Parashas Masei: Leviim as Role Models of Tolerance

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Artwork: Answered Prayers, by Seb McKinnon

Parashas Masei: Leviim as Role Models of Tolerance

The United States of America in the year 2019 is a curious place. For all of its "progressive" emphasis on compassion, inclusivity, and acceptance of intentional lifestyle choices, it is shockingly intolerant and unforgiving when it comes to unintentional offenses.

This category of "offenses" is not limited to criminal infractions, but includes any speech or behavior which inadvertently results in emotional pain or personal offense to others. Even the innocent act of expressing an unpopular opinion may be labeled an "attack" or an "act of aggression" by those who feel "victimized" by hearing sentiments with which they disagree.

There is a growing list of public figures - actors, comedians, artists, authors, politicians, celebrities - who have been guilty of such missteps and have been called out for their "crimes." As a result, these people are publicly shamed, boycotted, blacklisted, canceled, and subjected to verbal abuse or even physical threats, usually over social media. In many cases, even when they apologize and express genuine regret, they are not absolved or forgiven by the public. Instead, their transgressions are considered unpardonable and the perpetrators irredeemable. 

There is a mitzvah in this week's parashah which may shed some light on the Torah's view of this phenomenon. Upon entering the Land of Israel, Bnei Yisrael were commanded to establish 48 cities. These cities serve two functions: (1) all 48 cities are to be the residence of the Leviim (Levites), who do not own any other portion in the Land, and (2) six of these are to be designated as cities of refuge for unintentional murderers to flee from the goel ha'dam (blood avenger) where they will remain protected until their release upon the death of the Kohen Gadol.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch refers to this as "the mitzvah upon Israel to provide cities to the Leviim to dwell therein" (Mitzvah #408). In his explanation of "the root of the mitzvah" (i.e. the benefits or objectives of the mitzvah), he addresses the fact that these cities were to be inhabited by two very different groups of people. The distinguished scholar-class of the Leviim are to live side by side with the criminal-class of the unintentional murderers. The Torah could have set up the cities of refuge in the territories of the other tribes. Why send the unintentional murderers to live exclusively with the Leviim?

The Sefer ha'Chinuch provides two answers to this question, the second of which is as follows:

There is another reason for the matter: Since they (i.e. the Leviim) were men of [good] heart, renowned for the eminent worth of their character traits and their noble wisdom, it was evident to all that they would not detest the murderer who took refuge with them, and would not harm him, even if he killed one of their good friends or avenging blood relations (i.e. relatives whose kinship would cause them to avenge the victim's murder), since he killed them suddenly (i.e. unintentionally), without enmity. About this chosen tribe it is stated, "who said of his father and mother, 'I have not seen him'" (Devarim 33:9). In other words, they would do nothing in the world that was not in accordance with the upright path and in line with the truth, and their heart would not be swayed by the love of any person - not even love for a father and mother, brothers and sons, whose love is necessitated and compelled by nature - and all the more certainly not love for any other human beings. I wrote another argument about this subject in the eleventh negative mitzvah in Sidrah Behar.

The Sefer ha'Chinuch's comments in Behar pertain to the mitzvah "not to alter the open land around the cities of the Leviim or their fields" (Mitzvah #342). There he writes:

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the cities of the Leviim were prepared for the needs of all the other tribes. For this was the tribe chosen for avodas Hashem (the service of Hashem), and their entire occupation was with chochmah (wisdom), since they were not burdened with the affairs of agricultural labor like the other tribes of Israel. Of them it was said, "They will teach Yaakov Your ordinances, and Israel Your Torah" (Devarim 33:10). And because of the fact that there was wisdom among them, all the Israelites always had dealings with them, apart from the fact that among their cities were the cities of refuge for an unintentional killer. As a result, the eyes of all Israel were on their cities, "for a man never knows what a day may bring forth" (Mishlei 27:1).

It was therefore only right that those cities, in which all had an equal interest, with which the heart of all was concerned, should have a perfection of beauty and attractiveness. It would be to the praise and advantage of the entire people of Israel. Therefore, the order was given about them that nothing in their arrangement was to be changed. For the Sovereign Ruler of all founded and constructed them and set their boundaries, and He saw that it was good. Then any alteration beyond His words would be nothing but a detraction and a disgrace. 

There are several important lessons to be gleaned from this explanation.

Lesson #1 - Unintentional Murderers Deserve Compassion: By "compassion" I mean that they are to be treated "in accordance with the upright path," like any other Jew or human being, and not "harmed" or even "detested" by their neighbors. Although this level of compassion wouldn't necessarily extend to intentional* murderers, who committed their crimes "with enmity," it should be noted that those who seek refuge in one of these cities are not entirely blameless. If a death came about as a result of a totally freak accident, then the murderer wouldn't be exiled to a city of refuge, since he wouldn't be liable at all. The only murderer who lives in the cities of refuge is one who killed another person as a result of harmful actions on his part which he should have foreseen and prevented. In other words, he is guilty of lethal negligence, and is at fault for the loss of life he caused. Nevertheless, the Torah expects him to be treated in a kind and civil manner, and to not to be stigmatized in any way for his crime. This is true even if he hasn't done teshuvah.

Lesson #2 - The Torah Has High Expectations for Such Compassion: The Sefer ha'Chinuch makes it clear that the Torah expects the inhabitants of the cities of refuge to treat these murderers with this level of compassion no matter what - even if the murder victim was a close friend or relative. This is an exceedingly high level. The Sefer ha'Chinuch even says that one's feelings towards the murderer shouldn't be swayed by the natural love for one's own family. One might think that it would be impossible to achieve this level of personal clemency - and yet, the Torah considers it possible.

Lesson #3 - The Torah Does Not Expect This of All People: Nevertheless, the Torah's expectations are only this high for Leviim, whose lives are devoted to avodas Hashem and chochmah. The Torah does not have such high expectations for average Jews. According to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, this is why there are no cities of refuge in the territories of the other tribes. If there were, the murderers who lived there would be mistreated and resented because of the crimes they committed. Only Leviim can be relied upon to not give in to the natural human inclination to vilify and marginalize those who have committed manslaughter. 

Lesson #4 - The Torah Expects Us to Aspire to This Level: Even though average Jews are not expected to reach the level of the Leviim, we are expected to look up to them as role models. As the Sefer ha'Chinuch stated, "the eyes of all Israel were on their cities," knowing how and with whom the Leviim live, and being inspired by their virtues - including their tolerance and compassion towards the murderers in their midst.

These insights provide a new perspective on the prevalent attitude in America towards public figures who inadvertently cause offense through their words or actions. Bear in mind that we are not talking about terrorists, serial killers, school shooters, rapists, pedophiles, white collar criminals, corrupt politicians, or anyone else who knowingly and intentionally commits wrongful acts. We are talking about those who caused harm or hurt through mistakes - unintentional speech or behavior which could have been seen and prevented, but was not, due to negligence on the part of the perpetrator.

The major take-away from the Sefer ha'Chinuch's explanation of this mitzvah may be stated as follows: If the Torah maintains that a person who mistakenly kills another human being through  negligence deserves compassion and protection from maltreatment, then certainly this would be true of a person who unintentionally caused emotional offense or hurt feelings. 

Does the Torah expect all Jews to be able to rise above the natural tendency to malign the wrongdoers in our midst? No. This is a difficult task and an uphill battle. Yet, the Torah does expect us to recognize "the upright path," and to acknowledge that it is possible for some of us to reach an exceedingly high level of compassion even towards those who committed the worst crime - taking another human life - provided that they didn't intend to cause harm.

Clearly there is a lot more to be discussed on the topic of how we ought to treat and feel about various types of wrongdoers and criminals. The best approach is to learn whatever we can from each Torah law, and strive to incorporate these lessons into the way we live. And even if we can't live up to the lofty ideals conveyed through these mitzvos, we should still take these lessons to heart to the degree that we are able, and continually aspire to better ourselves in accordance with the Torah's value system. 

* There are other mitzvos and other sources in the Torah which enlighten us as to how we should treat and feel about intentional murderers and other reshaim (evildoers). This topic is multifaceted, and is beyond the scope of this blog post. 

Parashas Bamidbar: Click HERE to See the a Picture of the REAL Aron ha'Kodesh!

Is this an intentionally clickbait title? Maybe yes, maybe no. You'll have to decide based on the content of the post.

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Parashas Bamidbar: Click HERE to See a Picture of the REAL Aron ha'Kodesh!

In the third chapter of Parashas Bamidbar we are informed of the responsibilities entrusted to each of the three Levite families: Gershon, Kehas, and Merari. Each family was responsible for transporting certain components of the Mishkan (Tabernacle):  

The charge of the sons of Gershon in the Tent of Meeting was the Tabernacle, the Tent, its Cover, the Screen of the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, the curtains of the Courtyard, the Screen of the entrance of the Courtyard that surrounded the Tabernacle and the Altar, and its ropes  ...

[The charge of the sons of Kehas] was the Ark, the Table, the Menorah, the Altars, and the sacred utensils with which they would minister, the Partition and all its successors ... 

The assignment of the charge of Merari was the planks of the Tabernacle, its bars, its pillars, its sockets, and all its utensils, and all its accessories; the pillars of the Courtyard all around, and their sockets, their pegs and their ropes (Bamidbar 3:21-37).

At the very end of the parashah the Kohanim are given a mysterious warning regarding the Bnei Kehas:

Hashem spoke to Moshe and Aharon, saying: "Do not let the tribe of the Kehas families be cut off from among the Leviim. Thus shall you do for them so that they shall live and not die: when they approach the Holy of Holies, Aharon and his sons shall come and assign them, every man to his work and his burden. But they shall not come and look as the holy is covered, lest they die" (ibid. 4:17-20).

What does this mean? What, exactly, are the Kohanim being commanded to do or not do? How is the fate of the Bnei Kehas ("lest they die") dependent on the actions of the Kohanim?

The Abravanel [1] offers an explanation which he supports by citing a midrash:

It is possible to explain this in reference to the Bnei Kehas, that they shouldn't enter to look when the holy is covered - in other words, when they (i.e. the Kohanim) cover it (i.e. the keilim), if they (i.e. the Bnei Kehas) see it uncovered, they will die ...

And in the midrash (Bamidbar Rabbah 4:19) it was stated: Moshe said: “Master of the Universe! Is the blood of the children of Kehas prohibited and the blood of Aharon permitted?” Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu said to him, “No. Rather, Aharon is holy of holies, as it is stated, "He separated Aharon to sanctify him as holy of holies" (Divrei ha'Yamim I 23:13)” – and holy of holies cannot harm holy of holies. But the Bnei Kehas are not holy of holies; therefore, if they see the holy of holies, it will harm them and they will die. 

According to the Abravanel, the pesukim are warning the Kohanim to make sure that the keilim (i.e. the Aron, the Menorah, the Shulchan, etc.) are completely covered and ready to be moved before the Bnei Kehas enter to transport them. If the Kohanim fail in their duty, and the Bnei Kehas see the exposed keilim, they will die. 

This midrash aims to address the glaring double-standard in our pesukim. One can imagine a member of Bnei Kehas asking: "Why should we be subject to death, but not the Kohanim? You're telling me that the Kohanim can look at these keilim all they want, but if the Bnei Kehas so much as catch a glimpse, we'll die?!"

But the answer given by the midrash is perplexing. What do Chazal mean when they say that the holy of holies (i.e. Kohanim) cannot be harmed by the holy of holies (i.e. the keilim), but the Bnei Kehas can be harmed this way, since they are merely "holy" and not "holy of holies"? 

I believe that an insight provided by Rav Hirsch [2] explains this midrash, even though he doesn't cite it directly:

In the preceding verses the order had been given that the Bnei Kehas were to be given the holy objects they were to carry only after they had their covers put on to avoid their touching those objects directly. Now here it is said that they may not even be present when the covering is done. They are not to "see" the holy objects when they are being covered. Unless we are mistaken, the effect of this prohibition would be that the holy objects remain to their bearers as symbolic objects, subjects for the mind, for thoughts, not so much as actual tangible objects, and so all the more fill their minds with thoughts of their meaning. And this keeping constantly in their minds the true meaning of the holy objects entrusted to them would be an essential factor of their duty to which gazing at their being wrapped up for transit could very well have a disturbing effect. 

We have written previously about the power of art. We followed the approach of Ayn Rand who theorized that: "Art is a concretization of metaphysics. Art brings man’s concepts to the perceptual level of his consciousness and allows him to grasp them directly, as if they were percepts." Indeed, this is why the klei ha'mikdash needed to be designed and fashioned not only by talented artists, but by those who possessed "a Godly spirit, wisdom, insight, and knowledge" - those who understood the metaphysical concepts that these works of art were meant to embody.

According to this theory, to the extent that a person's grasp of metaphysics is sound and accurate, the keilim would amplify the reality of his concepts in his mind and help him to better relate to those ideas - but to the extent that his metaphysics is distorted, the keilim would further that distortion by anchoring his faulty concepts in tangible objects which appeal to his imagination and psyche and clouding his intellectual apprehension. 

The Kohanim, whose lives are devoted to the avodah in the Mikdash, and who are kept in check by their many additional mitzvos - they are not likely to be "harmed" in this manner by seeing the keilim, since their grasp of the metaphysical ideas represented by the keilim is firm and well-protected. This is what the midrash means when it says that the Kohanim, who are "holy of holies," can't be harmed by the keilim, which are also "holy of holies." In other words, the average Kohen in the Mikdash has perfected his tzelem Elokim (intellect) to the extent that it will not be overwhelmed by his nefesh ha'bahamis (animalistic soul) upon seeing the keilim; thus, he will be shielded from the type of distortion that would befall those who are on a lower level of kedushah.

In contrast, the Bnei Kehas - and certainly the other Leviim and Yisraelim - are not as grounded in their grasp of metaphysics, nor have they reached the level of kedushah to ensure that their tzelem Elokim will prevail over their nefesh ha'bahamis when confronted with these dazzling, emotionally charged objects. Therefore, if they see the keilim, there is a chance that their psyche and imagination will get caught up in the aesthetic grandeur and mystique of the keilim, thereby endangering their grasp of the metaphysical concepts that the keilim are designed to reflect.

To remedy this, the Kohanim are instructed to cover the keilim before they can be seen by the Bnei Kehas. This allows the Bnei Kehas to "see" the keilim without actually seeing them. As Rav Hirsch explained, this affords the Bnei Kehas the ability to contemplate these keilim as "objects of thought" rather than "tangible objects." The covering of the keilim is, in effect, a warning label which declares: "At your stage of development, these should be objects to think about - not objects to look at. Only those who can think about these objects properly are permitted to gaze upon them."

In other words, the requirement of covering the keilim isn't designed to deny the Bnei Kehas of a privilege reserved for Kohanim. Rather, the covering of the keilim is a boon for the Bnei Kehas, in that it protects them from harm and guides them towards a proper relationship with the keilim - a relationship that is essential for them not only as Jews, but as the family charged with the task of transporting the vessels of the King.

[The actual dvar Torah ends here, but I thought I'd address a follow-up question that some of you might have. I'll place this piece of distracting art in the middle to indicate the break, and making good on my clickbait promise.]

I promised you a picture of the actual Aron ha'Kodesh. Here it is!

You might be wondering: "What type of distortion are we talking about here? Do you mean to tell me that the Bnei Kehas will arrive at false conclusions in metaphysics simply because they looked at the keilim?"

No, not quite. The type of distortion we're talking about is far more subtle. I suggest you read/review our post on Ayn Rand, Art, and Avodah Zarah to fully appreciate the type of phenomenon we're talking about. But I'll add a bit of explanation here which might clarify things.

In conjunction with this midrash the Abravanel mentions the boundaries that were created around Har Sinai and the warning that Moshe was instructed to give to the people:

Hashem said to Moshe, "Descend, warn the people, lest they break through to Hashem to see, and a multitude of them will fall. Even the Kohanim who approach Hashem should be prepared, lest Hashem burst forth against them" (Shemos 19:21-22).

According to the Rambam, some of the greatest members of Bnei Yisrael fell prey to this temptation, as it is stated:

They saw the God of Israel, and under His feet was the likeness of sapphire brickwork, and it was like the essence of the heaven in purity. Against the great men of the Children of Israel, He did not stretch out His hand - they gazed at God, yet they ate and drank (ibid. 24:10-11).

The Rambam [3] explains that these pesukim are to be read as a censure - not a praise:

The "nobles of the Children of Israel," on the other hand, were overhasty, strained their thoughts, and achieved apprehension, but only an imperfect one. "They saw the God of Israel, and under His feet etc." and not merely "They saw the God of Israel." For these words are solely intended to present a criticism of their act of seeing, not to describe the manner of their seeing. Thus they were solely blamed for the form that their apprehension took inasmuch as corporeality entered into it to some extent - this being necessitated by their overhasty rushing forward before they had reached perfection. They deserved "to perish." However, [Moshe], peace be upon him, interceded for them; and they were granted a reprieve until the time that they were burnt at Taveirah, whereas Nadav and Avinu where burnt in the Ohel Moed, as is stated in a correct tradition. This having happened to these men, it behooves us, all the more, as being inferior to them, and it behooves those who are inferior to us, to aim at and engage in perfecting our knowledge of preparatory matters and in achieving those premises that purify apprehension of its taint, which is error. It will then go forward to look upon the divine holy Presence. It is accordingly said: "Even the Kohanim who approach Hashem should be prepared, lest Hashem burst forth against them." Accordingly Shlomo has bidden the man who wishes to reach this rank to be most circumspect. He said warningly in parabolic language: "Guard your feet when you go to the house of God" (Koheles 4:17).

This is the type of distortion that the Bnei Kehas would be subject to if they saw the keilim. It's not that the "nobles of the Children of Israel" reached mistaken conclusions about Hashem. If you gave them a test on Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah, they would all get 100%. Rather, as the Rambam explained, their apprehension of these abstract ideas became subtly tainted with corporeality.

It's one thing to know the correct ideas, but it's another thing for that knowledge to be real to the psyche. This "taint of corporeality" strengthens the veil (to borrow a mashal from the Rambam in Shemoneh Perakim, Perek 4) between our tzelem Elokim and Hashem. In perceptual terms, this "misperception" is more comparable to tinted glasses rather than a full-blown hallucination.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 4:20
[2] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 4:17
[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon, Moreh ha'Nevuchim 1:5