Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

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Artwork: Dispel, by Chase Stone

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

What is kedushah?

"Kedushah" is a prominent theme within Judaism. Although this term is typically translated as "holiness,""sanctity," or "sacredness," I have never found such translations to be of much use. If anything, they tend to be a hindrance to understanding. They're vague, they're loaded with foreign connotations, and they fail to convey Judaism's unique take on what it means to be kadosh. 

According to Judaism, "kedushah" is based defined as "transcendence of physicality." Hashem is called "kadosh" because He transcends physicality in an absolute manner: He has no physical body, has no physical characteristics, and is not subject to any physical effects, changes, or occurrences whatsoever. Angels [1] are called "kedoshim" because although they affect the physical world, they, themselves, are not physical.

How can a human being become "kadosh"? After all, we have a physical body and physical drives in addition to our non-physical soul. The answer is: human beings can become kedoshim insofar as we transcend our own physicality by rising above the dictates of our animalistic instincts and psychological drives and living our lives based on, and in service of, our tzelem Elokim (non-physical intellect). 

All mitzvos are instruments of kedushah: they are all serve the Torah regimen's goal of developing man into a knowledge-seeking being, whether by perfecting the body/psyche, or the intellect, or both. We acknowledge the kedushah dimension of mitzvos every time we make a birkas ha'mitzvah (blessing over mitzvos) by saying: "asher kideshanu b'mitzvosav" ("Who made us kadosh through His mitzvos"). 

While all mitzvos partake of the general character of kedushah, there are other mitzvos whose specific character is kedushah as well. The Rambam divided all 613 mitzvos into 14 categories, as codified in the 14 books of his Mishneh Torah. His Sefer Kedushah includes two categories of mitzvos: issurei biah (prohibited sexual relations) and maachalos assuros (prohibited foods). These mitzvos are designed to instill kedushah on an individual and national level by targeting the two primary instinctual drives in man: the sexual and the appetitive.

This explanation of kedushah applies to the other groups of mitzvos and halachic institutions which are explicitly associated with kedushah. For example, the mikraei kodesh ("holidays") are time periods devoted to kedushah-development, in which we withdraw from our involvement in melachah (shaping the physical world in accordance with our design) and focusing on the development of our tzelem Elokim. The Beis ha'Mikdash is the national kedushah-center, run by the kohanim ha'kedoshim - those individuals governed additional strictures of kedushah whose job is to process all of the kodshim (consecrated sacrifices) funded by hekdesh (consecrated property). The institution of kiddushin (betrothal and marriage) is designed to instill the relationship between a man and his wife - and, by extension, their home and family - with kedushah. And so on.

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Mutar Lach 

In addition to the kedushah-development that is facilitated through the observance of halacha, Chazal also urge us to practice kedushah beyond what is required by halacha. Parashas Kedoshim begins with the statement of kedoshim tihiyu (you shall be kadosh): 

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying: Speak to the entire assembly of the Children of Israel and say to them: "You shall be kedoshim, for I, Hashem, your God, am kadosh" (Vayikra 19:2).

The Ramban [2] explains kedoshim tihiyu as a commandment to strive for kedushah within the realm of the permissible:

The idea [of this mitzvah] is that the Torah warned against prohibited sexual relations and prohibited foods, but it permitted the cohabitation of a man with his wife and the [unlimited] consumption of meat and wine. Accordingly, the baal taavah (pleasure addict) can find room [within the parameters of the law] to be steeped in sexual indulgence with his wife or to be "one of the guzzlers of wine and gorgers of meat" (Mishlei 23:20), and to speak as he pleases about all vile things - for the prohibition of [such speech] is not [explicitly] mentioned in the Torah - and thus, he will be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah (a degenerate within the parameters of the Torah's permission).  

Therefore, this pasuk [of kedoshim tihiyu] comes after [the Torah] detailed the categorical prohibitions, and commands in a general statement that we shall remove ourselves from excess within permissible acts. [For example,] one should be temperate in cohabiting [with his wife] ... utilizing [marital relations] only as needed for the fulfillment of the mitzvah regarding it; he should be kadosh with regard to wine by being temperate in [its consumption] ... similarly, he should guard his mouth and tongue from becoming polluted with excessive, gluttonous eating or with vile speech ... 

It is with regard to these matters and those like them that this general mitzvah [of kedoshim tihiyu] comes [to caution], after [the Torah] detailed all of the transgressions which are categorically prohibited.

Chazal summed up this application of kedoshim tihiyu in the injunction: "kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach" ("sanctify yourself within what is permissible to you"). Just because the Torah grants freedom within a certain area doesn't mean that it's a free-for-all. Instead of acting like an animal, a person should exercise restraint and strive for moderation even with regard to what is permitted.  

One might ask: "If the Torah is against excessively indulgent behavior, then why didn't it prohibit all forms of such behavior so there would be no need for a separate mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu?" The answer to this is two-fold. First of all, it is inherently impossible to legislate kedushah in this manner. No matter how far the Torah might have gone in prohibiting a specific type of indulgence, there would always remain a permissible realm, and a person could still be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah in that area. In other words, as long as there is any amount of reshus (permission), then there is room to be a naval bi'reshus ha'Torah.

Secondly, the Torah recognizes that certain courses of development are most effective if the individual is allowed to tailor the Torah regimen to his own specifications, and to ramp it up at his own pace. For this reason, the Torah regulates the behavior of all Jews in a uniform manner up to a certain point, but beyond that, it is the responsibility of the individual to take on additional strictures and strive to fulfill the Torah's objectives in a personalized manner, beyond what is required by the strict letter of the law. (This is the basis of Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam's distinction between the Derech ha'Ahm and the Derech ha'Yachid; see this post for an elaboration.)

According to the Ramban, this is why the Torah included a mitzvah of kedoshim tihiyu. Even though it is impossible and ineffective to legislate this type of kedushah on a particular level, the Torah can still urge us to implement this in a general way by broadly commanding us in kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach.

Kadesh Atzmecha b'Assur Lach

I would like to coin a new phrase, which is an extension of the Ramban's explanation of kedoshim tihiyu and kadesh atzmecha b'mutar lach. That phrase is "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach" ("sanctify yourself within what is prohibited to you"). I am not suggesting that this principle is an actual mitzvah or a halacha. I do, however, believe that it is an important part of the Torah's approach to kedushah, and an indispensable practical guideline in the observance of halacha.  

By "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach" I mean that even when a person violates halacha, he or she should still practice kedushah to the extent possible. In other words, just because the transgressor knows he or she is going to violate halacha doesn't mean that he or she should just say, "To hell with it," and go on to act in a totally unrestrained manner. Instead, he or she should still exercise restraint and self-control within that violation of halacha - and, if feasible, should try to act in accordance with the objectives of the Torah, even though his or her actions are not in line with halacha itself.

Let's use a familiar, non-halachic analogy to illustrate this principle: dieting. Reuven is on a diet which requires him to observe precise dietary restrictions and to moderate his caloric intake. He's been sticking to his diet religiously for months. But one evening, he finds himself standing in front of a wedding smorgasbord featuring his arch-nemesis: UNLIMITED SUSHI. After battling with the urge to consume his favorite food, he admits defeat, and gorges himself on sushi ... and then he has some pasta ... and then some cookies ... and then ice cream ... all while telling himself, "Now that I've gone off my diet, I might as well let loose."

Although we may sympathize with Reuven's plight, we recognize the irrationality of his rationalization. He only lost the battle against sushi. Why should he concede additional territory to pasta, cookies, and ice cream as well? Just because he made one mistake doesn't mean that he should make three more mistakes! Instead, he should some sushi, and then return to his diet.

The same approach applies to halacha. Just as the person who stumbles in his diet should still exercise as much self-control as possible in line with the objectives and principles of his diet, so too, a person who stumbles in halacha should still exercise as much self-control as possible, in line with the objectives and principles of Torah. In doing so, he will at least be practicing kedushah even as he violates halacha. That is what I mean by kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach.

I will expand upon on this by focusing on three related (arguably identical) applications.

Application #1: The Baal Teshuvah

A baal teshuvah is someone who was once involved in a sin, but has engaged in teshuvah (repentance) and changed his or her ways for the good. Strictly speaking, "baal teshuvah" can refer to anyone who routinely engaged in any transgression or transgressions, and has subsequently done teshuvah. Colloquially, this term is reserved for people who "weren't religious" and became religious.

Halacha can be VERY daunting for a baal teshuvah who grew up non-observant. Most areas of halacha are so detailed that it is a challenge to even learn what to do and what not to do, let alone actually change one's lifestyle from non-halachic to halachic. This intimidation-factor can be a huge deterrent for potential baalei teshuvah, pressuring them to feel that they need to go from complete non-observance to being completely shomer Torah u'mitzvos (halachically observant). In many cases there exists a real danger that the would-be baal teshuvah will not even embark on the path of teshuvah because he or she feels the pressure to make an all-or-nothing lifestyle change in a very short amount of time.

This is where kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach comes in. Halacha really is all-or-nothing in terms of its  absolutely binding nature as a legal system, but that doesn't mean that the baal teshuvah should approach his return to halacha with such absolutism. It is often more realistic to take on halachic observance piecemeal, one step at a time, until one is fully shomer Torah u'mitzvos.

The first example of this that I witnessed happened in my own home. I was raised irreligious, but our family started becoming baalei teshuvah when I was around 13 years old. My dad was the first one to start keeping kosher in our family. However, he didn't go from zero observance to full observance of kashrus overnight. He began by giving up pork. Next, he stopped eating shellfish. Then he stopped eating milk with meat. After that he stopped eating milk after meat. Eventually, after around two years, we all took the plunge, kashered our kitchen, and kept a fully kosher home.

Now, a person could make the argument that what my dad did would be frowned upon by halacha. After all, almost everything that was cooked in our non-kosher kitchen was technically assur (prohibited), so it's not like he was actually "keeping kosher" until he fully made the switch.

Nevertheless, I believe that this step-by-step approach to doing teshuvah was a kiyum (fulfillment) of the principles of kedushah, even though it was an imperfect kiyum of the halachos of kedushah. It is assur to eating a piece of pork and it is also assur to eat a piece of chicken cooked in a pot that was used to cook pork - yet, my dad's act of resisting the urge to eat pork and forcing himself to eat chicken in order to uphold halacha was an act of kedushah, despite the fact that it involved a transgression.

I would argue that this is true for all of halacha, insofar as all mitzvos are vehicles of kedushah. Every step that a baal teshuvah takes towards halachic observance is a step taken with kedushah, even if it doesn't completely meet the standards of halacha at the present time.

I think that this is an important idea to emphasize with baalei teshuvah as they make their journey, since baalei teshuvah sometimes feel guilty about taking things slowly. Admittedly, it's a difficult balancing act: on the one hand, it must be made clear that halacha is an objective, uniform, Divinely mandated system, and that an aveirah (transgression) is still an aveirah; at the same time, it is psychologically beneficial and philosophically instructive to point out that the transgression of a baal teshuvah on the path towards observance is fundamentally different than the transgression of a non-baal teshuvah.

Application #2: The Teenager

Another demographic that kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach pertains to is teenagers. Teenagers and young adults from all across the shomer Torah u'mitzvos spectrum face a number of challenges throughout this difficult time in their lives. It is quite common for teens to go through lapses in various areas of their halachic observance.

As I - and I'm sure other Jewish Educators - can attest, these young men and women often feel "doomed" by their lapses or by their imperfect observance of halacha. They feel that if they're intentionally and habitually doing one aveirah, they might as well do more aveiros. For example, if they're texting on Shabbos, they might as well turn on lights on Shabbos; if they wear short sleeves, they might as well wear short skirts; if they eat non-kosher candy, they might as well eat at non-kosher restaurants; if they're violating "shomer negiah," they might as well do other things.

I think that the message we give baalei teshuvah should be given to these teenagers as well. Yes, halacha is absolutely binding. No, halacha does not grant you the permission to pick and choose. But if you feel that you can't give an area of halacha your 100%, then at least give it 80%, or 60%, or even 10%. So long as you are still exercising as much control as you can muster, that is still the derech of kedushah, and that is still something worth holding onto.

I witnessed a great example of this involving a teenager who happened to be a baal teshuvah. This incident took place during my second or third year of yeshiva, when I went back to visit my old high school. I sat in on a Q&A session with my Mishlei rebbi and a class of 10th graders. This kid told my rebbi that he was struggling with a certain area of halacha involving self-control. He said that it felt like the halacha was impossible for him to keep, and he wanted to know what to do about it. My rebbi asked him, "Can you control yourself sometimes or never?" The kid answered, "Sometimes." My rebbi then simply said, "Okay. So try to keep the halacha and only give in to your desires when you're in a situation where you can't control yourself," to which the kid replied, "Oh. I guess that makes sense!"

My first thought upon hearing this was, "Duh! Isn't that what the kid had already been doing in the first place? Wasn't he just trying to keep the halacha and then failing when the desire became overpowering? What did my rebbi's advice change in this kid's mind?" But then I realized what had happened. From the kid's question it was clear that he was ready to give up on trying to keep the halacha altogether. What my rebbi essentially did was to say, "Nobody's perfect, and it seems that you can't keep this halacha perfectly right now - but that doesn't mean that it's rational to just stop trying to keep it. Instead, approach the observance and the violation of this halacha with kedushah: try to observe the halacha, and only violate it when you can't control yourself."

Obviously, this must all be done delicately. The expression "give them an inch and they'll take a mile" definitely applies to the average teenager. The approach that my rebbi took worked in that case, but there are a number of ways in which it could have gone wrong. Educators must proceed with caution.

Application #3: The Uncontrollable Yetzer

The last application of kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach relates to a topic I've written about before. Years ago I wrote a blog post about Chazal's advice for someone who is overcome with an irresistible urge to violate halacha. Under certain circumstances, Chazal would instruct such a person to "go to a place where they don’t recognize him, put on black clothes and cover himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya (public desecration of God's Name)." See what I wrote for a full analysis, which includes important details and qualifications. For our purposes, I'll quote an excerpt from that post which pertains to the topic at hand:

There are so many Jews who have an "all or nothing" attitude when it comes to halachic observance. This is ridiculous. From a philosophical, halachic, and metaphysical standpoint, Torah is an "all or nothing" system. You can't pick and choose which halachos to keep. At the same time, realistically speaking, not every person is able to keep every halacha in every case. But the Torah has advice even for these people. The Torah doesn't just say, "To hell with you. Do whatever you want. See if I care."

This is highlighted very clearly in [Chazal's] teaching. [They are] essentially telling this person: "I understand. You can't control yourself in this case. Your own observance of this halacha will be compromised. But there is still the consideration of chillul shem shamayim, and you should at least retain that consideration as a priority."

Although Chazal identify chilul ha'Shem - not kedushah - as the governing principle, it is still a good illustration of the manner in which kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach should be applied.

Concluding Thoughts

I don't think what I've written about here contains anything new. It is simply a particular application of the principles discussed by the Ramban in his commentary on kedoshim tihiyu. Still, I think that by coining the phrase "kadesh atzmecha b'assur lach," this principle will become easier to think about, to discuss, and to apply in practice. 

[1] Ha! You probably thought that this footnote would define what "angels" are, didn't you? I'm afraid that question is beyond the scope of this blog post. 
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 19:2

Mishlei 11:1 - How to Neutralize the Yetzer ha'Ra

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Artwork: Counterbalance, by Joseph Meehan

Mishlei 11:1 - How to Neutralize the Yetzer ha'Ra

משלי יא:א

מֹאזְנֵי מִרְמָה תּוֹעֲבַת יְיָ, וְאֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה רְצוֹנוֹ:

Mishlei 11:1

Deceitful scales are an abomination to Hashem, but a perfect weight is His desire.

The questions on this pasuk are:

(1) What are "deceitful scales" and "a perfect weight"? Factually, what are we talking about here? 

(2) What is the meaning of the phrases "abomination to Hashem" and "His desire"? "Abomination of Hashem" is a loaded term, and is used to describe a wide variety of actions throughout Tanach. "Hashem's desire" is vague. And while we're at it, why does Mishlei characterize the two halves of the pasuk in terms of Hashem at all? What does this add?

(3) What makes "deceitful scales" an "abomination to Hashem"? Why is "a perfect weight" considered to be "His desire"? Essentially, this is asking, "What is the pasuk teaching us?"

[This is a difficult one. I recommend thinking about it before reading my explanation.]

If memory serves me correctly, I heard this explanation from one of my rabbeim. Here is my four-sentence summary:

“Deceitful scales” refers to scales which are falsely calibrated to earn illicit profit by clandestinely skimming money from the buyer. This pasuk refers not to the prohibition against using deceitful skills, but the separate prohibition of owning deceitful scales, as it is stated, “You shall not have in your pouch a weight and a weight etc. for anyone who does this is an abomination to Hashem” (Devarim 25:16). Shlomo ha’Melech reiterated this prohibition in Mishlei in order to highlight the underlying principle of decision-making to be gained therefrom, namely, that the time to do battle with the yetzer ha’ra (evil inclination) is not in the heat of the moment, but far in advance – before the temptation is even awakened. Although it might be possible to overcome the temptation in the moment through sheer will-power, chances are that this will be a losing battle.

There are many approaches out there for dealing with the yezter ha'ra, some of which attempt to confront the yeter ha'ra head on. According to Mishlei, this approach is rarely successful. The emotions are too overwhelming. If a person says, "I don't need to get rid of my unbalanced scales. I'll just resist the temptation to use them if the urge ever arises," then that person is just setting himself or herself up for failure. You can't count on winning that battle.

Inherent in the method of Mishlei is the idea that - as cliche as it sounds - the best defense against the yetzer ha'ra is a good offense. Those who strategically prepare themselves adequately ahead of time will be able to thwart the yetzer ha'ra before it even gets going "Do not approach the path of the wicked, and do not walk in the way of evildoers. Reject it; do not pass on it; veer away from it and pass on" (Mishlei 4:14-15).

Now, perhaps you'll have noticed that this explanation doesn't answer Question #2. That is true, and that is fine. I've mentioned in previous Mishlei posts that there are "major questions" and "minor questions," and that the majority of the meforshim (with the exception of the Malbim) focus on getting the main idea of the pasuk and don't always concern themselves with the details. The difficulty lies in knowing what is a detail and what is an essential part of the main idea.

When it comes to our pasuk we must ask: is "abomination of Hashem" a technical term which must be defined in order to access the main idea, or is it merely a poetic, emotionally charged term for describing something as "bad" in the eyes of Hashem? Undoubtedly, the meforshim will disagree on questions like this, and the student of Mishlei has no choice but to consider both views and then follow his or her intuition.

In this case, my rebbi - whose idea this is - didn't delve into the meaning of the terms "abomination" or "desire." That's fine. If you can come up with an answer to Question #2 which brings out a subtlety in this idea, or opens the door to a new idea, then that's fine as well.

Either way, we've come away from this pasuk with a clear, practical idea - which is why Shlomo ha'Melech wrote Mishlei in the first place.

There's one last methodology point I'd like to mention, even though it doesn't necessarily have anything to do with the idea of the pasuk. Rabbeinu Yonah, in his commentary on this pasuk, writes:

Deceitful scales are an abomination of Hashem. This is explicitly stated in the Torah, as it is said: "You shall not have in your pocket a stone and a stone etc." (Devarim 25:13), "for all who do this are an abomination of Hashem" (ibid. 25:16). [Therefore,] you need to seek out a reason why Shlomo (peace be upon him) found it necessary to rewrite this without adding any explanation or clarification of meaning.

One of the common mistakes that new Mishlei students make is to offer "explanations" of the pasuk which amount to little more than affirming that "the Torah says this is bad" or "the Torah says this is good." Rabbeinu Yonah confirms what logic itself tells us, namely, that Shlomo ha'Melech isn't going to waste his time merely repeating what the Torah already told us. And if he seems to be repeating the Torah verbatim or near-verbatim, like he does here, then our task is to figure out what he is adding by reiterating the Torah's statement in Mishlei. 

Am I Qualified to Write this Blog?

I have tried to cut down on the number of "personal" posts I write here, compared to the old blog. Nevertheless, I have found that "learning" and "my relationship with learning" are so inextricably bound together in my mind that I can't help but write posts on the latter. This is one of those posts.

Artwork: Reckless Scholar, by Steve Prescott

Am I Qualified to Write this Blog?

“Not everything that is thought should be said, not everything that is said should be written, and not everything that is written should be published.” 

I have seen this quotation attributed to Rav Chaim Soloveitchik, Rav Yisrael Salanter, Rav Menachem Mendel of Kotzk, and possibly others. But the last time I heard this was a couple of years ago, when someone gave me some unsolicited advice which basically amounted to: "you shouldn't be blogging." 

This fellow went on to explain that Briskers (read: "such as ourselves") were known for being extremely reluctant to commit any of their Torah to writing, and when they did, they only published it after much deliberation and countless revisions. Based on this, he then went on to chastise me for my prolific blogging and suggested that I only publish something after extensive and complete analysis, and thorough review (preferably by my peers), until I reach the point where I am absolutely certain about what I am writing. He certainly would not approve of my summer plan of publishing one blog post every weekday. 

It is at times like these that I question whether or not I should be blogging altogether. After all, I can't exactly say that this guy was wrong about any of his points. Am I too quick to write and publish? Should I really be "thinking out loud" in writing, or should I keep my ideas to myself until they are fully developed and refined? Am I really qualified to be writing on Torah topics? Maybe I should stop ...

But whenever I have moments of self-doubt regarding my decision to write, I recall the words of Rabbeinu Bachya ibn Paquda. In his introduction to Chovos ha'Levavos (Duties of the Heart) Rabbeinu Bachya recounts the train of thought which led him to write this book. After stating all the reasons why he should write the book, he tells us why he almost didn't write the book:

But when I thought of proceeding to carry out my decision to write this book, I saw that a man like myself is not fit to compose a work like this. I estimated that my ability was insufficient to properly divide its parts, for subject was too daunting in my eyes, my knowledge too inadequate, and my intellect too weak to grasp the concepts. Furthermore, I am not an expert in the subtleties of the Arabic language which it would need to be in, due to this being the easiest language for most of my contemporaries to grasp. I feared that I would be toiling excessively at a task and that I would thus be exceeding the proper bounds [of my own limitations]. I therefore, told my soul to retract the thought and to draw back from what it had resolved on. 

Rabbeinu Bachya deemed himself to be inadequate on multiple levels. He felt he was intellectually unqualified, that the subject matter was too vast and daunting, and that he lacked the proper skills as a writer. He worried that his efforts would be misplaced, and that he would be toiling in vain.

These doubts resonate with me as well. Although I do not share Rabbeinu Bachya's hesitation about writing in the native language of my country of residence, I definitely feel under-qualified as an authority on Torah. When I compare myself to my peers - and certainly my rabbeim - I cower in recognition of the paucity of my Torah knowledge and intellectual abilities. Who am I to represent Torah in a public venue? Is what I know worthy of sharing with the world? Am I doing more harm than good by expressing my thoughts and ideas in writing? 

And then I recall Rabbeinu Bachya's response to his own self-doubting:

When I then decided to relieve myself of the burden of this toilsome burden and give up my plan of composing this work, I again suspected my soul of having chosen tranquility, to dwell in the abode of laziness, in peace and quiet. I feared that perhaps this decision to abandon the project stemmed from the desire for pleasure, and that this is what had inclined me to the way of peace and tranquility, to decide to abandon this in order to sit in the company of laziness. 

I knew that many [works of] intelligence were lost due to fear, and many losses were caused by concern. I remembered the saying: "part of caution is not to be overly cautious." I told myself, if every person who ever composed a good work or who ever taught the upright and proper path had waited until all his wishes were fulfilled, no person would have ever uttered a word after the prophets, whom God had chosen as His agents and strengthened with His divine help. If every person who had wished to attain all good qualities but was unable to attain them, had abandoned whatever he could attain of them, then all human beings would be devoid of all good and lacking all excellencies. They would have been perpetually pursuing after false hopes, the paths of righteousness would have been desolate, and the abodes of kindness would have been abandoned.  

I understood that while men's souls lust greatly to attain evil ends, they are sluggish to toil in the pursuit of what is noble. They are lazy in seeking the good, and always walk in the paths of laughter and rejoicing. If a vision of lust appears to them and beckons to them, they invent falsehoods so that they may turn to it. They bolster up its arguments to make its deception seem upright, to strengthen its lies, to make firm its looseness. But when the light of truth invitingly shines before them, they make up idle pretexts to refrain from turning to it. They argue against it, declare its courses misleading and contradict its assertions, so as to make it appear inconsistent and thus have an excuse to part from it. Every man's enemy is between his own ribs, unless he has an aid from his God, a rebuker always ready for [rebuking] his soul, a powerful governor, that will harness his soul with the saddle of service, and will muzzle it with the bridle of righteousness, strike it with the stick of discipline; and when he resolves to do good, he should not delay, and if his heart entices him to a different path, he should scold it and overpower it.  

Therefore, I found myself obligated to force my soul to bear the task of composing this book, and resolved to expound its topics with whatever language or analogy would make the matters readily understandable. Among all the duties of the heart, I will only mention those which suggest themselves to me, and will not trouble to expound all of them, so that the book will not be too long. I will, however, cite among the things necessary for the clarification of each of its roots in the section allocated to it. And from God, the true Unity, may I receive aid. On Him, I place my trust and to Him I ask to teach me the right path which He desires, and which is pleasing and acceptable to Him, in word and deed, in inner and outer conduct. 

Rabbeinu Bachya realized that even if his reasons for not writing were valid, it is likely that he was just rationalizing his laziness and his pleasure-seeking. Despite his inadequacies, the work that he set out to do was extremely important, and it would be a tragedy if his abundance of caution prevented him from bringing this work to light. He recognized that if everyone with any deficiencies refrained from committing their Torah knowledge to writing, then we would be left only with the books of the prophets and nothing more. And with that, Rabbeinu Bachya threw caution to the wind (as an act of caution), trusted in God, and set himself to the task of writing the book he knew he had to write - in spite of his shortcomings.

The same is true regarding me and my blog. I am not the best writer, and I am nowhere near the most qualified Torah scholar or thinker. Nevertheless, I believe that I do have some meager Torah knowledge to offer the world, and if I refrain from writing on account of my feelings of inadequacy, this benefit will be lost. Enough people have expressed their appreciation for what I write to convince me that the good I am doing outweighs any of the harm, and as long as that remains true, I will continue to write.

If you are a reader of this blog, and have any thoughts to share on this topic, I would appreciate your input! Thank you for letting me vent my thoughts on this matter. 

Addendum

While we're here, there is one more point I'd like to make. For a while I struggled with what type of language to use in my blog, and what kind of audience to write for. Should I allow myself to use jargon and write for an advanced audience? Should I cater to those who know very little, and provide background information in detail? 

Ultimately, I settled on approach similar to the one Rabbeinu Bachya chose:

I propose to take the most direct (easiest) method of arousing, teaching, and instructing, using language clear, direct, and familiar, so that my words will be more easily understood. I will refrain from deep language, unusual terms, and the arguments in the way of "defeat" (nitzuach), which the logicians call in Arabic "Algidal", and likewise for remote inquiries which cannot be resolved in this work, for I only brought such arguments as are satisfactory and convincing according to the methods proper to the science of theology.

Likewise, I have decided to write in the plainest, clearest, and most direct manner possible for a lay audience, but on a range of topics that spans many different audiences. Some of my posts are on basic points and are geared towards beginners. Others are for the more enfranchised members of the Torah community. And some posts I write primarily for myself, because the ideas are of interest to me and I wish to clarify them by expressing them in writing. 

I hope that my decision to write in this manner has enabled me to reach the broadest audience possible, but to make my readers feel that I my blog posts are addressed to someone like them. 

How to Deal with an Uncontrollable Yetzer

Originally posted in July 2013.

Artwork: Lose Calm, by Justin A. Engle

How to Deal with an Uncontrollable Yetzer

Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

One of the most astounding Gemaras can be found in Kiddushin 40a:

Rebbi Elai ha'Zaken said: "If a person sees that his yetzer (inclination) is overpowering him, he should go to a place where they don’t recognize him, put on black clothes and cover himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya (public desecration of God's Name)."

[The Gemara asks:] Is this true? Wasn't it taught in a Braisa: “If a person does not have mercy on the glory of his Creator, he’d be better off not being born”? To whom does this refer? Rabbah says: "to a person who stares at a rainbow." Rav Yosef says: "to a person who transgresses in private." [According to Rav Yosef, this Braisa contradicts Elai’s statement!]

This is not a contradiction: [the Braisa refers to a situation] in which it is possible for him to control his yetzer, whereas [Elai’s statement refers to a situation] in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer.

The same statement of Elai ha'Zaken can be found in Chagigah 16a:

[As] Rebbi Yitzchak said: "If a person transgresses in private, it is as if he trips the legs of the shechinah, as it is stated, 'Thus said Hashem: The heavens are My throne and the earth is My footstool' (Yeshaya 66:1)." 

Is this true? Didn't Rebbi Elai ha'Zaken say: "If a person sees that his yetzer is overpowering him, he should go to a place where they don't recognize him, put on black clothes and wrap himself in black, and do what his heart desires, and not cause a chillul shem shamayim b'farhesya"?

This is not a contradiction: [Rebbi Yitzchak's statement referred to a situation] in which it is possible for him to control his yetzer, whereas [Elai's statement refers to a situation] in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer. 

There is one major problem with Elai ha'Zaken's statement: How can he encourage someone to intentionally sin?

Understanding Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

The Rishonim address this question in their interpretations of the Gemara. The most conservative approach is that of Rabbeinu Chananel, which is cited by the Baalei Tosafos (Chagigah 16a d"h v'yaaseh mah she'libo chafetz) as follows:

God forbid that [Elai ha'Zaken] would permit a person to commit an aveirah (transgression)! Rather, this is what he is saying: he should don black clothes and go to another place, since the wearing of black clothes and lodging [in different locations] will break his heart, and he will not come to transgress, and from that point and on he can do what his heart desires, for [at this point] his yetzer will certainly not overpower him!

The version of Rabbeinu Chananel printed in our version of the Gemara is quite different:

God forbid that Elai ha'Zaken permitted the transgression of any aveirah at all! Rather, this is what he said: If a person sees that his yetzer is overpowering him with regards to eating, drinking, and partying, and he fears that he will become drunk and come to transgress, [Elai] permitted him to go to another location and to dress in black - all in order to break his yetzer, since the heart of a traveler is broken ... Once he does this, his heart will be broken and he will automatically refrain [from sinning]. But to transgress an aveirah, or even to drink wine amid music which brings one to simchah - this is prohibited! And all the more so to do what is worse than this. All of this (i.e. Elai's advice) only applies to a situation in which he isn't able to control his yetzer ... and only where there is no aveirah.

In spite of these differences, both versions of Rabbeinu Chananel's opinion reflect his view that (a) Elai ha'Zaken was not talking about about doing an aveirah, and (b) he intended his advice to be deterrent, rather than permissive.

The Baalei Tosafos (ibid.) maintain that Rabbeinu Chananel's reading is forced and incorrect. They interpret the Gemara in the most straightforward manner possible:

"and do what his heart desires" completely, which implies that it is better for a person to carry out his desires in private than in public - not like Rabbeinu Chananel. 

Rashi's view (Kiddushin 40a d"h yilbash shchorim) is somewhat of a hybrid of the two interpretations. He writes:

"he should don black clothes" so that he doesn't view himself with dignity - perhaps this will cause his heart to become softened; furthermore, if he does sin, people won't pay attention to him since he will not appear distinguished in their eyes; therefore, he should wear black. 

In his comments on the Gemara in Chagigah, he simply writes:

"in which it is not possible for him to control his yetzer" it is better for him [to sin] in private than in public. 

In other words, Rashi learns that Elai's advice was intended as both a deterrent and as a form of damage control, in the event that the deterrent fails. Like Rabbeinu Chananel, Rashi learns that wearing black and going to a different location is likely to subdue the person's inclination, causing him to lose his resolve to sin. Like Tosafos, and unlike Rabbeinu Chananel, Rashi maintains that Elai is talking about a case involving a temptation to do an actual aveirah, and is recommending that the sinner opt for the lesser of two evils.

Implications of Elai ha'Zaken's Statement

This Gemara has some eye-opening implications, which I'd like to point out in a concise form:

Implication #1: Chazal held that some urges cannot be controlled.

We see from this Gemara that there are two states of hisgabrus ha'yetzer (being overpowered by one's inclination): one in which the person can control himself, and another in which he can't. This goes against the opinion of the many frum Jews out there who believe that we all have the ability to control our yetzer ha'ra in every situation, or that God wouldn't give you a desire that you can't control. Elai ha'Zaken would beg to differ.

Implication #2: Not every "overpowering urge" is actually uncontrollable.

We are expected to be able to tell the difference between the two states of hisgabrus ha'yetzer. There are many people who minimize or ignore this distinction, especially the Jews who are born and raised in American-galus. They point to people who are challenged by their instinctual urges, saying, "What do you expect these people to do? They can't help themselves!" Elai ha'Zaken would disagree: just because a person is overpowered by his yetzer doesn't necessarily mean that he can't control himself. It is entirely possible to be faced with an overwhelming urge, and to resist its demands. Addicts who are in recovery manage to do this every day.

Implication #3: A person who is overcome by an uncontrollable urge still has free will.

To my mind, the most amazing implication of Elai ha'Zaken's statement is this: even when a person finds himself in the grip of an uncontrollable yetzer, and he is definitely going to sin, the Torah still expects him to be able to exercise enough self-control to travel to a different location and put on black clothing before he indulges. In other words, "uncontrollable" just refers to the fact the need to act on one's urge; he is still expected to be able to control how he acts on it. This is the premise of Elai ha'Zaken's statement.

Implication #4: Chazal had a realistic view of the challenges of the yetzer.

Last, and perhaps most importantly, Chazal were realistic! They know that "There is no man on earth who is a tzadik who does [only] good and does not sin" (Koheles 7:20). We are human beings. We are not perfect, and we can't always live up to the ideal. Some of us will consider this point to be obvious, but, as we mentioned before, there are those who claim that the Torah doesn't make any demands of a person which he can't handle. Elai ha'Zaken definitely would not agree. 

Implication #5: The Torah still has advice for those who are going to transgress its laws

Chazal use the term "lifnim mi'shuras ha'din" (a.k.a. "beyond the letter of the law") to describe actions which go beyond the demands of the halacha, and are in line with the Torah's ultimate objectives. The term "shuras ha'din" (a.k.a. "the letter of the law") refers to the minimal requirements of halacha. 

I'd like to coin a new term: "me'achorei shuras ha'din" ("behind the letter of the law"). This refers to a person who, for whatever reason, must violate halacha, but wishes to do so in accordance with the Torah's principles to the greatest extent possible. This category is a very important one to keep in mind, especially when dealing with individuals who (for whatever reason) feel they must compromise the observance of halacha. 

There are so many Jews who have an "all or nothing" attitude when it comes to halachic observance. This is ridiculous. Don't get me wrong: from a philosophical, halachic, and metaphysical standpoint, Torah is an "all or nothing" system. You can't pick and choose which halachos to keep. At the same time, realistically speaking, not every person is able to keep every halacha in every case. But the Torah has advice even for these people. The Torah doesn't just say, "To hell with you. Do whatever you want. See if I care." 

This is highlighted very clearly in Elai ha'Zaken's teaching. He is essentially telling this person: "I understand. You can't control yourself in this case. Your own observance of this halacha will be compromised. But there is still the consideration of chillul shem shamayim, and you should at least retain that consideration as a priority." 

I once taught a group of "rebellious teenage boys" at a Modern Orthodox Jewish high school. They refused to daven, and had done so for years. I asked my rebbi what I should do. My rebbi asked me if I was sure that they weren't going to daven, and I answered in the affirmative. He then asked, "What if you told them just to say the Shema and daven shemoneh esrei - could you get them to do that?" I told him that I think I have a way. Guess what? It worked! For the rest of the year (at least), they said shema and davened shemoneh esrei every day. 

Some would look at this and say, "How dare you deviate from Chazal's prescribed tefilos! You have no right!" But to view it this way would be to miss the point entirely. There were two options here: continue to face the problem of these boys not davening at all, or at least get them to fulfill their de'oraisa obligations. To choose the former over the latter is to mix up one's priorities. That was my rebbi's cheshbone (calculation), and I agree with him. I believe Elai ha'Zaken's would also approve. 

Disclaimers

Needless to say, this Gemara is not a halachic matir (license) for a person to indulge whenever he wants. I wouldn't even consider this to be a matir, even according to Tosafos, since it is meta-halachic, rather than halachic. In other words, the Gemara isn't saying, "It is mutar (permissible) for such a person to go and fulfill his heart's desire." Rather, the Gemara is saying, "It is definitely assur (prohibited) for a person to go and fulfill his heart's desire, but in this case, that is what he should do in order to minimize chilul shem shamayim."

Moreover, the Gemara is clearly talking about an isolated instance of being overpowered by his yetzer. If a person finds himself scheduling regular "yetzer ha'ra indulgence" weekends, then I'd question whether such a person is actually "overcome by an uncontrollable yetzer" or whether he's just faking himself out.

I've seen some people mistakenly claim that this Gemara is talking about a case of oneis (i.e. being compelled against one's will to transgress halacha). I don't think that's the case. According to Tosafos, the person that Elai ha'Zaken is talking about is still committing an aveirah b'meizid (intentionally), and the aveirah still "counts" and he still needs to do teshuvah. This isn't a "freebie." 

Obviously, if a person found himself in a situation of an uncontrollable yetzer and decided to follow Elai ha'Zaken's advice, he should do so in a practical, cautious, intelligent way - unlike so many public figures. This goes hand in hand with the "you still have free will" point: just because you can't control yourself with regards to one instinctual urge doesn't mean you should throw caution to the wind and behave like a Mishleic fool. 

I'm sure there's a lot more to say about this Gemara. Although I am interested in your questions, insights, and critiques on all of my posts, I am particularly interested in what you have to say about this Gemara.

The Perfect Piña Colada (Doesn't Exist)

Originally posted in September 2009

The Experience

We recently came back from a trip to Hawaii. It was a short trip, but I managed to get in some solid relaxation time on the beach. On one particularly beautiful day I saw people walking around sipping piña coladas from hollowed out pineapple shells, like the one in this picture. It was such a hot and sunny day and those piña coladas looked so cool and refreshing that I decided to buy one for myself. 

I went over to the bar and asked how much a piña colada costs. The bartender responded, "$13". My first reaction was "!!!" but then I told myself, "What the heck. I'm on vacation," and placed my order. He handed me my cocktail and I eagerly went back to my beach chair to enjoy it. 

It was the perfect piña colada ... for about 30 seconds. Then reality kicked in. 

First of all, the thing was massive. Technically speaking I could hold it in one hand, but it was so big and unwieldy that I was afraid I would drop it, so I held it with both hands instead. This severely compromised my bodily position, making it difficulty to recline in my beach chair and drink at the same time. I was forced to hunch forward in my chair while holding the pineapple in both hands. So much for the drinking-while-luxuriating.

Shortly thereafter I began to get annoyed by the freezing temperature of the shell. You see, it would be inefficient to hollow out a fresh pineapple on the spot for every customer, so instead, all of the pineapple shells are hollowed out ahead of time and then frozen until an order is placed. When I first got my piña colada, the pineapple shell was actually encrusted with ice. This made my grip even harder to tolerate.

Then the pineapple started to thaw. If I were drinking from an ordinary glass, I would just get a little bit of condensation-water on my hands, which wouldn't be a big deal, but this was not an ordinary glass; it was a natural fruit co-opted for an unnatural purpose. As the shell thawed, the pineapple juice began dripping onto my hands. That alone wouldn't have been so bad, but as it continued to thaw, the juice ran down my arms, reaching my elbows and quickly drying into a sticky residue.

That wasn't the only ill effect of the melting fruit. As I continued to sip the piña colada, I started to detect the taste of old, freezer-burned pineapple. Apparently, these fruits were not frozen that morning, but were prepared days or weeks in advance. I suddenly realized that the thawing pineapple put me on a clock: the slower I drank, the more my piña colada would be polluted by freezer-taste, but the faster I drank, the less I would enjoy it. It was a lose-lose situation.

Then there was the act of drinking, itself. If I were drinking from an ordinary glass, a straw would have facilitated drinking, but this was not an ordinary glass. The bottom of the hollowed-out pineapple shell was uneven and chunky with shredded pineapple flesh. As I got towards the bottom of my drink, my straw started to get clogged by strands of pineapple, making it necessary for me to periodically cleanse my straw by forcefully and repeatedly expelling air. This became a task in and of itself: to maximize the liquid intake and minimize the pineapple blockage in each sip. Eventually, I realized that I was so caught up in the tedium of this chore that I wasn't even enjoying my drink anymore; I become so preoccupied with the means of drinking that the end became meaningless.

Finally, after resigning myself to the fact that it wasn't worth it to try to get the rest of the liquid, I decided that I was done. But could I then sit back in my chair and resume my relaxation? No sir. My hands and arms were covered with sticky pineapple juice, remember? I had to go and find water to wash them off. As I got and tossed the emptied shell into the trash, I kept on asking myself, "Was this worth $13?"

The Insight

Later on that day, I remembered the piña colada ordeal and decided to reflect on it to see what I could learn from the experience. I recalled the Rambam's definition of imagination (koach ha'dimayon or "the imaginative faculty") as stated in the first chapter of Shemoneh Perakim: 

The imagination encompasses the capacity to retain impressions of sensory experiences when they have vanished from the senses involved, and to combine some and separate others. It is the capacity that enables a person to combine certain experiences he has had along with others he never had nor ever could grasp - for example, to imagine an iron ship sailing [translator's note: sailing, not flying!] in the air, or an individual whose head is in the heavens while his feet are on the ground, or an animal with a thousand eyes, as well as many other such impossible things that are remembered when the imagination combines things and produces a fantasy.

Rabbi Yoni Sacks once compared the imaginative faculty to computer imaging software, like Adobe Photoshop. Photoshop allows you to take an image and manipulate it at will. You can turn it this way and that. You can crop the image, blocking out the parts you don't want to see. You can enlarge one part and make the image sharper while diminishing and blurring another part. You can even import other images from your memory and combine those images with this one to produce new creations. But unlike the images edited on Photoshop, which we know to be false, the images produced by our imaginative faculty can seem very real - so real, that we often mistake them for reality itself.

My experience with the piña colada - well, I should say, my fantasy of the piña colada prior to the actual experience - is a perfect example of the imaginative faculty in action. Rewind to beginning of the story. There I was, happily relaxing in the sun, when I saw people drinking piña coladas out of pineapple shells. These sense impressions were recorded and preserved in my memory as raw material for my imaginative faculty, which then proceeded to select only those images which I found pleasing, ignoring the unpleasant details. My imagination conjured up a tantalizing fantasy, in which I was the one relaxing and sipping my piña colada - an experience which, in my fantasy-world, only enhanced my relaxation without adding any pain or conflict.

But this fantasy was just that: a fantasy - a nonexistent product of the imagination. Had I subjected this fantasy (or the initial sensory data) to the light of reason, I could have easily detected the inevitable, unpleasant aspects of purchasing the piña colada. I could have foreseen the consequences of the decision, weighed them against the pleasure to be gained, and made an informed, reality-based decision. [I'm not saying that the decision to buy the piña colada was intrinsically bad. I might have even concluded that the piña colada would have been worth it, but I would have at least known what I was getting myself into: that in paying $13 for a tasty drink, I was also buying the experience of cold fingers, sticky hands, a frustrating straw, and a time-limit on my enjoyment.]

The Principle

What is true for piña coladas is true for all pleasures. Human beings are driven to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. The Rishonim refer to the source of this drive as the koach ha'misorer ("the emotive faculty) or the koach ha'misaveh ("the appetitive faculty"). If the appetitive faculty only drove us to seek real pleasures, that would be difficult enough to contend with. Unfortunately, most of the pleasures we seek are not really existing experiences, but fantasies - figments of our imagination. Not only do these fantasies greatly exaggerate the amount of pleasure to be gained, but they gloss over all of the painful details and harmful consequences and present the imagined experience as flawless, as my piña colada fantasy illustrates.

At the same time, we mustn't forget that the imaginative faculty is not intrinsically bad, and that without our imagination, the pursuit of human perfection would be impossible. The imaginative faculty is what allows us to recall sensory data which we can analyze in order to gain knowledge and understanding. Without the imaginative faculty, learning would be impossible; the rational faculty would have nothing to work with. Without the imaginative faculty I would not have been able to learn anything from the piña colada episode. I would have had the experience and immediately forgotten it. The same imaginative faculty which produced the fantasies that led me away from reality also functioned as a tool used by my mind to gain insight into reality.

The Ralbag summarizes all of these points in his introduction to the story of Gan Eden:

It has already been explained in On the Soul (3:7) that the imaginative faculty and the emotive faculty are the causes of motion in animals, be it moving towards an object or away from it. This occurs when the imaginative faculty generates a certain image of a perceptible thing, which causes the appetitive faculty to move the animal towards this image or to flee from it. Since it is in this manner that a person can be drawn after the physical pleasures, which remove him from his proper course of human development, the appetitive faculty is the yetzer ha’ra ("evil inclination"), and the imaginative faculty is its guide. It is therefore clear that the imaginative faculty can function in two separate frameworks: either as an instrument utilized in man’s development, or as an instrument which removes him from his path of proper development.

Sforno (Bereishis 3:1), citing a pithy allegory of the Sages, explains this idea in reference to the nachash (snake) in Gan Eden: 

"The Satan, the yetzer ha'ra, [and the malach ha'maves] are one and the same" (Bava Basra 16a) ... The yetzer ha'ra which causes one to sin is called "nachash," since it resembles a snake, which yields minimal benefit, causes great harm, and is almost completely unseen. The Sages said that Samael rides on top of it (Pirkei de'Rebbi Eliezer 12). [In other words,] the appetitive faculty causes one to sin by means of the imaginative faculty, which incites it with fantasies of physical pleasures, causing one to deviate from the path of perfection intended by God, Blessed is He. The appetitive faculty, along with the fantasies of physical pleasures which incite it, commands the bodily powers and causes them to stray from the objective and from the will of God, Blessed is He, unless the rational faculty stands firm against it and opposes it. Accordingly, the Sages say, "The eyes and the heart are the agents of sin" (Talmud Yerushalmi, Berachos 1:8). Concerning this, the Torah warns us, "And you shall not stray after your hearts and after your eyes" (Bamidbar 15:39).

The Sages refer to the imaginative faculty as "Samael" (suma + El) - that which blinds us to God's reality, or deceives us into believing that God is blind. The snake-like appetitive faculty, or yetzer ha'ra, is allegorically described as a nachash. Samael rides on top of the nachash and steers it in its pleasure-seeking with alluring fantasies. Together, they cause us to sin. The internal forces which moved me to seek out that piña colada are the same forces which cause all sin.

So in the end, considering all of the insight I gained, was the piña colada worth the $13? You bet. Every cent, and infinitely more.