How Rambam Sees God in the Sunset

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Photo: one of the many sunset photos I took this past Hawaii trip

How Rambam Sees God in the Sunset

I just returned from my annual trip to visit Popo (my 97-year-old grandmother) in Hawaii. Whenever I’m there, I do my best to trek out to the shoreline every evening to watch the Hawaiian sunset. It’s not just the aesthetic beauty which makes a sunset like this such a special experience. Rudolph Otto, a 20th century theologian and philosopher of religion, used the term “numinous” to mean “arousing spiritual or religious emotion; mysterious or awe-inspiring.” I’m sure I’m not the only one who has felt this numinous quality in a sunset. The question is: What does Judaism have to say? Just because this feeling is real doesn’t automatically mean that this is a valid religious experience in the Torah’s eyes.

My initial thought was that perhaps such experiences fall under the headings of ahavas Hashem (love of God) and yiras Hashem (awe of God). The Rambam defines these two experiences in the Laws of the Foundations of Torah 2:2:

What is the way of loving and fearing God? When a person contemplates (misbonein) His great and wondrous works and creations and sees from them His infinite and incomparable wisdom, he immediately loves, praises, and extols and is filled with a tremendous desire to know the Great Name, as David said, “My soul thirsts for God, for the living God” (Psalms 42:3).

And when he reflects upon these same matters, he immediately recoils back with fear and dread, knowing that he is a small, insignificant, unenlightened creature standing with a frail and puny mind in the presence of Perfect Knowledge, as David said, “When I behold Your heavens, [the work of Your fingers, the moon and stars that you have set in place, I exclaim:] ‘What is frail man that You should notice him, [and the son of mortal man that You should take note of him?’]” (Psalms 8:4-5).

Are the feelings described by the Rambam here identical with the numinosity felt by the average person? Seemingly not. According to the Rambam, ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem are the emotional states which result from cognitive activity: tevunah (theoretical understanding) and machshavah (practical consideration). Both require a relatively high level of knowledge, as evidenced by the fact that the Rambam goes on to provide a three-chapter primer of Aristotelian metaphysics and physics “to open the way for the meivin (contemplative thinker) to love the Name.” While it is certainly possible to for a sunset to awaken ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem, I don’t think the average person’s awe of the sunset stems from a scientific knowledge of astronomy, optics, and other areas of physics.

However, in the middle of the aforementioned primer, the Rambam drops a clue which might provide us with the basis for an answer. In the Laws of the Foundations of Torah 3:11, he cites a pasuk from Tehilim: "Praise Hashem from the earth: sea creatures and all depths, fire and hail, snow and smoke" (Tehilim 148:7). This is problematic: how can non-rational creations – such as “sea creatures and all depths, fire and hail, snow and smoke” – praise Hashem? Rambam answers:

The meaning of this statement is: praise Him, mankind, from His gevuros (mighty acts) which you see in the fire, the hail, and the other creations that can be seen on earth, the gevurah (might) of which is constantly discernable to the small and the great alike.

When the Rambam describes the gevurah of these phenomena, he is clearly not referring to the lofty intellectual levels described in Chapter 2:2, since he specifies that this gevurah is “constantly discernable to the small and the great alike.”

I believe that the gevurah mentioned by the Rambam is identical with (or is at least related to) the numinous feeling we experience when we behold such natural phenomena as crashing waves, a ferocious storm, and a dazzling sunset. In that aspect of these experience, man feels the overwhelming power of Hashem’s mighty acts, and “there the small and the great are equal” (Iyov 3:19). True, for the meivin who understands the science behind these phenomena, the sunset may give rise to ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem, but both the meivin and the average person alike will be able to praise Hashem from the awe that arises within them when they gaze upon His handiwork in nature.

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Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Vaeschanan: Declaring Hashem’s Oneness in Love

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Vaeschanan: Declaring Hashem's Oneness in Love

“Hear, O Israel, Hashem is our God, Hashem is One” (Devarim 6:4). This pasuk is the source of the mitzvah of Yichud Hashem (God’s Oneness). We are commanded to “unify” Hashem in our minds: to know that He is Absolutely One in every sense of the term, and to continually strip away all notions of contingency, multiplicity, physicality, and temporality from our conception of Him (Hilchos Yesodei ha’Torah 1:7-12).

“You shall love Hashem, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your resources” (Devarim 6:5). We are also commanded in the mitzvah of ahavas Hashem (love of God): to contemplate the infinite wisdom in His wondrous creations, which will result in a state of bliss (Sefer ha’Mitzvos: Aseh #3) and fill us with an overpowering desire to seek even more knowledge of Him (Hilchos Yesodei ha’Torah 2:2).

Yichud Hashem is logically prior to Ahavas Hashem. After all, how could a person have “a tremendous desire to know the great Name” (ibid.) without knowledge of who Hashem is (and who He is not)? Indeed, the Rambam explains that ahavas Hashem “is based entirely on knowledge, and the love will be in proportion to the knowledge: if little then little, if a lot then a lot” (Hilchos Teshuvah 10:6).

However, in his commentary on Ahavah Rabbah / Ahavas Olam – the berachah which we say in Shacharis before the Shema – the Abudirham indicates that ahavas Hashem is, in another sense, prior to Yichud Hashem:

You will find that this berachah includes many themes: that Hashem loves us more than all the other nations, that He gave us the Torah, that He instilled within us belief in His Oneness, and that He is the Lord of all – but the berachah concludes with [the theme of] love, not with [the theme of] Oneness, because the declaration of His Oneness is ineffective (lo yo’eel) unless it is from love and from a whole heart.

What does this mean? Presumably, the Abudirham would agree that there is inherent value in knowing Yichud Hashem, both because it is a fundamental truth and because such knowledge is a mitzvah. The Torah’s value system of avodah me’ahavah (serving Hashem out of love) and Torah lishmah (learning Torah for its own sake) is predicated on the idea that knowledge is intrinsically valuable, as the Rambam writes: “the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true” (Intro to Perek Chelek). What, then, is the Abudirham referring to when he speaks of the “efficacy” of our declaration of Yichud Hashem? “Effective” in what sense? And what makes a “loveless” proclamation of His Oneness “ineffective”?

According to the Abudirham, it is our declaration of Yichud Hashem that has a purpose beyond merely reviewing the idea. Ahavas Hashem is the motion of the yearning soul in its quest for knowledge of reality. Yichud Hashem is the (ultimately) unattainable destination of that quest. When we affirm our belief in Yichud Hashem from a place of ahavah, we strengthen our conviction that behind this multifaceted reality is a Unity. In other words, a “wholehearted” Shema will have the beneficial effect of reinforcing the synergistic relationship between Yichud Hashem and ahavas Hashem. But if God’s Oneness is nothing but an abstract theoretical construct which resides in our intellect, disconnected from our passionate truth-seeking, then our declaration of Yichud Hashem is reduced to a dry, ritualistic, “ineffective” catechism.

Now we can understand what we mean at the end of this berachah when we ask Hashem to help us “yachedecha be’ahavah” (lit. “to unify You in love”). We are asking that our conviction in His Oneness not only inform but also enflame our quest for knowledge, and that our seeking of truth be oriented towards the ultimate Truth. The conclusion of the berachah teaches us that Hashem’s love towards us is based on our love towards Him.

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Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast", "The Stoic Jew" Podcast, "Rambam Bekius" Podcast, "Machshavah Lab" Podcast, "The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here. 

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife?

This week’s dvar Torah is a digest of the answers given by the Rishonim [1] to a classic question, along with an original answer based on my understanding of Sefer Koheles. 

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Artwork: Honor's Reward, by Izzy

Parashas Bechukosai: What About the Afterlife? 

The Question 

Parashas Bechukosai opens with a list of the blessings that Hashem promises to bestow “If you will follow My decrees and observe My commandments and perform them” (Vayikra 26:3). Among these blessings are: rain in its proper time, abundant produce, peace in the land, military success, flourishing of our population, and Divine favor. A similar list of blessings is stated in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 28:1-14). 

But there is a shocking omission from both lists of blessings: Olam ha’Ba (the “World to Come” or “afterlife”), the ultimate reward for a life of Torah and mitzvos. 

This is a famous problem. Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? In contrast, the Oral Torah and midrashic literature are replete with references to Olam ha’Ba, the most prominent of which is the Mishnah’s statement: “All of Israel has a portion in Olam ha’Ba” (Sanhedrim 10:1). 

This discrepancy between the Written and Oral Torahs has led modern academics to conclude that the entire notion of an afterlife was a Rabbinic invention, introduced long after the Biblical period. Those who wish to believe such conspiracy theories will not be convinced by any arguments, and I will not even attempt to address them here. Suffice it to say, our Mesorah (tradition) is clear on this point: belief in Olam ha’Ba has always been a unanimously accepted part of Judaism, despite the fact that it is not explicitly referenced in the 24 books of Tanach. 

But the question remains: Why does the Written Torah omit Olam ha’Ba from its lists of rewards? Why does it focus exclusively on the physical blessings? 

Seven Answers from the Rishonim 

The Abravanel [2] raises our question in his Chumash commentary and refers the reader to a book he wrote on the topic of Olam ha’Ba called Tzedek Olamim, in which he answers this question in full. Sadly, this book has been lost to history. Fortunately, the Abravanel provides a brief summary of six answers given to our question by his predecessors, followed by his own seventh answer. Here are my summaries of the Abravanel’s summaries: 

(1) Rambam [3]: The blessings and curses promised in the Torah are not the true reward and punishment for the mitzvos. The true reward is Olam ha’Ba, which is purely spiritual in nature. The reason why the Written Torah didn’t mention this reward is so that a person will follow Torah lishmah (for its own sake) – or, as the Abravanel puts it, “for the sake of perfection” – rather than for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. The role of the blessings and curses is to facilitate our pursuit of human perfection for its own sake: to the extent that we follow Hashem, He will provide us with physical goods and remove physical impediments from our lives so that we can continue in our pursuit of perfection without worrying about our material well-being; and to the extent that we neglect His will, He will withhold His blessings and we will be subject to these curses which will impede our pursuit of perfection. 

(2) Ibn Ezra [4]: The reward in Olam ha’Ba is a deep concept which is difficult for the average person to grasp. Since the Written Torah was given to the entire Jewish nation – not just the elite scholars – it was necessary to only mention the physical rewards and punishments, which can be understood by everyone. The sode (“secret” or esoteric concept) of Olam ha’Ba was relegated to the realm of the Oral Torah, thereby allowing every teacher to assess their student’s readiness for this concept on an individual basis, in accordance with that student’s level of development. 

(3) Ramban [5] / Sefer ha’Chinuch [6]: Belief in the eternality of the soul and its reward in Olam ha’Ba is a matter that can be rationally demonstrated by way of philosophical argument, and therefore did not need to be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. In contrast, the blessings and curses are miraculous [7] phenomena which operate according to the principles of hashgachah (Divine providence) known only through nevuah (prophecy), which is why it was necessary for the Torah to spell them out in detail. 

(4) Ran [8] / Kuzari [9]: The majority of the people, in ancient and modern times, denied the reality of hashgachah pratis (individual Divine providence). This denial was rampant among the Jews as well. Were the Torah to only promise spiritual reward and punishment after death, then these misguided Jews would take this as a confirmation of their deistic worldview. Therefore, it was necessary for the Torah to reinforce the truth of hasghacha pratis by going into great detail about the physical blessings and curses that will transpire as a result of our adherence to Torah. As for the reality of the spiritual reward and punishment for the soul in Olam ha’Ba: this can be inferred from the physical blessings and curses in Olam ha’Zeh (the physical world). Once we see that God provides us with physical rewards, which relate to the lower part of our nature (i.e. the body), we will realize that certainly He must provide us with spiritual reward, to compensate the higher part of our nature (i.e. the soul). 

(5) Saadia Gaon [10]: The ovdei avodah zarah (idolaters) engaged in various behaviors which they believed would bring them material success and protection from physical harm. When Hashem prohibited these idolatrous practices, He didn’t want His people to think that they would lose out on these material benefits. Therefore, He promised us as part of His covenant that by keeping the Torah, we would enjoy rewards in the physical world greater than anything that the ovdei avodah zarah hoped for from their false gods, since Hashem is the true God of heaven and earth, Who has the ability to bestow such blessings as He sees fit. There was no need to mention spiritual rewards, since the promises of physical rewards were only included in the covenant to refute the false promise of physical blessings by the ovdei avodah zarah. (Apparently, the ovdei avodah zarah of that era did not yearn for spiritual rewards, which is why there was no need to mention them in the covenant.) 

(6) Kuzari [11] / Ran [12]: The afterlife of the soul is explicitly mentioned in the blessings promised by the Torah in such statements as: “I [Hashem] will walk among you” (Vayikra 26:12), “I will place My dwelling among you” (ibid. 26:11), “I will be God unto you” (ibid. 26:12). [The Abravanel then goes on to explain how, if the nature of this spiritual reward is properly understood, then even the promises of physical blessings will serve as a proof that the souls of the righteous will survive after death. However, I’m not 100% sure that I follow every step of his explanation, and I would rather omit it from my summary than risk misrepresenting this line of reasoning.] 

(7) Abravanel [13]: It would not be proper to mention Olam ha’Ba in the context of Bechukosai and Ki Savo, since these blessings are for the nation as a whole rather than for individuals, whereas the spiritual rewards of the afterlife are for individuals and not for the nation as a whole. If the Torah had mentioned Olam ha’Ba in its lists of blessings, this might lead to misconceptions about the nature of the reward in the afterlife. For example, one might mistakenly conclude that one’s portion in Olam ha’Ba is determined or affected by the righteousness and wickedness of the majority of nation, as is the case with the physical blessings and curses. 

An Eighth Answer 

Shlomo ha'Melech says: “Give a portion to seven but also to eight” (Koheles 11:2). While the seven of the aforementioned answers all have their merits, I would like to offer an eighth answer – one which lines up with that of the Rambam, but with a twist. 

The Rambam [14] devotes the final chapter of Hilchos Teshuvah to a discussion of the motives for serving Hashem. He opens his discussion by defining two levels of Divine service: 

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its wisdom in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in Olam ha’Ba” and “I will separate myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from Olam ha’Ba.”  

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the wise. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are the ignoramuses, the women, and the children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love.  

An “oveid me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”) involves himself in Torah and mitzvos and walks on the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, neither out of fear of the bad nor out of a desire to inherit the good. Rather, he does what is true because it is true, and the good will come of its own accord … 

It is easy to understand why doing mitzvos in order to receive the blessings promised by the Torah is considered to be an inferior motive, but why should this apply to one whose service is motivated by the prospect of reward in Olam ha’Ba? Didn’t the Rambam write earlier [15] that Olam ha’Ba is the greatest good? 

The [ultimate] goodness which is hidden away for tzadikim is Olam ha’Ba. This is the life which has no death with it, and the good which has no bad. This is what is written in the Torah, “so that it will be good for you, and you will prolong your days” (Devarim 22:7). From the Oral Torah we learn: “so that it will be good for you” [refers] to the world which is entirely good, and “you will prolong your days” [refers] to the world which is entirely long – and this is Olam ha’Ba. 

If Olam ha’Ba is the ultimate good, why shouldn’t it motivate our observance of mitzvos? 

The answer lies in the fact that it is impossible for us to comprehend the true nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba. The Rambam [16] introduces this difficulty in his introduction to Perek Chelek. He writes: 

Know that just as a blind man cannot experience colors, nor can a deaf man experience sounds, nor can a eunuch [experience] sexual desire, so too, physical bodies cannot experience spiritual enjoyments. And just as a fish does not recognize the element of fire because it (i.e. the fish) is immersed in its opposite, so too, one cannot know the enjoyments of the spiritual world while one is in this physical world, for we have no enjoyment other than bodily enjoyments alone – [such as] the experiences of our senses in eating, drinking, and sex – and everything outside of these [physical enjoyments] is not experienced by us, nor can we recognize it, nor can we apprehend it in our initial analysis, but only after much investigation. This is because we are in a physical world and cannot apprehend anything other than its enjoyments, but enjoyments of the soul are constant and unceasing, and there is no relationship at all whatsoever between these and those. 

Similarly, the Rambam [17] writes in the Mishneh Torah: 

Regarding the great good which the soul will enjoy in Olam ha’Ba: there is no way in Olam ha’Zeh to comprehend it or know it, because we only know in Olam ha’Zeh the good of the body, and that is what we desire; but that good [in Olam ha’Ba] is exceedingly great, and there is no comparison among the goods of Olam ha’Zeh except by way of analogy. 

Indeed, a few paragraphs earlier the Rambam condemns those who harbor foolish notions about the nature of the reward in Olam ha’Ba, writing: 

Maybe this good will seem trivial in your eyes, and you’ll imagine that the only reward for mitzvos and for being a person who is perfected in the ways of truth is to eat and drink good foods, have relations with beautiful figures, wear garments made of silk and woven fabrics, dwell in houses of marble, and use gold and silver utensils and other things like this – as is imagined by the foolish and idiotic Arabs who are steeped in lechery.

But the wise and those who possess knowledge know that all of these things are fantasy and nothingness, and there is no hope in them. They are only considered to be a great good for us in Olam ha’Zeh because we have bodies, and all of these things are bodily needs, and the soul only desires them and favors them because they are bodily needs, in order that its desires will be fulfilled and its health maintained. And when there is no body, all of these things will be found to be pointless. 

Having established all of these premises, I would like to propose my own answer to our original question: Why do the promises in the Written Torah focus exclusively on physical reward without ever explicitly mentioning the spiritual reward for the soul in the afterlife? Because since it is absolutely impossible to conceive of the spiritual enjoyments of Olam ha’Ba, then if we were to be motivated by the promise of such a reward, we would – by definition – be chasing a fantasy. In other words, whatever notion of Olam ha’Ba is driving our motivation must, of necessity, be false, since it is impossible for a physical being to conceive of non-physical enjoyments. 

It is for this reason that the Torah promises physical blessings to those who obey Hashem. The individual whose avodah (Divine service) is motivated by these physical blessings and the individual whose avodah is motivated by Olam ha’Ba are both engaged in avodah she’lo lishmah (not for its own sake), but the former individual is on a higher level because at least he’s being motivated by a reality, whereas the latter is being motivated by a fantasy. 

Make no mistake: Olam ha’Ba itself is a reality, but the version of Olam ha’Ba as a motivator is a fantasy. The vision of Olam ha’Ba in our minds and imaginations, to which our psyche attaches value, and which acts as the proverbial carrot (paired with the proverbial stick) – that notion of Olam ha’Ba has no basis in reality whatsoever. In contrast, “rains in their proper time,” “eating bread in satiety,” “peace in the land” and all of the other physical blessings exist as motivators in our imaginations which do correspond to their physical reality. 

This sheds light on the Divine wisdom in relegating Olam ha’Ba to the Oral Torah. In Hashem’s “Plan A” (so to speak), students would not be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba until they were developmentally ready, as the Rambam [18] describes: 

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of fear and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of love. 

Parents and teachers would motivate their children and students to serve Hashem for the she’lo lishmah motive of obtaining the blessings mentioned in the Written Torah. As they reached the requisite level of psychological and intellectual maturity, they would be introduced to the concept of Olam ha’Ba, which would click into its proper intellectual place as a truth about reality, rather than as a motivator for avodah. In this manner, they would bypass the stage of being motivated by a fantasy notion of Olam ha’Ba altogether. 

Ultimately, we cannot know why Hashem chose not to mention Olam ha’Ba explicitly in His lists of rewards, but these eight theories allow us to appreciate the fact that this was done with reason, and with wisdom. 

[1] This is a general remark, but I might as well mention it here. The line between Rishonim and Achronim is a matter of debate. Some distinguish between the two periods based on dates (e.g. the Rishonim are those who wrote in the 11th century to the 15th century, and the Achronim are post-15th century) or by specifying a cutoff point (e.g. all commentators who came before the composition of the Shulchan Aruch were Rishonim, and all who came after are Achronim). Personally, I don’t like either of these approaches. I prefer to define the two groups by their time period AND their relationship to their predecessors and/or their style. For example, I classify the Abravanel (1437 – 1508) as a Rishon because he argues with his predecessors as a contemporary, rather than a disciple. I classify the Sforno (1475 – 1550) as a Rishon because of his commentary’s style and commentary. 

[2] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 26:3 

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1); Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 9 

[4] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 32:39; it should be noted that the Ibn Ezra’s answer to this question parallels his answer to R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s question on the first of the Aseres ha’Dibros: Why does Hashem introduce Himself to the Jewish people by saying “Who took you out from the land of Egypt” instead of “Who created the heavens and the earth”? See the Ibn Ezra’s long commentary on Shemos 20:2. 

[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29 

[6] Sefer ha’Chinuch: Introduction. The Abravanel doesn’t actually quote the Sefer ha’Chinuch with reference to this view, but since it was the first place I encountered it in my own learning, and since the Sefer ha’Chinuch expands upon this view even more than the Ramban, I decided to attribute this view to him in my list. Moreover, the Abravanel attributes this view to “Rabbeinu Bachya ha’Zaken, as mentioned by the Ibn Ezra” but according to the Warsaw manuscript and H. Norman Strickman, the name mentioned by the Ibn Ezra is actually “Rabbeinu Hai.” This possible misattribution is yet another reason why I opted to label this under the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s name. 

[7] According to the Ramban, as the Abravanel himself points out. 

[8] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran #1 

[9] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi (Kuzari) 1:104-117 

[10] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 9:2 

[11] Rabbeinu Yehuda ha’Levi 1:115 

[12] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha’Ran, end of #3 

[13] The Abravanel credits the Ramban for this approach, based on the latter’s Commentary on Sefer Devarim 29:20; he also cites the Sefer ha’Ikkarim 4:40, chastising him for citing this answer in his own name rather than in the name of the Ramban. 

[14] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:1-2 

[15] ibid. 8:1 

[16] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Introduction to Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 10:1) 

[17] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah Chapter 8:6 

[18] Ibid. 10:5

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

I started writing a blog post about doing mitzvos lishmah (for their own sake) and she'lo lishmah (not for their own sake), and was shocked to discover that I haven't yet posted a translation of the Rambam's discourse on this topic anywhere on my blog. I decided to rectify that by posting my translation without any commentary, since it is something that every student of Torah should read. The paragraph divisions are my own.

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Artwork: Frantic Search, by Mitchell Malloy

Rambam: On Lishmah and she'Lo Lishmah

You, the thoughtful reader, should contemplate the following parable which I will present to you, and then pay attention to understand my words on this entire topic. 

A young child is brought to an educator to learn Torah. This is a tremendous good for him, because of the perfection he will attain from it. However, due to his young age and the deficiency of his mind, he will not understand the value of that good, nor [will he understand the value] of the perfection he will gain. Thus, necessity compels the teacher – who is more perfected than the child – to motivate him to learn by using something which is beloved to him, because of his young age. [The teacher] will say, “Learn and I will give you nuts and figs!” or “I will give you a piece of candy!” Then the student will learn and strive not for the learning itself, whose value he doesn’t know, but in order to attain that piece of food. The eating of that food is more important to him and more beneficial [from his perspective], without a doubt. Therefore, he will consider the learning to be a toil and exertion which he must work at in order to attain that desirable objective – that single nut or piece of candy. 

When the child grows and his intellect is strengthened, and that thing which he used to value becomes less important in his eyes and he goes go on to value other things, we motivate him with that which is even more important in his eyes. The teacher will say to him, “Learn and I will buy these fancy shoes for you” or “an article of clothing with such-and-such an appearance.” Then he will strive not for the learning itself, but for that article of clothing, because that article of clothing will be more valuable to him than the learning, and it will be the objective of the learning. 

When his mind becomes more perfected and that thing becomes less significant in his eyes, we motivate him with something greater than this. His teacher will say to him, “Learn this section or this chapter and I will give you a dollar or two.” Then he will learn and strive in order to earn that money, and the earning of that money will be more significant to him than the learning, for the purpose of learning – to him, at this time – is the earning of the money that was promised to him. 

When he becomes more cognizant and this thing [he once valued] becomes less significant in his eyes and he knows that it is a thing of inferior worth, we motivate him with something that is more important to him. We say to him, “Learn in order to become a rabbi and a judge. People will honor you; they will stand up in your presence; your words will be established and your reputation will grow during your lifetime and after your death, like so-and-so.” Then he will learn and strive in order to achieve that level of distinction, and the ultimate objective – to him – will be that people should honor him, exalt him, and praise him. 

All of this is despicable – yet, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human psyche (or mind), which causes him to make the purpose of learning something other than the learning [itself]. He will say, “Why should I learn this?” – only in order to achieve something which, in truth, is but a fantasy. This is what the Sages referred to as she’lo lishmah (lit. “not for its own sake”). In other words, he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of something else. The Sages (peace be upon them) cautioned us, saying, “Do not make them (i.e. matters of Torah) a crown through which to glorify yourself, nor an axe to chop with” (Avos 4:5). They are alluding to that which I have explained to you, that one should not make the purpose of his learning that people should honor him, nor the acquisition of wealth, nor should he make Hashem’s Torah into a livelihood. 

The purpose of his learning should be nothing other than knowledge itself; likewise, the only purpose of truth is to know that it is true; the mitzvos are true, and therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment. It is prohibited for a perfected person to say, “If I do these good things and if I refrain from these bad things which Hashem prohibited to me, what will be my reward?” For this is like what the child says: “If I learn, what will I be given?” And they say to him, “Such-and-such a thing,” for when we see the deficiency of his mind – that he doesn’t understand the value of this thing, and he seeks out a purpose for the purpose – we answer him in accordance with the degree of his foolishness, [as it is stated,] “answer a fool according to his foolishness” (Mishlei 26:5). 

The Sages already warned us about this – namely, that a person shouldn’t make the purpose of his avodah (service) and his fulfillment of the mitzvos any of these things – in the statement of the pious man who grasped the truth, Antignos of Socho: “Do not be like servants who serve the master with the intention of receiving a prize; rather, be like servants who serve their master with the intention not to receive a prize.” By this they mean that one should believe in truth for the sake of the truth itself. This is what [the Sages] referred to as “oved me’ahavah” (“one who serves out of love”). They said, “he desires His mitzvos exceedingly” (Tehilim 112:1). R’ Elazar said: “His mitzvos” and not “the reward of His mitzvos” (Avodah Zarah 19a). How great is this proof and how clear it is, for this is a clear proof to our preceding words! Even greater than this is the statement of the Sages in Sifrei: “Perhaps a person will say, ‘I will learn Torah so that I can become rich’ or ‘so that I will be called “rebbi”’ or ‘so that I will receive reward in the World to Come’ – but the pasuk says, ‘to love Hashem, your God’; everything you do, you should only do out of love” (Eikev: Devarim 11:13). 

It has been explained and made clear that this is the goal of the mitzvos and the foundation of our Sages’ belief. The only person who will be oblivious to this is a fool and a naïve simpleton who has already been corrupted by crazy, fantastical, imaginary and degenerate notions. This [high level of lishmah] is the level of Avraham Avinu, who was oved me’ahavah (Sotah 31a), and this is the path which we are obligated to strive for. 

But the Sages (of blessed memory) knew that this was a very difficult concept which not every person can grasp. Even if he does grasp it, it will not seem correct at first glance, and it will not seem like a true opinion, since man’s nature is to not do an action unless it will bring him some benefit or enable him to avoid some harm, and if it does neither of these, then the act would be pointless. How is it possible to say to a Torah-observant Jew, “Do these actions and don’t do these,” not out of fear of Hashem’s punishment and not out of a hope for reward? This is very difficult, for not all people grasp the truth and will be like Avraham Avinu. 

Therefore, they permitted the masses to remain in accordance with their mentality, to do the good out of hope for reward and to avoid the bad out of fear of punishment. They encouraged them in this, and strengthened their thoughts about it, until the apprehender apprehends and knows the truth and knows what the perfected path is – just like the youth at the time of learning, according to the aforementioned analogy. They were critical of Antignos of Socho for publicizing among the masses what he publicized, saying, “Sages – be careful with your words! etc.” as we explained in Avos. The masses do not lose out completely by fulfilling the mitzvos out of fear of reward and hope of punishment; they are just not perfected. But it is better for them to do this in order for them to acquire the disposition and preparation for fulfilling Torah, so that they will [eventually] move on to the truth and serve out of love. This is what the Sages (of blessed memory) said: “A person should always be involved in Torah even she’lo lishmah, for from she’lo lishmah he will come to lishmah” (Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b).

Parashas Eikev: What is Yiras Hashem (Fear of God)?

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Artwork: Oveverwhelming Splendor, by Richard Wright.
The question: Does the fear depicted in this artwork have anything to do with yiras Hashem?

Parashas Eikev: What is Yiras Hashem (Fear of God)?

Only Yirah

This week's parashah contains of the many "fundamentals of Judaism" pesukim in Sefer Devarim. Moshe Rabbeinu declares: 

"Now, O Israel, what does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Hashem, your God, to go in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve Hashem, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, to observe the commandments of Hashem and His decrees, which I command you today, for your benefit." (Devarim 10:12-13)

Chazal (Talmud Bavli Berachos 33b) are astonished by Moshe's use of the word "only" asking: "Is fear of heaven a small matter?!" They answer: "Yes - for Moshe it was a small matter. This may be compared to [the following case:] if a man is asked for a big item and he has it, then it seems like a small item to him, but if he is asked for a small item and he doesn't have it, then it seems like a big item to him." 

According to Chazal, Moshe's statement was difficult. According to the meforshim (commentators), Chazal's answer is difficult. And every time I've taken up this topic with my chavrusas, it's proven to be difficult.

This week, however, I stumbled upon a 10-page analysis by the Abvravanel [1] of the topic of yiras Hashem in his commentary on our parashah. The Abravanel paraphrases the view of his predecessors (i.e. the Ran and the Rambam), states his objections to it, then offers his own view. His presentation is so valuable that I decided to write a "Set Table" style dvar Torah, with a walk-through of his analysis.

Ordinarily my practice on this blog is to translate and incorporate as many firsthand sources as possible into my treatment of the material. In this case, for the sake of brevity, I will summarize rather than translate - with only a few direct quotations/translations. 

The View of the Ran (and the Rambam - according to the Abravanel [2])

The Ran [3] begins by explaining that there are two types of yirah, in general (i.e. not specifically in relation to Hashem). 

The first type of yirah he defines as "a withdrawal of the soul and a mobilizing of its faculties when it senses something intimidating." In English we refer to this emotion as "fear." We experience this "yirah of fear" when faced with anything that we perceive to be a threat of any kind. The Ran explains that this type of yirah stems from the "animalistic soul" (nefesh ha'chiyunis) and can therefore be found in many animals as well (e.g. the fear felt by a lamb upon seeing a wolf). Examples of this "yirah of fear" in Tanach include: "Rescue me, please, from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Eisav, for I fear him lest he come and strike me down, mother and children" (Bereishis 32:12) and "for I was afraid to say, 'This is my wife,' lest they kill me" (ibid. 26:7).

In contrast, the second type of yirah is a product of the intellect (seichel) and stems from the recognition of something or someone that is exceedingly great. In English we refer to this emotion as "awe." Examples of this "yirah of awe" include: "Why were you not afraid (i.e. sufficiently awed) to speak against My servant, Moshe?" (Bamidbar 12:8) and "And [Yaakov] feared (i.e. was in awe) and said, 'How awesome is this place! This is none other than the abode of God, and this is the gate of the heavens!" (Bereishis 28:17) and "Let your fear (i.e. awe) of your teacher be like your fear of heaven" (Avos 4:12).

The Ran explains that both types of yirah can be found in relation to Hashem. Those people who are deficient (anashim chaseirim) are afraid of the punishments that are sent forth from Hashem. Those who are perfected (shleimim) have no such fear. Instead, they have an "intellectual awe of His exaltedness" (yirah sichlis l'romemuso), based on their comprehension of His creations and the lowly place of man in the totality of existence. 

The Rambam [4] provides a beautiful description of this "yirah of awe" in the Mishneh Torah. Since the Rambam maintains that the experience of ahavas Hashem (love of God) and yiras Hashem (fear of God) go hand in hand, and since we will revisit the topic of ahavas Hashem later in this blog post, I will quote his definitions of both yirah and ahavah here:

What is the way of loving and fearing God? When a person contemplates His great and wondrous works and creations and sees from them His infinite and incomparable wisdom, he immediately loves, praises, and extols and is filled with a great desire to know the Great Name, as David said, “My soul thirsts for God, for the living God” (Psalms 42:3). 

And when he reflects on these same principles in relation to himself, he immediately recoils back with fear and dread, and knows that he is a small, insignificant, unenlightened creature standing with a frail and puny mind in the presence of Perfect Knowledge, as David said, “[When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers, the moon and stars that you have set in place, I exclaim,] ‘What is frail man that You should notice him, [and the son of mortal man that You should take note of him?’]” (Psalms 8:4-5).

Later on, the Rambam [5] writes another description of ahavah and yirah, from a slightly different angle:

When a person contemplates all of these things (i.e. all of the phenomena in the universe) and recognizes all of the creations – from angels, to celestial bodies, to man, etc. – and sees the wisdom of HaKadosh Baruch Hu in all of the forms and creations – his love for God will increase, his soul will thirst, and his flesh will yearn to love God; and he will be in fear and trepidation from his own lowliness, insignificance, and frailty when he compares himself to even one of these large, holy bodies – and certainly to one of the pure forms which are utterly separated from matter – and he will find himself to be like a vessel filled with shame and embarrassment, empty and lacking.

This is what the Ran means when he characterizes this yirah as "intellectual" awe: it will only be experienced by a person in proportion to his knowledge and understanding of God's wisdom as manifest in the universe. The Ran adds that this type of yirah will also have an effect on a person's actions: just as one would be ashamed to do something improper in front of a great person, although he doesn't fear any harm, so too, one who recognizes Hashem's greatness will feel ashamed to act contrary to His will. 

Having established these two types of yirah, the Ran returns to our pasuk and asks: Which type of yirah was Moshe Rabbeinu talking about when he said, "what does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Hashem, your God etc."? Was Moshe referring to both types of yirah, or was he referring solely to the "yirah of awe"? 

On the surface, both answers present difficulties. If we assume that the yirah mentioned by Moshe includes the "yirah of fear," then there are two problems. The first is that this type of fear doesn't distinguish between between good and bad, true or false, just or unjust. The individual who operates based on this fear is simply responding to a threat, and doing whatever is necessary to avoid the perceived harm. For example, after witnessing Chur get killed by Bnei Yisrael (Shemos Rabbah 41:10), Aharon decided to build the Eigel ha'Zahav (Golden Calf); in other words, his fear led him him to do an aveirah (transgression), for which he was punished with death. [6] It is inconceivable that Hashem would demand a type of avodah which stems exclusively from the animalistic part of man, and doesn't even differentiate between good and bad.

The second problem stems from the aforementioned statement of Chazal, that this type of yirah was "a small thing for Moshe but a large thing for us." Is "yirah of fear" really such a "large thing" for us? Of course not! Even young children and animals have a basic fear of punishment. It would be absurd for Chazal to describe this type of primal fear as "a large thing" for us. 

On the other hand, if we assume that Moshe was only talking about the "yirah of awe," then we run into an even bigger problem: this type of yirah can only be found in the greatest chachamim (wise men) and neviim (prophets), who have reached such a superlative level of scientific knowledge. How could Moshe expect this level to be attained by the entire nation? Even Moshe, at the outset of his prophetic career, was praised for this type of yirah, as it is stated: "and Moshe concealed his face, for he was afraid to gaze at God" (Shemos 3:6). This shows that this was a "big thing" even for Moshe, at this point in his development. To expect all of Klal Yisrael to reach this level is unrealistic.

The Ran proposes a creative answer. He explains that Moshe was, indeed, referring exclusively to "yirah of awe." Why, then, did he describe this yirah as though it were easy and universally attainable? Because he was trying to make a point about the nature of this yirah. Since this yirah stems from the intellect, and since man's intellect naturally yearns for knowledge [6], then this type of yirah is actually an easy thing for the intellect - like walking up the stairs on an upwards escalator. This is what Moshe Rabbeinu was speaking about when he described yirah as "easy." In other words, we shouldn't think about love of learning as something foreign to our nature, which we must fight and work to instill within ourselves. Rather, as human beings, we naturally enjoy learning and seek knowledge.

However, we all have a major impediment which makes things difficult: our physicality, which includes our body, our psyche, and all of our drives, tendencies, and personality traits. The surest way to prevent our physicality from overcoming us and impeding our quest for yirah is to subdue it with threats of punishment - that is, by strategically employing the "yirah of fear" to control our inner animal. For this reason Moshe Rabbeinu follows up his discourse about the intellectual yirah with by reminding Klal Yisrael of the punishments that Hashem wrought in Egypt and in the Wilderness (see Devarim 11). 

Thus, the Ran holds that Moshe Rabbeinu's exhortation was designed to convey the full picture of how to develop yiras Hashem. On the one hand, yirah [of awe] is easy, since the mind of man naturally yearns for knowledge. On the other hand, yirah [of fear] is necessary to keep the animalistic part of man at bay, so that the rational soul can be properly nurtured to the point where it reigns supreme.

The Abravanel's Critiques of the Ran

I liked the Ran's approach quite a bit ... but the Abravanel doesn't. Not only does he disagree with the Ran's explanation of our pasuk and Chazal's commentary, but he even objects to the Ran's two types of yirah and maintains that they cannot be considered "yiras Hashem" in any sense, whatsoever!

The Abravanel begins with a critique of the Ran's explanation of our pasuk, saying that "the rav (i.e. the Ran) wanted to combine two types of yirah as both being necessary - on account of the intellect and physicality - to acquire success." He then explains that the two types of yirah as defined by the Ran are so fundamentally different that they cannot be subsumed under a single category, nor can they coexist within a single person. The "perfected person" will have no need for the "yirah of fear" and the "deficient person" will have no access to the "yirah of awe." 

[My chavrusa and I still feel that we aren't grasping the Abravanel's argument here. Didn't the Ran acknowledge the inherent differences between these two types of yirah? Didn't he explain that because man has an intellectual and an animalistic nature, both types of yirah are necessary? We figured that perhaps the Abravanel is objecting to the fact that Moshe speaks as though he is referring to one type of fear. If these two types of fear only differ quantitatively, and exist on a spectrum, it would be possible to say that he was referring to both types of yirah, and addressing both types of people. But since these types of yirah are qualitatively different, then they cannot be subsumed under Moshe's statement "only to fear Hashem." We're still working on this point.]

Next, the Abravanel dismantles the Ran theory that these two general types of yirah correspond to two levels of yiras Hashem. He explains that the "yirah of fear" cannot possibly have anything to do with Hashem, "since all avodah (service) towards Hashem in all matters must be directed by knowledge and understanding, which are activities of the intellect - whether the theoretical intellect or the practical intellect - but not from the animalistic soul." He explains that the animalistic soul is only affected by physical stimuli, but not by comprehension and intellection. For this reason, fear of Hashem's punishments should not be classified under "animalistic fear," since the former involves knowledge the intellect to some degree. 

Moreover, animalistic fear can't be considered "avodah" because it is really just a form of oneis (duress) and compulsion. As proof the Abravanel cites the midrash (Shabbos 88a) that Hashem held Har Sinai over Bnei Yisrael, saying: "If you accept the Torah - great! If not, this will be your grave," to which Chazal raise a difficulty: "From here we see a strong objection against [our obligation to keep] Torah!" Chazal respond to this difficulty by saying that the Jews accepted the Torah out of love during the days of Mordechai and Esther. Regardless of how we understand Chazal's answer, we see from their question that acceptance of the Torah under a threat which arouses animalistic fear (e.g. being crushed to death by a mountain) does not constitute a valid acceptance of Torah and mitzvos. How, then, could an animalistic fear be a valid form of avodas Hashem - one which Hashem actually desires? The Abravanel even goes so far as to say that doing mitzvos out of an animalistic fear doesn't even qualify as the type of avodah she'lo lishmah (divine service which is not for its own sake) which leads to lishmah (divine service for its own sake).

Next, the Abravanel argues that "yirah of awe" also cannot be what the Torah means by "yiras Hashem." First of all, this type yirah should really be called "chochmah" (wisdom) or "yediah" (knowledge), since - according to the Ran - the injunction to "fear Hashem" practically means "gain knowledge of Hashem's wondrous creations and a recognition of your own place in the universe." And if you'll say that it should be called "yirah" because of the emotional affect which emerges from this level of knowledge, it would be more fitting to call this "pliah" ("wonderment"), since the experience creates wonder but doesn't lead to "fear" in any sense. To the contrary, the more knowledge one has of Hashem's exaltedness and man's lowliness, the less yirah he has because he feels even more distant from Hashem. But the more he knows, the more pliah he experiences.

Furthermore, the term "yirah" in Tanach always implies action - not study or knowledge. In fact, the pasuk says: "Fear of Hashem is the beginning of wisdom, good intelligence to all their practitioners" (Tehilim 111:10), which implies that yiras Hashem is a precursor to wisdom - not the result of wisdom. Throughout all of Tanach "yirah" never refers to "advanced knowledge of the universe." 

Lastly, the experienced described by the Ran as "yirah of awe" would more aptly be described as "ahavah" (love) - but it is impossible to simultaneously love and fear someone, since love is a force of attraction and fear is a force of repulsion. And if the Ran is so comfortable saying that there are two categories of yiras Hashem (i.e. intellectual awe and animalistic fear of punishment) then why doesn't he also posit that there are two categories of ahavas Hashem (i.e. intellectual ahavah and animalistic desire for reward)? 

The Abravanel concludes is breakdown by saying that the Ran's view "is not dictated by intellectually straight thinking, nor is it warranted by the pesukim, nor can it be found in the words of Chazal." 

The Abravanel's View

The Abravanel now introduces a completely different paradigm for ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem. He starts with the foundation of his entire view of avodas Hashem, ahavas Hashem, and yiras Hashem. Since this part is relatively concise, I will translate it instead of summarizing it:

Our avodas Hashem is proper and obligatory on account of the kindnesses which we have received from Him - the bringing into existence of creation and its preservation, as well as His love for our forefathers, His bringing us out from Egypt, His giving of the Torah, His [enabling us to] inherit the Land, and all of the other acts of goodness He did for us that are outside of the patterns of nature, as miracles, in accordance with His absolute will. 

Because of this beneficence which Hashem has done for us, we are obligated to love Him - and from this love, [we are obligated] to serve Him with all of our heart, and all of our soul. This is due to the fact that avodah and ahavah are two in name but one in existence, like the oneness of "potentiality" and "actuality." Ahavah towards Him is a potentiality that is found within the soul that is bound up in it, and avodah is the actualization of that ahavah. 

In addition to the ahavah which is proper towards Him in order to serve Him, man also must guard himself to the utmost degree from sinning before Him or provoking Him, for it would not be proper to have ingratitude to someone who bestowed such kindness and benefits. 

Thus, we have in relation to God an obligation of love, to do His avodah, as well as an obligation to guard ourselves and to be afraid of provoking Him. And there is nothing here that involves His exaltedness, or the wonders and and harmony of of His creations, such that one would need a high degree of understanding and wisdom beyond [a basic recognition] of His kindness in the creation and preservation of the universe, which every person knows. 

And in addition to the fact that this perspective [based on the creation and preservation of the universe] obligates us to love Him and fear Him, there is additional good reward for those who love Him and keep His mitzvos, for Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu will benefit them and give them reward for their love and their avodah. Likewise, their [additional] yirah and caution against sinning will save them from the harms and misfortunes of the world. 

To summarize: our obligation to serve, love, and fear Hashem all stem from our "indebtedness" (so to speak) to Him for all of the good He has done for us, both in creating and maintaining the universe and in the abundant goodness He has shown to our forefathers and our nation. This hakaras ha'tov (gratitude) is equally applicable and accessible to all people, regardless of their level of intelligence and comprehension of His works. No amount of knowledge will change the extent of our indebtedness. The chacham and the simpleton owe equal amounts of gratitude to Hashem for the benefits they have received. This is the Abravanel's view.

Before explaining Moshe's statement, the Abravanel directs our attention to the context in which our pasuk appears. In the pesukim leading up to our pasuk, Moshe reminds Bnei Yisrael of their many rebellions in the Wilderness - the worst of which was the Cheit ha'Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf). The Abravanel explains what Hashem could have done, and what He actually did:

According to the strict letter of the law, even if Hashem forgave them and atoned for the incident of the Eigel, He could have increased upon them the yoke of Torah and mitzvos. This is what kings do with those who rebel against their service, namely, that even though they are forgiven for their sin and they return to their work, the king imposes upon them more laws than they previously had. But Hashem did not do this. He didn't increase the weight of their yoke, nor did he add even a single mitzvah. Instead, He only warned them that they should be exceedingly vigilant in guarding those mitzvos which He had already given them.

On the basis of his conceptualization of avodah, ahavah, and yirah, and in light of the context established by Moshe's speech, the Abravanel explains our pasuk:

Therefore [Moshe] said: "What does Hashem, your God, ask of you? Only to fear Him" for this request is not hard, but easy - and all the more so after [Bnei Yisrael] wickedly sinned with the Eigel. 

Chazal explained that because "man's inclination is evil" and always inclines towards sin, they asked: "Is yirah a small thing?" Their answer was that in relation to Moshe, who guarded himself from sin, this vigilance was easy. And even in relation to Israel, based on the goods they had received from Him, [yirah] would be proper and right. 

According to the Abravanel, the following analogy may be made. A student is given a generous scholarship to attend a prestigious university - a scholarship which was not earned by merit, but was given out of generosity. But instead of working hard to excel in his courses, he slacks off, disrespects his professors, trashes his dorm, and violates the terms of his student contract. The dean calls him in and says, "Look. We have given you this tremendous opportunity, for your benefit. We will give you another chance to boost your grades, we will forgive you for your chutzpah, we will overlook the damage you have caused to university property, and we will forgive your breach of contract. The ONLY thing we are asking is that you guard yourself from future infractions. Is that an unreasonable request?"

It would seem that the Abravanel is learning Chazal's interpretation of Moshe's statement in the same vein. Moshe was saying: "Yiras Hashem ought to be easy, considering all of the good that Hashem has done for you, and the tolerance He has shown you despite your many rebellions. Not only has He forgiven you for these transgressions, but He has even refrained from increasing your yoke. The only thing He is asking you to do is to exercise vigilance and not violate the mitzvos with which you have been charged." 

Concluding Thoughts

Unfortunately, my chavrusa and I were only able to work on this for two days before I had to write and post this dvar Torah. There are still many questions that we need to resolve, including:

• Which of the Abravanel's critiques of the Ran have merit and which do not? 
• What are the Ran and the Abravanel really arguing about? What is at the root of their disagreement? 
• Which explanation of the pasuk is smoother and more convincing? 
• What is this the Abravanel's concept of being obligated to serve Hashem out of this hakaras ha'tov? How does this differ from other views of the nature of our avodah (e.g. the Ralbag's conceptualization of Torah as part of the unfolding of the hashgachah in the universe)? 
• According to the Abravanel, how do the Ran's two types of yirah fit into Judaism? Was he really serious about animalistic fear playing absolutely no role in our avodah?

Lastly, there is another answer that I'd like to develop based on my understanding of yiras Hashem in Mishlei. That, along with these other questions, will have to wait until a later time.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim 10:12

[2] I say "the Rambam - according to the Abravanel" because that is the view of the Rambam I intend to write about in this blog post. In other words, this will not be an examination of what the Rambam holds on his own terms. Instead, this should be understood as the Abravanel's understanding of the Rambam's view. 

[2] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Drashos ha'Ran #10. Full disclosure: although I have learned this drashah inside several times, I am relying on the Abravanel's presentation of the Ran's view.

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 2:2

[4] ibid. 4:12

[5] This is according to the Abravanel's interpretation, which I wrote about in Parashas Chukas: Moshe Rabbeinu's Sin.

[6] "[Hashem] instilled within [people] the capacity to learn and to understand - for this tendency is present in every man, that the more he is drawn after the ways of chochmah (wisdom) and tzedek (righteousness), the more he desires them and pursues them" (Rambam, Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:4)

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

This week I'd like to give a special shout-out to the Abravanel, who did all of the research for me and enabled me to write this dvar Torah on the plane with only his commentary on hand!

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Artwork: Scour from Existence, by Clint Cearley

Parashas Shelach: What is Kareis?

In Parashas Shelach, in the section detailing the various sin-offerings, the Torah mentions the onesh (punishment) commonly referred to as “kareis”: 

But the soul that acts with a high hand, whether the native or the convert – he has blasphemed Hashem; and that soul shall be cut off from among its people. For he has despised the word of Hashem, and has violated His commandment; that soul shall be utterly cut off; his iniquity is upon him (Bamidbar 15:30-31).

The question is: What is kareis? The root of the word kareis (כ.ר.ת.) literally means “to cut” or “to cut off.” This verb is easy to understand if you’re talking about a carrot or a tree branch, but what does it mean for a nefesh (soul) to be “cut off from among its people” or “utterly cut off”? 

Thankfully, the Abravanel does us a tremendous favor by summarizing and critiquing the views of all his predecessors on the matter, and concludes by presenting his own theory [1] Although my usual practice on this blog is to present translations of the meforshim (commentaries) rather than summaries, the Abravanel’s comments here are far too lengthy. For this reason, I will provide my own summary of the Abravanel’s summaries, but I will try to stick to his words as closely as possible. 

For the sake of brevity, I will NOT include the questions and difficulties that the Abravanel raises on each of the views, nor will I include my own analysis. I will leave it to you, the reader, to conduct further research, and to arrive at your own conclusions. 

(1) Saadia Gaon [2] and Ibn Ezra [3]

Both Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra learn that the term nefesh in the context of kareis refers to a person’s physiological vitality, rather than the intellect, or the spiritual part of man. Therefore, they interpret kareis as premature death – the “cutting short” of a person’s life. According to this view, there is no difference between kareis and the other divinely enacted punishment of misah b’ydei shamayim (death by the hands of heaven). 

(2) Rashi [4]

Rashi holds that kareis refers to the premature death of the sinner AND the premature death of his or her children. This latter feature is what differentiates kareis from misah b’ydei shamayim. However, according to Rashi, there is no difference between kareis and the divinely enacted punishment of ariri (childlessness), which is incurred by certain arayos (prohibited sexual relations). [5]

(3) Tosafos [6]

Like Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra, the Baalei Tosafos maintain that kareis refers to premature death. They differentiate between kareis and misah b’ydei shamayim on the basis of when the sinner dies. They hold that someone who is liable for kareis will die before reaching the age of 50, whereas a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die before reaching the age of 60.

(4) Tosafos [7]

The Baalei Tosafos offer a second explanation of kareis: that a person will die from an illness, on the third day of that illness. According to this explanation, misah b’ydei shamayim affects the length of a person’s lifespan, whereas kareis affects the duration of (what will turn out to be) a person’s terminal illness. 

(5) Rambam [8]

Unlike the four Rishonim mentioned above, who maintain that kareis affects a person’s physical existence in Olam ha’Zeh (This World), the Rambam maintains that kareis affects a person’s non-physical soul in the purely spiritual Olam ha’Ba (The World to Come). According to the Rambam, kareis refers to the excision and annihilation of the soul after death. The existence of the sinner who incurred kareis will come to an end with his physical demise, just like an animal. Thus, he will be deprived of the everlasting spiritual bliss of Olam ha’Ba, which is the ultimate reward. In contrast, a person who is liable for misah b’ydei shamayim will die prematurely, but his death will provide kaparah (atonement) for him, and his soul will merit existence in Olam ha’Ba. 

(6) Ramban [9]

The Ramban’s view is the most complex of them all. Whereas all of the Rishonim mentioned thus far hold that all instances of kareis are uniform (i.e. the same in every case, no matter who the sinner and no matter what the sin), the Ramban maintains that there are three levels of kareis:

• If a person’s merits outweigh his iniquities, then he will receive a physical kareis in the form of a premature death; his soul, however, will remain untouched in the purely spiritual Gan Eden and in the Messianic Era of Olam ha’Ba after Techiyas ha’Meisim (Resurrection of the Dead). [10] This form of kareis is practically identical with kareis as understood by Saadia Gaon and the Ibn Ezra.
• If a person’s iniquities outweigh his merits, then he will receive a spiritual kareis in the form of his soul being cut off from eternal life in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba. This type of kareis is similar to kareis as explained by the Rambam, but whereas the Rambam maintains that the afterlife is purely spiritual, the Ramban maintains that it is a combination of the physical and the spiritual. 
• The most severe form of kareis is reserved for those who worship avodah zarah (idolatry) and for those who commit the transgression of blasphemy; these individuals die prematurely in this world AND their souls are cut off from existence in Gan Eden and Olam ha’Ba.

(7) Abravanel

The Abravanel holds that kareis affects the sinner in Olam ha’Zeh AND in Olam ha’Ba: in Olam ha’Zeh his life is cut short, and in Olam ha’Ba, his soul is “distanced from the radiance of the shechinah (divine presence),” which is its source of spiritual pleasure and reward. The Abravanel maintains that kareis is subject to degrees, based on the severity of the sin. Unlike the Rambam, the Abravanel holds that the soul is never fully cut off from Olam ha’Ba, since it is a “spiritual essence” which, by its very nature, does not deteriorate. The Abravanel holds that kareis causes spiritual “pain” to the soul, but after it receives its punishment, it will be restored to a state of pleasure and reward. 

There you have it: a seven-way machlokess (disagreement) on what kareis is. And these are just the opinions of the Rishonim cited by the Abravanel. I would not be surprised if there are other views to be found in other meforshim.

To my mind, this multiplicity of views raises another question: Why is the Torah’s presentation of kareis so vague? 

Perhaps you will dismiss this question. After all, there are many subjects in Torah on which there is a lot of machlokess, and one might ask the same question in each of these cases. Why ask this question here as opposed to any of those cases?

The reason I believe this question is justified here is based on my understanding of why the Torah mandates onshim (punishments) altogether, which I wrote about in another post. There are seven levels of onshim. In order, from most severe to least severe, they are: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), chenek (strangulation), kareis, misah b’ydei shamayim, and malkos (lashes). According to the Rambam, these onshim are designed to indicate the severity of the transgression and to deter the would-be sinner from sinning. When it comes to skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, and malkos, we know exactly what each onesh entails. The same goes for misah b’ydei shamayim; although there might be some machlokess on the particulars, everyone agrees that this refers to premature death. And yet, when it comes to the onesh of kareis, there is no consensus on what the Torah means. This is an anomaly among onshim, and poses a problem if one maintains that the purpose of onshim is to serve as a deterrent. How can one be deterred by kareis if the meaning of kareis is so unclear? 

The way I see it, we are forced draw one of two conclusions: either (1) there was once a clear and unanimous understanding of kareis which was lost over time, which eventually gave rise to wide-ranging machlokess, or (2) the Torah’s formulation of kareis was intentionally left vague, and that is why there is an inordinate degree of machlokess. 

If the former is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on the teruah-blast of the shofar: the Torah was clear about it, but the mesorah (transmission of teaching) was lost over time, and machlokess developed as a result. If the latter is true, this would be comparable to the machlokess on how the messianic era will come to be, about which the Rambam [11] writes: 

All of these matters and those that are like them … even the Sages did not have a tradition in these things, but rather, [they theorized] based on the implications of the pesukim, and that is why there is machlokess.

If the answer is (1), then there is nothing more to say. Somehow, sometime, the understanding of kareis was lost, and machlokess developed, just as it has in other areas of Torah. But if the answer is (2), then we are left with our question: Why did the Torah intentionally present kareis in such a vague manner?

The most I can offer at this point is a speculative answer – one which only works for those who hold that kareis affects the soul (i.e. Rambam, Ramban, Abravanel) and not just the body (i.e. Saadia Gaon, Ibn Ezra, Rashi, Tosafos). The Rambam [12] at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah writes:

A person should not say, “I will do the mitzvos of the Torah and involve myself in its chochmah in order to receive all of the blessings that are written in it,” or “in order that I will merit life in the World to Come,” “and I will distance myself from the transgressions about which the Torah warns us, in order to escape from the curses written in the Torah” or “so that I will not be cut off from the World to Come.” 

It is not proper to serve Hashem in this manner, for one who serves Hashem in this manner is called “oveid mi’yirah” (“one who serves out of fear”). This is neither a virtue of the prophets nor of the chachamim. The only ones who should serve Hashem in this manner are ignorant men, women, and children, whom we train to serve out of fear until their minds develop and they serve out of love. 

Hashem does not want us to serve Him out of yirah (fear). Although it is necessary to begin by serving Him that way, and we encourage people to do so in the initial stages of their learning, this is not an ideal state. The Rambam even goes so far as to say about the various yirah-based motives, “All of this is despicable; however, it is necessary for us, due to the deficiency of the human mind/psyche.” The goal is to gradually wean ourselves from serving God out of yirah and develop the ability to serve Him out of ahavah. This is a slow and delicate process which must progress in step with each person's development, as the Rambam writes:

Therefore, when we teach the children, women, and general populace of laymen, we should only teach them to serve out of yirah and in order to receive reward, until their minds mature and they gain additional wisdom; we should reveal this secret to them bit by bit, and accustom them to this concept with pleasantness, until they apprehend it and know it and serve out of ahavah. 

The onshim of the Torah clearly belong to the framework of yirah. All of the other onshim (skilah, sreifah, hereg, chenek, malkos) are things which happen in this world. Fear of them is rooted in observation and experience. Kareis, on the other hand, is not – at least, not according to the Rambam, the Ramban, or the Abravanel. To understand kareis requires knowledge of deep, abstract concepts, such as the nature of the soul, how the soul exists after death, what Olam ha'Ba is, how it relates to techiyas ha'meisim, how we are rewarded and punished after death, etc. These concepts take decades of learning to be able to begin to understand, since they are metaphysical phenomena that are out of this world. Not only that, the imagination is quick to latch onto its own "counterfeit" versions of these ideas, which are rooted in psychological fears and insecurities, and not reality.

Thus, the Torah in a bind. On the one hand, kareis is a reality which has relevance in the halachic system; as such, it must be mentioned explicitly in the Torah. On the other hand, kareis is an exceedingly lofty concept, and any attempt to explain it would only provide the imagination with more fuel for its fantasy-based fear, and threaten to lock a person in yirah-mode.

How did the Torah solve this dilemma? By intentionally speaking about kareis in vague terms. On its most basic level, "to be cut off" is intuitively bad-sounding, even if one doesn't know exactly what that means. Those who are prone to filling in the gaps with their imagination will do so anyway, but at least the Torah will not be lending credence to these detrimental chimerical notions. And since the Torah's formulation of kareis is so vague, it will remain open to reexamination and reevaluation as the individual learns and develops.

I can't say I find this answer to be 100% satisfactory, but I do think it is a fruitful approach. At the very least, I hope you gained from the Abravanel's overview of kareis, and that I've left you with a nice question to think about!

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[2] Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon, Emunos v’Deos 6 

[3] Rabbeinu Avraham ben Ezra (Ibn Ezra), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:31 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben YiTzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 17:14; Vayikra 17:9 

[5] Vayikra 20:20-21 

[6] Baalei Tosafos, Yevamos 2a; Shabbos 25a 

[7] The Abravanel seems to say that Tosafos says this on Yevamos 2a, but I can’t seem to find it. If you can track it down, please let me know. 

[8] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides / Rambam), Commentary on the Mishnah – Sanhedrin 8:6; Introduction to Perek Chelek; Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:5-6; 8:1 

[9] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Nachmanides / Ramban), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 18:29; Shaar ha’Gemul [currently do not have access to a precise citation] 

[10] This is neither the time nor the place to go into the Ramban’s view of reward and punishment and the afterlife. If you are interested in this topic, I recommend reading the Shaar ha’Gemul, which is available here in Hebrew, and was translated into English by Chavel. 

[11] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Shoftim, Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2 

[12] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:2