Showing posts with label Methodology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Methodology. Show all posts

Friday, December 30, 2022

An Etymological Drash from Rav Hirsch on Jewish vs. Pagan Priests

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Sarah in celebration of the marriage of Rivkie and Dovi Siderson. Mazal tov!

Click here for a printer-friendly 2-page version of this article, and click here for the podcast version.

Artwork: Shadal and Rav Hirsch having a debate in a library
(generated using the "outpainting" tool on DALL-E)

An Etymological Drash from Rav Hirsch on Jewish vs. Pagan Priests

There are two types of linguistic analysis of the Hebrew language found in Torah commentaries. The first type takes into consideration all available data as the basis for its conclusions and follows the evidence wherever it may lead. This approach may be described as “scientific,” “evidence-based,” or “academic.” The second type of analysis avowedly does not factor in all the data but is guided by a particular set of assumptions, philosophical beliefs, and rhetorical objectives. This approach may be described as “poetic,” “imaginative,” or “homiletical.” The first type of analysis is “bottom-up” whereas the second is “top-down.” The first is a necessity for “pshat” whereas the second is a valuable a tool in the arsenal of “drash.”

Shadal (Samuel David Luzzatto, 1800-1865) exemplifies the scientific approach, as Daniel Klein writes in his preface to Shadal on Genesis: “In his investigation of word meanings, Luzzatto drew upon every means at his disposal” including “comparisons with the later (Mishnaic) Hebrew of the rabbis and with languages cognate to Hebrew, such as Aramaic, Syriac, and Arabic” (p.22) Shadal’s commentary is replete with philological analyses based on his understanding of the evolution of the Hebrew language.

Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888), a grand master of the poetic approach, holds by a different set of premises from Shadal. According to Mattityahu Clark (ed. Etymological Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew Based on the Commentaries of Samson Raphael Hirsch), Hirsch believed that Hebrew “is not a language that has historically developed and grown by absorbing or adapting words and expressions from foreign sources. Rather, it is a single, integral unit with its own internal structure and grammar, its own logic and patterns, its own meanings and nuances” (p.x). Hirsch “states repeatedly that one should not look to foreign languages to find meanings of words in the Torah,” believing instead that “the Hebrew language is self-contained” (p.xi). Thus, “in his analysis, Hirsch makes no use of or references to other languages of the ancient Near East” (p.293), instead basing his conclusions on his idiosyncratic theory of three-letter roots.

Although there are hundreds of examples which illustrate the differences between these two approaches, the main reason I wrote this article is to showcase a single excerpt from Rav Hirsch’s commentary in Parashas Mikeitz. Yosef is overcome with emotion upon seeing his younger brother Binyamin. “Yosef hurried because נִכְמְרוּ רַחֲמָיו towards his brother, and he sought to weep; he went into the room and wept there” (Bereishis 43:30). The basic question is: What does נכמרו רחמיו mean in the context of this pasuk?

A second question arises from a more common use of this three-letter root in the word כומר, which is universally understood to mean “pagan priest,” as in “[Yoshiyahu] also dismissed the כומרים” (II Melachim 23:5), “for its people will mourn over it, as well as its כומרים” (Hoshea 10:5), and “I will cut off from this place any remnant of the Baal and the memory of the ministers with the כומרים” (Tzfanya 1:4). The second question is: What, if anything, is the relationship between the expression נכמרו רחמיו and the word כומר?

Shadal’s Italian translation of the pasuk in Mikeitz (rendered into English by Daniel Klein) reads as follows: “And immediately Joseph, pity having been kindled in him toward his brother, and wanting to weep, entered into the room and wept there.” Shadal elaborates on his reasoning in his commentary (43:30):

kindled (nikhmeru). Became hot and burning, as in, “Our skin is hot [nikhmeru], like an oven” (Eichah 5:10). In Rosenmueller’s opinion (and before him the Alexandrian translation), the original meaning of rahamim [here translated as “pity”] was “bowels,” just as [the singular form] rehem [means “womb”].

Shadal is not the first one to translate נכמרו as “hot and burning” Ibn Ezra, Avraham ben ha’Rambam, Ralbag, and others took the same approach, many of them citing the same pasuk from Eichah.

As for our second question, we – or at least, I – don’t have access to Shadal’s commentary on any of the three instances of the word כומר cited above. We do, however, have the commentary Hoil Moshe by Rabbi Moshe Yitzchak Ashkenazi (Moisè Tedeschi, 1829-1898), one of Shadal’s “informal” students, who employs a similar evidence-based linguistic approach to that of his teacher:

הכומרים. According to [Heinrich Wilhelm] Gesenius (1786-1842) in his lexicon, its meaning is “those who burn incense.” If so, one must assume that the letters ג,י,כ,ק were transposed and its origin is Aramaic or Syriac. Gachalei eish (fiery coals) is translated as gumrin d’iysha, and the priests raise up smoke with fiery coals on the firepan; accordingly, they are superior in rank to priests whose forms of service are not as significant.

Thus far the scientific approach of Shadal. Rav Hirsch’s poetic approach stands in stark contrast. He reads our pasuk as: “Yosef hastened, for his feelings toward his brother had been stirred up and he wished to cry, and he went into the room and wept there” (trans. Daniel Haberman). Rav Hirsch’s commentary begins with a pshat answer to our first question, then segues into a drash answer to our second question:

נכמרו רחמיו. For Yosef knew what he intended to do to Binyamin, the painful ordeal he intended to put him through, even if only briefly.

כמר, the stirring up of strong emotions, is also the root of מכמורת, a net. A כומר is a pagan priest. The Rabbinic term כמר של זיתים denotes laying fruit on top of one another so that they should heat up and ripen, or it denotes burying them in the earth for this purpose, sealing them off until they become ripe and tender. מכמר בשרא (Pesachim 58b) – initial spoilage in meat. ביב שהוא קמור תחת הבית (Ohalos 3:7) – a hidden drain.

The basic meaning of כמר, then, is to keep back something, shut it up and prevent it from going free, and thus to bring it to fermentation. Thus, on the one hand, a net, and on the other, the process of fermentation. Transposed to the emotional realm, כמר denotes pent-up feelings which, as a result of repression, reach an intense state of ferment. Compare  כִּי יִתְחַמֵּץ לְבָבִי (Tehilim 73:21), emotional ferment which can no longer be contained in one’s breast; intense emotional excitement.

For this reason, apparently, pagan priests are called כמרים as opposed to כהנים. The Jewish כהן is not dependent on devotion, emotion. Jewish Divine service is not designed to excite dark mysterious feelings. The Jewish Sanctuary appeals primarily to the intellect: התפלל means to rectify one’s judgment and to make clear to oneself one’s relationship to things in general, one’s duties. Feelings are very cheap. One can weep copiously before God in prayer, and then get up and be no better than one was before! The כומר counts on exciting the emotions. The כהן, however, has to be כן with himself and מכין, provide others with firm direction and a firm basis. Heathenism works on the emotions and thereby shackles the intellect. The emotions, however, are like a clock mechanism without hands, restless movement that knows not whence or wither, which can be exploited for any purpose. The כומר fans the flames of hell and arouses fanaticism; he celebrates his triumph when נכמרו מעים, when the innards of the believers reach a point of total ferment.

This is a beautiful example of what I call “etymological drash.” Rav Hirsch uses the Hebrew language to expound on a core idea about Judaism. The fact that his analysis of the root כ.מ.ר. may or may not be “scientifically accurate” by the standards of modern philology is immaterial. This is the way of drash.

Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between the approaches of Shadal and Rav Hirsch, just as we need not commit ourselves exclusively to either pshat or drash. Rabbi David Fohrman once likened the interrelationship between pshat and drash to that of melody and harmony: both play different roles – the parameters of which must be understood to be effectively used – but together, they result in beautiful music.

________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, November 18, 2022

Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

This week's Torah content has been sponsored anonymously, in gratitude for making my Torah available and accessible to everyone. May Hashem send a refuah shleimah to Tzvi ha'Kohen ben Shoshanah Geylah.

Click here for a printer-friendly 1-page version of this article, and click here for the podcast version.

Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt: "abstract oil painting of Biblical Abraham sitting on his servant's hand" 



Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

When Avraham Avinu charges Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, he begins by saying: Place now your hand under my thigh, and I will have you swear by Hashem, God of heaven and God of earth, that you not take a wife for my son from the daughters of the Canaanites” (Bereishis 24:2). Similarly, when Yaakov is about to die, he tells Yosef: “Please – if I have found favor in your eyes, please place your hand under my thigh and do kindness and truth with me – please do not bury me in Egypt” (ibid. 47:29). The question is: What is the significance of this gesture?

Rashi (ibid. 24:2), citing Chazal’s drashah (Midrash Rabbah ibid.), maintains that “place your hand under my thigh” means “grab hold of the place of my bris milah.” He explains: “one who swears an oath needs to take a mitzvah object in hand, such as a Torah scroll or tefillin, and milah was the first mitzvah for [Avraham], and came to him through pain, and was beloved to him.” According to Rashi, the conduct of Avraham and Yaakov serves as a precedent for the halachic requirement to hold a mitzvah object when making certain types of oaths (see Talmud Bavli Shavuos 38b and Rashi’s commentary there). Rashi does not qualify his comments, nor does he cite any alternative views.


The majority of other Rishonim either oppose or qualify Rashi’s interpretation. The leader of the opposition is Ibn Ezra (Bereishis 24:2) who objects to the notion that Avraham swore by milah, and then offers his own take:

[The Sages] said that [the phrase “place your hand under my thigh”] refers to milah, but if this were so, he would have sworn by his milah and not by Hashem. The more likely explanation to me is that it was customary in those days for a person to place his hand under the thigh of the person who had mastery over him, meaning: “If you are under my dominion, place your hand under my thigh,” and the master would sit on the hand, [as if the servant were] saying: “Behold! My hand is under your dominion to do your will.” This custom is still followed in India today.

Ibn Ezra’s view is cited and endorsed by a number of other Rishonim, including Rashbam (ibid.), Bechor Shor (ibid.), Radak (ibid.), Chizkuni (ibid.), Rabbeinu Bachya (ibid.), Tur (peirush ha’aroch ibid.), Ralbag (ibid.), and Ibn Kaspi (ibid.). Other major commentators highlight the difficulties with Rashi. Abravanel (ibid. question #4) rejects Rashi’s approach as “extremely improbable, for a person cannot take an oath on any mitzvah [object,] like maakeh, sukkah, or lulav, and especially not on milah, which would be disgraceful.” The Rosh (Shavuos 6:1) finds the plain reading of Chazal’s drashah to be so halachically problematic that he relegates it to a mere asmachta (textual allusion) rather than a legitimate halachic source – unlike Rashi, who takes the drashah at its halachic face value.

In sum, Rashi is the minority position among the mainstream commentators who comment on this pasuk. Even those who cite both opinions characterize Rashi’s as “the midrashic approach” and Ibn Ezra’s as “pshat.”

I do not find this to be problematic. However, there are those who find this conclusion to be deeply troublesome. A number of prominent rabbis, among them the Roshei Yeshiva of Beth Medrash Govoha (of Lakewood, NJ), have recently signed a ban on a popular edition of Chumash entitled Pshuto shel Mikra (LNN, 11/15/22). The ban alleges (among other things) that this Chumash constitutes “a stumbling block for the masses” because it presents other traditional commentaries as pshat instead of regarding Rashi as the definitive pshat.

My thoughts on this ban cannot be shared in the space of a 1-page article. Moreover, as of this morning, I have only read 24 pages of the 76-page Kuntress Vayivinu ba’Mikra which explicates the many reasons for the ban. Suffice it to say, as someone who favors the non-Rashi pshat commentators among the Rishonim, I am as disturbed by this ban as its promulgators are disturbed by the Chumash Pshuto shel Mikra. I can’t help but wonder what all the Rishonim cited above would say about this treatment of their Torah.

________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, October 28, 2022

Noach: Shadal’s Radical Application of Dibrah Torah ki’Lshon Bnei Adam

This week's Torah learning has been sponsored by Vanessa, the first person who offered to cover the costs of my Zoom account for the year. Thank you, Vanessa! 

Click here for a printer-friendly 1-page version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, 
"painting in the style of Van Gogh of Noah bringing an animal sacrifice"

Noach: Shadal’s Radical Application of Dibrah Torah ki’Lshon Bnei Adam

Parashas Bereishis features a handful of “extreme” anthropomorphisms: “Let Us make man in Our Image” (1:26), “They heard the sound of Hashem-God walking in the garden” (3:6), and “Hashem regretted having made man on earth, and He was pained to His heart” (6:6). Another example can be found in Parashas Noach. After Noach emerges from the Ark and brings burnt-offerings to Hashem, we are told that “Hashem smelled the soothing fragrance” (8:21), then declared that He would no longer curse the earth or smite all living creatures. Shadal (R’ Shmuel David Luzzatto, 1800-1865), quoting Johannes Coccejus (1603-1669), explains that this anthropomorphism “signifies a sacrifice brought to make God forget His anger.” Shadal continues:

(translated from the Italian by Dani Klein, with my own underlining for emphasis) 

This expression, of course, is merely an anthropomorphism suited to the popular understanding of the generation in which the Prophet (i.e. Moshe Rabbeinu) lived (על דרך דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם לפי מצב בינת אנשי הדור שהנביא עומד בו). At this point it is well to consider that the prophet Samuel told Saul, "Has the Lord as great delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice." [I Samuel 15:22]. From then on, we find this concept widespread in Israel; David said: – "For You delight not in sacrifice" [Psalms 51:18]; – "If I were hungry [for sacrifices], I would not tell you" [ibid. 50:12]; – "Burnt offering and sin offerings have You not required" [ibid. 40:7]. All the prophets of the Monarchic period, moreover, expatiated at length on this subject. Hence it should be clear as day that the Torah could not have been written during the Monarchic period, or from the time of Samuel onward, for the Torah speaks the language of people who were on a far lower intellectual plane than that of the Israelites of the Monarchic period (כי התורה דברה כלשון בני אדם אשר שכלם עומד במצב שפל מאוד ממצב ישראל בימי המלכים). 

Before we discuss the “radical” part, let us appreciate Shadal’s main point. Shadal wrote his commentary in the wake of the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), in which the Torah’s authority was challenged from all sides. Maskilim (the so-called “enlightened Jews”) claimed that the Torah was composed during the Monarchic period – specifically, during the reign of Yoshiyahu in the 7th century B.C.E. Shadal argues that if the Torah were composed during this later era, the text would evince a negative attitude towards korbanos, as we see from numerous statements made by national leaders, such as Shmuel, David, Yeshayahu, and Yirmiyahu. Shadal concludes that this positive characterization of God’s response to korbanos is a concession to the lower intellectual level of the Jews in the pre-Monarchic period, and therefore serves as evidence of the Torah’s antiquity. 

It is Shadal’s opening and closing statements (underlined above) which intrigue me the most. I’m not troubled by Shadal’s assertion that the Jews in Moshe’s time were “on a far lower intellectual plane than that of the Israelites of the monarchic period.” The Jews who left Egypt had been steeped in the paganistic Egyptian culture for over two centuries. The Korban Pesach (lit. “sacrifice of skipping”) is predicated on the fact that the Jews were identical with their Egyptian masters in nearly every way and therefore needed to differentiate themselves by rejecting avodah zarah in order to merit redemption. The narratives that follow the Exodus are rife with examples of how attached Bnei Yisrael were to the Egyptian culture from whence they came. Likewise, I am not troubled by the notion that the Torah catered to the earlier generations’ attachment to korbanos. Indeed, this is the basis of the Rambam’s entire theory that korbanos as a whole are (as it were) a concession to the Jews’ attachment to the modes of worship that were ubiquitous at the time the Torah was given (see Moreh 3:32).

What I find both radical and compelling is Shadal’s application of dibrah Torah ki’lshon bnei Adam (Torah speaks in the language of man). This principle is typically invoked to explain the Torah’s use of anthropomorphisms: since it is impossible for the human intellect to have any positive knowledge of God, we are forced to speak of Him in terms which are, strictly speaking, inaccurate. Shadal takes this one step further by claiming that in some cases (at least) the Torah’s specific anthropomorphisms are tailored to the developmental level of the audience to which it was given. This methodological move has enormous implications, which I will leave the reader to consider.  
________________________________________________________________

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Tuesday, August 2, 2022

Wishful Thinking and Prophetic Interpretation

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Ariel Rachmanov, a friend and Mishlei talmid of mine. Ariel works for Keller Williams Real Estate and has generously offered to donate to the Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund a percentage of any business that comes his way as a result of this sponsorship, resulting in a Mishleic "win, win, win" scenario for all parties involved. Ariel is based in New York but will be happy to help you meet your real estate needs in all 50 states.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.



Wishful Thinking and Prophetic Interpretation

Last summer, my mom asked me to look through a bunch of random Jewish books in our possession to see which ones we should keep and which ones we should sell or give away. One of the books I found (and have no idea how we came to own) was called, Fascinating Torah Prophecies Currently Unfolding (1997). The contents are exactly what you’d expect from a book with that title – especially one with a teaser banner on the cover advertising “fascinating codes and more.” 

I found myself thinking of this book after reading R’ Yosef ibn Kaspi’s introduction to Sefer Yirmiyahu:

This prophet Yirmiyah also did what Yeshaya [did], mentioning at the beginning of his book the name and intent of its author. This prophet also informed us of the intent of his book by stating that his prophecies were from the time of Yoshiyahu until the end of the days of Tzidkiyahu, in whose days and era the Temple was destroyed. Therefore, note that this prophet doesn’t speak at all about the building of the Third Temple, which we undoubtedly yearn for today. This is clear, for he prophesied the destruction of the First Temple and the building of the Second Temple, as Yeshaya did. The general rule is that it is not at all appropriate to ascribe to any prophet a prophecy about the building of the Third Temple unless we first find written in his book a promise about the destruction of the Second Temple. Without a doubt, Yirmiyah did not strive to assure them about the destruction of the Second Temple, even though he undoubtedly alluded [to it] with hints, as Yeshayahu did – just as Moshe alluded to the destruction of the First Temple with hints that would not be grasped by the masses … someone who is an expert in these holy books will understand the truth of our words.

Ibn Kaspi’s “general rule” is not unanimous. Others maintain that prophets do prophesy beyond their stated range. Rashi, for instance, interprets “I shall yet build you, and you shall be built, O virgin of Israel” (Yirmiyahu 31:3) to mean: “You had two buildings made by men. Therefore, they were destroyed. Yet again, I, Myself, will build a third building which will be built forever.” Ibn Kaspi was aware of such views, which is why he stated his objections at the outset of his commentary.

Which side of the machlokess do I think is correct? I have no idea. Why not? Because, as Ibn Kaspi said, only “someone who is an expert in these holy books will understand the truth of our words,” and I am not an expert in prophetic exegesis. Not even close. I have heard it said in the name of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik that “we no longer know how to learn Neviim nowadays.” I was unable to track down a source or a context for this quotation, but I refuse to believe he meant that the ideas and mussar (rebuke) of the neviim is inaccessible to us. Instead, I assume he meant that we, unlike the medieval commentators, are unable to decipher the precise meanings of the prophecies in the Neviim portion of Tanach.

It is very easy for a person to think they’re deciphering cryptic prophecies with their mind when all they’re doing is engaging in wishful thinking with their imagination. Who wouldn’t want to find a message of hope in a pasuk from Sefer Yirmiyahu about yemos ha’Moshiach and the building of Bayis Shelishi? But that’s exactly the point: our interpretation of the neviim should not be guided by hope, but by our knowledge of how nevuah works and how the neviim wrote. Rashi did not interpret the aforementioned pasuk to be about Bayis Shelishi simply because he wanted it to be about yemos ha’Moshiach. His interpretation was guided by his understanding of the subject matter.

Lastly, we must remember the Rambam’s words (Hilchos Melachim u’Milchamos 12:2) about Messianic speculations:

Regarding all of these [details of the time of Moshiach] – no person knows how they will be until they happen, for these things were hidden even from the prophets, and there is no clear tradition from the Sages on these matters. Therefore, there is disagreement about them. Nevertheless, neither the order nor the details of these matters are an essential part of the religion. A person shouldn’t involve himself in the words of the aggados (homiletical teachings), nor should he spend time in the words of the midrashim which were stated about these topics, and he shouldn’t regard them as fundamental, for they do not bring a person to fear [of God] nor to love [of God]. 
__________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Tuesday, July 26, 2022

Ralbag on the Speculative Nature of Taamei ha'Mitzvos

The Torah content for this week has been sponsored by Ellis and Janice Cohen in memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.




Ralbag on the Speculative Nature of Taamei ha'Mitzvos

Throughout his Torah commentary, Ralbag provides numerous taamei ha’mitzvos (reasons for the commandments), endeavoring to show how each mitzvah perfects our middos (character traits) and deios (knowledge of the universe). Many of these explanations are “Aristotelian” in character. Ralbag takes no measures to conceal this. He often quotes Aristotle directly or refers the reader to his works. 

What are we to make of these Aristotelian taamei ha’mitzvos explanations? Does Ralbag really believe that Hashem had these Aristotelian ideas “in mind” when He “designed” these mitzvos? How certain is Ralbag that his taamei ha’mitzvos theories are true? Thankfully, Ralbag addresses these questions in his introduction:

You should not overlook the fact that when giving causes (i.e. reasons, or as Aristotle would call them, “final causes”) in Torah matters such as these, it is impossible to provide causes which necessitate the existence of these mitzvos in an absolute manner, as it is in the deductive branches of wisdom. It is also impossible to provide the same types of causes as those given in the study of the natural world. This is not at all possible, since the nature of the subject matter of Torah does not lend itself to this degree of certainty, as Aristotle explained in the Sefer ha’Middos

Ralbag is referring to the following passage in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1:3:

We must also remember what has been said before, and not look for precision in all things alike, but in each class of things such precision as accords with the subject matter, and so much as is appropriate to the inquiry. For a carpenter and a geometer investigate the right angle in different ways; the former does so insofar as the right angle is useful for his work, while the latter inquires what it is or what sort of thing it is; for he is a spectator of the truth.

In other words, it would be a methodological mistake to look for the same degree of certitude in the study of history as in math, the same level of precision in literary analysis as in physics, or the same degree of necessary conclusions in moral philosophy as in symbolic logic. Every intellectual discipline has its own methods and standards, and it would be wrong to expect one subject matter to comply with the conventions of another. Ralbag then goes on to explain why he felt compelled to include this point in his introduction:

We mentioned this so that the reader does not devalue the reasons we provided for the mitzvos of the Torah in our commentary for failing to meet the standards of other disciplines; the subject matter of those subjects lends itself to a greater degree of verification than these Torah matters and other things like them.

Ralbag was concerned that someone might read his speculative taamei ha’mitzvos and think to themselves, “How can he claim that this is the reason for this mitzvah? How does he know? Can he prove it? Can he explain why this middos/deios objective necessarily warrants this particular mitzvah-structure with these particular halachos?” Such questions stem from the methodological error of demanding that the study of taamei ha’mitzvos conform to the standards of other branches of knowledge. Such an error would be disastrous if it led the reader to make light of the taamei ha’mitzvos theories that Ralbag provides – or worse, to disregard the study of taamei ha’mitzvos altogether.

At the end of the day, how might Ralbag respond to the charge (leveled by some) that he has projected Aristotelian ideas onto Torah? I’d like to think he’d say something like this: “First, the study of taamei ha’mitzvos is not an exact science. Second, I do not regard Aristotle to be infallible. I have recorded what, to my mind, are the most compelling explanations for the taamei ha’mitzvos. Since I hold that Aristotle was right about a great many things, I have chosen to express my ideas by drawing upon his writings.” 

What would Ralbag say about alternative explanations? I suspect he would say what he, in fact, writes in his introduction to Sefer Mishlei: “And if you will find another suitable way to explain a pasuk [which differs from our explanation], this does not constitute an argument against us, for we do not proclaim that the pasuk cannot tolerate any other explanation.” 

For all his radical views, Ralbag was an intellectually humble thinker.
___________________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Thursday, July 14, 2022

The Pros and Cons of a Postmodernist Analysis of Halacha

The Torah content for these two weeks has been sponsored by Judah and Naomi Dardik in loving memory of Rabbi Moskowitz zt''l, who taught his students to pursue truth by asking questions, who modeled love of Torah and learning, and who exemplified living a life of the mind.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.




The Pros and Cons of a Postmodern Analysis of Halacha

I recently read Faith Shattered and Restored: Judaism in the Postmodern Age (2017), by Rabbi Shagar. I found it to be exceedingly thought-provoking, if fundamentally objectionable. I agreed with many of Rabbi Shagar’s particular insights while disagreeing with his overall framework. (If you’re interested in my review of the book, let me know and I’ll share it with you.) One example of this is his approach to taamei ha’mitzvos (the reasons for the commandments). He writes:

The test of halakha is not its truth, but its ability to maintain the integrity of its character as a linguistic and practical system. This character is the core of halakha, whose scale of values and beliefs - which neither proves nor justifies it - is merely a byproduct of the nature of the halakhic system. Thus, rather than justify or rationalize halakha, we must describe it phenomenologically. For instance, we should examine how the laws of family purity shape the relationship between husband and wife, instead of propounding justifications for them with facile pronouncements about how halakha "exalts women," or "acknowledges the body," or "values emotion," and so forth. Such apologetics emanate from a self-deceptive desire to beautify the halakhic world in the face of criticism from the world of Western cultural values. Instead, one should lay down the ethical and existential consequences of halakha: What sort of romance is shared by couples who lead such a lifestyle, how their passion manifests, and so on.

I hold the study of taamei ha’mitzvos in high regard. Although I regularly engage in what Rabbi Shagar disparagingly refers to as “self-deceptive apologetics,” I also see the benefits of a phenomenological analysis of halacha. See, for instance, my article entitled The Non-Symbolic Trumpets, in which I cite the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s phenomenological explanation of the reason for the mitzvah of sounding the trumpets at the time of korbanos. He explains that (a) man needs help focusing, (b) korbanos require focus, and (c) a loud trumpet sound helps man to focus on the korban. Likewise, in my shiur entitled Kiddush: The Universe of Torah in a Glass of Wine, I discuss R’ Yehuda ha’Levi’s explanation of making berachos on food: pausing and contemplating what you’re about to eat results in greater enjoyment from the food. I appreciate how such analyses can be readily integrated into one’s practice because they are rooted in our immediate experience.

At the same time, I disagree with Rabbi Shagar’s postmodernist foundation. In his preface to the book, Aryeh Rubin defines post-modernism as “the denial and deconstruction that come from the erosion of belief in any ‘grand narrative’ and in the ability to perceive the truth.” This is why Rabbi Shagar is opposed to the traditional approaches to taamei ha’mitzvos. He would look at the Ralbag’s definition of Torah (“a God-given regimen that brings those who practice it properly to true success”) as being influenced by Ralbag’s immersion in the Greek world of Aristotelianism, dismissing it as an artificial “grand narrative.” Likewise, he would characterize Rav Hirsch’s Torah im Derech Eretz paradigm as a 19th century German Jew’s noble (or ignoble) effort to integrate the values of Western Culture into Judaism. He would chalk up the various kabbalistic explanations of mitzvos as byproducts of this or that cultural or intellectual influence. And so on.

I think that Rabbi Shagar’s approach is self-defeating. He claims to reject the “grand narratives” and value systems that other thinkers employ in their analyses, yet somehow maintains that he is able to engage in an objective phenomenological description untethered to any particular value system. Is this possible? Can he really assess “what sort of romance is shared by couples” who follow the laws of family purity without imposing some culturally biased view of romance? Romance in 21st century America differs from the romance of the Victorian era which differs from Romance during the Persian Empire. Can he make statements about “how their passion manifests” without subscribing to his own narratives about “passion”? Can he “examine how the laws of family purity shape the relationship between husband and wife” without taking a stance on what “relationship” means and what constitutes “shaping” that relationship?

One might respond to the above, saying, “Ha! Your objections reveal that you agree with his postmodern framework after all!” Yes and no. I agree that our view of reality is influenced by our personal theoretical frameworks. But at least I’m not the one who is claiming to reject all grand narratives while insidiously framing everything in my own grand narrative.
___________________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Tuesday, June 21, 2022

On Reading the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah Like a Love Letter

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Naomi Mann in honor of Rabbi Moskowitz zt"l, whose shloshim is this week.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

close-up of the Oxford 577 Huntington 80 manuscript
"checked against my book - I, Moshe, son of Maimon zt"l"











On Reading the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah Like a Love Letter

This article is part PSA and part rant. For the past two years I’ve given a Rambam shiur in yeshiva four days a week. Time and again I’ve stressed the importance of using a critical edition of the Mishneh Torah based on accurate manuscripts, rather than relying on the standard Warsaw-Vilna printed editions owned by most Jews. Here’s an excerpt from R’ Yosef Qafih’s [1] introduction to his edition of the Mishneh Torah in which he explains why the standard editions are so unreliable:

The errors and deficiencies of the printed texts were well known, so much so that the printed books were used to characterize a mistaken person: when someone said something incorrect on some subject, they would respond "you are like a defoos (printed text)," and point out the correction. These matters were inscribed on my heart, and I grew up with the assumption that there were two types of Maimonides texts in the world: that of the Yemenite manuscripts and that of the printed book.

Qafih goes on to write about how the Rambam updated the Mishneh Torah throughout his lifetime and how the Yemenite scholars made every effort to incorporate these emendations into their copies. With the printed texts, this did not happen.

… in the printed texts, only a few of the changes which Maimonides himself inserted in his book appear, since only a few reached the early printers. Some of the emendations which Maimonides added he wrote in the margins on the side, and the copyists did not pay attention to the correct placement and inserted them in the wrong place, causing much trouble and difficult questions in the understanding of Maimonides’ words … The "editors" tried to deduce changes. The Mishneh Torah was subjected to severe editing by the printers, and various editors who made emendations of style, language, the structure of sentences and the division of halachot … to the extent that there is hardly any halacha that has not been emended. I know of no other book that was so severely emended … every third or fourth rate scholar who thought himself capable of doing so would presume to try his hand at making emendations and corrections according to his own understanding.

Mark Twain once quipped: “Be careful about reading health books. You may die of a misprint.” Kal va’chomer for a book which contains not only transcription errors, but willful emendations made recklessly by unqualified individuals. And the Twain quotation doesn’t do it for you, consider this analogy given by Mortimer J. Adler in How to Read a Book (1940):

If we consider men and women generally, and apart from their professions or occupations, there is only one situation I can think of in which they almost pull themselves up by their bootstraps, making an effort to read better than they usually do. When they are in love and are reading a love letter, they read for all they are worth. They read every word three ways; they read between the lines and in the margins; they read the whole in terms of the parts, and each part in terms of the whole; they grow sensitive to context and ambiguity, to insinuation and implication; they perceive the color of words, the odor of phrases, and the weight of sentences. They may even take the punctuation into account. Then, if never before or after, they read.

The Rambam most certainly wrote the Mishneh Torah with love: love for Hashem, love for His Torah, and love for all Jews, “small and great,” for whom it was written. His book should be read like a love letter. And if you wouldn’t trust a transcription of a love letter knowing that its text was mangled, manipulated, and revised by scores of strangers, then don’t even touch the standard editions of the Rambam. I cannot, for the life of me, understand those talmidei chachamim who continue to use the bad versions of the Mishneh Torah. I’m tempted to chalk this up to ignorance or laziness, but I can’t tell whether doing so counts as being dan l’chaf zechus (giving them the benefit of the doubt) or its the opposite.

Do you know what is not an excuse? Accessibility. The most accurate version of the Mishneh Torah is the new edition published by R’ Yitzchak Sheilat, available in its entirety for free on AlHaTorah.org. A close runner-up is R’ Yohai Makbili’s edition, which has a free app for iPhone and Android. Use these. Use them in good health. And don’t die of a misprint.

[1] Rabbi Yosef Qafih (1917 – 2000) was a Yemenite scholar who translated and published critical editions of the Rambam’s works. The 20-page introduction to his critical edition of the Mishneh Torah can be found here, translated into English by Michael J. Bohnen.
___________________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Thursday, August 19, 2021

When to Dance Between Two Opinions

Today's Torah content has been brought to you by the generosity of my Patrons on Patreon.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: Static Orb, by Tommy Arnold



When to Dance Between Two Opinions

Earlier this week I referenced a book I’m reading called Already Free: Buddhism Meets Psychotherapy on the Path of Liberation. The author is Bruce Tift, a practicing psychotherapist and Buddhist. In the foreword of the book, the publisher recounts her first meeting with Tift in which she asked him how he reconciles these two disparate and often irreconcilable approaches. He replied: “I alternate between a Buddhist approach and a psychotherapeutic approach without any hope of resolution.” That caught my attention.

The author outlines three possible models of “dialogue” between the two views:

#1: Simplistically, we might assume there is just one truth, and the dialogue is a way to test our theories in order to discover which is true. #2: Or we might assume that most theories are useful approximations of what's true in some ways but that they have their own limitations in other ways; so the point of the dialogue is to come up with a synthesis or integration that combines the best of both. #3: Perhaps an even more interesting use of dialogue is to investigate our experience of standing in the middle, with no fantasy of resolution. What is it like to have no ground to stand on, no theory to identify with? To use theories for practical purposes rather than as positions to take?

The author eventually settles on the last option, noting the advantages of the resulting mindset:

We develop the capacity not to take refuge in any one position. As a result, we end up in this open middle ground where there's no support for personal identity and no objective confirmation that we're ever doing anything the "right way." Obviously, from an egoic point of view, this can be quite disturbing, especially at first. But the benefit is that we are able to just show up without a preconceived formula about how to live our lives. We begin to experience the reality that every moment is fresh. It's open. We don't know what's going to happen, and we don't know the right way to do this or that.

The most important shiur I gave last year was Of Wolves, Men, and Methodology. The main point of the shiur was to highlight the pitfalls of unwarranted reductionism - the attempt to take a complex phenomenon and to reduce it to an oversimplified thing, believing this to be The Truth.

Even though I gave this shiur and reference it constantly, I didn’t realize until I read Tift’s words that I was still falling prey to a reductionist way of thinking. I now see that I’ve been clinging to approaches #1 and #2 in my conception of what truth-seeking looks like, and that I was blind to #3. It never even occurred to me that there may be merit in “[investigating] our experience of standing in the middle, with no fantasy of resolution.” I had viewed “standing in the middle” as a necessary evil en route to one of two outcomes: either eliminating one view as false or arriving at a synthesis. I didn’t consider the possibility that deliberately not seeking a conclusion, or even an integration, might bring us the closest to truth.

There are certainly times when the desire to hold on to two mutually exclusive views inhibits our truth-seeking. In such situations we must goad ourselves to keep moving forward in our investigation, asking ourselves: “How long will you dance between two opinions?” (I Melachim 18:21). But I am now beginning to realize that there are also times when our need for certainty, identity, and other forms of psychological security push us towards unwarranted reductionism under the guise of intellectual diligence. In those situations, we must resist the impulse for security, allowing ourselves to remain in the space in between, with all the discomfort of doubt and uncertainty. A wise woman said: “Any fool can engage in action, but only the wise man can wait.” Any fool can force a conclusion, but only the wise man can wait.
___________________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here

Tuesday, July 27, 2021

The Principle of Humanity vs. Emunas Chachamim

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by Sol and Chummie Azose, in honor of the upcoming 81st birthday of the Rosh ha'Yeshiva, Rabbi Yisroel Chait, and the 91st birthday of Sol's father, Hazzan Isaac Azose. If you're interested in sponsoring a day's or a week's worth of Torah content, you can contact me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this article, and click here for an audio version.

Artwork: Compulsive Researchi, by Kristina Collantes

The Principle of Humanity vs. Emunas Chachamim

At the beginning of Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation, Jonathan Lear mentions the Principle of Humanity: “that we should try to interpret others as saying something true – guided by our own sense of what is true and of what they could reasonably believe.” The very short Wikipedia article has a different formulation:

[When] interpreting another speaker we must assume that his or her beliefs and desires are connected to each other and to reality in some way, and attribute to him or her “the propositional attitudes one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances.”

A third formulation, stated in the Wikipedia article on the nearly identical Principle of Charity, includes negatives: “to avoid attributing irrationality, logical fallacies, or falsehoods to the others' statements, when a coherent, rational interpretation of the statements is available.”

Compare all of that to “emunas chachamim,” which the braisa (Avos 6:6) identifies as one of the 48 qualities through which the Torah is acquired. Some might explain "emunas chachamim" to mean “faith in the wisdom of the Sages,” which suggests an uncritical acceptance of the truth of the Sages’ words. According to my understanding, it would be more accurate to render “emunas chachamim” as “faith that the Sages are chachamim.” In Darchei ha’Talmud, the relatively unknown Talmudic methodology manual by R’ Yitzchak Kanpanton (1360 – 1463 C.E.), the author expounds in detail on what emunas chachamim looks like in action:

At the outset of your analysis, you should establish as a premise of your thinking that each of the speakers – the one who asks and the one who answers – that both of them are intelligent, and that all their words [were spoken] with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, without anything twisted or distorted. This is what [the Sages] mean when they [rhetorically] exclaim: "Are we dealing with idiots?!" (Shevuos 48b). Therefore, you must analyze all their statements and see if they are statements with sound reasons, "as strong as a molten mirror" (Iyov 37:18) or whether [they are] weak statements, [like] "bland food without salt" (ibid. 6:6), and whether they are intellectually probable or improbable. One must strive to make their words probable and to adjust their ideational content so that [the statements] will be beautiful and acceptable and intellectually feasible; [one must also strive] not to ascribe to them the guilty iniquity of a tenuous or weak sevara (theory). None of their words should fall to the earth, for they are all "the words of the living God." And if they are "empty," [the "emptiness"] is from you. (Darchei ha’Talmud 1:3)

There are clear similarities between the Principle of Humanity and emunas chachamim. Both prompt the reader to grant the text in question the benefit of the doubt, interpreting it in the best light possible. Both effectively counteract the “strawman” fallacy by encouraging a “steelman” approach.

It is the differences between these two principles which interest me. The Principle of Humanity dictates that our interpretation of the text should be guided by “our own sense of what is true” as the first version has it. The second goes further and says that we must “attribute to him or her the propositional attitudes one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances.” In other words, we interpret the words in light of our own ideas. In contrast, emunas chachamim prompts us to move outside of our current understanding, recognizing that we are dealing with superior minds who will expand our horizons of understanding.

The limitation, of course, is that whereas the Principle of Humanity can and should be applied to everyone, emunas chachamim applies on a sliding scale based on the extent to which the author is deemed a chacham. This necessitates a prior judgment to be made by the reader – one which, unfortunately, the reader is not always equipped to make. At least the Principle of Humanity can act as a failsafe for when emunas chachamim misfires.
___________________________________________________________________________________
If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at www.patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you

If you would like to sponsor an article, shiur, or podcast episode, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone. 

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  For the full guide to all of my Torah content, click here