My Stubborn and Unpopular Educational Belief

This can be regarded as a follow-up to my educational philosophy statement. It’s the text of an email I recently sent to one of my former students in response to a question she asked about my educational philosophy. Consequently, there is some overlap with what I explicitly stated in my educational philosophy statement, but the main thing I wanted to do here was to articulate one of the premises of my educational philosophy. 

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My Stubborn and Unpopular Educational Belief

My stubborn and unpopular belief is that every student loves learning. Many of them either don't know it yet, or they've had the love of learning nearly snuffed out by their educational experiences.

The basis of my belief is my premise that every human being is created b'tzelem Elokim. According to my understanding, this means that every human being has the capacity for conceptual understanding and abstract thinking, as well as an innate drive to seek out knowledge of truth for its own sake. 

It is this fundamental belief about human nature which impels me, as a teacher of Torah, to treat every student with respect as a fellow truth-seeking mind, and to treat every question as a potential catalyst of tzelem Elokim development. Although I do care about teaching specific ideas with clarity, and hope that students remember what they learn in my classes, this isn't my main goal. My main goal is to awaken the latent tzelem Elokim in my students, and to equip them with the tools - in the realm of chochmah (intellect) and mussar (middos) - to live as a tzelem Elokim, the ultimate level of which is making good bechirah (free will) decisions on the basis of their tzelem Elokim, reaching ahavas Hashem (love of God) and yiras Hashem (fear of God) and learning lishmah (for its own sake). If a student walked away from my class with an enhanced love of learning, but without remembering a single idea I taught her, then I would still be happy and consider my job well done.

I referred to this belief of mine as "unpopular" because I do not think that this belief is shared by all teachers. Some profess it in speech, but don't believe it in their minds or in their hearts. Others don't even profess it. For example, there are teachers who believe that kids need to be instilled by their parents and teachers with a desire to learn, and that this desire is not natural. Others maintain that students need to be bribed - with praise, with grades, and with other "carrots" - or threatened with punishment in order to "get them to want to learn." Others take a religious angle, attempting to instill their students with a drive to learn as an act of avodas Hashem (divine service). Others believe that some kids do have a natural desire to learn, whereas others just "aren't cut out for learning." These teachers are usually quick to give up on those whom they perceive to be in the latter category.

I maintain that all of these teachers are wrong. I walk into my classroom - whether it's filled with old students or new students - with the assumption that EVERY student has an innate love of learning, an innate enjoyment of thinking, and an innate sense of curiosity. In many cases, these innate potentials are latent, or suppressed, or even crippled by years of educational abuse - but they're there. My job is to awaken the potential thinker in all students, to the extent that I can, and nurture them with good ideas, good thinking, and good, enjoyable learning. I refer to this belief of mine as "stubborn" because I am so convinced it is true that I will be willing to continue operating on this premise even when all evidence points to the fact that a given student is not interested in learning. 

This reminds me of a conversation I had a few years ago with someone I went to high school with, who is currently a rebbi at [insert name of well-known school]. He and I were talking about my educational approach, which he was familiar with from our teachers at [insert name of my high school alma mater]. I will never forget what he told me. He said, "Your whole approach of getting kids into learning by answering their questions and teaching them to think ... maybe that used to work, but it's an outdated approach. Kids these days aren't interested in thinking. They want a kesher (personal connection) with their rebbi. That's the best way to reach them. Not by answering questions." 

I couldn't believe how diametrically opposed our approaches were. This is a rebbi who uses methods like having kumzitzes (singing sessions) during shiur (Torah class), baking cookies for his talmidim (students), putting his arm on their shoulder, artificially attempting to rev up enthusiasm with phrases like, "Isn't this Toisfis geshmack?" and "We're going to learn some heilga TOIRAH!" Those methods in and of themselves aren't inherently problematic, but when "that outdated method" of thinking-based Torah is replaced with such devices, then that is worse than misguided; it's evil. 

I will not deny that this approach "works" for some kids. I say "works" (in quotation marks) because I maintain that this type of approach cannot serve as a foundation that's made to last. Like any emotionally-fueled approach, it will only "work" while the emotional mood is active and kept at a heightened level, and the nature of all emotional moods is that they cannot remain at a constant state forever. Someone who subscribes to such an approach will ride the high until it starts to wear off, and will then desperately try to chase after another high to keep his religiosity going. At "best," he'll spend his life repeatedly chasing such highs, like a drug addict. At worst, the high will wear off, and he'll drop his religiosity, or rebel against it. 

My approach is made to last because it is based on the higher part of our human nature as tzelem Elokim. Moreover, for those students of mine who are inducted into the world of Mishlei and Koheles, my approach is also based on the lower part of our human nature as pleasure-seeking pain-avoiding animals. By showing that Torah has a rational basis which satisfies the intellect, while simultaneously providing a way of life which results in maximum pleasure and minimum pain, I am appealing to the entire human being which, as Aristotle defined, is a "rational animal." Even if a student discontinues learning after high school, the part of the student which I awakened is their essence. I did not merely put them into a certain mood by singing a zemer or making them feel a kesher with their rebbi. I activated their humanity. 

I should mention that I am not trying to dismiss or downplay those whose attachment to Torah and Judaism is purely or largely emotional. That's a good thing, just as any she'lo lishmah is a good thing - at least, in potential. But I am intentionally objecting to Torah educators who believe that such an approach is an ideal, and that the "radical" approach of "appealing to the mind" is an "outdated" method. They are wrong, and their wrongness does harm.

And so I will continue to teach in accordance with my stubborn and unpopular belief, and let the results speak for themselves.  

The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

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The Harmful Notion of the "Jewish Soul"

Disclaimer and Context

This is more of a "rant" than a strictly "lishmah" post. I have consciously chosen to write this post as more polemical than dialectical. For this reason, do not expect this to be a comprehensive treatment of the topic at hand, in which both sides of the issue are examined from a detached, analytical, non-judgmental perspective. Unlike most of the posts on this blog, which I strive to write from a neutral standpoint, this post has an agenda: to articulate why I object to the notion of "Jewish souls."

I think it would help to provide some context for how I came to write this post. Last week I was invited to join a new (secret) Facebook support group for gerim (converts). Hearing so many personal stories of discrimination and insensitivity towards gerim has caused me to revisit some of the ger-related topics which I hadn't thought about for a while.

In Friday's dvar Torah (Which Souls Were at Sinai?) I mentioned a pet peeve of mine: when born-Jews learn that I'm a ger (convert) and exclaim, "Oh, but you're such a good Jew! You CLEARLY must have been born with a Jewish soul!" or "You CLEARLY have a spark of Yiddishkeit in your soul!" or "You MUST have had a Jewish ancestor, and now your Yiddishe neshamah (Jewish soul) is just finding its way back home!" 

I am irked by comments like these for three reasons: (1) they are racist, in the sense of being "anti-goyim," (2) they minimize my journey to Judaism and my conversion, and (3) according to my understanding, the notion of a "Jewish soul" is false. 

We will now discuss each of these three reasons. 

Reason #1: Racism / Anti-Gentilism

I know that in most cases, born-Jews don't mean anything bad or malicious by such statements, but that doesn't change the anti-goyim undertones of their words. The underlying message I hear in their words is: "It simply cannot BE that you were once a GOY! Goyim can't POSSIBLY be part of the Jewish people! Therefore, you MUST have been a Jew SOMEHOW! Heaven FORFEND that a dirty goyishe neshamah could have found its way into our holy ranks!"

Now, before any of the born-Jews start "Jewsplaining" to me how I'm reading too much into statements like these, let's see if we can agree to the following four points: (1) there are born-Jews who say these things WITHOUT these intentions, even on an unconscious level; (2) there are born-Jews people who say these things who DO harbor such intentions, even though they aren't aware of them or don't mean anything bad by them; (3) there are geirim who are NOT bothered by such comments, and might even find them to be welcoming and affirming of their Jewish identity; (4) you, as a born-Jew, have never been on the receiving end of comments like these, and therefore, you have a different perspective than I do; you are certainly entitled to your opinion, but you cannot tell me how I feel. 

I've even had students who love my classes and have learned from me for years, but will nevertheless speak in my presence about "the disgusting goyim" and how "goyim don't have souls" or how "goyim were made to be our slaves." Whenever I hear such comments I usually respond, "You know, I used to be a 'disgusting goy.' Are you saying that I didn't have a soul? Was I born to be your slave" to which they respond, "No, Rabbi ______, I wasn't talking about YOU! Obviously YOU are different!" These kids are too young to realize the weaknesses of "the friend argument" (i.e. "I'm not racist! I have friends who are black!"), but that is essentially the argument they're trying to make.

It's no secret that Jewish tribalism and elitism has always "been a thing" in our nation, and has been reinforced by millennia of Antisemitism. This is understandable, and even excusable insofar as it is a natural defense mechanism which is (arguably) necessary for Jewish survival. But the historical reality of Antisemitism certainly does not validate anti-goyim beliefs or sentiments, nor does it justify making anti-goyim remarks in the presence of those of us who used to be goyim.

Reason #2: Minimization of Geirus (Conversion)

When you tell a ger (whether explicitly or implicitly) that he or she "was destined to be Jewish," be aware that you might be perceived by the ger to be minimizing the significance and/or hardship of his or her journey and conversion process. 

There are so many different types of paths that people take to Judaism, some of which are harder than others. I have heard horror stories from gerim that you wouldn't believe, filled with instances abuse, discrimination, and despicable behavior from Jewish laypeople and rabbis alike. Think about what it means to tell a person who has been through such a difficult journey, "Oh, that? Yeah. That wasn't your free will decision, and had nothing to do with your perseverance, or your love for Hashem and His Torah, or your sacrifices you made, or your trust in the truth of your convictions, or your courage. It was in your spiritual DNA. You were basically programmed to follow this path. It had to happen." 

Would you ever say something like this to a veteran who survived a war, or to someone who went through therapy, or to a person who is in recovery from an addiction? These may sound like "negative" comparisons to geirus, but they are apt analogies for those whose path to Judaism was fraught with challenges and hardships. 

Without knowing the full story of the ger to whom you are speaking, making statements such as these can easily stray into the territory of onaas ha'ger (abusing a convert).

Every day, those who are born Jewish make the berachah of "she'lo asani goy" ("Blessed are You, Hashem, King of the universe, Who did not make me a gentile"). I, as a ger, do not make that berachah because Hashem did make me a goy. [1] Let me say that again: Hashem made me a goy, and I chose to become a ger. Don't minimize my life and my decisions by telling me that my soul was already Jewish. 

Reason #3: Falsehood

Since the topic of "the soul" is extremely broad and deep, I will confine my remarks here to a general summary of my reasons for rejecting the notion of a "Jewish soul," and point the way to resources for further reading.

As far as I know, based on my own research and the research of academic scholars I have read on this matter, the idea of a "Jewish soul" is an entirely "Kabbalistic" [2] and/or Chasidic concept. The distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls cannot be found anywhere in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or in any of the non-"Kabbalistic" works of the Kadmonim [3]. Sure, it can be read into these sources - but if you learn through these classical sources on their own terms, without the influence of "Kabbalah" or Chasidus, you would not encounter any distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish souls. 

Does this lack of sources mean that this belief is false? Not necessarily. "Ee efshar l'beis midrash b'lo chidush - it is impossible to have a study hall without innovation" (Chagigah 3a). Nevertheless, whenever I see a concept which only appears in "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources with no basis in the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, then I am suspicious - especially if the concept in question is purported to be a fundamental of Judaism. If there is no evidence that Chazal and the Kadmonim were aware of a particular concept, then at the very least, this means that it is not an essential part of Judaism. At worst, this means that it is not part of Judaism at all. 

According to my understanding of the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, and the writings of the non-"Kabbalistic" Kadmonim, people only have one kind of soul: a human soul. This is the soul that the Torah refers to when it says: "And God said, 'Let us make man in our form (b'tzalmeinu), like our likeness (ki'dmuseinu)'" (Bereishis 1:26) and "God created man in His tzelem (form); in tzelem Elokim He created him; male and female He created them" (ibid. 1:27) and "Hashem-God formed the man of dust from the ground, and He blew into his nostrils nishmas chayim (the soul/breath) of life, and man became a nefesh chaya (living/speaking soul)" (ibid. 2:7).

According to all of the Kadmonim, the tzelem Elokim refers to the human intellect: man's capacity to apprehend and seek conceptual knowledge and understanding. There is no inherent difference between the tzelem Elokim of a Jew and that of a non-Jew. Frankly, I don't even know what it would mean to differentiate between a "Jewish intellect" and a "non-Jewish intellect." [4] 

The distinction between Jew and non-Jew is a legal one - not metaphysical one. In other words, "Jew" and "non-Jew" are halachic labels, indicating the particular system of Divine law by which one is legally bound. A Jew is someone who has entered into the covenant of Torah - whether by birth or by conversion - and is legally obligated to keep the system of Taryag mitzvos (613 Commandments). Non-Jews, on the other hand, are only obligated to keep the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach (Seven Noahide Commandments), which have been binding on all humans since the time of Noach, and which were "renewed" with the giving of Torah at Sinai. [5] 

Maybe someday I'll write a post in which I compile sources from the Kadmonim which state these points explicitly, alongside a list of the "Kabbalistic"/Chasidic sources which assert a metaphysical distinction between the souls of Jews and non-Jews. However, as I pointed out in my disclaimer, this is a polemical post - not a dialectical one. Suffice it to say, the burden of proof is on the "Kabbalists"/Chasidim to show that their belief has its source in the Mesorah (or to show that their belief is valid despite not having a source in the Mesorah). 

[Incidentally, if you would like to peruse a fairly comprehensive list of sources from both sides, check out The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-Jew, by Hanan Balk, published in Hakirah. This article also does a great job of illustrating why I consider the belief in "Jewish souls" to be harmful, dangerous, and repugnant.]

There is only one of the Kadmonim who, at first glance, might seem to hold that Jews and non-Jews have different souls: R' Yehuda ha'Levi. In his famous work, "the Kuzari," R' Yehuda ha'Levi [6] writes that only Jews possess the "Inyan ha'Elohi" ("divine quality") - a metaphysical quality which allows Jews to become prophets. Non-Jews do not have the Inyan ha'Elohi. Not only that, but even gerim lack the Inyan ha'Elohi; our conversion doesn't endow our souls with this special quality that only born-Jews possess.

Much has been written about R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view on this matter, but for the purposes of this post we are only interested in one thing: Does this view of Inyan ha'Elohi imply that the souls of Jews and non-Jews are inherently different? The answer is: no. R' Yehuda ha'Levi clearly held that Jews are born with a special quality which non-Jews lack, but their souls are fundamentally the same. Professor Menachem Kellner expressed this eloquently in his book, Maimonides' Confrontation with Mysticism:

It is important to emphasize: Halevi does not affirm that Jews differ biologically from non-Jews, that Jews have special souls, or that Jews are a species apart. He does not hold that non-Jews are any less created in the image of God than are Jews. He maintains that Jews have a special property (the potential to become prophets) lacking in non-Jews. This property is in some fashion (never explained by Halevi) transmitted through lineage. 

[For a detailed exposition and clarification of R' Yehuda ha'Levi's view, I recommend Professor Norman Strickman's article Misrepresenting Rabbi Judah Ha-Levi.]

The bottom line: I will continue to maintain that the Kadmonim did not recognize any difference between the soul of a Jew and that of a non-Jew, until someone shows me that I am incorrect. The only difference between a Jew and a non-Jew is obligation in mitzvos. Our souls are inherently the same. [7]

Jews and Non-Jews: A Common Soul, and a Common Path

I'd like to end this post on a more positive note.

Because Jews and non-Jews have the same human soul, we share a common path. As we said before, the Torah that Hashem gave through Moshe Rabbeinu was intended for Jews and non-Jews alike; the only difference is which system of mitzvos we are legally obligated to keep. According to Judaism, a righteous non-Jew has a portion in the World to Come. [8] Not only that, but a non-Jew is capable of reaching the same spiritual heights as a Jew. Adam ha'Rishon, Shem, Eiver, Chanoch, Noach, and Avraham Avinu were all non-Jews - yet, all of them were able to achieve high levels of closeness to God. The Gemara says (Sanhedrin 59a):

R' Meir says: How do we know that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal to a Kohen Gadol (High Priest)? As it is stated, "[You shall observe My decrees and My laws,] which man shall carry out and by which he shall live" (Vayikra 18:5) - it does not say, "Kohanim, Levites, and Israelites" but man. From here we learn that even a non-Jew who involves himself in the study of Torah is equal a Kohen Gadol.

The Rambam [9] codifies this principle at the end of his discussion about the special role of Shevet Levi (the Tribe of Levi). He writes:

Why didn’t the Tribe of Levi merit in the inheritance of the Land of Israel and its spoils along with their brethren? Because they are set aside to serve Hashem and to minister to Him and to teach His upright ways and righteous laws to the masses, as it is stated, “They shall teach Your laws to Yaakov and Your teachings to Israel” (Devarim 33:10). 

Therefore, they are separated from the ways of the world. They do not go to war like the rest of Israel, nor do they receive an inheritance, nor do they acquire for themselves with their bodily power, but rather, they are the legion of Hashem, as it is stated: “Bless, O Hashem, His legion” (ibid. 33:11), and He, Blessed is He, provides for them, as it is stated: “I Am your Portion and your Inheritance” (Bamidbar 18:20).  

Not only the Tribe of Levi, but each and every member of humanity whose spirit generously moves him and whose understanding of his knowledge [of all existing things causes him] to separate himself to stand before Hashem to minister unto Him and to serve Him in order to know Hashem, and to walk with uprightness as God made him, removing from his neck the yoke of the many calculations which people seek – he becomes sanctified as holy of holies. God will be His portion and heritage forever and ever, and He will provide what is sufficient for him in this world like He provides for the Kohanim and the Levites. And thus David declared: “Hashem is the lot of my portion; You are my cup; You support my lot” (Tehilim 16:5). 

This halacha is predicated upon the fact that Jews and non-Jews possess the same tzelem Elokim, and are drawn to the truth in the same way, as the Rambam [10] writes in Hilchos Teshuvah:

He instilled within them the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them. 

Yes, it is true that our nation has a special status among the nations of the world. Nevertheless, our national identity as "the Chosen People" does not indicate any inherent superiority on our part, nor does it imply that Jews have different souls. Rather, it is a reference to our role in humanity: to be "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Shemos 19:6), to teach mankind to fear and love Hashem. 

It is for this reason that the prophets promise that one day, all of humanity will be united by our pursuit of knowledge of Hashem, which stems from the tzelem Elokim within each and every human being. "For the earth will be filled with knowledge of Hashem, as water covers the sea bed" (Yeshayahu 11:9). "On that day, Hashem will be One and His Name will be One" (Zechariah 14:9).

[1] To my knowledge there is no non-"Kabbalistic" halachic view which maintains that a ger should make the berachah of she'lo asani goy. If anyone knows of such a view, please let me know.

[2] I have chosen to write the word "Kabbalistic" in quotation marks so as not to enter into the dicey analysis of which so-called "kabbalistic sources" are authentic, which are innovations, and which are fabrications. All I mean by "Kabbalistic" (with quotation marks) is that the proponents of these works consider them to be Kabbalistic. 

[3] By "Kadmonim" I am referring to the Geonim, Rishonim, and early Achronim. These Kadmonim include, but are not limited to: Rambam, R' Avraham ben ha'Rambam, Rav Hai Gaon, Saadia Gaon, Ramban, Ibn Ezra, Ralbag, Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda, Rif, Sforno, Rashba, Rashi, Baalei Tosafos, Ritva, Radak, Rashbam, R' Yosef Albo, R' Yehudah ha'Levi, Meiri, Avudarham, Raavad, Ran, Rabbeinu Yonah, Sefer Ha'Chinuch, Abravanel, Chazkuni, Rabbeinu Bachye ben Asher, Rosh, Tur, and more. See my post Neglecting the Thinkers of the Past for more details on this group.
[4] It can be argued that there are "Jewish types of thinking" (e.g. Talmudic analysis, Scriptural analysis in accordance with the principles of Torah she'baal Peh), and one can even try to argue that there are quantitative differences between the intellects of Jews and non-Jews (though I personally don't buy this), but these are a far cry from claiming that there is a qualitative difference between a Jewish intellect and a non-Jewish one.
[5] Taryag is a regimen designed to bring those who practice it properly to true human perfection, whereas the system of Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach is designed to keep mankind from descending to the level of animals, thereby granting them the opportunity to pursue human perfection on their own, or with the aid of the Torah regimen.

[6] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha'Levi, Kuzari 1:95

[7] There is also an ideological definition of Jew, as defined by the first mishnah in the 10th chapter of Sanhedrin, whose meaning and implications are heavily debated by the meforshim (commentators). This definition of Jew is even narrower than the halachic definition. In other words, there are a significant number of people who are halachic Jews (i.e. they are obligated to keep Taryag), but are not considered a part of the Jewish people (i.e. they do not hold by the foundational ideas that define the people "Israel"). This is a separate topic, but I thought it would be worthwhile to mention in passing.

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim 8:11

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zeraim, Hilchos Shemitah v'Yovel 13:12-13

[10] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4

Torah Study as Natural Discovery

I originally wrote this post in February 2009, towards the end of my time in graduate school. It was then that I discovered the writings of Jerome Bruner, whose insights into education dovetailed nicely with the revolution in my Torah paradigm from Rabbi Y.S. over the two preceding years. I would eventually go on to write my final paper on the relationship between Bruner and the Rambam. This blog post was the starting point of that train of thought.

Artwork: Natural Order, by Terese Nielsen

Torah Study as Natural Discovery

I am currently taking an amazing class in graduate school called "Curriculum Development" - a subject near and dear to my heart. Thus far, each and every reading and writing assignment has been thought-provoking and enlightening. Today I came across a short essay entitled Structures in Learning, by Jerome S. Bruner, a famous psychologist and educational philosopher. 

I'd like to share an excerpt from this essay because I believe it contains profound insights into the proper approach to education. If you would like to read the full essay (which isn't much longer than the excerpt I've posted), click here. As usual, the emphases in bold are my own.

Structures in Learning - by Jerome S. Bruner 

Every subject has a structure, a rightness, a beauty. It is this structure that provides the underlying simplicity of things, and it is by learning its nature that we come to appreciate the intrinsic meaning of a subject.  

Let me illustrate by reference to geography. Children in the fifth grade of a suburban school were about to study the geography of the Central states as part of a social studies unit. Previous units on the Southeastern states, taught by rote, had proved a bore. Could geography be taught as a rational discipline? Determined to find out, the teachers devised a unit in which students would have to figure out not only where things are located, but why they are there. This involves a sense of the structure of geography.  

The children were given a map of the Central states in which only rivers, large bodies of water, agricultural products, and natural resources were shown. They were not allowed to consult their books. Their task was to find Chicago, "the largest city in the North Central states."  

The argument got under way immediately. One child came up with the idea that Chicago must be on the junction of the three large lakes. No matter that at this point he did not know the names of the lakes - Huron, Superior, and Michigan - his theory was well reasoned. A big city produced a lot of products, and the easiest and most logical way to ship these products is by water.  

But a second child rose immediately to the opposition. A big city needed lots of food, and he placed Chicago where there are corn and hogs - right in the middle of Iowa.  

A third child saw the issue more broadly - recognizing virtues in both previous arguments. He pointed out that large quantities of food can be grown in river valleys. Whether he had learned this from a previous social studies unit or from raising carrot seeds, we shall never know. If you had a river, he reasoned, you had not only food but transportation. He pointed to a spot on the map not far from St. Louis. "There is where Chicago ought to be." Would that graduate students would always do so well! 

Not all the answers were so closely reasoned, though even the wild ones had about them a sense of the necessity involved in a city's location.  

One argued, for example, that all American cities have skyscrapers, which require steel, so he placed Chicago in the middle of the Mesabi Range. At least he was thinking on his own, with a sense of the constraints imposed on the location of cities.  

After forty-five minutes, the children were told they could pull down the "real" wall map (the one with names) and see where Chicago really is. After the map was down, each of the contending parties pointed out how close they had come to being right. Chicago had not been located. But the location of cities was no longer a matter of unthinking chance for this group of children.  

What had the children learned? A way of thinking about geography, a way of dealing with its raw data. They had learned that there is some relationship between the requirements of living and man's habitat. If that is all they got out of their geography lesson, that is plenty. Did they remember which is Lake Huron? Lake Superior? Lake Michigan? Do you?  

Teachers have asked me about "the new curricula" as though they are some special magic potion. They are nothing of the sort. The new curricula, like our little exercise in geography, are based on the fact that knowledge has an internal connectedness, a meaningfulness, and that for facts to be appreciated and understood and remembered, they must be fitted into that internal meaningful context. 

This approach to education did not originate with Bruner, but with Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu's method of teaching Adam ha'Rishon in Gan Eden: 

"Now, Hashem-Elokim had formed out of the ground every beast of the field and every bird of the sky, and brought them to the man to see what he would call each one; and whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name. And the man designated by name all of the cattle and the birds of the sky and every beast of the field" (Bereishis 2:19-20). 

The essence of this method is that it is geared towards the tzelem Elokim - man's natural seeking of insight into the principles of lawfulness underlying the phenomena he observes in his environment. Instead of bombarding children with a barrage of meaningless facts, lifeless formulae, and rote analytical procedures, we must cater to their natural curiosity and intuitive ability to sense order and structure in the phenomena they encounter. Bruner elaborates on this in his explanation of the three virtues of intellectual potency, intrinsic motivation, and techniques of inquiry: 

For the child to develop intellectual potency, he must be encouraged to search out and find regularities and relationships in his environment [read: "to discover lawfulness in his environment, like Adam ha'Rishon"]. To do this, he needs to be armed with the expectancy that there is something for him to find and, once aroused by this expectancy, he must devise his own ways of searching and finding. 

Emphasis on discovery in learning has the effect upon the learner of leading him to be a constructionist - to organize what he encounters in such a manner that he not only discovers regularity and relatedness, but also avoids the kind of informational drift that fails to keep account of how the information will be used.  

In speaking of intrinsic motives for learning (as opposed to extrinsic motives), it must be recognized that much of the problem in leading a child to effective cognitive ability is to free him from the immediate control of environmental punishments and rewards [read: "to release his soul and its faculties from the control of the nefesh ha'bahami (animal-psyche)"].  

For example, studies show that children who seem to be early over-achievers in school are likely to be seekers after the "right way to do it" and that their capacity for transforming their learning into useful thought structures tends to be less than that of children merely achieving at levels predicted by intelligent tests.  

The hypothesis drawn from these studies is that if a child is able to approach learning as a task of discovering something rather than "learning about it" he will tend to find a more personally meaningful reward in his own competency and self-achievement in the subject than he will find in the approval of others.  

There are many ways of coming to the techniques of inquiry, or the heuristics of discovery. One of them is by careful study of the formalization of these techniques in logic, statistics, mathematics, and the like. If a child is going to pursue inquiry as an eventual way of life, particularly in the sciences, formal study is essential. Yet, whoever has taught kindergarten and the early primary grades (periods of intense inquiry) knows that an understanding of the formal aspect of inquiry is not sufficient or always possible.
Children appear to have a series of attitudes and activities they associate with inquiry. Rather than a formal approach to the relevance of variables in their search, they depend on their sense of what things among an ensemble of things "smell right" as being of the proper order of magnitude or scope of severity.  

It is evident then that if children are to learn the working techniques of discovery, they must be afforded the opportunities of problem solving. The more they practice problem solving, the more likely they are to generalize what they learn into a style of inquiry that serves for any kind of task they encounter. It is doubtful that anyone ever improves in the art and technique of inquiry by any other means than engaging in inquiry, or problem solving. 

The question I had when I finished this article is: How can we apply this principle to our own Torah learning? I'm not just talking about chinuch for younger children. I'm talking about me and my own learning! I have found, especially in recent times, that my learning is severely lacking in the quality present in Adam ha'Rishon's learning. My learning has become exceedingly removed from the process of naming phenomena in my real-world environment. The formalistic dimension of Talmud Torah, while absolutely necessary, is supposed to be built upon a solid foundation in real-world naming. Without this foundation, the formal definitions are artificial skeletons which fail to illuminate the life of mitzvos. 

This problem needs a solution, but at the moment I do not have one, nor do I fully understand the multifaceted nature of the problem. However, I have complete faith that our Mesorah contains such a solution. My two best leads are the Rambam and the Pesach Seder. I will keep you posted as the quest continues. For now, let us ponder the problem.

Update: Thank God, in the seven years since I wrote this blog post, my learning and teaching have become more in line with the ideal of natural discovery. There's still a lot to think about here, but improvement is possible!

Parashas Re'eh: MEAT IS MURDER!!!

Originally posted in August 2013. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Butcher's Cleaver, by Jason Felix

I've always wanted to write about what the Torah would say about "ethical vegetarians" - people who refuse to eat meat for moral reasons. This "school newsletter dvar Torah" is not that post, but it's the closest thing to it that I've written. Enjoy!

Parashas Re'eh: MEAT IS MURDER!!!

Is the slaughtering of an animal tantamount to murder? This is a hotly debated question in contemporary society, especially among those who practice vegetarianism for ethical reasons. Although a comprehensive treatment of the topic of vegetarianism is beyond the scope of this dvar Torah, we will aim to answer the question above based on a mitzvah in this week's parashah.

During the 40 years in the Midbar (Wilderness), Bnei Yisrael were only permitted to slaughter animals in the context of korbanos (sacrifices). If you wanted a steak dinner, you would bring your cow to the Mishkan (Tabernacle) where it would be slaughtered and offered up as a korban to Hashem. Its fat and blood would be brought on the mizbeach (altar), and only afterwards would its flesh become permissible to eat.

In this week's parashah, Moshe Rabbeinu informs Bnei Yisrael of two changes that will take place upon entering Eretz Yisrael. The first change is that once the Beis ha'Mikdash (Holy Temple) is built, it will become prohibited to slaughter and offer korbanos in any other location: "Beware for yourself lest you bring up your burnt offerings in any place that you see. Rather, only in the place that Hashem will choose ... there shall you bring up your burnt-offerings, etc" (Devarim 12:13-14).

The second change is that Bnei Yisrael will be permitted to slaughter animals for food even outside of the context of korbanos: "However, in your soul's desire you may slaughter and eat meat, according to the blessing that Hashem, your God, will have given you in all your cities, etc." In other words, if you want a steak, you can slaughter your cow without bringing it as a korban.

The prohibition to slaughter animals outside the context of korbanos was originally stated in Parashas Acharei Mos. It is there that we find the answer to our question:

"Any man from the House of Israel who will slaughter an ox, a sheep, or a goat in the camp, or who will slaughter outside the camp, and he has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to bring it as an offering to Hashem before the Tabernacle of Meeting - it shall be considered as bloodshed for that man; he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from the midst of his people" (Vayikra 17:3-4).

The Torah openly states that if a Jew slaughters an animal outside of the context of korbanos, it is considered to be bloodshed! The Hebrew term used here is shfichus damim (lit. "bloodshed"), which is the same term that the Torah uses for the coldblooded murder of a human being! [1] How are we to understand this seemingly excessive condemnation of slaughtering an animal outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash? After all, the Torah clearly endorses slaughtering an animal inside the Beis ha'Mikdash, as well as slaughtering it for food!

The Sefer ha'Chinuch [2] provides an answer. He explains that the human beings do not have an inherent right over the lives of animals. We were only permitted to take an animal's life for our physical needs (e.g. food, medicine, material) or for our "spiritual" needs (e.g. korbanos and other mitzvos). Thus, to take an animal's life without any useful purpose is a wantonly destructive act, which is why the Torah refers to it as an act of shfichus damim.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch goes on to explain that a person who slaughters an animal as a korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is committing a wasteful and destructive act. He is taking an animal's life without any practical benefit to himself, and he is doing so by transgressing Hashem's commandment. It is purely an act of bloodshed.

However, the Sefer ha'Chinuch stresses that there is a major difference between killing an animal and killing a human. He writes:

Even though [killing an animal] is not like spilling human blood, due to the superiority of the human and the inferiority of the animal, it is nevertheless called bloodshed, since the Torah did not permit spilling [its blood] for no useful purpose. 

In truth, the Sefer ha'Chinuch's entire explanation is based on pesukim in Parashas Noach. Before the Flood, human beings were only permitted to eat vegetation; animals were entirely off limits. After the flood, as part of the covenant with Noach, Hashem permits mankind to kill animals for food. In the very same paragraph, He reiterates the prohibition of murder: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the tzelem Elokim (divine form) He made man" (Bereishis 9:6).

We see from the pesukim in Noach and Acharei Mos that the Torah regards taking any creature's life as an act of shfichus damim. However, a person who sheds the blood of another human being is liable for the death penalty because man was created b'tzelem Elokim. Sforno (like all other Rishonim) maintains that the tzelem Elokim refers to the human intellect - the capacity for rational thought. He explains that since the physical body of a human being is the vessel which serves his rational soul, the vessel itself is considered to be "precious" in God's eyes (so to speak). It is for this reason that He demands the blood of anyone who sheds the blood of his fellow human being. [3]

With animals, this isn't the case. It is clear that Hashem "cares" about the lives of all animals. He only permits us to slaughter animals for our physical or spiritual benefit, and if we take the life of an animal outside of those parameters, He considers it to be a destructive act of bloodshed.

[1] See, for example, Bereishis 37:22; Bamidbar 35:33; Devarim 21:7
[2] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Acharei Mos, Mitzvah #186
[3] Sforno on Bereishis 9:6

Adler: On Animal Speech and Animal Intelligence

In my recent post, Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra), I presented the Ibn Ezra's idea that man's soul (i.e. his ability to think rationally) and his ability to speak are correlated; as one develops, so does the other. A friend of mine asked me whether the Ibn Ezra was referring specifically to the ability to speak, or to the ability to communicate? When I answered that it was the latter, he asked me about animals that can communicate (e.g. monkeys who have been taught sign language). 

I thought that this might be a good time to (re)post three excerpts from the writings of Mortimer J. Adler, in which he addresses the differences between animal speech and human speech, as well as animal thought and human thought. These excerpts were originally published as two separate blog posts in June and August of 2007.

Artwork: Connection, by Yuumei

The Difference of Man and the Difference it Makes (1967, 1993)

Chapter 9: The Pivotal Issue: Language and Thought, p.136-138

The second critical point made by these contemporary philosophers, and by such scientists as Crichtley and White, turns on their making a sharp distinction between perceptual and conceptual thought. This distinction is implicit in the observation that animal thinking is confined to the perceptual present, whereas human thinking transcends the immediate environment and extends not only to objects in the remote past and the remote future but also to objects that have no temporal locus whatsoever. Precisely because they are incapable of conceptual thought, animals, these writers contend, are not only (1) incapable of sentence-making that includes statements about the past and future, (2) unable to fabricate tools for remote future use, (3) devoid of a cumulative cultural inheritance that constitutes a long historical tradition, but they are also (4) incapable of any behavior that is not rooted in the perceptually apprehended present situation.

Animals can certainly think, in the sense of learning from experience, generalizing, discriminating, and abstracting, solving problems by trial and error or by insight, and even, as Price, following Hume, points out, making inductive inferences from empirically learned cues or signals. The evidence is both plain and ample that they can think in all these ways. But it is equally plain from the observations of their behavior, in the laboratory or in the field, that they cannot think in any of the following ways: they cannot think about objects that are not perceptually present as well as about those that are; and with regard to objects of thought, present or absent, they cannot make judgments or engage in reasoning (i.e., think that such and such is or is not the case, or think that if such and such is the case, then so and so is not) ...

Bennett argues that animal learning and problem-solving, whether by trial and error or by insight, does not involve any of the steps that constitute human reasoning from experience - the process whereby human beings either establish an empirical conclusion or refute one. Since that always involves the separate acknowledgment of a timeless universal, on the one hand, and of particular instances of past occurrence, on the other, animals, whose apprehensions are limited to the immediate perceptual present, cannot possibly engage in the kind of thinking that consists in giving reasons pro and con. And, Bennet further contends, behavior that involves giving or receiving reasons cannot be causally explained by reference to empirical sequences. In his view, there can be no behavioristic account of human rational behavior, as there can be of animal learning and problem-solving, in terms of causal connections between stimuli and responses or by reference to the causes at work in the formation of the conditioned responses or the imprintings that represent the modifications of animal behavior through repeated experience ...

Ten Philosophical Mistakes (1985)

Chapter 2: The Intellect and the Senses, p.50-53

Since Darwin’s day, experimentation with animals in psychological laboratories has turned up much additional evidence that has been regarded as reinforcing this conclusion [namely, that man differs from animal only in degree, not in kind]. It has been interpreted as showing that other animals have concepts as well as percepts, even if they do not have intellects in the traditional sense of that term. Accompanying this attribution of conceptual intelligence to other animals has been the attribution to them of linguistic performances that are said to differ only in degree from the human use of language.

... I will concentrate here on the misinterpretation of the evidence that is supposed to show that other animals have concepts that enable them to deal with generalities as well as particulars.

To put the matter briefly, the experimental evidence does show that other animals, under laboratory conditions, can learn to discriminate between different kinds of perceived objects. They learn to react in one way to squares and in another to circles, for example; or to eat what is placed on a green surface and to avoid what is placed on a red surface. Such discriminations indicate that they are able to generalize, and this is made the basis for attributing concepts as well as percepts to them.

The error here consists in thinking that to be able to discriminate between different kinds of objects is tantamount to being able to understand distinct kinds and their differences. To regard an animal’s ability to discriminate between perceived similarities and dissimilarities as evidence of conceptual thought on the animal’s part involves an equivocal use of the word “concept.”

Strictly used, concepts are (a) acquired dispositions to recognize perceived objects as being of this kind or of that kind, and at the same time (b) to understand what this kind or that kind of object is like, and consequently (c) to perceive a number of perceived particulars as being the same in kind and to discriminate between them and other sensible particulars that are different in kind.

In addition, concepts are acquired dispositions to understand what certain kinds of objects are like both (a) when the objects, though perceptible, are not actually perceived, and (b) also when they are not perceptible at all, as is the case with all the conceptual constructs we employ in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.

There is no empirical evidence whatsoever that concepts, thus precisely defined, are present in animal behavior. Their intelligence is entirely sensory. Its operations are limited to the world of perceptual objects and imaginable ones. What lies beyond perception and imagination is totally beyond the powers of the animal mind or intelligence. Only animals with intellects, only members of the human species, have the conceptual powers that enable them to deal with the unperceived, the imperceptible, and the unimaginable ...

Chapter 3: Words and Meanings (Section 6)

In their study of the evidence of animal communication, [animal psychologists and behavioral scientists] seldom if ever note the difference between signs that function merely as signals and signs that function as designators – as names that refer to objects. Almost all of the cries, sounds, gestures, that animals in the wild, and domesticated animals as well, use to express their emotions and desires, serve as signals, not as designators. It is only in the laboratory and under experimental conditions, often with very ingeniously contrived special apparatus, that such higher mammals as chimpanzees and bottle-nosed dolphins appear to be communicating by using words as if they were names, and even to be making sentences by putting them together with some vestige of syntax.

The appearance is then misinterpreted by the scientists as a basis for asserting that the only difference between animal and human language is one of degree, not of kind – a difference in the number of name words in an animal’s vocabulary and difference in the complexity of the utterances that are taken to be sentences.

This misinterpretation arises from the neglect or ignorance, on the part of the scientists, of the difference between perceptual and conceptual thought. That, in turn, stems from their failure to acknowledge the difference between the senses and the intellect or their denial that the difference exists ... 

While there is evidence that chimpanzees under experimental conditions do use artificially contrived signs to designate or name things, the things they name are all perceptual objects. There is not a single piece of evidence showing their ability to use signs to designate what is not perceived through their senses or what lies totally beyond the sensible realm and is intrinsically imperceptible ...

The animal’s behavior manifests different reactions to objects that are different in kind. But the kinds of things that animals appear to differentiate are all kinds of which there are perceptual instances in the animal’s experience. Humans differentiate kinds or classes of which there either are no perceptual instances in their experience or of which there cannot be any. This is the distinguishing characteristic of conceptual thought and the irrefutable evidence of the presence of intellect in man and of its absence in brutes.

One further observation, if it were made by the animal psychologists, might open their eyes to the difference in kind, not degree, between human language and the acquirement by animals of signs that appear to function as designative names. It involves the distinction, already made, between a word acquiring its designative meaning through direct perceptual acquaintance with the object named and the acquirement of meaning by means of a verbal description, as when a child learns the meaning of the word “kindergarten” by being told that it is a place where children get together to play and learn.

In all the experimental work done on animals, there is no instance where a sign that an animal uses gets is meaning from a collocation of other signs that purport to express its meaning. In every case, a new sign that is introduced into the animal’s vocabulary becomes meaningful through being attached to a perceptual object with which the animal has direct acquaintance.

If the students of animal behavior had engaged in their observations and experiments with a recognition of the difference between perceptual and conceptual thought, and with an acknowledgment that humans have intellect as well as senses, whereas animals lack intellects, they would not be so prone to ignore or deny the difference in kind between the human and animal use of signs as names or designators.

Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra)

I must preface this post with a disclaimer: I don't understand what a "soul" is. Years ago I used to think I understood the Torah's view on the concept of "soul," but the more I learned, the more I realized the breadth and depth of the topic, and of my own ignorance and metaphysical naiveté. 

Here is what I do know:

1. The word "soul" is used equivocally. It can mean different things in different contexts. Although there are different words for "soul" (e.g. nefesh, ruach, neshamah), even these terms aren't necessarily consistent in their usage, and each must be interpreted based on its context. 
   
   
2. The human soul has something to do with the tzelem Elokim, which has something to do with the human intellect, but I am at a loss to explain how these three things are related.
   
   
3. There is also some relationship between the human soul and free will, and I find free will to be an even more daunting topic than the soul.
   
   
4. There is a lot of machlokes on this topic among the meforshim, and it is very difficult to discern which of the meforshim are working with the same premises and which of them are working with a completely different set of premises.

And that's about it. Beyond these four points, I feel that I am still "groping in darkness and not in light ... staggering like a drunkard" (cf. Iyov 12:24-25) on this topic. 

Thus, I have decided to take the same approach with this subject as I did with Sefer Mishlei: rather than trying to form grand theories and a complete understanding of the topic, I will instead approach the topic step by step, one idea at a time. If I (am zocheh to) do this for a number of decades, perhaps a clearer picture will begin to emerge. 

Having said all of that, I would like to present one idea about the soul from the Ibn Ezra. Please regard this as merely a clue in our investigation of the vast mystery story of the soul.

Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra)

That's the question. How would you answer it on a multiple choice quiz with these choices?

          (A) yes
          (B) no
          (C) maybe
          (D) potentially

Let's cut right to the chase. According to the Ibn Ezra, the answer is (D) potentially. Or, to be more precise, babies have potential souls - not actual souls.

The Ibn Ezra states his view in his commentary on Tehilim 8:3. Here is the perek in its entirety:

(1) For the conductor, on the gittis, a psalm by David. (2) Hashem, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth, [You] Who places Your majesty on the heavens. (3) Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings You have established strength, because of Your enemies, to silence foe and avenger. (4) When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers, the moon and the stars that You have set in place, [I think,] (5) "What is frail man that You should remember him, and the son of mortal man that You should be mindful of him?" (6) Yet, You have made him but slightly less than the angels, and crowned him with glory and splendor. (7) You give him dominion over Your handiwork, You placed everything under his feet: (8) sheep and cattle, all of them, even the beasts of the field; (9) the birds of the sky and the fish of the sea; for [man] even traverses the lanes of the sea. (10) Hashem, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth!

The question on our pasuk is: How is Hashem's strength established through "the mouths of babes and sucklings"? What does this even mean? 

Ibn Ezra begins by quoting the explanation of R' Moshe ha'Darshan, who learns that the pasuk is referring to the literal mouths of the babies, through which they obtain nourishment:

R' Moshe says that out of the mouth of babes means that the babes themselves will praise You even though they cannot speak, for You sustain them. You make them fruitful and You multiply and increase their body’s height and width.

Rabbi H. Norman Strickman, in his footnotes on the Ibn Ezra's commentary, understands R' Moshe ha'Darshan as follows: "The way children grow bears witness to the existence of a Creator. Thus the babes, as it were, declare that there is a God." 

However, the Ibn Ezra disagrees with this approach, and states his own view:

However, in my opinion Scripture reads, “out of the mouth of babes” because man is the most glorious being created in this world. “Out of the mouth of babes” refers to the time that a child first begins to speak. Its meaning is that the power of the rational soul first appears in the body when the child begins to speak. The rational soul develops to the point where it can learn of the power of its Creator by logical thinking. Indeed the soul grows in strength day by day. This is the meaning of, “has Thou founded strength.”

A baby is born with only the potential for rational thinking, which is what the Ibn Ezra means when he speaks of a "soul." This potential is first actualized when the child begins to speak, and continues to develop from that point forward. In this manner, the child builds and cultivates his own soul, which ultimately brings him to recognize his Creator.

The Ibn Ezra's interpretation is in line with Targum Onkelos's translation of the statement, "[God] blew into [man's] nostrils the breath of life, and man became a nefesh chayah (living soul)" (Bereishis 2:7) as "and man became a ruach memalela (speaking spirit)." The human soul and the ability to speak are inextricably linked, and as one develops, so does the other.

And that, my friends, is all I've got for today. Just one piece of the puzzle of the soul. I don't know where this idea fits into the grand scheme of things. I don't know what bearing it has on such topics as the immortality of the soul, the incorporeality of the soul, Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), reward and punishment, the relationship between mind and body, etc. etc. etc. Those questions must be left for another time.

This morning I came across a passage in the Sefer ha'Chinuch that made me smile. After expressing great apprehension at the prospect of writing about the mitzvah of Parah Adumah (Red Heifer), the Sefer ha'Chinuch offers a few speculations. Immediately thereafter, he apologizes for his boldness, and downplays what he just wrote, saying:

This is not a clarification to provide any comprehension whatsoever of the matter. It is only the love of holiness and the eagerness to achieve a knowledge of the hidden that moves the quill to write.

That sentiment resonated with me while writing this post. Remember, friends: this blog is nothing more and nothing less than a venue for me to think out loud, and to discuss ideas with others who are interested. If you are looking for certainty, expertise, and "authoritative knowledge," then I would be happy to refer you to other resources. 

A Definition of "Torah"

What is "Torah"?

This is one of the most basic question we can ask about Judaism. Like most basic questions, it is a surprisingly difficult one to answer.

Let's be more specific. What kind of a thing is Torah? Is it a book? Is it a system of law? Is it a collection of teachings and stories? Is it a religion? And if one is tempted to answer "all of the above," is there a unified definition of Torah which provides a framework for understanding how all of these characteristics are interrelated?

And what about the components of Torah? How do Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah) fit into a unified definition? What is the relationship between the Torah's narratives, prophecies, laws, philosophical ideas, and ethical guidelines? What place do halachos mi'de'rabbanan (Rabbinic laws) and minhagim (halachic customs) have within Torah, seeing as how they came into existence post-Sinai, but are clearly an integral part of Torah?

Artwork: Hassid Reading From Torah Scroll With Yellow Fiery Passion Going Up To Heaven He Points To Letters, by M. Zimmerman

The clearest and most explicit definition of Torah I have seen is the one provided by the Ralbag in the final sentence of the opening paragraph of his Introduction to Torah. Although his definition stands on its own, it can only be fully understood in context. You'll soon see why. Here is the first paragraph in its entirety:

Blessed and exalted be the Rock, Who, with His Understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge, gives existence to all existing things – the existence of which manifests a chochmah (wisdom) and chaninah (beneficence) that none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, Who, out of His desire to benefit these existences and to bring them from deficient existence to complete existence, directed His hashgachah (providence) upon these lowly existences, developing them stage by stage until He reached the existence of man. In addition to directing His hashgachah on man’s existence in the wondrous design of his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which his [physical] existence is preserved, He did not refrain from directing His hashgachah on man by guiding him on the path to true perfection – man’s ultimate state of existence, for the sake of which this lowly material existence was endowed with tzurah (design) to the extent that it is. He did this by giving us the divine Torah, which is a nimus (regimen) that brings those who practice it properly to the true success.

I will now summarize and expand upon each of the Ralbag's points in light of my understanding of his hashkafah:

• Hashem is the Eternal ("the Rock") source of good ("blessed") Who transcends physicality ("exalted").
• He is the Cause of all existence.
• All existences are the product of His understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge. 
• Although His chochmah and chaninah are manifest in the universe, He is the only One who completely apprehends it. 
• He is the Yotzer - the One Who fashions the universe. 
• As the Yotzer, He is praiseworthy (since we can only know Him through His creations).
• His will ("his desire") is to benefit His creations. 
• His hashgachah extends to all existing things (not only to man). 
• The role of His hashgachah is to benefit His creations, and to bring them from a state of potentiality ("deficient existence") to actuality ("complete existence"). 
• The hashgachic evolution of the universe's creation progressed from stage to stage (i.e. inorganic matter => organic matter => plants => creatures of the sea => creatures of the air and land) until it culminated with the creation of man.
• Hashem's hashgachah furnished man with everything he needs as a physical organism: his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which he maintains his existence as a biological organism.
• But Hashem didn't stop there. In addition to hashgachically providing for man's physical existence, He also provided for man's metaphysical existence - his existence as a tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect) - thereby guiding him on the path to his true perfection.
• He did this by giving us His Torah: a regimen that brings those who practice it properly to the true success. 

The Ralbag defines the term "the true success" in his commentary on Sefer Iyov: "the true human success consists in man comprehending Hashem, to the extent that this is [humanly] possible" (Ralbag on Iyov 34).

Artwork: Words of Torah, by David Baruch Wolk

The Ralbag's definition is as clear as day. What kind of a thing is Torah? According to the Ralbag, the Torah is a regimen. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "regimen" as "any systematic or prescribed course of action, esp. one adopted for a particular purpose or end." 

What is that end? According to the Ralbag, the ultimate end of the Torah-regimen is "the true human success [which] consists in man comprehending Hashem, to the extent that this is humanly possible." The Ralbag's formulation echoes the words of the navi:

Thus says Hashem: "Let not the wise man glorify himself with his wisdom, nor let the mighty man glorify himself with his strength, nor let the rich man glorify himself in his wealth; but let him that glorify himself glory in this: comprehending and knowing Me, for I am Hashem Who does kindness, justice, and righteousness in the land, for in these is My desire" - the word of Hashem (Yirmiyahu 9:22-23).

All of the Torah's laws, stories, and ethical and philosophical teachings are components of this regimen, and are instrumental in helping us to achieve its goal. The same goes for its components: Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh, halachos mi'de'rabbanan and minhagim. Of course, the question still remains: "How do these all of these things work together within the regimen to achieve the desired end?" Thankfully, the Ralbag answers this question in detail in the subsequent paragraphs of his Introduction to Torah. But even if he didn't spell out the answer, his operational definition of Torah would provide us with a sufficient basis for thinking through these questions on our own. That, to my mind, is what makes the Ralbag's definition so useful and enlightening.

The Ralbag's introduction helped me to realize another fundamental truth, namely, that matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah at Sinai) was an instance of the same hashgachah by which Hashem brings all things into existence. Just as Hashem brought the universe into existence through the laws of physics, and just as He brings man's physical body into existence through the laws of biology, so too, man's tzelem Elokim is brought into existence through his adherence to the Torah-regimen.

There is much more that can be said about the Ralbag's definition of Torah, as well as the other ideas in the first paragraph of his Introduction to Torah. With God's help, we will explore these points in future posts. For now, I urge you to take the Ralbag's definition and ponder it from time to time. I think you'll find this to be a fruitful exercise which will enhance your understanding and appreciation of Torah.

Let's review his definition one more time: the Torah is a regimen which brings those who practice it properly to true success - comprehending and knowing Hashem to the extent that is humanly possible.