Parashas Re'eh: When Mitzvos Are Curses

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Artwork: Cursed Scroll, by D. Alexander Gregory

Parashas Re'eh: When Mitzvos Are Curses

Vegan Tefillin

A few weeks ago I came across a post on a Jewish Facebook group by a woman inquiring whether there is an option to use "vegan tefillin" (i.e. tefillin made from non-animal products). When asked what prompted her question, she responded: "How could I wear the skin of a dead animal?! The thought of leather tefillin absolutely disgusts me! I'd only put on tefillin if I could find a vegan version." 

There are many things to discuss here - too many for a single post. I'm only going to focus on one angle: this woman's disgust at the thought of mitzvas tefillin k'hilchesa (i.e. the mitzvah of tefillin as defined by halacha).

Disgusted by Mitzvos

The first thing I associated to was one of the opening pesukim of the tochahah (Rebuke) in Parashas Bechukosai: "if you are disgusted by My decrees, and if your very being is repulsed by My ordinances, so as not to perform all My commandments, so that you annul My covenant - then I will do the same to you etc." (Vayikra 26:15-16). If a person is "disgusted" and "repulsed" by the mitzvos - sentiments which this person on Facebook openly expressed about the mitzvah of tefillin - then Hashem will be "disgusted" and "repulsed" by that person. 

What does it mean for Hashem to be "disgusted" by someone? And why is this the "punishment" for being disgusted by Hashem's decrees and ordinances? The Sefer ha'Chinuch [1] addresses both points in his commentary on the Chumash's use of the term "abomination":

[The Torah states:] "and you shall do none of these abominations" (Vayikra 18:26); this includes all these matters which are an abomination to Hashem, meaning that anyone who engages in these activities becomes distanced from the good and removes himself from Hashem's providence. This is the meaning of "abomination to God" in every instance, according to what I have heard.  

So likewise, what is written at the end of the matter: "for all these abominations the men of the land did who were before you and I abhorred them" (ibid. 20:23). Its sense is to convey that the quality is most ugly; every unusually bad and repulsive thing, Scripture describes as though Hashem detests it, all along the lines that we have stated, and in the vein of what the Sages of blessed memory said in every instance: in order to convey intelligibly to the ear what it is able to hear. 

According to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, when the Torah calls something "an abomination," this means that a person who engages in this behavior is "distancing himself from the good and removing himself from Hashem's providence." Just as a person distances himself from that which he finds repulsive, so too, Hashem "distances Himself" from those who do actions which He regards as "abominations."

To have difficulties and struggles with keeping a mitzvah is natural (for everyone except Moshe Rabbeinu). It is even natural to feel "disgusted" by certain mitzvos. But if a person embraces this disgust to the point where he or she modifies, neglects, or delegitimizes the mitzvos, then this person has actively chosen to distance himself or herself from Hashem's beneficence. In other words, Hashem's statement "then I will do the same to you" should not be understood as a retaliatory "tit for tat" punishment, but as a natural consequence of this person's free-will decision.

Mitzvos as Curses

This week I came across an idea which took this insight even further. The idea is from the Abravanel's commentary on the first pasuk in our parashah, which reads:

See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse. The blessing: that you hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, that I command you today. And the curse: if you do not hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, and you stray from the path that I command you today, to follow other gods, that you did not know. (Devarim 11:26-28).

Rashi [2] understands the "blessing and curse" in our pasuk to be referring to the blessings and curses on Har Gerizim and Har Eival, which are stated much later on in Parashas Ki Savo (Devarim 27:11-26). His interpretation is based on the fact that the very next pasuk states:

It shall be that when Hashem, your God, brings you to the Land to which you come, to possess it, then you shall deliver the blessing on Har Gerizim and the curse on Har Eival. (ibid. 11:29).

The Abravanel [3] challenges Rashi on this matter, based on the following argument:

[Moshe] stated here: "See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse." He did not say this about the blessings and curses that were given on Har Gerizim and Har Eival; since [those blessings and curses] were not given "today," how could  he say "that I  place before you today"? 

The Abravanel then gives a creative and convincing interpretation:

Rather, Moshe stated that these mitzvos which he gave before them today would be as if he presented them with a blessing and a curse.  

How could the same thing be a blessing and a curse, which are two opposite, contradictory things ...? Namely, [the mitzvos] will be a blessing if [Bnei Yisrael] hearken to them, but they will be a curse to the person who doesn't hearken to them. For even though the mitzvos are good in and of themselves, they [differ] depending on the recipient: sometimes they are a blessing, if they are hearkened to, and sometimes they are a curse, for when they are not fulfilled, they will be for them like a snare and a curse. 

This is in line with what the navi (prophet) said: "for the ways of Hashem are upright: tzadikim (the righteous) walk in them, but posh'im (sinners) stumble in them" (Hoshea 14:10). In other words, they themselves are upright and good; however, on account of the recipients, they can be either good and proper to follow from the standpoint of the tzadikim, but from the standpoint of the sinners they are regarded as a bad path of stumbling. 

This type of thing also happens with good food, like bread, meat, and wine: they are beneficial forms of nutrition in and of themselves, and when a healthy man takes them, he will be sustained, and strengthened, and his health will increase; however, if a sick man [4] takes them, they will harm him or even kill him - not because of the nature of the food, but because of the nature and corruption of the recipient. 

In this vein, [Moshe] said to all of Klal Yisrael - or to each and every one of them, according to the Ibn Ezra - "See, I place before you etc." This means to say: "See through the eyes of your intellect that I am placing before you etc." - not that this blessing and curse is verbal [such that it would be "heard" rather than "seen"], but rather, [both the blessing and curse] potentially exist in the mitzvos, and either blessing or curse can proceed from them, without any in-between state. For if "you hearken to the mitzvos of Hashem, your God, that I command you etc." then I have given you a blessing, for they are good in and of themselves, and they will be a blessing for you - but if you don't hearken to them, they will be considered a curse for you. It is in this sense that I have placed a blessing and curse before you today, in that I have given the mitzvos, which will be a blessing or a curse depending on the recipient. 

This is why [Moshe] made this statement before reminding [Bnei Yisrael] of the mitzvos [throughout the next four parshiyos]. He even said at the end [after reviewing all of these mitzvos]: "See - I have placed before you today the life and the good, and the death and the bad" (Devarim 30:15), and he explained how He has given them these things by saying: "to keep His commandments" (ibid. 30:16) - for by commanding them He has given them "the life and the good" if they hearken to them, but "the death and the bad" if they do not hearken to them and do not observe them. 

The Abravanel's interpretation flows directly from a literal reading of our pesukim: "See, I place before you today a blessing and a curse. The blessing: that you hearken to the commandments of Hashem, your God, that I command you today. And the curse: if you do not hearken to the commandments of Hashem." Hearkening to the mitzvos is the blessing - both the cause and the effect. Not hearkening to the mitzvos is the cause and the effect of the curse.

The first instance in Chumash of the mitzvos being a blessing to those who keep them and a curse to those who don't keep them is the very first sin: Adam and Chava eating the fruit of the Eitz ha'Daas Tov v'Ra (Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad). Hashem commanded them not to eat from this tree for their own benefit: "for on the day you eat from it, you shall surely die" (Bereishis 2:17). But once the nachash (snake) talked its way into Chava's head, she began to view this mitzvah as a curse rather than a blessing. She viewed this mitzvah as holding her back from the real good.

The nachash said to the woman: "You will not surely die, for God knows that on the day you eat from it, your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and bad." And the woman perceived that the tree was good for eating, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the three was desirable as a means to wisdom, etc. (ibid. 3:4-6).

The Rambam [5] explained that both the cause and effect of the sin of Adam and Chava was the fact that they gave in to the distorted world of subjective values, which tainted their perception of objective truth and falsehood and objective good and bad. (For a detailed explanation, see this post. Also, for the record, I think that the Abravanel's insight sheds light on the curses which resulted from the sin of Adam and Chava ... but that would take us beyond the scope of this post.)

This "warped view of good and bad" is the basis of the blessing and curse in our pasuk, as explained by the Abravanel. To the extent that we set aside our personal, subjective, flawed notions of "the good" and "the bad" and allow ourselves to be shaped by our adherence to the system of Torah, we will move towards an increasingly accurate view of objective reality. We will then be able to recognize the inherent good of the mitzvos, and will regard them as "a blessing," and will actually receive the blessings (i.e. the increase of objective good) that result from their observance.

But to the extent that we cling to our preconceived notions of "the good" and "the bad" and allow our personal value system to compromise our adherence to Torah, we will be held back from clarity and knowledge of objective reality. We will then perceive the the mitzvos as "a curse" and will actually be cursed (i.e. suffer harmful consequences, both objectively and in accordance with our subjective value system) when we neglect their observance.

The Emptiness Comes from Within

To the woman who insisted on only using "vegan tefillin," Moshe Rabbeinu (according to the Abravanel) might offer guidance along the following lines: "I understand and sympathize with your feeling that the use of animal leather in tefillin is inhumane and immoral. However, the fact that the Creator requires tefillin to be made from leather means that He does not share your view - and since His view is objective reality, then there must be some flaw in your thinking. I encourage you to learn from Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah) to try to understand wherein lies your error. Yes, this does mean that you will have to give up your personal view, but if you succeed in arriving at a true understanding, you will come to recognize that all of the mitzvos - including tefillin - are 'for your benefit' (Devarim 10:13), and you will then regard them as 'a blessing' and they will be a blessing."

Chazal midrashically express this approach by expounding on the pasuk: "for [the Torah] is not an empty thing for you (lit. "from you"), for it is your life, and through this matter shall you prolong your days on the Land to which you cross the Jordan, to possess it" (ibid. 32:47). The midrash (Yerushalmi Peah 1:1) states:

"for [the Torah] is not an empty thing from you (ki lo davar reik hu mi'kem)" - and if you find it to be "an empty thing" (davar reik), then it is "from you" (mi'kem hu).

It is natural to perceive "emptiness" (or "deficiencies") in Torah. The question is: Where do we go with this perception? If we regard our own views as the objective reality and conclude that the Torah is flawed, then we are mistaken. Rather, we must recognize that the perceived flaw stems from our own ignorance, and we must search for a true understanding which reveals the holes in our thinking.

To the uninitiated this might sound like a form of intellectually dishonest religious apologetics, but to those who understand the relationship between science and Torah and the place of the proof of Torah mi'Sinai, this is no different than the scientist who must set aside his or her personal opinion in light of the empirical data. Just as we wouldn't accuse the scientist of "apologetics" for subordinating his or her personal opinion to the scientific data, so too, we shouldn't consider it to be "apologetics" when subordinating our personal opinion to the data of Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh.

I feel like this post should end with a conclusive "takeaway" message. In that spirit, I would say the following: we all want to be "blessed" by Hashem, and we know that according to the Torah, observance of mitzvos results in "blessing" - but what Moshe Rabbeinu intends to teach us (according to the Abravanel) is that the mitzvos are the blessing. Hence, it's not as though we do the mitzvos and have faith that Hashem will bless us. Rather, by doing the mitzvos, we are guaranteed to receive the blessings which are inextricably bound up in the mitzvos themselves.

Nobody said it better than the Malbim [6] in his commentary on Iyov (which I wrote about in these posts). We will conclude with his analogy:

This may be compared to the following: an ill patient doesn't seek out a reward from his physician [in payment] for obeying his instructions to safeguard his health, nor does the physician punish the patient if he fails to heed his warnings, for the reward and punishment are consequent upon the action itself. If he obeys [the physician’s instructions], he will be healed from his sickness, and that is his reward. If he doesn't obey, he will die, and that is his punishment. [This reward and punishment are not meted out] by the physician, but by [the patient] himself.  

Similarly, the reward [for good actions] is the good path itself, since he acquires perfection of his soul [by following it]; and if he does good for others, he will enjoy benefits from the society [in which he lives]. Conversely, “one who does evil corrupts his soul and his flesh” (Mishlei 11:17), and if he does evil to others, he will suffer from the wickedness of the society. 

If we want Hashem's blessings, then we must see that He has placed them before us, today, in every mitzvah we observe.

[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Mitzvah #118
[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 27:11
[3] Don Yitzchak Abravanel ("The Man"), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 27:11
[4] The Abravanel here specifies two types of sickness: "מחלת הצד" and "מחלת המוקדח", but since I wasn't sure which sicknesses he was referring to, I omitted them from my translation.
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:2
[6] Ha'Rav Meir Leibush ben Yechiel Michel Wisser (Malbim), Commentary on Sefer Iyov 35:8

Parashas Re'eh: MEAT IS MURDER!!!

Originally posted in August 2013. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Butcher's Cleaver, by Jason Felix

I've always wanted to write about what the Torah would say about "ethical vegetarians" - people who refuse to eat meat for moral reasons. This "school newsletter dvar Torah" is not that post, but it's the closest thing to it that I've written. Enjoy!

Parashas Re'eh: MEAT IS MURDER!!!

Is the slaughtering of an animal tantamount to murder? This is a hotly debated question in contemporary society, especially among those who practice vegetarianism for ethical reasons. Although a comprehensive treatment of the topic of vegetarianism is beyond the scope of this dvar Torah, we will aim to answer the question above based on a mitzvah in this week's parashah.

During the 40 years in the Midbar (Wilderness), Bnei Yisrael were only permitted to slaughter animals in the context of korbanos (sacrifices). If you wanted a steak dinner, you would bring your cow to the Mishkan (Tabernacle) where it would be slaughtered and offered up as a korban to Hashem. Its fat and blood would be brought on the mizbeach (altar), and only afterwards would its flesh become permissible to eat.

In this week's parashah, Moshe Rabbeinu informs Bnei Yisrael of two changes that will take place upon entering Eretz Yisrael. The first change is that once the Beis ha'Mikdash (Holy Temple) is built, it will become prohibited to slaughter and offer korbanos in any other location: "Beware for yourself lest you bring up your burnt offerings in any place that you see. Rather, only in the place that Hashem will choose ... there shall you bring up your burnt-offerings, etc" (Devarim 12:13-14).

The second change is that Bnei Yisrael will be permitted to slaughter animals for food even outside of the context of korbanos: "However, in your soul's desire you may slaughter and eat meat, according to the blessing that Hashem, your God, will have given you in all your cities, etc." In other words, if you want a steak, you can slaughter your cow without bringing it as a korban.

The prohibition to slaughter animals outside the context of korbanos was originally stated in Parashas Acharei Mos. It is there that we find the answer to our question:

"Any man from the House of Israel who will slaughter an ox, a sheep, or a goat in the camp, or who will slaughter outside the camp, and he has not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to bring it as an offering to Hashem before the Tabernacle of Meeting - it shall be considered as bloodshed for that man; he has shed blood, and that man shall be cut off from the midst of his people" (Vayikra 17:3-4).

The Torah openly states that if a Jew slaughters an animal outside of the context of korbanos, it is considered to be bloodshed! The Hebrew term used here is shfichus damim (lit. "bloodshed"), which is the same term that the Torah uses for the coldblooded murder of a human being! [1] How are we to understand this seemingly excessive condemnation of slaughtering an animal outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash? After all, the Torah clearly endorses slaughtering an animal inside the Beis ha'Mikdash, as well as slaughtering it for food!

The Sefer ha'Chinuch [2] provides an answer. He explains that the human beings do not have an inherent right over the lives of animals. We were only permitted to take an animal's life for our physical needs (e.g. food, medicine, material) or for our "spiritual" needs (e.g. korbanos and other mitzvos). Thus, to take an animal's life without any useful purpose is a wantonly destructive act, which is why the Torah refers to it as an act of shfichus damim.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch goes on to explain that a person who slaughters an animal as a korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash is committing a wasteful and destructive act. He is taking an animal's life without any practical benefit to himself, and he is doing so by transgressing Hashem's commandment. It is purely an act of bloodshed.

However, the Sefer ha'Chinuch stresses that there is a major difference between killing an animal and killing a human. He writes:

Even though [killing an animal] is not like spilling human blood, due to the superiority of the human and the inferiority of the animal, it is nevertheless called bloodshed, since the Torah did not permit spilling [its blood] for no useful purpose. 

In truth, the Sefer ha'Chinuch's entire explanation is based on pesukim in Parashas Noach. Before the Flood, human beings were only permitted to eat vegetation; animals were entirely off limits. After the flood, as part of the covenant with Noach, Hashem permits mankind to kill animals for food. In the very same paragraph, He reiterates the prohibition of murder: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the tzelem Elokim (divine form) He made man" (Bereishis 9:6).

We see from the pesukim in Noach and Acharei Mos that the Torah regards taking any creature's life as an act of shfichus damim. However, a person who sheds the blood of another human being is liable for the death penalty because man was created b'tzelem Elokim. Sforno (like all other Rishonim) maintains that the tzelem Elokim refers to the human intellect - the capacity for rational thought. He explains that since the physical body of a human being is the vessel which serves his rational soul, the vessel itself is considered to be "precious" in God's eyes (so to speak). It is for this reason that He demands the blood of anyone who sheds the blood of his fellow human being. [3]

With animals, this isn't the case. It is clear that Hashem "cares" about the lives of all animals. He only permits us to slaughter animals for our physical or spiritual benefit, and if we take the life of an animal outside of those parameters, He considers it to be a destructive act of bloodshed.

[1] See, for example, Bereishis 37:22; Bamidbar 35:33; Devarim 21:7
[2] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Acharei Mos, Mitzvah #186
[3] Sforno on Bereishis 9:6