Behaalosecha: Moshe’s Mysterious Marriage

For an response to the view of Ibn Kaspi as presented in this post, see Rabbi Yaakov Trachtman's enlightening article Moshe's Disguised Divorce - a Response to Ibn Caspi.

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Artwork: Autumn's Veil, by Kekai Kotaki

Behaalosecha: Moshe's Mysterious Marriage

The Question 

Parashas Behaalosecha marks the turning point in Sefer Bamidbar from the hopeful to the nopeful.[1] Bnei Yisrael are marching towards Eretz Yisrael with the Ark of Hashem in their midst, poised to bring the Redemption from Egypt to a close with the establishment of a Torah society in the land promised to Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. Then tragedy strikes. A series of missteps by the nation and by individuals culminates in the sin of the spies, resulting in 40 years of wandering the Wilderness, and the death of the generation that left Egypt. 

Our parashah concludes with one such misstep: the sin of Miriam and Aharon. The sin itself is recorded in a single pair of pesukim (verses): 

Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite [2] woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. They said, “Was it only to Moshe that Hashem spoke? Didn’t He also speak with us?” and Hashem heard. (Bamidbar 12:1-2). 

What, exactly, happened here is murky, to say the least. We are told that Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe “regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married” – yet, the statement attributed to them is entirely about prophecy, as is Hashem’s focus when He subsequently reprimands them. What does this have to do with “the matter of the Kushite woman that he married”? Furthermore, how are we to understand the seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman”? What is this intended to add or explain? 

But perhaps the most basic question of all is: Who is this Kushite woman? She is not identified by name and is not mentioned anywhere else in Tanach. This is the question we will focus on. We will not aim to explain the sin of Miriam and Aharon in full. Instead, we will focus on the three methodological approaches taken by the commentators. 

A survey of the commentators reveals that there are essentially two camps. One camp maintains that the Kushite woman is Tziporah, the daughter of Yisro whom Moshe married in his youth after fleeing Egypt as a fugitive. The second camp maintains that the Kushite is some other woman, aside from Tziporah. 

Camp “Tziporah” 

According to the Tziporah camp, there are two questions which must be addressed. The first question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman”? After all, Tziporah has been mentioned by name three times prior to this incident. Why not call her by name here? The second question is: Why is she called “the Kushite woman” if she was, in fact, not Kushite, but Midianite? 

Onkelos, the Aramaic translator of the Torah, often deviates from a literal translation of the Hebrew in order to address certain issues in the pshat (straightforward meaning of the verse). In this case he is bothered enough by our questions that he makes two rather radical changes. 

Original Hebrew: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the Kushite woman that he married, for he had married a Kushite woman. 

Onkelos’s Aramaic: Miriam and Aharon spoke about Moshe regarding the matter of the beautiful woman that he married, for the beautiful woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned. 

Rashi, following Onkelos’s lead, answers both of our questions by explaining that “Kushite” is a euphemism for Tziporah’s beauty – either her physical beauty or the beauty of her deeds. How does “Kushite” function as a euphemism? Rashi explains: “just as the skin-color of a Kushite is universally acknowledged, so too was Tziporah’s beauty universally acknowledged.” [3] Apparently, it was deemed uncouth, immodest, or somehow inappropriate to explicitly speak about Tziporah’s beauty – hence the need for circumlocution. Rashi adds that the gematria (numerical value) of the word “Kushite” equals that of the phrase “beautiful appearance.” 

Onkelos maintains that the phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” actually means that Moshe “abandoned the beautiful woman he had married.” It is unclear whether “abandoned” means that Moshe separated from Tziporah, or whether he actually divorced her. The question is: How did Miriam know that Moshe separated from Tziporah, and why was she talking about this now? Rashi [4], citing a midrash of Chazal [5], fills us in with the backstory: 

From where did Miriam know that Moshe separated from his wife? Rebbi Nosson says: Miriam was next to Tziporah at the time when it was said to Moshe: “Eldad and Medad are prophesying in the camp!” (Bamidbar 11:27). Upon hearing this, Tziporah exclaimed: “Woe unto the wives of these [men] once they are needed for prophecy, for they will have to separate from their wives in the same way that my husband separated from me!” From there Miriam knew [about Tziporah’s separation from Moshe] and told it to Aharon. And if Miriam didn’t intend to degrade Moshe and was punished thus, kal va’chomer (all the more so) one who speaks in order to degrade his friend! 

There you have it: “Camp Tziporah” answers our questions by positing that “the Kushite woman” is Tziporah, by explaining “for he had married a Kushite woman” to be a veiled reference to their separation, and by filling in the back-story explaining why Moshe and Tziporah separated and why Miriam only brought this up now. 

Camp “Other Woman” 

The Rashbam is known for his pshat explanations. He rarely cites midrash and prefers to answer questions conservatively, based on the principles of Hebrew grammar and the information provided in the text. It is not surprising that he rejects Rashi’s midrashic explanation. What is surprising is that he bases his answer on an obscure “outside text” entitled Divrei ha’Yamim Shel Moshe Rabbeinu (loosely translated as The Moses Chronicles in English). 

This non-canonical text is controversial, to say the least. Those who hold by its authenticity, such as the Rashbam, treat it as a historical account of “the missing years” of Moshe’s life which are not recorded in the Torah. Those who question or reject its authenticity, such as the Ibn Ezra [6], treat it as little more than “Moshe Rabbeinu fan-fiction,” and regard it as worthless. 

Nevertheless, the Rashbam [7] cites this text to explain who Moshe married, supporting his answer with the second question we raised on the position of Camp Tziporah: 

It is written in The Chronicles of Moshe Rabbeinu that he ruled as king in Ethiopia for 40 years and married an [Ethiopian] queen but didn’t sleep with her, as it is written there – but [Miriam and Aharon] didn’t know when they spoke about [Moshe] that he didn’t sleep with her. This is the essential pshat, for if they were speaking about Tziporah, what need was there to explain “for he married a Kushite woman”? Did they not know until now that Tziporah was a Midianite? Another objection is as follows: she wasn’t Kushite! Kush was one of the suns of Cham, but Midian was one of the children of Keturah who was descended from Avraham. 

Unlike Rashi, the Rashbam does not elaborate on why Miriam saw fit to bring this up to Aharon now, nor does he explain why the subsequent dialogue focuses on prophecy rather than on Moshe’s marriage to this Ethiopian queen (whom the Torah doesn’t bother to mention). 

But there is another pshat commentator who answers our question based on the text, and he has quite a lot to say. I am speaking of R’ Yosef ibn Kaspi. Allow me to preface my citation of his commentary with a confession: the whole reason I wrote this article was as an excuse to bring up this excerpt from ibn Kaspi’s commentary. It is one of the most scathing indictments of Rashi’s midrashic approach that I have ever encountered. My jaw dropped as I read it. 

Here is a full translation of what ibn Kaspi had to say, with my own paragraph divisions: 

I am astounded by the early [commentators], who were all more perfect than I am – I who couldn’t even reach their heel. How did they always fall into their own imagination, explaining the Torah to be the opposite of what is written, whether by substituting one word for the opposite word, or adding words with the opposite meanings? 

I am referring to the well-known commentary of Onkelos, about whom the Rambam said, “Onkelos ha’Ger was a great chacham (wise man)!” From where did [Onkelos] get the idea to explain “Kushite” as “beautiful,” [two words] which are as opposite as black and white? [8]

Furthermore, where did he get the idea to add opposite words after “for he married a Kushite woman” as though it was written in the Torah that “the Kushite woman he married he [subsequently] abandoned” or “distanced himself from.” If this were the intent of the Giver of the Torah, why didn’t He write this, and why did He write its opposite? 

Furthermore, who permitted us to do this? Who gave Onkelos so much power, or the Sages of the Talmud, or the Ibn Ezra – all of whom agree on this? Why can’t we do something like this, each man doing what is upright in his own eyes, to the point where we invert, “and you shall love Hashem, your God” to say – God forbid – “you shall hate Hashem, your God,” or “the one whom Hashem loves” to “the one whom He hates.” 

And if you’ll say, “The Torah was received at Sinai and transmitted to Yehoshua, who taught us [as part of the] Oral Torah that this is the explanation of this verse” – the answer is what we responded to the initial claim: Why wasn’t the matter written out as it actually was, rather than writing a word which has the opposite meaning? Is the substitution of a word for its opposite worthy of being called an “explanation”? Rather, an “explanation” is what we call something which explains the words in accordance with their meaning in some way, as [the Sages] explained, “you shall not kindle a fire,” and “you shall not eat over the blood” with deep explanations which fit into what is written, and which certainly do not reverse its meaning. Anything other than this we call “an exchange” or “a reversal” or “an erasure” or “a revision” or “an uprooting.” And this is true in every language whatsoever. [According to the approach of Onkelos et al.,] why shouldn’t we say that “Hashem took you” really means “[Hashem] abandoned [you]”? Similarly, “he and his neighbor should take” [can be interpreted to mean, “he and his neighbor should leave”]. What advantage is there of this over this? 

As Hashem lives, this method – which is unanimously accepted by all of the early Sages, the pillars of the world and of faith and of strength to the Torah of Moshe – is so beyond me that I cannot accept it. God forbid I should do something like this, [which would be tantamount to] completely abandoning the Torah of Moshe and believing that a New Testament was made – God forbid! 

Let us pause here to process the ibn Kaspi’s objection to the approach taken by Onkelos, Rashi, and Chazal. He vehemently objects to those commentators who “interpret” the term “Kushite” as “beautiful,” based on his premise that the two terms are opposites. He refuses to accept the notion that this explanation is “part of the Oral Torah,” and he is so dedicated to the pshat that he implicitly equates the midrashic explanation to pledging allegiance to a New Testament! To be fair, his objection is not to midrash per se, but to midrashic explanations which go against the plain meaning of the text. This will be apparent from what follows. 

After this diatribe, he offers his own explanation: 

Therefore I say that the explanation of what is written here is according to what is necessarily understood from the Hebrew language, namely, that “Kushite” means a woman from the Land of Kush, and the meaning of “because he L.K.CH. [9] a Kushite woman” is that he took her [in marriage], for this is the explanation of the root L.K.CH. as opposed to A’.Z.V. All of this [is based on] the conventional use of the language. 

Accordingly, after Moshe married Tziporah, he married a Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for a reason that he (peace be upon him) knew. One shouldn’t question the motives of his actions, for he undoubtedly did this out of wisdom. We don’t know the time period in which he married her, whether now when they were traveling or beforehand, because this hadn’t been mentioned in the Torah until this point, just as the Torah didn’t record many of the events that transpired. 

Because this wasn’t mentioned until now, then in order [that the reader] not be confused when it said “regarding the Kushite woman he married,” which we haven’t ever heard about, it said after this, “for he married a Kushite woman” – as if to say, “you should know that he married a Kushite woman, even though this hasn’t been mentioned yet, and this is what [Miriam and Aharon] were speaking about.” 

Because the reason for this additional marriage was hidden from them – perhaps Tziporah fell ill, or maybe she disobeyed him, or maybe it was some other reason we don’t know, or maybe they knew her reason, but they didn’t know [his] secret and the wisdom in this – therefore, they spoke about Moshe’s marriage to an additional wife, because one wife should have been enough for this perfected person. 

To summarize: ibn Kaspi maintains that Moshe married an ethnically Kushite woman in addition to Tziporah for reasons that were unknown to Miriam and Aharon, and undisclosed to us. The seemingly redundant phrase “for he had married a Kushite woman” is intended to validate the reader’s confusion upon learning of this fact, as if to say, “yes, this is a thing Moshe did, even though the Torah didn’t mention it until now.” 

Ibn Kaspi then goes on to explain the connection between Miriam’s statement and the subsequent discussion of prophecy. Miriam and Aharon reasoned that they were on a high enough level of prophecy to be “let in” on Moshe’s reasons for his unconventional decision to take a second wife. Because they overestimated the level of their own prophecy in relation to that of their brother, Hashem rebuked them and explained just how categorically superior Moshe’s prophecy was. And as for the “secret” reasons behind Moshe’s second marriage, Hashem’s silence on the matter indicates that it was really none of their business. 

Methodological Take-aways 

We have seen three approaches taken by the commentators to these two cryptic pesukim: 

(1) Onkelos and Rashi opt for a midrashic explanation which neatly answers all of the questions and fills in the gaps with an elaborate narrative. The weakness of this approach is that it puts a heavy strain on a literal reading of the text. 

(2) Rashbam rejects the midrashic approach and explains the text by making recourse to an outside source. The benefit of this approach is that it supplies us with missing information. This approach is very similar to the academic method employed by modern day Bible scholars. The weakness of this approach lies in the credibility of his source. Moreover, according to the Rashbam, what did Hashem intend for the reader of Torah to make of this episode? Did He expect everyone to have read The Chronicles of Moses? 

(3) Ibn Kaspi also rejects the midrashic approach – not only as false, but as a perversion of God’s word and the Hebrew language. Instead, he relies exclusively on the literal meaning of the text and conservatively infers a larger narrative from the minimal information provided in the pesukim. The downside of this approach is that it completely rejects the wisdom offered in the midrashic literature. 

Each of these three approaches has its pros and cons. Students of Chumash will likely be drawn towards one approach or the other. I, myself, favor the third, but recognize the value – and sometimes, the necessity – of the other two. 

This multiplicity of approaches is part of what makes the study of Chumash such an enjoyable and rich experience. 

Footnotes:

[1] I began writing this article on two hours of sleep, and the conclusion of this first sentence was the amusing result. I was going to change it, but my friends convinced me to leave it in – perhaps as a memorial to my folly. 

[2] The word “Kushite” is traditionally translated as “Ethiopian,” but is often used to refer to people from sub-Saharan Egypt, in general. 

[3] Talmud Bavli, Moed Katan 16b 

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 

[5] Midrash Tanchuma, Tzav 13 

[6] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Long Commentary on Sefer Shemos 4:20 

[7] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Meir (Rashbam), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 12:1 

[8] This statement will undoubtedly strike the modern reader as strange, inappropriate, or false. Others will deem it to be offensive, racist, and condemnable. Like it or not, the fact of the matter is that certain Rishonim (medieval commentators) regarded Kushites as unattractive, and maintained that the same aesthetic valuation was held by the figures in Tanach whose words and actions they aimed to decipher. Whether Miriam and Aharon actually found Kushites to be unattractive is a question for the historians and anthropologists. Our task as students of these Rishonim is to set aside our personal views in an attempt to understand what insight these commentators intended to convey through their explanations, regardless of whether or not we agree with the premises on which these explanations were based. (I would like to thank the members of the Facebook group “Orthodox Jews Against Discrimination and Racism” for reviewing this footnote to ensure that it was worded in a sensitive manner.) 

[9] Here the Ibn Kaspi actually spells out each letter of the three-letter root – presumably for snark value.

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

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Artwork: Visions of Beyond, by Terese Nielsen

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

The Question

My students have, on numerous occasions, asked me questions about ruach ha'kodesh (lit. "the holy spirit"), such as: "Is it true that Rashi had ruach ha'kodesh?" or "Didn't the meforshim get their explanations from ruach ha'kodesh?" or "How can the rabbis be wrong if they had ruach ha'kodesh?" 

On the one hand, it seems as though my students view ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah (prophecy) as interchangeable terms. On the other hand, if I asked them point blank: "Are you under the impression that Rashi was a navi?" or "Is the Ramban's commentary on Chumash an example of nevuah?" they would most certainly say "no." And yet, if I asked them to define or explain the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah, they would be at a loss.

I do not believe my students are alone in this regard. I suspect that many Jews are unfamiliar with the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. I certainly was until I looked into the matter. I also don't blame anyone for their lack of clarity on these topics. Not only are the concepts themselves extremely deep and lofty, but it's even difficult to track down the relevant sources! And, to make things even more difficult, sometimes the term "ruach ha'kodesh" is used to describe nevuah! I can understand why people are confused. 

The purpose of this post is not to provide the answer to the question in the title. I'm not even going to attempt to present a comprehensive digest of all - or even most - of the shitos (views), since I've barely scratched the surface of this subject in my own learning. 

Instead, I'm going to present the answer that I give to my own students, which is based on the writings of the Rambam. My goal is to provide them with enough information about nevuah and ruach ha'kodesh to be able to differentiate the two concepts in their minds.

What is Nevuah?

If I am not mistaken, the first time the Rambam defines nevuah is in his presentation of the Thirteen Ikkarim (fundamental principles) in his Introduction to Perek Chelek: [1] 

The Sixth Fundamental Principle is nevuah, namely, to know that within this human species there exist men who possess highly developed traits and great perfection, whose souls develop the capacity to receive the form of the intellect, and their human intellects join with the Active Intellect, and it emanates over them in abundant emanation - these are the neviim, this is nevuah, and this is its concept. And the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy, and our goal is not the explanation of the particulars of each of these fundamental principles and an elucidation of the method of knowing them, for this would encompass all of branches of knowledge. Rather, we shall only mention them for informational purposes. And there are many verses which testify to the prophecy of the prophets.

If your reaction to reading this is, "Say what?" then don't worry. Like I said, our goal here is not to fully understand what nevuah is, but to know enough to be convinced that ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah are not the same thing.

The Rambam's treatment of nevuah in the Mishneh Torah [2] spans four chapters, and is too long to even attempt to summarize here. Instead, I've selected a few halachos from those four chapters which flesh out the concept of nevuah: 

7:1 – One of the fundamentals of the religion is to know that God prophetically communicates to mankind …when the spirit [of nevuah] rests upon him, his soul mingles with the level of angels which are called “ishim” and he becomes another person, and he understands with his mind that he is not as he once was, but that he has ascended above the level of other chachamim …

7:2 – … When [neviim] prophesy, their limbs quake, their bodily power weakens, their thoughts become scrambled, and their mind becomes free to contemplate what they see …

7:3 – The matters that are made known to the navi in a prophetic vision are conveyed to him by way of mashal (allegory), and immediately the interpretation of the mashal becomes engraved in his mind in the prophetic vision, and he knows what it is …

7:7 – It is possible that the navi’s nevuah is for him alone, to expand his mind and increase his knowledge, until he knows things that he didn’t know from those great things (i.e. physics and metaphysics), and it is possible that he is sent to a segment of the population – to the residents of a city or a kingdom – to prepare them and to inform them what to do, or to prevent them [from continuing] the evil actions in their hands – and when [the navi] is sent [for this reason], he is given a sign and wonder in order to make known to the people that God sent him in truth.

10:3 – … all the words of a navi are fulfilled, as it is stated: “for no word of Hashem will fall to the earth” (II Melachim 10:10); likewise it is stated: “The [false] prophet with a dream tells [his] dream, but the one with my word speaks My word of truth. How can the chaff compare to the kernel? – the word of Hashem” (Yirmiyahu 23:28) – in other words, the words of sorcerers and dreamers are like chaff mixed in with a little bit of grain, whereas the word of Hashem has no chaff at all.

The Rambam further elucidates nevuah by differentiating the nevuah of a regular navi from the nevuah of Moshe Rabbeinu. I'll cite his presentation of these differences in the Introduction to Perek Chelek, with all of the details and proofs omitted, for the sake of brevity:

The prophecy of Moshe, our master, differs from the prophecy of the other prophets in four ways:  

The first difference is that each and every navi was only spoken to by Hashem by way of an intermediary, but Moshe was without an intermediary ... 

The second difference is that every navi only receives his nevuah vision while asleep ... or during the day after the prophet falls under a trance into a state in which all of his senses have been suspended and his mind is blank just like in sleep ... but the word came to Moshe in the daytime when he was standing ... 

The third difference is that when a navi receives a nevuah, even though it is through a vision and by means of an angel, his powers weaken and his bodily frame becomes disarranged and an overpowering fear falls upon him as if he were going to die ... but this was not the case with Moshe. Rather, the word came to him and no weakness occurred in him at all ...

The fourth difference is that the vision does not come to all the prophets at their own desire but only at the will of Hashem ... However, Moshe, our master, was able to say at any time that he wished ...

To summarize: nevuah is a type of knowledge conveyed from Hashem to the mind of the navi (via angels) in mashal form. As the Rambam said, "the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy" and a full explanation "would encompass all of branches of knowledge." Nevertheless, the basic information here is sufficient for our purposes. 

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh?

Now let's turn to the Rambam's definition of ruach ha'kodesh, as stated in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim.[3] I'm only going to cite the first part of this chapter, with my own paragraph breaks and underlines: 

After the preceding explanation of the true reality of nevuah according to the requirements of philosophical speculation combined with the explanation supplied by our Torah, it behooves me to mention to you the degrees of nevuah according to these two sources. 

Now not everybody who is found in one of the degrees, which I call the degrees of nevuah, is a navi. For the first and second degree are steppingstones toward nevuah, and someone who has attained one of them is not to be considered as a navi belonging to the class of neviim discussed in the preceding chapters. And even though he may sometimes be called a navi, this term is applied to him in a general sort of way, because he is very close to the neviim …

1st Degree – Ruach Hashem: The first of the degrees of nevuah consists in the fact that an individual receives or is accompanied by a divine help that moves and activates him to an exceedingly good and valuable act – such as the saving of a community of virtuous people from a community of evildoers, or the saving of a virtuous and great man, or the conferring of benefits on numerous people. The individual in question finds in himself something that moves and incites him to the action, and that is called “ruach Hashem” (“the spirit of Hashem”). And it is said of the individual who was in such a state that “the spirit of Hashem was upon him” or that “the spirit of Hashem clothed him” or that “the spirit of Hashem rested upon him” or that “Hashem was with him,” or other similar expressions are applied to him. That is the level of all the judges of Israel, of whom it is said in general that: “And when Hashem raised them up as judges, then Hashem was with the judge, and delivered them” (Shoftim 2:18) … 

Know that such a force did not abandon Moshe Rabbeinu from the moment he reached the age of maturity. It was because of this that he was moved to slay the Egyptian and to reprove the one who was in the wrong among the two men that struggled. The strength of this force in him shows in the fact that when – after having been filled with fear and having fled – he came to Midian as a stranger full of fear and saw some wrong that was done, he could not refrain from putting an end to it and was incapable of patience with regard to it … 

Such a ruach Hashem by no means caused one of these people to speak of anything; rather its object was to move the one strengthened by it to a certain action: not to any chance action, but to an action that provides assistance a wronged one – whether it be one great man or a community – or to an action that leads to that result. 

And just as not everyone who has seen a true dream is a navi, not everyone who has received [divine] assistance in some chance matter – such as the acquisition of property or the achievement of an end that concerns him alone – can be said to have been accompanied by ruach Hashem, or that “Hashem is with him,” or to have done what he has done “through ruach ha’kodesh.” We only say this about one who has performed a good action of capital import or an action that leads to that result; as, for instance, the success of Joseph in the house of the Egyptian, which was, as is clear, the first cause for great things that occurred afterwards.

2nd Degree – Ruach ha’Kodesh: It consists in the fact that an individual finds that a certain thing has descended upon him and that another force has come upon him and has made him speak, so that he talks in words of wisdom, or praise, or in beneficial statements of rebuke, or concerning political or divine matters – and all this while he is awake and his senses function as usual. Such an individual is said to speak through ruach ha’kodesh (“holy spirit”). 

It is through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh that David composed Tehilim, and Shlomo composed Mishlei and Koheles and Shir ha’Shirim. Daniel and Iyov and Divrei ha’Yamim and all the other Kesuvim (Writings) have likewise been composed through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh. For this reason people call them Kesuvim, meaning thereby that they are written through ruach ha’kodesh.

As you can see from this source, in light of the other sources, the Rambam is very explicit in differentiating ruach ha'kodesh from nevuah. Here is a list of differences:

• nevuah is nevuah, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is "a steppingstone to nevuah" which is merely called nevuah
• in this sense it may be said that ruach ha'kodesh is "on a lower level" than nevuah
• in nevuah there is actual content conveyed from Hashem to man, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is a force which moves a person to speak profound statements of his own
• nevuah can only be received while asleep or in a trance, whereas a person receives ruach ha'kodesh while awake and in full possession of his sensory faculties
• nevuah comes in the form of mashal, whereas ruach ha'kodesh produces words
• in Nach, the books classified in Neviim contain words of nevuah whereas the books classified in Kesuvim contain words of ruach ha'kodesh

These differences are stark. Ruach ha'kodesh is not nevuah.

Support from the Sefer ha'Ikkarim

While I don't know enough to say that the Sefer ha'Ikkarim's [4] view of ruach ha'kodesh is identical to that of the Rambam, it certainly seems to be in the same vein. He begins with a description of the four levels of intellect. Level 5 is ruach ha'kodesh, and Level 6 is the first degree of nevuah. Again, I will not cite the entire chapter, but only enough to provide context for his treatment of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. The paragraph breaks, paragraph titles (including level numbers), and underlines are mine:

We must now explain the existence of prophecy and its various grades, so that believers may find it easier to understand the existence of prophecy and the different degrees thereof.

Level 1 - Senses: At the moment of birth the individual is devoid of all understanding. The first things that are formed in him are the five external senses, touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight. The individual does not get these all at once, but one at a time. At the moment of his appearance in the outer world he perceives only with the coarsest of the senses, that of touch. The objects of his perception at this stage are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, softness and hardness, roughness and smoothness and the like. After a further interval of time after birth, he perceives a finer and more ‘important class of objects, namely tastes, like sweet, bitter, sour, astringent, sharp, and so on. Later on he perceives another class of things still finer, namely the odors, the agreeable and the disagreeable, etc. Later still he perceives with the sense of hearing a class of objects that is still finer than those of the sense of smell, and that may be perceived at a greater distance, such as sounds and tones, and their various kinds, etc. Still later he perceives with the sense of sight another class of existents finer than all the rest, which can be perceived at a greater distance than the others, such as colors and forms according to their various kinds, and so on. One of these five senses cannot perceive the objects of the others. Thus, the sense of sight cannot perceive sounds, or tones or odors; nor can the senses of smell and taste perceive colors and sounds.

Level 2 - Memory: After he has advanced a considerable time and has become habituated to the five senses, he rises to a higher degree than that of perceiving the objects of the various senses. He now has the power of recognizing a thing when it is no longer actually perceived. He recognizes what he has once perceived when he sees it again, and though the thing has disappeared he remembers the knowledge which is impressed on his imagination and recognizes the object. This power of apprehension he acquires through the medium of the first faculty.

Level 3 - Intellectual Apprehension: As he grows older still, he attains to a higher degree by means of the first powers, a new gate opens before him, and he acquires the power of intellectual apprehension. He strips the sensible object of its particular qualities and apprehends the general essence. For example, he takes animality and rationality in a human being and judges that these are common to the whole species and are different from those particular qualities which differ in different individuals.

Level 4 - Intellectual Comprehension: As he advances further in years and acquires information, another gate opens before him which he has not entered hitherto. He now makes a distinction between substance and accident, and between the necessary, the possible and the impossible. He combines rational principles not based upon sense perception with each other, and acquires all the sciences, which he could not have acquired by means of the powers mentioned before.

These four stages form the limit of the human intellect, beyond which it cannot go. Some individuals do not reach the highest stage, but stop with the second or the third. These then are the powers which the generality of men have.

Level 5 - Ruach ha'Kodesh: But it is possible that in addition to these powers, still another gate may open to a person and still another degree may be attainable by him of which he has no idea. For just as, if a person who has never seen them were told about lights and colors, he would not be able to imagine them and would not understand the different colors, as a eunuch cannot imagine the pleasure of sexual intercourse, so it is possible that though by the custom of nature man does not attain a greater degree than the four mentioned, nevertheless the mind may conceive of a higher degree. And experience testifies to this. For we see that beyond the four degrees above mentioned, a new gate opens before a given person which his own nature never imagined, and he speaks words of wisdom or words of song and praise to God in pure and fluent style such as he was incapable of hitherto. Everyone who hears him wonders at his knowledge and the manner of his expression, while he himself does not know whence this power came to him, as a child learns to speak without knowing whence the power came. But everybody recognizes his superiority in this respect. This degree is called ruach ha’kodesh.

Level 6 - Developed Imagination: Now just as the human intellect stops at the four degrees above mentioned and does not pass beyond, so there are persons who stop at the degree of ruach ha’kodesh and do not pass beyond it. There are persons whose imagination is strong by nature or who do certain things to strengthen it, like the practices of the diviners or the woman with the familiar spirit. As a result of this they have imaginative visions. There are others who have true dreams, like Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, the chief butler and the chief baker. By reason of these powers some of them think they are prophets. They are the persons of whom the prophet in Scripture says that they “prophesy out of their own heart.” For though they sometimes speak the truth, they are bound sometimes to speak falsehood. Thus Ezekiel says, “Woe unto the vile prophets, that follow their own spirit, … They have seen vanity and lying divination, that say: The Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them, yet they hope that the word would be confirmed.” The intimation is that it is impossible, for though their words may be partly true, they can not but be partly false, for such is the nature of the power of imagination, the source of dreams. Our Rabbis say: As there is no wheat without straw, so there is no dream without foolishness.

Level 7 - 1st Degree of Nevuah: When, however, the rational power prevails over the imagination, then the person sees true dreams without foolishness. The explanation is given by the Rabbis: “Raba asked the question, How reconcile the statement, ‘And the dreams speak falsely,’ with the expression, ‘I do speak with him in a dream?’ His answer is, the two passages are not incompatible. The one passage refers to dreams that come through the medium of an angel, the other to those that come through the medium of a demon.” Angel stands for the rational power, demon for the power of imagination. If the rational power prevails over the power of imagination, the person sees true dreams or visions which communicate to him information he never had before. In the measure in which the rational power prevails over the imagination is the person better or less well prepared for nevuah. There are persons whose rational power is stronger than the imagination, but the superiority is not great, and hence the power of imagination maintains its strength. And therefore though the rational power is prepared to receive the nevuah, yet on account of the strength of the imagination and its opposition to the rational power, the person receives the [prophetic] overflow in trembling and pain. His limbs shake, his sinews tend to dissolve, and a great trembling comes over him, that his soul almost leaves him. And after all that pain the nevuah comes to the rational power in a dream or vision of the night, and the person dreams prophetic dreams and learns things he has never known before — ideas about the separate substances, or particular notions, or universal ideas of existence, and the like. This is the first degree of nevuah.

Similar to the Rambam, ruach ha'kodesh is identified as a level of intellection which is prior to nevuah, and the descriptions of each phenomenon mirror what the Rambam wrote.

Concluding Thoughts

So when my students ask me whether Rashi or the other meforshim had ruach ha'kodesh, I summarize the definitions of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah presented here, making sure that they at least walk away with an awareness that the two phenomena are distinct. Then I answer their question by saying that it is entirely possible that chachamim (wise people) throughout the ages spoke or wrote with ruach ha'kodesh, even after the time that nevuah ceased. 

However, I do not think this has any ramifications on how we learn. Even if, for example, the Raavad [5] claims that his critique of the Rambam's shitah (view) is backed by ruach ha'kodesh, that doesn't mean that the Rambam needs to abandon his opinion, nor does it necessitate that we side with the Raavad.

Similarly, this does not mean that Chazal - and certainly the Geonim, Rishonim, and Achronim - were infallible. One need look no further than Vayikra Chapter 4 (about the sin-offerings brought by a Sanhedrin that errs) or the story of the Achnai Ovens (Bava Metzia 59b) to see that Chazal can err - despite the fact that they were inevitably moved by ruach ha'kodesh.

That pretty much exhausts my knowledge of ruach ha'kodesh. Perhaps one day we will explore views of ruach ha'kodesh which differ from that of the Rambam. 

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin Chapter 10, Introduction

[2] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapters 7-10

[3] ibid. Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:45; the paragraph breaks are mine

[4] Rabbeinu Yosef Albo, Sefer ha'Ikkarim 3:10; ordinarily I would translate this on my own, but I'm pressed for time, so I've decided to use the translation on www.sefaria.org (Jewish Publication Society of America: 1929)

[5] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Daud, Critiques on Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Shofar, v'Sukkah, v'Lulav 8:5