

[6] Baalei Tosafos, Yevamos 2a; Shabbos 25a 

[7] The Abravanel seems to say that Tosafos says this on Yevamos 2a, but I can’t seem to find it. If you can track it down, please let me know. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides / Rambam), Commentary on the Mishnah – Sanhedrin 8:6; Introduction to Perek Chelek; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:5-6; 8:1 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Nachmanides / Ramban), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29; Shaar ha’Gemul [currently do not have access to a precise citation] 

[10] This is neither the time nor the place to go into the Ramban’s view of reward and punishment and the afterlife. If you are interested in this topic, I recommend reading the Shaar ha’Gemul, which is available here in Hebrew, and was translated into English by Chavel. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2 

[12] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:2

Mark Twain: On Olam ha'Ba

This was one of the first blog posts I ever wrote, way back in May 2007.

Mark Twain: On Olam ha'Ba

I can’t help but smile whenever I chance upon a fundamental Torah idea eloquently expressed by a non-Torah thinker. I'd like to share with you an idea from the uncensored collection of Mark Twain's writings entitled Letters from the Earth.

In his essay, The Damned Human Race, Mark Twain cynically portrays man as the most inferior and corrupt creature on earth:

I have been studying the traits and dispositions of the “lower animals” (so-called), and contrasting them with the traits and dispositions of man. I find the result humiliating to me. For it obliges me to renounce my allegiance to the Darwinian theory of the Ascent of Man from the Lower Animals; since it now seems plain to me that the theory ought to be vacated in favor of a new and truer one, this new and truer one to be named the Decent of Man from the Higher Animals.

In the last paragraph, after his cynical diatribe against human nature, Mark Twain makes a single concession to Man, which he follows with a related critique of religion:

He has just one stupendous superiority. In his intellect he is supreme. The Higher Animals cannot touch him there. It is curious, it is noteworthy, that no heaven has ever been offered him wherein his one sole superiority was provided with a chance to enjoy itself. Even when he himself has imagined a heaven, he has never made provision in it for intellectual joys. It is a striking omission.

Interestingly enough, the vision of the afterlife of which, according to Mark Twain, has never been envisioned by man is precisely the notion of the afterlife promised by the Torah. The Rambam (Hilchos Teshuvah 8:2) writes:

There are no physical bodies or physical things in Olam ha’Ba (the World to Come), but only the souls of tzadikim (righteous people), without a body – like the ministering angels. Since there are no bodies, there is no eating, drinking, or anything which human bodies require in Olam ha’Zeh (This World). None of the bodily occurrences which happen to bodies in Olam ha’Zeh can happen in Olam ha’Ba – such as sitting, standing, sleeping, death, pain, humor, and other things like that. This is what the Early Sages said: “In Olam ha’Ba there is no eating, no drinking, and no relations – rather, the tzadikim sit, with their crowns on their heads, and derive enjoyment from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence).” 

It has been made clear to you that there are no bodies there, since there isn’t any eating or drinking there. That which was said, “the tzadikim sit” was said by way of metaphor; it means to say that the tzadikim exist there, without toil and without exertion. Likewise, that which they said, “and their crowns on their heads” means that the knowledge they know, by which they merited life in Olam ha’Ba, exists with them, and is their crown, as Shlomo said, “with a crown that his mother crowned him with” (Shir ha’Shirim 3:11). And it is said, “the eternal joy is upon your head” (Yeshayahu 35:10; 51:11) – and “joy” isn’t a physical object, such that it could rest on a head; thus, the “crown” which the Sages spoke about here is knowledge. 

And what is this which they said, “and derive enjoyment from the radiance of the shechinah”? – this means that they know and apprehend the reality of the Holy One, Blessed is He, in a manner which they could not know while they were in dark and lowly bodies.

According to the Rambam, the ultimate "reward" promised by the Torah is Olam ha'Ba: an entirely non-physical afterlife in which disembodied intellects derive pleasure contemplating the reality of Hashem. Even the Ramban, who argues with the Rambam and maintains that Olam ha'Ba is physical, nevertheless maintains that the essential reward is the intellectual contemplation of knowledge of Hashem (see Shaar ha'Gmul 357).

Mark Twain was right: Religious Man never envisioned an intellectual afterlife. But, as is often the case, Religious Man was wrong.