Showing posts with label Pshat. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pshat. Show all posts

Friday, December 16, 2022

Vayeishev: Should this Rashi be Taught to Children?

The Torah content for the month of Kislev has been sponsored by Serena and Paul Koppel, who want to be makir tov and express gratitude.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "post-impressionist painting of young Biblical Joseph being forgotten in prison by the king's steward"



Vayeishev: Should this Rashi be Taught to Children?

The final episode in Parashas Vayeishev opens with Yosef incarcerated in Potiphar’s dungeon. After interpreting the dream of the sar ha’mashkim (chief cupbearer), Yosef makes a request: “But if you would remember me when things go well for you, please do me a favor and make mention of me to Paroh and take me out of this house. For indeed, I was stolen from the land of the Hebrews, and here, too, I did not do anything that they should have put me into the pit.” (Bereishis 40:14-15). The parashah concludes on a somber note: “And the Sar ha’Mashkim did not remember Yosef; he forgot him” (ibid. 40:23).

Ask any child educated in the Jewish day school system “Why was Yosef forgotten?” and they’ll likely answer: “as a punishment for trusting in the sar ha’mashkim instead of Hashem.” This is Rashi’s (ibid.) explanation:

Because Yosef placed his [trust] in [the sar ha’mashkim] to recall him, it became necessary for him to be imprisoned for two more years, as it is stated: “Praiseworthy is the man who has placed his trust in Hashem, and did not turn to the haughty” (Tehilim 40:5) – that is, he shouldn’t have trusted in Egypt, who is called “haughty” (Yeshayahu 30:7).

Ralbag takes the opposite approach. He highlights this in his list of toalos (lessons) on the parashah (40:14):

The seventh lesson [we learn from this section] is in middos (character traits), namely, that it is proper for a person to strive with all his might to save himself from the bad [situation] in which he finds himself, using all the means at his disposal that might help him, and he should not rely on a miracle, even if he is under Hashem’s providence to a high degree. You see that despite the wondrous extent of Hashem’s providence towards Yosef, he [nevertheless] entreated the sar ha’mashkim to recall him to Paroh to take him out of the dungeon.

Why, then, was the righteous Yosef forced to languish in prison for two additional years? Ralbag answers (ibid. 41:39-45, Toalos, after the 8th toeles), explicitly doubling down on his rejection of Rashi’s approach:

It should be clear that Yosef did not place his trust in human beings (lit. “make flesh his strength,” cf. Yirmiyahu 17:5) when he spoke to the sar ha’mashkim; he merely saw that mentioning him to Paroh would bring about good, as it ultimately did. But Hashem caused the sar ha’mashkim to not remember him until the time arrived that would be most beneficial to Yosef. Thus, you will find that all the misfortunes that befell [Yosef] from the time he was sold – all of them were a means of bringing him into power, and this is clear with even the most superficial analysis.

Neither Rashi nor Ralbag were the originators of the interpretations they cite in their commentaries. Both can be found in the midrashic literature (Bereishis Rabbah 89:3). First the Sages present the view that Yosef’s sentence was increased by two years because he asked the sar ha’mashkim to recall him, in violation of “Praiseworthy is the man who has placed in trust in Hashem.” A few sentences later, the Sages offer an alternative explanation: “Why were two years added to his imprisonment? So that Paroh would dream a dream, through which [Yosef] would become great.” Rashi prefers the first explanation, whereas Ralbag opts for the second.

Of the two views, Rashi’s is the most difficult. We see numerous examples in Tanach of righteous individuals who had great bitachon (trust) in Hashem, but nevertheless adhered to the unanimously accepted principle of “ein somchin al ha’neis” (“we do not rely on a miracle”). Thankfully, my Rosh ha’Yeshiva wrote an essay featuring a beautifully nuanced explanation of how Yosef’s appeal to the sar ha’mashkim evinced a lack of bitachon in Hashem and why, in this case, a person who fully trusted in Hashem would have simply awaited His salvation.

The problem with Rashi, in my opinion, is not what he wrote, but how it’s presented. Odds are that the young children who are taught this Rashi as pshat (the straightforward meaning of the text) will walk away with the message that Yosef was wrong to ask for help, and that it is better to rely on a miracle than to act intelligently. I am convinced that it is better to teach Ralbag as pshat, but I’m open to hearing arguments in favor of Rashi.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Monday, November 28, 2022

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah content for the month of Kislev has been sponsored by Serena and Paul Koppel, who want to be makir tov and express gratitude.

Click here for a printer-friendly 1-page version of this article, and click here for the podcast version.


Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "impressionist painting of a woman's beautiful and haunting green eyes"

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah introduces Leah by way of comparison to her sister: "Lavan had two daughters: the name of the older was Leah and the name of the younger was Rachel. And the eyes of Leah were rakos (lit. soft), but Rachel was beautiful of form and beautiful of appearance” (Bereishis 29:17-18). The two basic questions are: What does “rakos” mean, and why does the Torah tell us this?

The commentators here can be divided into three camps: (1) “minimalist pshat” commentators who answer the first question but not the second, (2) “maximalist pshat” commentators, who extrapolate answers to the second question from their answer to the first question, (3) “midrashic” commentators who use the text as a springboard to fill in other details about Leah’s character and backstory. Here is a summary of all the explanations I’ve read.

“Minimalist pshat” explanations include: her eyes were weak (Ibn Ezra); Leah’s eyes were physically beautiful (Onkelos); they were beautiful because they radiated joy (R’ Yosef Kara); she had beautiful pale eyes, and the rest of her was ALSO beautiful (Rashbam); her eyes were her ONLY beautiful feature (R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam); she was beautiful in all respects EXCEPT for her eyes because she wept frequently (Radak); Leah wasn’t as beautiful as Rachel, but the Torah conveys this euphemistically by praising her beautiful eyes (R’ Hirsch).

“Maximalist pshat” explanations include: Leah’s eyes were beautiful but sensitive to the wind, making her unfit for shepherding (Bechor Shor); similarly, her eyes were overly sensitive to the sun (Ramban); Leah’s eyes were runny because of some disease which Yaakov was concerned might affect her progeny (Ralbag); likewise, the condition of Leah’s eyes made Yaakov think she would go blind (Abravanel); Leah’s eyes indicated that she was emotionally sensitive – not in a bad way, but in a way that made Yaakov more attracted to Rachel (Shadal).

The midrashic interpretation of Chazal is paraphrased by Rashi: “[Leah's eyes were] tender because she cried, thinking that she was destined for the lot of Eisav, because everyone used to say: ‘Rivkah has two sons and Lavan has two daughters: the elder [will marry] the elder, and the younger the younger.’” Chazal tell us that Leah would cry and pray, saying: “May it be [God’s] will that I not fall into the lot of that evildoer” (Bereishis Rabbah 70:15) and that she cried out in prayer “until her eyelashes fell out” (Bava Basra 123a).

Of the three approaches, the second and third are likely to find more favor in people’s eyes than the first. The maximalist pashtanim answer both questions by making reasonable inferences from the text. The midrashic commentators take homiletical liberties to provide a behind-the-scenes glimpse into Leah’s thoughts and feelings, reinforcing her righteous character. Both approaches deepen our understanding of the story in satisfactory ways.

But what are we to make of the “minimalist pshat” approaches? They seem to raise more problems than they solve. Indeed, ibn Kaspi – a staunch member of the minimalist camp – is led by his reading to ask a brazen question:

It should not surprise us that the Giver of the Torah didn't explain for us the reason for Leah's inferiority and Rachel's beauty, for there is no artist like our God. However, what is surprising – based on our principles, and the principles of every pious individual – is how Yaakov Avinu chose maidens [based on] beauty.

Ibn Kaspi’s commentary follows in the footsteps of R’ Yosef Kara, minimalist pashtan par excellence, who writes: “the prophetic text was written complete, with its solution and everything it needs … lacking nothing in its place [to be fully understood], and there is thus no need to bring proof from another place nor from midrash” (I Shmuel 1:17). This is the minimalist pshat method: to read the text as conservatively as possible, and unflinchingly face whatever questions may arise. This approach is difficult and treacherous, which is why it is far less popular than the other two approaches. Nevertheless, it is part of our mesorah, and should not be dismissed or undervalued.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, November 18, 2022

Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

This week's Torah content has been sponsored anonymously, in gratitude for making my Torah available and accessible to everyone. May Hashem send a refuah shleimah to Tzvi ha'Kohen ben Shoshanah Geylah.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt: "abstract oil painting of Biblical Abraham sitting on his servant's hand" 



Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

When Avraham Avinu charges Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, he begins by saying: Place now your hand under my thigh, and I will have you swear by Hashem, God of heaven and God of earth, that you not take a wife for my son from the daughters of the Canaanites” (Bereishis 24:2). Similarly, when Yaakov is about to die, he tells Yosef: “Please – if I have found favor in your eyes, please place your hand under my thigh and do kindness and truth with me – please do not bury me in Egypt” (ibid. 47:29). The question is: What is the significance of this gesture?

Rashi (ibid. 24:2), citing Chazal’s drashah (Midrash Rabbah ibid.), maintains that “place your hand under my thigh” means “grab hold of the place of my bris milah.” He explains: “one who swears an oath needs to take a mitzvah object in hand, such as a Torah scroll or tefillin, and milah was the first mitzvah for [Avraham], and came to him through pain, and was beloved to him.” According to Rashi, the conduct of Avraham and Yaakov serves as a precedent for the halachic requirement to hold a mitzvah object when making certain types of oaths (see Talmud Bavli Shavuos 38b and Rashi’s commentary there). Rashi does not qualify his comments, nor does he cite any alternative views.


The majority of other Rishonim either oppose or qualify Rashi’s interpretation. The leader of the opposition is Ibn Ezra (Bereishis 24:2) who objects to the notion that Avraham swore by milah, and then offers his own take:

[The Sages] said that [the phrase “place your hand under my thigh”] refers to milah, but if this were so, he would have sworn by his milah and not by Hashem. The more likely explanation to me is that it was customary in those days for a person to place his hand under the thigh of the person who had mastery over him, meaning: “If you are under my dominion, place your hand under my thigh,” and the master would sit on the hand, [as if the servant were] saying: “Behold! My hand is under your dominion to do your will.” This custom is still followed in India today.

Ibn Ezra’s view is cited and endorsed by a number of other Rishonim, including Rashbam (ibid.), Bechor Shor (ibid.), Radak (ibid.), Chizkuni (ibid.), Rabbeinu Bachya (ibid.), Tur (peirush ha’aroch ibid.), Ralbag (ibid.), and Ibn Kaspi (ibid.). Other major commentators highlight the difficulties with Rashi. Abravanel (ibid. question #4) rejects Rashi’s approach as “extremely improbable, for a person cannot take an oath on any mitzvah [object,] like maakeh, sukkah, or lulav, and especially not on milah, which would be disgraceful.” The Rosh (Shavuos 6:1) finds the plain reading of Chazal’s drashah to be so halachically problematic that he relegates it to a mere asmachta (textual allusion) rather than a legitimate halachic source – unlike Rashi, who takes the drashah at its halachic face value.

In sum, Rashi is the minority position among the mainstream commentators who comment on this pasuk. Even those who cite both opinions characterize Rashi’s as “the midrashic approach” and Ibn Ezra’s as “pshat.”

I do not find this to be problematic. However, there are those who find this conclusion to be deeply troublesome. A number of prominent rabbis, among them the Roshei Yeshiva of Beth Medrash Govoha (of Lakewood, NJ), have recently signed a ban on a popular edition of Chumash entitled Pshuto shel Mikra (LNN, 11/15/22). The ban alleges (among other things) that this Chumash constitutes “a stumbling block for the masses” because it presents other traditional commentaries as pshat instead of regarding Rashi as the definitive pshat.

My thoughts on this ban cannot be shared in the space of a 1-page article. Moreover, as of this morning, I have only read 24 pages of the 76-page Kuntress Vayivinu ba’Mikra which explicates the many reasons for the ban. Suffice it to say, as someone who favors the non-Rashi pshat commentators among the Rishonim, I am as disturbed by this ban as its promulgators are disturbed by the Chumash Pshuto shel Mikra. I can’t help but wonder what all the Rishonim cited above would say about this treatment of their Torah.

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If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider contributing to my Patreon at patreon.com/rabbischneeweiss. Alternatively, if you would like to make a direct contribution to the "Rabbi Schneeweiss Torah Content Fund," my Venmo is @Matt-Schneeweiss, and my Zelle and PayPal are mattschneeweiss at gmail.com. Even a small contribution goes a long way to covering the costs of my podcasts, and will provide me with the financial freedom to produce even more Torah content for you.

If you would like to sponsor a day's or a week's worth of content, or if you are interested in enlisting my services as a teacher or tutor, you can reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail.com. Thank you to my listeners for listening, thank you to my readers for reading, and thank you to my supporters for supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Be sure to check out my YouTube channel and my podcasts: "The Mishlei Podcast""The Stoic Jew" Podcast"Rambam Bekius" Podcast"Machshavah Lab" Podcast"The Tefilah Podcast"  Email me if you'd like to be added to my WhatsApp group where I share all of my content and public shiur info. 

Friday, June 12, 2020

Behaalosecha: Moshe’s Mysterious Marriage

For an response to the view of Ibn Kaspi as presented in this post, see Rabbi Yaakov Trachtman's enlightening article Moshe's Disguised Divorce - a Response to Ibn Caspi.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Autumn's Veil, by Kekai Kotaki









Behaalosecha: Moshe's Mysterious Marriage

The Question 

Parashas Behaalosecha marks the turning point in Sefer Bamidbar from the hopeful to the nopeful.[1] Bnei Yisrael are marching towards Eretz Yisrael with the Ark of Hashem in their midst, poised to bring the Redemption from Egypt to a close with the establishment of a Torah society in the land promised to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. Then tragedy strikes. A series of missteps by the nation and by individuals culminates in the sin of the spies, resulting in 40 years of wandering the Wilderness, and the death of the generation that left Egypt. 

Our parashah concludes with one such misstep: the sin of Miriam and Aharon. The sin itself is recorded in a single pair of pesukim (verses): 

Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite [2] woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. They said, “Was it only to Moshe that Hashem spoke? Didn’t He also speak with us?” and Hashem heard. (Bamidbar 12:1-2). 

What, exactly, happened here is murky, to say the least. We are told that Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe “regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married” – yet, the statement attributed to them is entirely about prophecy, as is Hashem’s focus when He subsequently reprimands them. What does this have to do with “the matter of the Kushite woman that he married”? Furthermore, how are we to understand the seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman”? What is this intended to add or explain? 

But perhaps the most basic question of all is: Who is this Kushite woman? She is not identified by name and is not mentioned anywhere else in Tanach. This is the question we will focus on. We will not aim to explain the sin of Miriam and Aharon in full. Instead, we will focus on the three methodological approaches taken by the commentators. 

A survey of the commentators reveals that there are essentially two camps. One camp maintains that the Kushite woman is Tziporah, the daughter of Yisro whom Moshe married in his youth after fleeing Egypt as a fugitive. The second camp maintains that the Kushite is some other woman, aside from Tziporah. 

Camp “Tziporah” 

According to the Tziporah camp, there are two questions which must be addressed. The first question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman”? After all, Tziporah has been mentioned by name three times prior to this incident. Why not call her by name here? The second question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman” if she was, in fact, not Kushite, but Midianite? 

Onkelos, the Aramaic translator of the Torah, often deviates from a literal translation of the Hebrew in order to address certain issues in the pshat (straightforward meaning of the verse). In this case he is bothered enough by our questions that he makes two rather radical changes. 

Original Hebrew: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. 

Onkelos’s Aramaic: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the beautiful woman that he married, for the beautiful woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned. 

Rashi, following Onkelos’s lead, answers both of our questions by explaining that “Kushite” is a euphemism for Tziporah’s beauty – either her physical beauty or the beauty of her deeds. How does “Kushite” function as a euphemism? Rashi explains: “just as the skin-color of a Kushite is universally acknowledged, so too was Tziporah’s beauty universally acknowledged.” [3] Apparently, it was deemed uncouth, immodest, or somehow inappropriate to explicitly speak about Tziporah’s beauty – hence the need for circumlocution. Rashi adds that the gematria (numerical value) of the word “Kushite” equals that of the phrase “beautiful appearance.” 

Onkelos maintains that the phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” actually means that Moshe “abandoned the beautiful woman he had married.” It is unclear whether “abandoned” means that Moshe separated from Tziporah, or whether he actually divorced her. The question is: How did Miriam know that Moshe separated from Tziporah, and why was she talking about this now? Rashi [4], citing a midrash of Chazal [5], fills us in with the backstory: 

From where did Miriam know that Moshe separated from his wife? Rebbi Nosson says: Miriam was next to Tziporah at the time when it was said to Moshe: “Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp!” (Bamidbar 11:27). Upon hearing this, Tziporah exclaimed: “Woe unto the wives of these [men] once they are needed for prophecy, for they will have to separate from their wives in the same way that my husband separated from me!” From there Miriam knew [about Tziporah’s separation from Moshe] and told it to Aharon. And if Miriam didn’t intend to degrade Moshe and was punished thus, kal va’chomer (all the more so) one who speaks in order to degrade his friend! 

There you have it: “Camp Tziporah” answers our questions by positing that “the Kushite woman” is Tziporah, by explaining “for he had married a Kushite woman” to be a veiled reference to their separation, and by filling in the back-story explaining why Moshe and Tziporah separated and why Miriam only brought this up now. 

Camp “Other Woman” 

The Rashbam is known for his pshat explanations. He rarely cites midrash and prefers to answer questions conservatively, based on the principles of Hebrew grammar and the information provided in the text. It is not surprising that he rejects Rashi’s midrashic explanation. What is surprising is that he bases his answer on an obscure “outside text” entitled Divrei ha’Yamim Shel Moshe Rabbeinu (loosely translated as The Moses Chronicles in English). 

This non-canonical text is controversial, to say the least. Those who hold by its authenticity, such as the Rashbam, treat it as a historical account of “the missing years” of Moshe’s life which are not recorded in the Torah. Those who question or reject its authenticity, such as the Ibn Ezra [6], treat it as little more than “Moshe Rabbeinu fan-fiction,” and regard it as worthless. 

Nevertheless, the Rashbam [7] cites this text to explain who Moshe married, supporting his answer with the second question we raised on the position of Camp Tziporah: 

It is written in The Chronicles of Moshe Rabbeinu that he ruled as king in Ethiopia for 40 years and married an [Ethiopian] queen but didn’t sleep with her, as it is written there – but [Miriam and Aharon] didn’t know when they spoke about [Moshe] that he didn’t sleep with her. This is the essential pshat, for if they were speaking about Tziporah, what need was there to explain “for he married a Kushite woman”? Did they not know until now that Tziporah was a Midianite? Another objection is as follows: she wasn’t Kushite! Kush was one of the suns of Cham, but Midian was one of the children of Keturah who was descended from Avraham. 

Unlike Rashi, the Rashbam does not elaborate on why Miriam saw fit to bring this up to Aharon now, nor does he explain why the subsequent dialogue focuses on prophecy rather than on Moshe’s marriage to this Ethiopian queen (whom the Torah doesn’t bother to mention). 

But there is another pshat commentator who answers our question based on the text, and he has quite a lot to say. I am speaking of R’ Yosef ibn Kaspi. Allow me to preface my citation of his commentary with a confession: the whole reason I wrote this article was as an excuse to bring up this excerpt from ibn Kaspi’s commentary. It is one of the most scathing indictments of Rashi’s midrashic approach that I have ever encountered. My jaw dropped as I read it. 

Here is a full translation of what ibn Kaspi had to say, with my own paragraph divisions: 

I am astounded by the early [commentators], who were all more perfect than I am – I who couldn’t even reach their heel. How did they always fall into their own imagination, explaining the Torah to be the opposite of what is written, whether by substituting one word for the opposite word, or adding words with the opposite meanings? 

I am referring to the well-known commentary of Onkelos, about whom the Rambam said, “Onkelos ha’Ger was a great chacham (wise man)!” From where did [Onkelos] get the idea to explain “Kushite” as “beautiful,” [two words] which are as opposite as black and white? [8]

Furthermore, where did he get the idea to add opposite words after “for he married a Kushite woman” as though it was written in the Torah that “the Kushite woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned” or “distanced himself from.” If this were the intent of the Giver of the Torah, why didn’t He write this, and why did He write its opposite? 

Furthermore, who permitted us to do this? Who gave Onkelos so much power, or the Sages of the Talmud, or the Ibn Ezra – all of whom agree on this? Why can’t we do something like this, each man doing what is upright in his own eyes, to the point where we invert, “and you shall love Hashem, your God” to say – God forbid – “you shall hate Hashem, your God,” or “the one whom Hashem loves to “the one whom He hates.” 

And if you’ll say, “The Torah was received at Sinai and transmitted to Yehoshua, who taught us [as part of the] Oral Torah that this is the explanation of this verse” – the answer is what we responded to the initial claim: Why wasn’t the matter written out as it actually was, rather than writing a word which has the opposite meaning? Is the substitution of a word for its opposite worthy of being called an “explanation”? Rather, an “explanation” is what we call something which explains the words in accordance with their meaning in some way, as [the Sages] explained, “you shall not kindle a fire,” and “you shall not eat over the blood” with deep explanations which fit into what is written, and which certainly do not reverse its meaning. Anything other than this we call “an exchange” or “a reversal” or “an erasure” or “a revision” or “an uprooting.” And this is true in every language whatsoever. [According to the approach of Onkelos et al.,] why shouldn’t we say that “Hashem took you” really means “[Hashem] abandoned [you]”? Similarly, “he and his neighbor should take [can be interpreted to mean, “he and his neighbor should leave]. What advantage is there of this over this? 

As Hashem lives, this method – which is unanimously accepted by all of the early Sages, the pillars of the world and of faith and of strength to the Torah of Moshe – is so beyond me that I cannot accept it. God forbid I should do something like this, [which would be tantamount to] completely abandoning the Torah of Moshe and believing that a New Testament was made – God forbid! 

Let us pause here to process the ibn Kaspi’s objection to the approach taken by Onkelos, Rashi, and Chazal. He vehemently objects to those commentators who “interpret” the term “Kushite” as “beautiful,” based on his premise that the two terms are opposites. He refuses to accept the notion that this explanation is “part of the Oral Torah,” and he is so dedicated to the pshat that he implicitly equates the midrashic explanation to pledging allegiance to a New Testament! To be fair, his objection is not to midrash per se, but to midrashic explanations which go against the plain meaning of the text. This will be apparent from what follows. 

After this diatribe, he offers his own explanation: 

Therefore I say that the explanation of what is written here is according to what is necessarily understood from the Hebrew language, namely, that “Kushite” means a woman from the Land of Kush, and the meaning of “because he L.K.CH. [9] a Kushite woman” is that he took her [in marriage], for this is the explanation of the root L.K.CH. as opposed to A’.Z.V. All of this [is based on] the conventional use of the language. 

Accordingly, after Moshe married Tziporah, he married a Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for a reason that he (peace be upon him) knew. One shouldn’t question the motives of his actions, for he undoubtedly did this out of wisdom. We don’t know the time period in which he married her, whether now when they were traveling or beforehand, because this hadn’t been mentioned in the Torah until this point, just as the Torah didn’t record many of the events that transpired. 

Because this wasn’t mentioned until now, then in order [that the reader] not be confused when it said “regarding the Kushite woman he married,” which we haven’t ever heard about, it said after this, “for he married a Kushite woman” – as if to say, “you should know that he married a Kushite woman, even though this hasn’t been mentioned yet, and this is what [Miriam and Aharon] were speaking about.” 

Because the reason for this additional marriage was hidden from them – perhaps Tziporah fell ill, or maybe she disobeyed him, or maybe it was some other reason we don’t know, or maybe they knew her reason, but they didn’t know [his] secret and the wisdom in this – therefore, they spoke about Moshe’s marriage to an additional wife, because one wife should have been enough for this perfected person. 

To summarize: ibn Kaspi maintains that Moshe married an ethnically Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for reasons that were unknown to Miriam and Aharon, and undisclosed to us. The seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” is intended to validate the reader’s confusion upon learning of this fact, as if to say, “yes, this is a thing Moshe did, even though the Torah didn’t mention it until now.” 

Ibn Kaspi then goes on to explain the connection between Miriam’s statement and the subsequent discussion of prophecy. Miriam and Aharon reasoned that they were on a high enough level of prophecy to be “let in” on Moshe’s reasons for his unconventional decision to take a second wife. Because they overestimated the level of their own prophecy in relation to that of their brother, Hashem rebuked them and explained just how categorically superior Moshe’s prophecy was. And as for the “secret” reasons behind Moshe’s second marriage, Hashem’s silence on the matter indicates that it was really none of their business. 

Methodological Take-aways 

We have seen three approaches taken by the commentators to these two cryptic pesukim

(1) Onkelos and Rashi opt for a midrashic explanation which neatly answers all of the questions and fills in the gaps with an elaborate narrative. The weakness of this approach is that it puts a heavy strain on a literal reading of the text. 

(2) Rashbam rejects the midrashic approach and explains the text by making recourse to an outside source. The benefit of this approach is that it supplies us with missing information. This approach is very similar to the academic method employed by modern day Bible scholars. The weakness of this approach lies in the credibility of his source. Moreover, according to the Rashbam, what did Hashem intend for the reader of Torah to make of this episode? Did He expect everyone to have read The Chronicles of Moses

(3) Ibn Kaspi also rejects the midrashic approach – not only as false, but as a perversion of God’s word and the Hebrew language. Instead, he relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the text and conservatively infers a larger narrative from the minimal information provided in the pesukim. The downside of this approach is that it completely rejects the wisdom offered in the midrashic literature. 

Each of these three approaches has its pros and cons. Students of Chumash will likely be drawn towards one approach or the other. I, myself, favor the third, but recognize the value – and sometimes, the necessity – of the other two. 

This multiplicity of approaches is part of what makes the study of Chumash such an enjoyable and rich experience. 


Footnotes:
[1] I began writing this article on two hours of sleep, and the conclusion of this first sentence was the amusing result. I was going to change it, but my friends convinced me to leave it in – perhaps as a memorial to my folly. 
[2] The word “Kushite” is traditionally translated as “Ethiopian,” but is often used to refer to people from sub-Saharan Egypt, in general. 
[3] Talmud Bavli, Moed Katan 16b 
[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 
[5] Midrash Tanchuma, Tzav 13 
[6] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Long Commentary on Sefer Shemos 4:20 
[7] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Meir (Rashbam), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 
[8] This statement will undoubtedly strike the modern reader as strange, inappropriate, or false. Others will deem it to be offensive, racist, and condemnable. Like it or not, the fact of the matter is that certain Rishonim (medieval commentators) regarded Kushites as unattractive, and maintained that the same aesthetic valuation was held by the figures in Tanach whose words and actions they aimed to decipher. Whether Miriam and Aharon actually found Kushites to be unattractive is a question for the historians and anthropologists. Our task as students of these Rishonim is to set aside our personal views in an attempt to understand what insight these commentators intended to convey through their explanations, regardless of whether or not we agree with the premises on which these explanations were based. (I would like to thank the members of the Facebook group “Orthodox Jews Against Discrimination and Racism” for reviewing this footnote to ensure that it was worded in a sensitive manner.) 
[9] Here the Ibn Kaspi actually spells out each letter of the three-letter root – presumably for snark value.

Friday, May 22, 2020

Bamidbar: The Terminal Bachelorhood of Nadav and Avihu

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Bamidbar: The Terminal Bachelorhood of Nadav and Avihu 

The census of the Leviim (Levites) begins with Aharon and his sons: 
These are the names of the sons of Aharon: the firstborn was Nadav, and Avihu, Elazar, and Itamar. These were the names of the sons of Aharon, the anointed Kohanim, whom he inaugurated to minister. Nadav and Avihu died before Hashem when they offered a strange fire before Hashem in the Wilderness of Sinai, and they had no children; Elazar and Itamar ministered during the lifetime of Aharon, their father. (Bamidbar 3:2-4). 
The question is: Why does the pasuk (verse) emphasize that Nadav and Avihu “had no children”? This information seems irrelevant in a census, the point of which is to count actual children rather than children-that-never-were. 

The pshat (straightforward) answer given by most commentators is that the first half of the pasuk preemptively explains the end of the pasuk: “Elazar and Itamar ministered during the lifetime of Aharon, their father.” If Nadav and Avihu had sons, these sons would have inherited the prestigious positions of adjunct Kohanim Gedolim [1] (high priests) from their fathers. Since they didn’t have sons, these positions passed on to their brothers, Elazar and Itamar. 

A different answer kind of answer is stated in the midrash: [2]
One who does not engage in [attempting to fulfill the mitzvah of] peru u’revu (“be fruitful and multiply”) is liable for death, as it is stated: “Nadav and Avihu died, and they did not have children” – [implying] that if they had children, they would not have died. 
This midrash is aggadic (non-legal) rather than halachic (legal), and is clearly not intended to be taken literally. According to halacha, one who does not engage in peru u’revu is not actually liable for death. Furthermore, Nadav and Avihu didn’t die because they neglected peru u’revu, but because they “offered before Hashem a strange fire that He had not commanded them” (Vayikra 10:2). This is clear from the fact that each and every time the deaths of Nadav and Avihu are mentioned in Tanach, this is reason given for their death. 

If so, the question is: What does this midrash mean when it says that if Nadav and Avihu had children, they wouldn’t have died? 

The Torah Temimah [3] offers the following explanation: 
This is to be understood in light of Taanis 4a, which says: “Yaakov Avinu didn’t die” because “his offspring are alive, and therefore, he is not considered to be dead,” and Bava Basra 116a which states: “Why does it say ‘lying down’ for David’s death but ‘death’ for Yoav? Because David left behind a son, like him, [whereas Yoav did not].” Here, too, the intent is that if [Nadav and Avihu] had sons, [these sons] would have served in their place … and if that had been the case, it wouldn’t have mentioned the deaths [of Nadav and Avihu because they would “live on” through their sons]. 
This explanation aims to connect the midrashic interpretation of our pasuk to the pshat explanation stated above. The “lives” of Nadav and Avihu were defined by their avodas Hashem (Divine service) in their position of adjunct Kohanim Gedolim. If they had sons, and their sons succeeded them in this role, then this “life” of theirs would not have ended. 

However, there is a harsher midrashic [4] take on the causal relationship between the childlessness of Nadav and Avihu and their fate: 
“and they had no children” – but if they did have children, they wouldn’t have died. Nadav and Avihu were aristocratic, [5] saying: “Our father is Kohen Gadol, our father’s brother is a king, our mother’s brother is a prince, and we are the two chiefs of the Kehunah (priesthood). Which woman is good enough for us?” and they withheld themselves and didn’t desire to marry any woman to fulfill peru u’revu. That sin caused them to die by fire. 
An even more condemnatory version of this midrash [6] elaborates on their sin: 
R’ Levi said: [Nadav and Avihu] were exceedingly aristocratic. They would say, “Which woman is good enough for us?” There were many lonely [7] women sitting and waiting for them, but they said: “Our father’s brother is a king, our father is a Kohen Gadol, our mother’s brother is a prince, and we are chiefs of the Kehunah. Which woman is good enough for us?”

Rebbi Menachma [8] said in the name of Rebbi Yehoshua bar Nechemiah: regarding [Nadav and Avihu] David said: “Fire consumed His young men, and His maidens had no marriage celebrations” (Tehilim 78:63). Why were “His young men consumed by fire”? Because “His maidens had no marriage celebrations.” 

Another [proof can be brought] from: “To Moshe He said, ‘Go up to Hashem, you and Aharon, Nadav and Avihu” (Shemos 24:1). This teaches that Moshe and Aharon would walk ahead, Nadav and Avihu would walk behind them, and all of Israel were behind them, and they (i.e. Nadav and Avihu) would say, “When will these two old men die, so that we can exert our authority over the community in their place?” 
These alternative midrashic accounts shed quite a different light on the notion that Nadav and Avihu died because “they had no children.” According to these midrashim, it wasn’t the transgression of abstaining from peru u’revu per se which made them liable. Rather, it was the aristocratic bearing which gave rise to this transgression and warranted this punishment. 

The problem is that these midrashim make Nadav and Avihu out to seem like they had some real serious problems! Are we really to believe that these sons of Aharon ha’Kohen took such petty pride in their own status and in the status of their family members? Did they really think that no woman was good enough for them, knowing full well that Moshe and Aharon each got married, despite their greatness? Most astounding of all, are we really supposed to believe that Nadav and Avihu eagerly awaited the deaths of their beloved father and their illustrious uncle so that they could seize power to lord over the community? It is quite difficult to accept this portrait of Nadav and Avihu at face value. Remember that these are the individuals whom Hashem referred to as, “My close ones” (Vayikra 10:3) [9], and who were second only to Moshe and Aharon in their proximity to the divine glory at Sinai (see Shemos 24:1,9). 

In my view, the answer is: no, Nadav and Avihu were not the pompous megalomaniacs depicted in these midrashim. Rather, I believe this is a case in which the midrashim employ the device of exaggeration in order to make a point, as Chazal [10] said: “The Torah spoke in an exaggerated language, the Prophets spoke in an exaggerated language, and the Sages spoke in an exaggerated language.” 

This stylistic device of magnifying the imperfections of tzadikim is frequently employed by the pesukim themselves in order to make it easier for us to learn from their flaws, which would otherwise be too subtle for us to appreciate. For example, the pesukim say: “Reuven went and slept with Bilhah, his father’s concubine” (Bereishis 35:22), “Samson went down to Timnath, and in Timnath he saw a woman of the daughters of the Philistines [and married her]” (Shoftim 14:1), “Shlomo built an alatar for Chemosh, the abomination of Moav, on the Mount facing Jerusalem, and for Molech, the abomination of the Children of Amon” (I Melachim 11:7). According to the traditional interpretations, none of these tzadikim committed the serious transgressions described in the pesukim. All of these narratives are exaggerations of transgressions or flaws which were much less severe, and which are blown out of proportion for rhetorical and didactic effect. And if the pesukim themselves are known to do that, then certainly the aggadic midrashim can be expected to follow suit. 

I believe that the authors of these midrashim would acknowledge that Nadav and Avihu died because they “offered before Hashem a strange fire that He had not commanded them,” as the pesukim explicitly state. Having acknowledged that, the authors of these midrashim are theorizing about the personal shortcoming which led to this severe transgression. Based on the information provided in the pesukim, the authors of these midrashim maintain that Nadav and Avihu had an underlying sense of aristocratic pride in their roles as adjunct Kohanim Gedolim, which gave them the unconscious feeling of superiority, and derived incidental gratification from the power they held. In other words, these were not open faults in their character. If they were, the Torah would have been more explicit in divulging such information which would be critical in order to understand why they died. It is quite possible that this deep-seated streak of aristocratic pride didn’t manifest itself outwardly at all. 

According to these midrashim, it was this underlying feeling of pride which led Nadav and Avihu to “make a halachic decision in the presence of Moshe, their teacher” [11] by offering the “strange fire” without being commanded. It was this unconscious aristocratic mentality that caused them to defer marriage and procreation on the pretext of not finding suitable wives. It was this idle musing about who might take over as the nation’s spiritual leaders after Moshe and Aharon died which arose in their imagination when they stood on the mountain and “saw the God of Israel” (Shemos 24:10) and which nearly prompted divine retribution, as it is stated: “against the great men of Israel He did not stretch out His hand” (Shemos 24:11). 

How are we to understand their punishment? According to the pshat, they died by fire because they brought a “strange fire,” midah kneged midah (measure for measure). But perhaps according to these midrashim one can see a different level of midah kneged midah which corresponded to their underlying flaw. They unconsciously sought to supplant Moshe and Aharon in order to claim a permanent place in the eternal pantheon of the Israelite hierarchy, and they believed they were “too good” to perpetuate the human race. As a punishment, their lives were prematurely cut short, and because of their abstention from peru u’revu, they left no offspring through whom they could “live forever” in the sense that Yaakov and David “live forever” through their progeny. 

There are two takeaway lessons for us: one in methodology and the other in human perfection. The lesson in methodology is that the authors of midrashim will expound on any textual clue, no matter how small, if there is some lesson that can be extrapolated from it, and when it looks like they’re making a mountain out of a molehill, they’re really just embellishing the presentation of their theory in order to make a subtle concept into a blatant part of the narrative. 

The lesson in human perfection is that a misplaced sense of pride is an insidious thing which can plague even the greatest of men, often on account of their genuine greatness. Like a small crack in a large dam, this pride can grow and spread imperceptibly until it’s too late, and the entire edifice comes crumbling down. 


[1] See Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 3:4, who writes that Nadav and Avihu were anomalous among Kohanim in that they functioned in the capacity of Kohen Gadol similar to their father, whereas in all subsequent generations there would only be one Kohen Gadol at a time. I’m calling this the position of “adjunct Kohen Gadol.” According to this explanation, Elazar and Itamar inherited this unique designation of Kohen Gadol upon the deaths of their brothers, Nadav and Avihu. 
[2] This midrash appears in a number of different texts with variations between them. Perhaps the most authentic version is the one that appears in Talmud Bavli: Yevamos 64a. I’ve chosen to use the version of that midrash as cited by the Torah Temimah, both because it is phrased in a more standalone manner, and because I subsequently reference the Torah Temimah’s commentary later. 
[3] Ha’Rav Baruch ha’Levi Epstein, Torah Temimah on Bamidbar 3:4 footnote 1 
[4] Midrash Aggadah (Buber), Sefer Bamidbar: Bamidbar 3 
[5] The Hebrew term here is שחוצים, which Jastrow translates as: aristocratic, proud, vainglorious, pompous. 
[6] Midrash Tanchuma (Warsaw) Sefer Vayikra: Acharei Mos 6 
[7] עגונות, which can’t be understood in the usual halachic sense here – unless I’m missing something. The term literally means “deserted,” and since we’re talking about unmarried women here, I’ve translated it as “lonely.” 
[8] Not a typo; just an unusual name: רבי מְנַחְמָה 
[9] According to Rashi, at least. 
[10] Talmud Bavli: Maseches Tamid 29a 
[11] Talmud Bavli: Maseches Eruvin 63a

Tuesday, July 16, 2019

How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 2 of 2

This post is a continuation of How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 1 of 2. It is recommended that you read that post before reading this one.

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How I Teach Maaseh Bereishis - Part 2 of 2

Reminder: The term “Maaseh Bereishis” in this post refers specifically to the text of Bereishis Perek 1 (Genesis Chapter 1). It does not refer to the pesukim after the first perek, nor does it refer to the event of the creation – just the pesukim. 

Kass's Approach to Maaseh Bereishis 

We left off with the following question: if the pesukim of Bereishis Perek 1 were never intended to be taken literally, and the true meaning was only intended for the elite chachamim, then what purpose do these pesukim serve for the masses? What is the average Jew supposed to get out of a literal reading of Maaseh Bereishis? Why didn't the Torah simply state the fact that Hashem created the universe in Six Days in a single pasuk and leave the detailed account to Torah she'baal Peh, as the Ramban suggested?

The best answer to this question I’ve encountered can be found in Leon Kass’s commentary on Sefer Bereishis, entitled, The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading Genesis (2003). Kass is a secular philosopher [1] whose commentary utilizes what he refers to as “a wisdom-seeking approach” to the text of the Bible (see this post for an elaboration). Though I cannot endorse his entire book, both because I haven’t read it all and I didn’t agree with everything I did read, his approach to Maaseh Bereishis certainly opened my eyes, and inspired the direction I take in teaching this unit. 

Here is Kass’s commentary on the first pasuk of Bereishis. I’ve underlined the passages which led me to develop the approach I use when teaching this to my students: 
Unfortunately for those who demand clear pictures, the text’s account of the very beginning is shrouded in mystery:

In beginning, God [’elohim] created the heavens and the earth. 

The first sentence of Genesis majestically summarizes the entire story and states its main theme and thesis: creation, by God, and creation by God. Yet there is much in this verse that is hard to understand: in beginning of what? (Of time? Of everything? Of God’s creative activities?) What is “creating”? And who or what is this creating being, God? To some of these difficulties – especially creation – we shall return. But even now, with our incomplete understanding, we grasp a major point: the assertion of creation by God emphatically denies important competing alternatives. Right from its beginning, Genesis, by speaking about the origins of heaven and earth, denies the eternity and, a fortiori, the divinity of the visible universe: neither the heavens – the lofty celestial vault with its sun, moon, stars – nor the earth, the fertile, teeming source of life, are gods. They are, rather, creatures, creations of God. Perhaps more important, Genesis denies the alternative of generative beginnings: the sky did not beget upon the earth; our world is not the result of sexual (or warring) activities of gods and goddesses. In denying that the world comes to be through giving birth – that is, in rejecting cosmogony and, all the more so, theogony – Genesis begins by rejecting the necessity of polytheism. The coming into being of our world does not imply or demand more than one god.  
The Bible does not polemicize against these alternatives. As Umberto Cassuto remarks, “the controversial note is heard indirectly, as it were, through the deliberate, quiet utterances of Scripture, which sets the opposing views at naught by silence or by subtle hint.” Still, one cannot exaggerate the importance the Bible attaches to rejecting these alternatives. Numerous people of the ancient Near East – and elsewhere – regarded the heavenly bodies as divine. In the course of Genesis, we shall meet – as alternative and rejected ways of life – the Babylonians, who looked up to the heavens, and the Egyptians, who worshipped the sun and other nature gods. Because every people (and also every person) is defined ultimately by what it (or he or she) admires and reveres, the Bible wastes no time in denying the standing of other peoples’ candidates for the divine. The reason for this urgent rejection is a matter to which we will return. 
Skipping a few paragraphs, here’s another part of Kass’s commentary which highlights his approach: 
The account, though comprehensive, has an earth-centered focus. Though it speaks about what we call, in nonbiblical language, the universe or the cosmos, it addresses us, as terrestrial beings and as seeing beings, looking around and, especially, up. It begins with what we recognize and trust: the visible world we see above and about us. It shows us the articulated world of our native experience, as it manifests itself to sight.

All the beings mentioned are known to us in ordinary experience: There are no mythical beasts and no gods and goddesses. The main regions of our world are present – land, sea, and air – with their appropriate inhabitants, divided into recognizable kinds or species. And the overarching, star-studded, watery blue vault of heaven that beckons our gaze is present almost from the start, preceded only by light, in the absence of which nothing at all could be distinguished or gazed upon. By addressing human beings exactly as they experience the world, especially through sight, Genesis begins with what is both familiar and first for us, and for all mankind at all times.

But in the course of appealing first to our familiar point of view, the story in fact calls that viewpoint into question. Although addressed to our experience, the account of Genesis 1 does not simply accord with our experience; indeed, some of the peculiarities of the account induce perplexities about the way we ordinarily encounter the world. 
To review, our question is: What purpose is served by the literal pshat of Maaseh Bereishis, as read and understood by the masses? Based on the approach set forth by Kass, we may answer our question as follows: Maaseh Bereishis is intended to be a philosophical primer for healthy development as a tzelem Elokim (truth-seeking intellect). Specifically, its purpose is twofold: (1) to establish the foundations of a worldview which helps the masses develop a philosophically mature way of relating to the world around them, and (2) to steer these readers away from competing worldviews which would otherwise arrest their philosophical maturation. 

This may seem like a radical move on the Torah’s part, but in truth, it is merely a specialized instance of dibra Torah ki’lshon bnei adam (“the Torah speaks in the language of man”). Rather than stating the “raw truth” explicitly, in a manner that would be incomprehensible and/or detrimental to the majority of readers, the Torah presents the truth in a manner which is accessible to the average readers on their level, in terms they can easily relate to. This “watered down” version of the truth is designed as a developmental primer. In other words, the literal interpretation is not intended to remain as the reader’s permanent understanding, like a classical myth; it is meant to temporarily frame the reader’s conception and lay the groundwork for the next step in his or her understanding. As the reader continues to develop intellectually and psychologically, he or she will delve deeper into the true meaning underlying the external sense of the pesukim and come to terms with the truth at his or her own pace. The Torah uses this approach when speaking about Hashem; the Neviim and Kesuvim use this approach with many subjects; Chazal use this approach in midrashim. It shouldn’t surprise us that the Torah uses this approach when discussing the profound subject of Maaseh Bereishis.

Before expanding on this approach, I'd like to anticipate and address an objection. Our instinctive reaction as "modern readers" is to compare and contrast the Torah’s account with our modern scientific understanding of cosmogony. If we do this, we will surely be disappointed. The Torah's geocentric narrative of the Six Days of Creation pales in comparison to the current theoretical model of the Big Bang and the unfolding of the entire universe. Some might even consider the Torah's account to appear childish in comparison. 

But we must remember that the Torah was not addressing itself to "scientifically enlightened" readers in the 21st century. Rather, as Kass pointed out, the Torah's narrative was competing with pre-scientific and non-scientific creation mythology - and rightly so, for it is these myths which have dominated mankind's conception of the heavens and earth for millennia. If the Torah had been written specifically for the 21st century, for an audience that already has a basic grasp of scientific thinking, or for readers immersed in a world where secular atheism is the competing worldview with Torah monotheism, I'm sure that the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis would look quite different. 

It is this realization that the Torah was aimed at combating myths which prompted me to use an out-of-the-box method in presenting this to my students. 

Comparing Maaseh Bereishis to Creation Myths of Other Religions 

Rather than spoon-feeding this reading of Maaseh Bereishis to my students or having them read the relevant excerpts from Kass’s book, I try to have them derive it on their own. I found a site called www.BigMyth.com. The home page shows a map of the world with 25 dots identifying regions on six of the seven continents. If you hover your mouse over a dot, the name of the nation, culture, or religion will pop up (e.g. Egyptian, Chinese, Maori, Inuit, Inca, etc.). Once you make your selection, you’ll be taken to an early 2000’s era “flash animation” which depicts that group’s creation story, complete with cheesy sound effects and narration. 

I show my students the first couple of minutes of around 5-7 of these animations, then encourage them to watch more at home prior to doing their assignment. Their assignment is to identify the major differences between the Torah’s account of creation and the creation myths of these groups. I tell them to focus on how each account of creation might impact the way that these people view the human race, God (or gods), and the universe as a whole. 

On the day after the assignment is due, we go through the students’ findings and discuss them. I conclude the unit by presenting what I see as the key differences between the Torah’s account of creation and the common features of these creation myths. Here are a few examples. 
anthropomorphic creator(s) vs. non-anthropomorphic Creator: Other religions depict their god(s) in highly anthropomorphic ways. The Torah does not. The only verbs it uses are verbs which do not evoke strong anthropomorphic imagery (e.g. creating, speaking, seeing, separating, calling, making, placing etc.) as opposed to the gross anthropomorphisms found throughout the rest of the Torah (e.g. body parts, such as eyes, ears, hand, arm, or emotions such as anger, sadness, regret, mercy, love). It is as though the Torah wants our introduction to Hashem to be as devoid of physicality as possible, so as not to not lead us to associate the physical universe as proceeding from a physical creator – especially one that resembles ourselves. All of this prepares our minds to seek out the non-physical causes of nature, which will ultimately lead us to the non-physical First Cause.

multiple creators vs. One Creator: Many other creation stories involve multiple creators and/or divinities. According to the Torah, Hashem was the sole cause of the universe. A person who believes that the universe is the product of multiple gods will have no impetus to seek a unity of design underlying the diverse particulars of the universe. Why should he, if different parts of the universe belong to different gods? But according to the Torah, there is only One Architect of the universe with one law that governs His entire domain.

“scientific” account of creation vs. “magical” account of creation: Other religions’ creation stories are mythological and fantastical. Many of them involve a multiplicity of divine beings (e.g. spirits, angels, demons, demi-gods), supernatural objects with mystical properties, and magical generative processes. In contrast, Maaseh Bereishis is scientific in its character. It describes an orderly creation process involving things we see in the world around us: no otherworldly beings or supernatural things – just earthly phenomena that we observe around us every day. Even the actions of the Creator are not described in miraculous terms. It is easy to see how this orientation towards the world lends itself to a value system which promotes scientific inquiry, rather than imaginative mythos and primitive superstiion.

yeish me’yesh (creation out of something) vs. yeish me’ayin (creation out of nothing): Many other creation stories begin with something that already exists, and everything emanates or is created from that. According to the Torah – as understood by the majority of the meforshim – Hashem created the universe out of nothing. Therefore, He is truly the First Cause, and nothing can be compared to Him in His eternality. In other words, there is nothing in the Torah’s account that occupies the “throne” of eternality other than Hashem.

universe as divinity vs. universe as creation: Other religions maintain that the universe itself is divine, or has divine qualities. The Torah makes it clear that the entire universe is a creation. This rules out the possibility of worshipping the universe or parts of the universe (e.g. sun, moon, stars, planets) as gods, or having godly qualities. It can be argued that this is the essential difference between a primitive outlook and a scientific one. So long as a society perceives nature as a panoply of divinities, each with its own independent will that must be appeased, the gates of scientific inquiry will be barred and concealed.

creation process as melachah (intelligent design) vs. creation as non-melachah: Other religions’ creation stories involve accidents, mistakes, and automatic generative processes. According to the Torah, the entire work of creation is characterized as “melachah” – a deliberate creative process in which matter is transformed in accordance with intelligent design – and the sequence of days follows a logical, hierarchical order. Moreover, it is clear that our Creator knows what He is doing: at each step of the way, he declares what He intends to do, He does it, and He perceives that it is good. At the end of the Six Days of Creation, He deems the entire creation as “very good” – that is, produced in complete accord with His plan. It is easy to see how this analogy of melachah would radically alter a person’s view of the universe. Are we living in a universe which is an expression of wisdom, with an underlying lawfulness and order that can be discerned by the truth-seeking human intellect, or was the universe a fluke, a blunder, or the result of blind forces acting without any objective or blueprint.

no motives are given for creation vs. creation is a result of human motives: In the creation stories of other religions, motives are given for the actions of the gods. Usually these motives are petty: because the god is lonely, because the god is angry, because the god wants to be worshipped, etc. In stark contrast, the Torah says nothing about why Hashem created the universe. This underscores the Torah’s view that we cannot know the purpose of the universe, because we cannot know Hashem’s Mind, which is identical with His unknowable Essence. 
These aren’t the only differences between Maaseh Bereishis and the creation myths of other religions, but I hope they illustrate how a literal reading of the pesukim paves the way for the development of the scientific and philosophical worldview that is the ultimate objective of the Torah regimen. At the very least, I hope these fundamental distinctions highlight how being raised with the creation myths of other religions makes it extremely difficult for scientific truth-seeking thinkers to arise from their ranks. 

Conclusion 

So that concludes my overview of Unit 1: Maaseh Bereishis. I tweak it from year to year, and emphasize different things based on my students and their questions, but the core presentation has remained the same. If the only thing my students walk away with is an awareness that the pesukim of Maaseh Bereishis were never intended to be taken literally, and that that the literal meaning of the pesukim was designed to promote a scientific, philosophically mature worldview, then I have done my job. But I am always looking for ways to improve, so if you have any questions, objections, or suggestions about what I have presented here, then please do share!


[1] According to his Wikipedia page, he is “an American physician, scientist, educator, and public intellectual, best known as proponent of liberal education via the ‘Great Books,’ as an opponent of human cloning, life extension and euthanasia, as a critic of certain areas of technological progress and embryo research, and for his controversial tenure as chairman of the President's Council on Bioethics from 2001 to 2005. Although Kass is often referred to as a bioethicist, he eschews the term and refers to himself as ‘an old-fashioned humanist. A humanist is concerned broadly with all aspects of human life, not just the ethical.’”