Parashas Pinchas: Overcoming Psychological Obstacles to Asking Your Rabbi

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Artwork: Azor's Elocutors, by Johannes Voss

Parashas Pinchas: Overcoming Psychological Obstacles to Asking Your Rabbi

Introduction

I will preface and contextualize this blog post with a rather vague claim supported by anecdotal evidence. My vague claim is that some women refrain from asking shailos (halachic questions) to their rabbis due to a variety of social, practical, and/or psychological hurdles. 

My anecdotal evidence is drawn from ten years of teaching high school girls, and encountering numerous instances in which my suggestion to "just ask your posek (halachic decisor)" is met with reluctance, anxiety, and even fear. 

Further evidence is drawn from an informal poll I took on various social media platforms in which I asked Orthodox women whether they think it's more difficult for women than men to ask their rabbi halachic questions due to various social, practical, and/or psychological obstacles. The overwhelming majority of women who responded concurred. 

It is in this specific context that I would like to examine the story of the Daughters of Tzelofchad. Let's review the relevant pesukim: 

The daughters of Tzelofchad, son of Chefer, son of Gilad, son of Machir, son of Menashe, of the families of Menasheh son of Yaakov drew near - and these were the names of his daughters: Machlah, Noah, Choglah, Milcah, and Tirzah - and they stood before Moshe, before Elazar ha'Kohen, and before the Leaders and the entire assembly at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, saying: "Our father died in the Wilderness, but he was not among the assembly that was gathered against Hashem in the assembly of Korach, but he died of his own sin, and he had no sons. Why should the name of our father be omitted from among his family because he had no son? Give us a possession among our father's brothers." And Moshe brought their claim before Hashem.

Hashem said to Moshe, saying: "The daughters of Tzelofchad speak properly. You shall surely give them a possession of inheritance among the brothers of their father, and you shall cause the inheritance of their father to pass over to them." 

I believe that there are several lessons we can learn from the fact that the Daughters of Tzelofchad asked this question, and from the manner in which they asked it. These lessons may not help remove the social and practical barriers which Jewish women face, but my  hope is that they provide some chizuk (encouragement) for overcoming some of these psychological difficulties. 

I will examine four psychological obstacles to shailah-asking. The first one applies specifically to women, and the others apply women and men alike. These certainly aren't the only such obstacles, but they are the only ones I managed to identify with corresponding insights from this parashah. 

Psychological Obstacle #1: Gender

When learning Torah it is often instructive to take note of what the Torah doesn't say, in addition to what it actually says. It is easy to overlook the simple fact that the Daughters of Tzelofchad did not hesitate to approach Moshe, Elazar, and the Leaders of the nation on account of their gender. They didn't say, "we're women, and it wouldn't be appropriate for us to appear before these distinguished men" or "we're women, so these men wouldn't listen to us" or "we're women - of what value is our opinion?" or anything having to do with their gender. 

Likewise, they weren't criticized by these men or by the Torah in any way for asking their question. They received an answer just the same as anyone else, without any fanfare - positive or negative - as the asking of a shailah should be.

There has been an uproar in recent years about certain ultra-religious communities which refuse to feature pictures of women - even modestly dressed women - in magazines or illustrations of women in children's books in order to avoid any form of "gazing at women." In stark contrast, the Daughters of Tzelofchad took center stage, "before Moshe, before Elazar, before the Leaders and the entire assembly at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting." They didn't send their message through an intermediary, nor did they stand behind a mechitzah (partition), nor did they opt to appoint only one of their party to present their case. They all stood there and spoke in public in front of all these men. 

There is something compelling about the stark contrast between the way that these ultra-religious communities would react to the prospect of women appearing in front of their rabbinic council, and the matter-of-fact way that the Torah recounts the case of the Daughters of Tzelofchad. 

But the essential point is simple: when it comes to asking shailos, the Torah is egalitarian, even though the real world (unfortunately) isn't. 

Psychological Obstacle #2: Embarrassment 

The Ralbag derives a lesson for all Jews from the fact that the Daughters of Tzelofchad asked their question. He writes:

[This story] informs us that it is not proper for a person to refrain from bringing his case in front of the authorities on account of boshes (shame); rather it is proper for him to strive to do this (i.e. to present his case) with enthusiasm and diligence in order to get what he deserves. We see that the daughters of Tzelofchad were not embarrassed to bring their case before Moshe and before Elazar ha'Kohen and before the leaders and the entire assembly in order to attain what they sought in regards to the matter of inheritance, which they asked about correctly, as we explained. 

There is no indication from the Ralbag that this "shame" and "embarrassment" - or rather, the lack thereof - had anything to do with gender. It is reasonable to assume that he was talking about the general feeling of self-consciousness which prevents both men and women from asking their rabbi questions. 

Chazal identify this problematic type of boshes in the famous statement in Avos 2:5: "lo ha'bayshan lomeid" ("one who is ashamed / embarrassed will not learn"). Although that mishnah is about learning Torah in general rather than asking shailos, the nature of the boshes is often the same in any case. The intrepid student worries: "What if my question is dumb?" "What if they laugh at me?" "What if they get angry at me for asking it?" The rationalizations generated by such boshes are innumerable. 

The fact that the Daughters of Tzelofchad didn't succumb to this boshes is noteworthy enough for the Ralbag to point it out as a lesson for the rest of us. 

Psychological Obstacle #3: "Never mind. It's Not Worth It"

It is interesting how the Ralbag formulates his praise of the Daughters of Tzelofchad. He says that they "were not embarrassed to bring their case before Moshe and before Elazar ha'Kohen and before the leaders and the entire assembly in order to attain what they sought in regards to the matter of inheritance." He doesn't laud their chochmah (wisdom), or their legal reasoning, or even their devotion to the proper observance of halacha. He praises them for the fact that they went this far in order to get what they wanted. 

This sounds like a trivial point, but I think it's worth mentioning. I've had many students who have wanted to do some enjoyable activity or partake in a pleasure or even obtain a real benefit which they think might assur (prohibited). I tell them to ask their rabbi, in case there's a heter (reason to permit) or a kula (leniency) which they're unaware of. When I check in with them a few days later and ask, "So, what did your rav say?" they answer: "Oh, I decided not to ask him." When I hear this, I want to exclaim: "What? Why! This is something you looked forward to doing! The worst he can say is, 'No,' in which case you'd be right where you are now, but the best case scenario is that he says, 'Yes' and you'll get to enjoy yourself!" And yet, I sympathize with how easy it is to just say, "It's not worth it," and give up on the matter without asking. It's easy to give up long-term pleasure on account of immediate anxiety. 

When I think of the Ralbag's emphasis on the Bnos Tzelofchad asking a shailah to obtain what they want, I am reminded of my Rosh Yeshiva's explanation of an obscure midrash on the pasuk: "When you eat the labor of your hands, you are praiseworthy, and it is good for you" (Tehilim 128:2). The midrash applies our pasuk to a talmid chacham (Torah scholar) who is confronted with the meat of an animal which is a safek treifah (i.e. the carcass of properly slaughtered kosher animal which might nevertheless turn out to be prohibited, depending on whether it exhibits certain physical defects). Rather than just throw out the meat, this talmid chacham applies his halachic knowledge to it an attempt to find a basis for permitting it:

Mar Zutra expounded in the name of Rav Chisda: any talmid chacham who reads [Written Torah], learns [Oral Torah], and is meshamesh talmidei chachamim (i.e. is skilled in the methods of abstract halachic analysis) and assesses a treifah on his own, the pasuk says about him: "you are praiseworthy, and it is good for you."

My Rosh Yeshiva pointed out that this is diametrically opposed to the "frum" (religious) mentality. The frum person would "play it safe" and discard the treifah rather than rely on his own halachic knowledge and run the risk of possibly violating a prohibition. This midrash advocates the opposite approach: as long as a person makes recourse to the halachic system in a responsible and objective manner - in this case, relying on his expert application of halachic analysis and psak (halachic adjudication) - then there is nothing wrong with trying to maximize personal enjoyment from Olam ha'Zeh (This World), even when a halachic doubt is involved. To the contrary, not only is "it good" for him, since he gets to enjoy the meat, but he is even considered to be "praiseworthy" by the Torah. 

Although the Daughters of Tzelofchad were not relying on their own halachic analysis in this case - which would have been an exceedingly arrogant move, given the fact that Moshe Rabbeinu was still alive - the "moral of the midrash" as explained by my Rosh Yeshiva applies. They could have been frum and said, "never mind, I don't need to ask; everyone else is probably right about their application of the halacha anyway" and forfeiting their inheritance, they strove "to attain what they sought," and believed to be rightfully theirs. 

One might object to this line of reasoning, saying: "Of course the Daughters of Tzelofchad asked their shailah! It's their inheritance! Do you really think they ever considered not asking Moshe?" My answer is: you'd be surprised by the cases I've heard in which people have refrained from asking their posek potentially life-changing shailos based on the types of excuses we've been talking about. I don't want to go into detail about these examples (out of respect for privacy), but it's not that hard for me to imagine a person refusing to ask a shailah even when there's a lot at stake. A person's anxiety doesn't care whether or not she's being rational. 

The willingness to strive to obtain what we want doesn't seem like it should be noteworthy, but the fact that many people don't means that those who do should be recognized for their success in overcoming their inner impediments. 

Psychological Obstacle #4: Bureaucratic Barriers

The last obstacle I'd like to discuss is based on the Abravanel's interpretation. He writes:

The statement "and they stood before Moshe, before Elazar ha'Kohen, and before the Leaders and the entire assembly" indicates that these Daughters first went before Moshe and said to him: "Our master, we have come for judgment." He responded: "Did I not give Israel officers of thousands, officers of hundreds, officers of fifties, and officers of tens? Go before them! Why are you asking me about a matter of law?" And they went before Elazar ha'Kohen, for Aharon had died, and he responded similarly. And they went before the leaders and the officers of the people and told them their argument. They responded: "This matters in included in 'a difficult matter [of judgment]' and we have not heard its law. Go to Moshe, for it is written: 'the difficult matter they would bring to Moshe [and the minor thing they themselves would judge]' (Shemos 18:26). 

Once the Daughters saw that no one would listen to them, this one saying go to the officers, and [the officers] saying to go to Moshe, they acted strategically and waited until all of them - namely, Moshe, Elazar, the leaders, and the officers of the assembly - were gathered together at the entrance of the Tent of meeting: "and they stood before Moshe, before Elazar ha'Kohen, and before the Leaders" and they stated their argument in front of all of them, saying, "Look, now! Whoever is fit to judge this, come and judge it!" 

I find it somewhat odd that the Abravanel explains this pasuk in a manner which paints such a negative picture of the ordeal experienced by the Daughters of Tzelofchad, but if we accept his interpretation, then we see another quality that these women had: fortitude and cunning when dealing with bureaucracy. 

Nobody likes to deal with bureaucracy. It is easy to give up, especially when sent in circles, as the Abravanel described. But not only did the Daughters of Tzelofchad not give up. They cut right through the bureaucratic red tape and set up a situation in which the authorities were forced to respond, on their terms. 

This might not always be possible in real life. Sometimes there's just no way. But we see from the Daughters of Tzelofchad that even when it seems like there's no way, you have to at least try to make a way. 

Conclusion

My heart goes out to everyone - both women and men - who face these psychological obstacles which make it difficult for them to ask their shailos. I hope that these lessons from the Daughters of Tzelofchad can provide some inspiration and encouragement for those who struggle. 

Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara

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Parashas Balak: One Reason Why Women Should Learn Gemara 

Two Like-minded Rebellions 

Zimri ben Salu, prince of the tribe of Shimon, staged a public rebellion against Moshe: 

Behold! A man from the house of Israel came and brought near a Midianite woman in the sight of Moshe and in the sight of the entire assembly of the Children of Israel, and they (i.e. Moshe and the Children of Israel) were crying at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. (Bamidbar 25:6) 

Rashi, citing a midrash in Sanhedrin 82a, fills in the details of Zimri’s public demonstration: 

[Zimi] seized [Cozbi, the Midianite woman] by her hair and brought her before Moshe. “Son of Amram,” he exclaimed, “is this woman forbidden or permitted? And if you say, ‘she is forbidden,’ then who permitted you [to marry] Yisro’s daughter [Tzipora]?” 

This isn’t the first time that a leader of Israel challenged Moshe by attempting to undermine his halachic authority. The most famous instance was the rebellion of Korach. The midrash Tanchuma fills in the details of Korach’s confrontation with Moshe: 

What did [Korach] do? He arose and gathered 250 heads of courts … and he dressed them in tallisos (prayer shawls) made entirely of techeiles (i.e. the blue threads which it is a mitzvah to incorporate into the tzitzis – white fringes – on every four-cornered garment). They came and stood before Moshe. They said to him, “A tallis made entirely of techeiles – is it obligated in tzitzis or exempt?” He said to them, “Obligated.” They began to laugh at him, [saying,] “Is it possible that [in the case of] a tallis is made entirely out of another [color of] material, a single thread of techeiles exempts it, [but] this [tallis] which is made entirely of techeiles will not exempt itself?” 

There are clear parallels between the rebellions of Zimri and Korach. Both were driven by personal motives: Zimri by his lust for non-Jewish women, and Korach by his jealousy over the leadership positions held by his cousins, Moshe and Aharon. Both Zimi and Korach staged public acts of defiance which aimed to discredit Moshe in the eyes of the assembly. Both sought to undermine Moshe’s authority by showing that halacha is ridiculous, and should therefore not be taken seriously. 

Anyone who has even a basic knowledge of halacha can see through the childish arguments made by Zimri and Korach. Why was Tziporah permitted to Moshe? Because they got married before Matan Torah (the Giving of the Torah), when there was no halacha prohibiting a Jew from marrying a non-Jew! In fact, before Matan Torah, there were no “Jews” in a technical sense. Both Moshe and Tziporah were halachically non-Jewish, and both became Jews at the same time as the rest of the Children of Israel, after the Torah was given and the covenant was made. Why does a tallis made entirely of techeiles still require a thread of techeiles? Because the halacha states that every four-cornered garment, no matter what color, is obligated in tzitzis and techeiles! Although Korach might be able to argue that there is no philosophical purpose to the thread of techeiles on a tallis made entirely of techeiles, this would have no bearing on the halachic requirements of the mitzvah, since we never make halachic rulings on the basis of philosophical considerations. 

Rationalization of “Going Off the Derech” (i.e. Becoming Irreligious) 

Every year, usually at springtime, I am asked to give a presentation to the 12th graders about how to retain and continue to develop their Orthodox Jewish identity after graduation, when they venture out into the secular world as young adults. One of the main points I make and stress is that the human being cannot tolerate cognitive dissonance for an extended period of time. If there is a contradiction between one’s beliefs, ideas, and values on the one hand, and one’s desires, actions, and habits on the other, the latter will tend to prevail. The most common means by which this will occur is theological rationalization. 

In other words, a person will not, in the long-run, be able to say, “I believe that the Torah is true and halacha is binding, but I don’t keep such-and-such halacha because I can’t help myself.” The cognitive dissonance and negative self-image will be too much for the psyche to bear for any prolonged period of time. Instead, she will rationalize her violation of halacha, coming up with spurious reasons as to why the halacha doesn’t make sense, or why it shouldn’t apply in her situation, or – in the most severe cases – why halacha as a whole is irrational. The individual will convince herself that her abandonment of halacha stems from her arguments, but in reality, the reverse is true: first she made the decision to abandon halacha, and only afterwards did she come up with arguments to retroactively justify her behavior. 

My decade of experience as a high school teacher, combined with my exposure to hundreds of “off-the-derech Jews” on the internet and social media platforms, have shown me countless examples of how flimsy these types of theological rationalizations tend to be. Every day online I encounter lapsed Jews making laughably fallacious and counterfactual lines of reasoning in support of their irreligious life choices. They think that their Clever, Enlightened, Superior minds have discovered a Truth which their religious brethren are too Dull-witted or Brainwashed to have spotted. They do not realize how ignorant, simplistic, and baseless their arguments are. 

[To be clear: I am not saying that anyone who goes off the derech is ipso facto a self-deceiving ignoramus whose arguments are all straw-men. I have encountered many Jews who do have knowledge of Judaism but have rejected it because of powerful questions and substantial philosophical arguments to which they could not find satisfactory answers. It just so happens that such individuals are rare, and tend not to be as vocal and militantly anti-religious on the internet. I also know Jews who went off the derech for personal reasons (e.g. tragedy, abuse, familial or martial relationship problems, etc.), and while these Jews may also engage in anti-religious rhetoric without substance, their situation ought to be viewed differently.] 

Rav Soloveitchik on Women Learning Gemara 

I will preface this next section with a disclaimer. The topic of whether women may or should learn Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah) and Gemara (Talmud) is vast, nuanced, and fraught with difficulty. We will not even attempt to present an in-depth analysis or comprehensive overview of the topic in this article. Instead, the scope of this topic will be limited to a single statement of a single rabbinic authority: that of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik (a.k.a. “The Rav”). 

On May 27, 1953, the Rav wrote a letter to Rabbi Leonard Rosenfeld on the topic of teaching Torah she’baal Peh to girls in a coeducational Jewish day school. Here is the letter in its entirety; the underlined portions do not appear in the original, and were added by me for emphasis: 

Dear Rabbi Rosenfeld,

Please accept my apologies for not answering your letters sooner. The delay was due to my overcrowded schedule. As to your question with regard to a curriculum in a coeducational school, I expressed my opinion to you long ago that it would be a very regrettable oversight on our part if we were to arrange separate Hebrew courses for girls. Not only is the teaching of Torah she’baal Peh to girls permissible, but it is nowadays an absolute imperative. This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction which is still advocated by certain groups within our Orthodox community has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism. Boys and girls alike should be introduced into the inner halls of Torah she’baal Peh.

I hope to prepare in the near future a halakhic brief on the problem which will exhaust the various aspects of the same. In the meantime I heartily endorse a uniform program for the entire student body.

With kindest personal regards, I remain
Sincerely yours,
Joseph Soloveitchik 

The Rav is unequivocal in his endorsement of women learning Torah she’baal Peh in exactly the same manner as men. Practically speaking, this means that girls should study Gemara and be trained in the rigors of Talmudic analysis to the same extent and following the same methods and curriculum as boys. Although the Rav was addressing a coed school, there is no reason to believe that he would hold differently about an all-girls school or seminary. 

The only part of the Rav’s letter which is unclear is his statement that “This policy of discrimination between the sexes as to subject manner and method of instruction … has contributed greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” The question is: How so? How does teaching women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud prevent this deterioration? 

Halachic Thinking and Assimilation 

I don’t know how the Rav would answer this question, but I do have my own answer. The failure to train Jewish girls and women in the highest levels of Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud renders them susceptible to the specious arguments used to denigrate and delegitimize halacha. 

A well-trained yeshiva bochur (a young man engaged in post-high school Torah study in a rabbinic seminary) should be able to spot the flaws in anti-halachic sophistry with relative ease, due to the depth and breadth of his halachic knowledge, as well as the critical thinking skills he has acquired from his Talmudic training. But what about bas Yisrael (Jewish woman) who is only familiar with halacha on a simple level? How would she respond to an accusation of halachic hypocrisy, like Zimri’s, or a pseudo-halachic polemical protest, like Korach’s? Ask her a question about a detail of halachic practice and she may know the answer, but present a critique of Torah as a system which is rhetorically engineered to make halacha seem foolish, outdated, or unreasonable, and what is she supposed to do? How can we expect her to know what to say or think in response? 

This, I believe, is why neglecting to teach young women Torah she’baal Peh and Talmud “contributes greatly to the deterioration and downfall of traditional Judaism.” Women who do not have a firm grasp of the inner-workings of halacha and the nature of halachic thinking are particularly vulnerable to the false claims about halacha and false critiques of its validity. 

If this was true in the 1950’s when the Rav penned his letter to Rabbi Rosenfeld, then it is even truer in today’s world. Almost every Modern Orthodox girl has unfettered access (via the internet and social media) to all of the anti-halacha arguments under the sun. Teenagers and young adults are already at an age that is prone to rebellion and experimentation. Combine this with the dwindling numbers of religious people in general, and the increase in anti-religious sentiment on college campuses – both of which will make her a minority amid a hostile majority – and how can we expect her religiosity to survive intact through the crucible of her college years? Even if she remains religious, her internal conviction in Judaism will undoubtedly suffer due to the questions and doubts that have been raised and gone unanswered. 

This is one of the main reasons why I believe that girls should learn Gemara just like boys. This is also one of the long-term objectives in my own introductory Gemara course. Many of the girls in my class have never learned Gemara before, so the responsibility lies with me to give them a strong foundation. I don’t particularly care whether my female students retain knowledge of the details of what we learn. If they graduate from high school with enough Talmudic experience to appreciate halacha as a system, to be able to differentiate between the taamei ha’mitzvos (philosophical reasons for the commandments) and the technical halacha itself, and to have begun to realize that halacha operates based on its own internal principles and halachic reasoning rather than common sense, then I have done my job. 

And if I have done my job successfully, then perhaps I will have helped stem the tide of assimilation, thereby giving the next generation of Orthodox Jews a better chance to survive and thrive in Torah.

Truman: On What Ruins a President

I was going to wait until January 20th to post this, but considering all of the unrest about Trump's election, I thought it might be beneficial to post it now.

Trump (#45) and Truman (#33) - sharing the first four letters of their surnames, and not much else

Truman: On What Ruins a President

One of the best biographies I have ever read is Merle Miller's Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (1974). There are many memorable (and quotable) passages in this book, but when I think about the upcoming inauguration of our 45th U.S. president, two passages come to mind. The first is about the the danger of becoming a President. Harry Truman said:

"You see the thing you have to remember. When you get to be President, there are all those things, the honors, the twenty-one-gun salutes, all those things, you have to remember it isn't for you. It's for the Presidency, and you've got to keep yourself separate from that in your mind ... If you can't keep the two separate, yourself and the Presidency, you're in all kinds of trouble." 

[Miller said to Truman:] Jonathan Daniels says in one of his books that - I hope you'll forgive me - he was very upset when he was a boy, and he and a friend were passing the White House, and his friend reminded him that the President - I believe it was Coolidge at the time - the President had to go to the bathroom just like everybody else.  

"That's right. We've had a few Presidents who've not remembered a thing like that, and the minute it happens, you can't possibly do the job" (pp.203)

The second passage is about what ruins a man:

[Truman] said, "Do you want to know what I think causes the ruination of a lot of men?" 

I said that I most certainly did. The question is one that has occurred to me now and again. 

"Well," Mr. Truman said, "I've made a great, long study of these things, as you can see up there if you've looked." 

He pointed to the bookshelves, which, as I've said, mostly contained biographies and histories. 

"Three things ruin a man if you want to know what I believe. One's power, one's money, and one's women. 

"If a man can accept a situation in a place of power with the thought that it's only temporary, he comes out all right. But when he thinks that he is the cause of the power, that can be his ruination. 

"And when a man has too much money too soon, that has the same effect on him. He just never gets to understanding that getting enough money to eat and getting a roof over his head is the thing that throughout history most people have spent their lives trying to do and haven't succeeded. ... If you've got too much money too soon, it ruins you by setting you too far apart from most of the human race. 

"And a man who is not loyal to his family, to his wife and his mother and his sisters can be ruined if he has a complex in that direction. If he has the right woman as a partner, he never has any trouble. But if he has the wrong one or if he's mixed up with a bunch of whores, why, then he's in a hell of a fix. And I can name them to you, the ones that got mixed up in that way. But we won't do it now. 

"Those three things, though, in my opinion, power, money, and women in that order, are what most often contribute to the ruination of a man. You read your history and you'll find out" (pp.342-343).

If we accept Truman's theory about what ruins a man, then we can be quite certain that Trump will be ruined. We know he has problems when it comes to women: his fidelity to his wives, his treatment of his daughter, and most of all, the way he treats and views women in general. We know he has problems with money: he definitely "got too much money too soon," and it is fair to say that he lives a life "too far apart from most of the human race." And Trump's desire for power, while maybe not as great as Hillary Clinton's, is evident in everything he does.

Suffice it to say, this does not bode well. 

The real question to my mind is whether Trump will be able to keep himself and the presidency separate. I am inclined to think not. The only source of hope I have is that Trump has consistently surprised everyone, and has defied almost all predictions. I hope this will be the case here as well.

Let us pray that our new President can keep himself separate from the Presidency, and that his power, money, and his way of relating to women do not lead to his ruination and the ruination of our country.

Parashas Bechukosai: Why are Women Worth Less than Men?

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Preface: I struggled with the title of this blog post. I wanted it to be attention-grabbing in the same way as the pesukim themselves are attention-grabbing, but I also wanted a title which will be read in one way by a reactive person (who will likely dismiss it), and in another way by someone who is more open-minded and is willing to investigate before drawing conclusions - since that is one of the major points of this blog post. 

Artwork: Ardent Plea, by Chippy

Parashas Bechukosai: Why are Women Worth Less than Men?

The Facts

The final chapter of Sefer Vayikra begins with the laws of arachim - a type of vow which allows a person to donate the monetary equivalent of the value of one's field, one's house, one's animal, or the value of a human being to the building fund of the Beis ha'Mikdash. 

In the case of a pledged field, house, or animal, the Kohen evaluates the worth of the item on an individual basis. However, when it comes to pledging the value of a human being, the Torah establishes fixed amounts based solely on age and sex. This valuation of human beings doesn't take into account any other qualities: wealth, health, appearance, mental capacity, tribe, or even whether a person is a Jew or a gentile.

The Torah she'bi'Chsav explicitly states the value for each age/sex combination:

The valuation of a male shall be: for someone twenty years to sixty years of age, the valuation shall be fifty silver shekels, of the sacred shekel. If she is female, the valuation shall be thirty shekels. And if from five to twenty years of age, the valuation of a male shall be twenty shekels and of a female ten shekels. And if from one month to five years of age, the valuation shall be five silver shekels; and for a female, the valuation shall be three silver shekels. And if from sixty years and up, if for a male, the valuation shall be fifteen shekels; and for a female, ten shekels (Vayikra 27:3-7)

Here is the same information in the form of a table, incorporating some modifications from Torah she'baal Peh:

The Questions

I presented these facts to some of my students today. As I anticipated, one of them reacted by exclaiming: "WHAT?! HOW CAN THE TORAH SAY THAT MEN ARE WORTH MORE THAN WOMEN? THAT IS INCREDIBLY SEXIST!"  

To this student, and to anyone else who might respond in a likewise fashion, I would say the following: "Clearly, you are bothered by what the Torah says, and you have a legitimate question. Let's see if we can formulate your question in a clearer and more precise fashion."

Thankfully, the Abravanel does an excellent job of articulating the questions. He writes:

1. Why did the Torah establish the values of arachin vows for human beings? It would have been more fitting to entrust [this task] to the Kohen to evaluate each person in accordance with his or her value. For example, there might be a person who is worth 100 [shekels] and another person who isn't even worth 10. Just as the fields, and properties, and animals are evaluated by the Kohen, why aren't people evaluated in the same manner?  

2. Why did the Torah differentiate between the value of a male and the value of a female, seeing as how both of them are human beings, as it is stated, "male and female He created them" (Bereishis 1:27) "and He called their name 'man'" (ibid. 5:4)? In the realm of damages we see, "If the ox shall gore a slave or a maidservant, thirty silver shekels" (Shemos 21:32) - without making a differentiation between male and female. Why is the matter like this in this mitzvah? 

3. Why don't these valuations have a specific and set ratio between the male and the female? Between the ages of 20 and 60 the value of a female is 3/5ths the value of a male. From age 5 to 20 the value of a female is half the value of a male. From one month to 5 years the value of a female is 3/5ths the value of a male. And from 60 years and up the value of a female is 2/3rds the value of a male. It behooves us to investigate why this is the case. 

Let's take a moment to appreciate the difference between my student's initial reaction and the Abravanel's questions. The student was bothered by these facts and immediately jumped to a conclusion that the Torah was being sexist (i.e. discriminating against women out of the belief that they are inferior). In contrast, the Abravanel approached the area with the objective mindset of a scientist, looking for patterns, anomalies, and clues which might lead to deeper insight. This step of formulating the questions is critical. Even if we don't end up finding satisfactory answers, we will still have moved one step forward towards understanding.

An Approach

I would like to present Rav Hirsch's explanation, which answers the Abravanel's questions. His answers might not appeal to everyone, but I believe this is a good example of a valid and fruitful type of approach or method.

Rav Hirsch begins by examining the facts in search of some foothold from which to develop a comprehensive theory. He writes:

The eirech (valuation) of a male in these stages of life is 5, 20, 50, and 15 shekels, respectively. The eirech of a female is 3, 10, 30, and 10 shekels, respectively. These fixed amounts surely were not chosen arbitrarily, without reason. Since they do not take into account the physical, spiritual, moral, and social uniqueness of each nefesh (soul/being), and they vary only according to gender and age, it must be that they represent some common factor that is equal in all the nefashos, and that varies only according to age and gender.

Rav Hirsch's first deduction is a solid one. Unlike other areas of halacha, where we factor in a person's qualities, background, or circumstances, the laws of arachin are only interested in the subject's age and gender. Whatever these numbers represent, they must somehow be tied only to gender and age. Rav Hirsch continues:

Furthermore, since we are dealing here with erkecha nefashos la'Shem, with the national valuation of persons for God and His Sanctuary, it follows that this factor - common to all the nefashos and modified only by age and gender - pertains to the relation of these nefashos to God and to His Sanctuary. If we are not mistaken, then there is no factor that is common to all the nefashos as regards their relation to God and His Sanctuary, and that varies only according to age and gender, other than the task and mission of life that are given to every nefesh. On this basis we can explain the meaning of the numbers given here by Scripture, which rise and fall according to age and gender. 

This is the crux of Rav Hirsch's theory, namely, if we are evaluating eirech nefashos la'Shem ("the value of souls to Hashem"), and if this valuation is determined solely on the basis of age and gender, then these numbers must have something to do with "the task and mission of life that are given to every nefesh" - irrespective of any other personal quality. We will now see how he develops this approach:

Let us compare the numbers fixed for a male, namely, 5, 20, 50, and 15, to the numbers fixed for a female, namely 3, 10, 30, 10. Bear in mind that the full eierch amount for an adult male from the age of 20 to the age of 60 is 50 shekels, whereas the full eirech amount for an adult female is 30 shekels and that both these numbers - 30 and 50 - are 10 times the eirech of an infant girl or boy, whose eirech is 3 or 5. It appears, then, that we are not mistaken in proposing that the key to the whole scale is the numbers 3, 5, and 10. 3 is the signature of the female's life mission; 5 is the signature of the male's life mission; and 10 is a sign of completion and perfection.

Allow me to repeat this last point for emphasis: Rav Hirsch infers that 5 represents man's life mission; 3 represents woman's life mission; 10 signifies completion and perfection. How do these values make any sense? Rav Hirsch explains:

We venture to suggest that the home and the family - man, woman, and child - are represented by the number 3, whereas the society is represented by the number 2, as we often find in the Torah. Accordingly, the family and the society together would be represented by the number 5. The number 3 is the signature of woman's mission, namely, the family and the home, whereas the number 5 is the signature of man's mission, namely, the family and the society.

Rav Hirsch is working with the premise that a woman's life-mission pertains primarily to realm of the home, whereas a man is responsible for his home and his community. The number 3 represents the home, insofar as the smallest family unit is three people (man, woman, and child). I don't know where Rav Hirsch gets the idea from that society is represented by the number 2, but he seems to maintain that this is a recurring theme throughout Torah, and - for the purposes of this blog post - we'll take his word for it. Thus, woman's number is 3 (home) whereas man's number is 5, which is the sum of home (3) + community (2).

Now Rav Hirsch explains how these numbers account for all of the different values at each stage:

The eirech of an infant boy and of an infant girl starts with these two numbers, which signify the mission of man and woman. This eirech remains fixed for them, until they reach a trainable age, at the end of their 5th year.

From the end of the 5th year to the end of the 20th year are the years of training and completion in preparation for their mission. The preparation of the woman is on one level - preparation for the home; and its signature is 10. The preparation of the man is on two levels - preparation for the home and for the society; and its signature is 20. 

From the end of the 20th year to the end of the 60th year are the years of the full attainment of the male and female missions. The signature of this full attainment - as regards the woman's mission - is the product of 10 and 3: 30; whereas as regards the man's mission, it is the product of 10 and 5: 50.

From the end of the 60th year until the end of a person's life are the years of ziknah (old age) - the years of the harvest of life. As regards one's work as an individual, one can look back with satisfaction at the completed edifice of his life. As regards one's work in society, one can look back at least at a substantial contribution to the community. Hence, for the woman, whose work is in the individual realm, the signature of ziknah is a number representing completion: 10; whereas for the man, whose work is in the individual realm and also in the societal realm, the signature of ziknah is a number representing completion, plus partial completion: 10 + 5 = 15.

If one accepts Rav Hirsch's initial interpretation of the key numbers (i.e. 3, 5, and 10), then his interpretation of each of the stages fits quite nicely. To sum it up:

• 1 month to 5 years - pre-training: at this stage, prior to embarking on the preparation for one's life mission, we have the "base value" representing the life-task of each gender: the value of the male (5) and the value of the female (3), without any degree of completion (no 10s)
• 6 to 20 years - training for the mission: since 10 signifies the process of perfection, the woman's value lies in her single track of perfection (i.e. the realm of family) whereas the man's value lies in his dual-track of perfection (i.e. the realm of family and community); therefore, the woman's value at this stage is represented by a single 10, whereas the man's value reflects his dual track, and is a double-10 (i.e. 20). 
• 21 to 60 years - full attainment of mission: the Torah signifies a completed life-task as a product of the number representing completion (10) and the number representing the life-task of that specific gender. Thus, the man's value during this time is 10 x 5 = 50, whereas the woman's is 10 x 3 = 30.
• 61 years and up - the harvest of life: this value reflects what has been accomplished after the prime of one's life; the woman can look back at her contribution as being totally complete; in contrast, the man can only claim total completion in his family life, but only partial completion in the realm of his societal contributions; thus, the woman's value is the number of completion (10) whereas the man's is full completion plus partial completion (10 + 5 = 15).

This answers all three of the Abravanel's questions. 

1. Why did the Torah establish the values and not leave it up to the Kohen? Because the values here signify the life-missions of the age and gender to which the individual belongs - not the particular qualities of that individual, as is the case in the valuation of animals, houses, and land.

2. Why did the Torah differentiate between the valuation of men and women? Because their life-missions lie in different realms: the woman's is in the home, and the man's is in the home and in the community.

3. Why the differing ratios? Because the numbers are significant because of what they represent at each stage of life - not the intrinsic value of each gender. 

Upon hearing Rav Hirsch's explanation, my student said, "But the man is still worth more than the woman!" I responded that Rav Hirsch isn't necessarily learning that the monetary value of the ararchim-vow is an actual appraisal of the worth of the human being in the same way that a price tag indicates the value of the item. Rather, he is learning these arachim-valuations as symbolic - using fixed numbers as symbols to reflect ideas about the respective life-tasks of men and women.

An example of this type of numerical symbolism can be seen in the common Jewish practice of making donations in multiples of 18, which represents the numerical value of חי (chai = life). Imagine if everyone who would have donated $18 would donate $20 instead. From a strictly fiscal standpoint, $20 donations are much better. Nevertheless, people often want the amount they donate to represent something, or to convey a message. Donating $18 might provide less monetary value than donating $20, but it is superior in the message it conveys through the significance of the number 18.

I believe that is how Rav Hirsch regards these arachim-valuations. Yes, it is true that a woman who pledges her eirech will, in fact, be donating less money to the Beis ha'Mikdash than her male counterpart, but I think that it is a mistake to view this as indicative of women being inferior to men. This is especially true considering that this explanation comes from Rav Hirsch, who emphasizes the equality of men and women elsewhere in his Torah commentary.

Guess what? The student who objected ended up saying that she liked Rav Hirsch's explanation, and didn't find it to be sexist. That's great, but even great is the value of the methodology lesson that the student gained: things aren't always as they first appear, and if you take the time to formulate good questions, and approach your analysis in a deliberate and thoughtful manner, perhaps you'll find something you didn't expect.

Afterthought (5/30/19): 

Upon revisiting this post, I thought of another analogy. Women have two X chromosomes in each cell, whereas men have one X and one Y. Imagine if, upon first learning this fact, a student exclaimed, “THAT IS INCREDIBLY SEXIST! Why should a MAN get TWO types of chromosomes and a woman get stuck with just an extra of the same type?” We would all recognize such a question as being immature and misguided – and yet, when a person asks a question like this about the structure of a mitzvah, then it is often treated as a legitimate critique of Torah. 

This double-standard reveals a difference in the way people approach the empirical sciences versus the way they approach the analysis of Torah and mitzvos. This difference can be boiled down to two points: (1) in the sciences, people accept facts as facts, and (2) they recognize that these facts are determined by chochmah (wisdom) – namely, the lawfulness of nature. But when it comes to Torah and mitzvos, (1) people often refuse to even accept the facts as facts, and (2) they attribute the facts to social causes (e.g. “primitive beliefs about the world,” “outdated social norms,” “Old, white, cisgendered rabbis upholding the patriarchy under the guise of religion in order to oppress women and rob them of their power”). 

Ultimately, when analyzing Torah and mitzvos, the question is this: Do you regard the facts of Torah as being authored by the same Creator as the facts of nature? If so, then you should approach them with the same analytical objectivity, letting your investigation be guided by the facts and the nature of the subject matter, unencumbered by preexisting prejudices. If not, then on what basis do you make this distinction? If this latter question cannot be answered, then chances are it stems from some form of emotional prejudice or bias rather than from a genuine analysis of what Torah and mitzvos are.