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Parashas Shelach: Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah
In the penultimate section of this week's parashah we find the incident of the Mekoshesh Eitzim ("the gatherer of wood," as the phrase is conventionally translated). Here is the short story in its entirety:
The Children of Israel were in the Wilderness and they found a man gathering wood on the Sabbath day. Those who found him gathering wood brought him to Moshe and Aharon, and to the entire assembly. They placed him in custody, for it had not been clarified what should be done to him.
Hashem said to Moshe: "This man shall be put to death; the entire assembly shall pelt him with stones outside of the camp."
The entire assembly removed him to the outside of the camp; they pelted him with stones and he died, as Hashem had commanded Moshe (Bamidbar 15:32-36).
Perhaps the most basic question we can ask is: What are we supposed to learn from this story?
One thing is for certain: the story is here to teach us the penalty for Shabbos desecration. According to Sifrei (Shelach 57), Bnei Yisrael knew that Shabbos desecration was liable for the death penalty, but they didn't know which of the four death penalties to administer: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), or chenek (strangulation). Indeed, according to the pshat (straightforward meaning) of the pesukim, there there wouldn't have been much - if any - need for the Torah to report this incident had Moshe Rabbeinu and Bnei Yisrael known which death penalty to administer.
This raises a difficulty: Why didn't Hashem inform Moshe and Bnei Yisrael of the precise specific penalty for Shabbos desecration? They had already been told, "Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day is an ultimate, holy cessation [from melachah]; whoever does melachah shall surely be put to death" (Shemos 31:15). Why wasn't the particular death penalty taught at the same time? What could possibly be gained by delaying the release of this critical information?
The Baalei Tosafos (bottom of Bava Basra 119a) provide some much needed insight into this matter. They explain that according to Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah), any time Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) uses the generic phrase "he shall surely be put to death" (mos yumas), we are to interpret this as referring to chenek (death by strangulation). Why, then, was Moshe even in doubt? He should have ruled that the mekoshesh eitzim should be put to death by chenek, and there would be no need to ask Hashem for clarification.
The Baalei Tosafos answer as follows:
In light of this Tosafos, perhaps we can resolve our difficulty. Why didn't Hashem inform Moshe and Bnei Yisrael of the precise specific penalty for Shabbos desecration? Apparently, because it was necessary for Moshe to arrive at this conclusion on his own based on the relationship between Shabbos and avodah zarah. And since it was necessary for Moshe to confirm his theory by consulting Hashem, thereby putting the death sentence of the desecrator on hold, the whole incident of the mekoshesh took on the character of a "breaking news story" and garnered a tremendous amount of publicity. Not only was this the first time anyone had violated Shabbos, but the entire nation was forced to wait with bated breath for the fate of the transgressor to be decreed by the Almighty, Himself. And when that ruling was finally handed down, Moshe Rabbeinu (with an emphasis on "Rabbeinu") almost certainly used this as an opportunity to draw attention to the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.
Thus, not only did this divinely orchestrated publicity stunt underscore the severity of Shabbos desecration in the eyes of the entire nation, but it also brought awareness to the important principle that Shabbos-desecration and avodah zarah are conceptually linked, and are equal in their severity.
In case you don't buy this theory, it just so happens that another Rishon (early medieval authority) arrived at the same conclusion - albeit through an entirely different route. I am speaking of the Ralbag, who also learns that the story of the mekoshesh eitzim was placed in our parashah to highlight the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.
The Ralbag arrives at his conclusion not from an analysis of the event itself, but from the placement of this story within the parashah. The topic which appears right before the story of the mekoshesh is - you guessed it - avodah zarah! In these preceding pesukim the Torah presents the laws of korbanos (sacrifices) to atone for unintentional public avodah zarah and for individual worship of avodah zarah. The pesukim immediately before the story of the mekoshesh teach the penalty for intentional worship of avodah zarah:
The Baalei Tosafos (bottom of Bava Basra 119a) provide some much needed insight into this matter. They explain that according to Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah), any time Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) uses the generic phrase "he shall surely be put to death" (mos yumas), we are to interpret this as referring to chenek (death by strangulation). Why, then, was Moshe even in doubt? He should have ruled that the mekoshesh eitzim should be put to death by chenek, and there would be no need to ask Hashem for clarification.
The Baalei Tosafos answer as follows:
Moshe theorized that [the mekoshesh eitzim] should receive the ruling of skilah (death by stoning), like an oveid avodah zarah (worshiper of idolatry), for in all places we find that the mitzvah of [keeping] Shabbos is compared to [the mitzvah of refraining from] avodah zarah - that is, the one who publicly desecrates Shabbos is equated to the one who worships avodah zarah.They are referring to the halachic principle codified by the Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos 30:15:
Shabbos and avodah zarah – each of them is equal in weight to all of the other mitzvos of the Torah. Shabbos is the eternal sign between Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu and us. Therefore, if a person transgresses any of the other mitzvos, he is included among the wicked Israelites – but one who publicly desecrates Shabbos is considered to be like an oveid avodah zarah, and both of them are treated like non-Jews in all matters.As we see from the conclusion of the mekoshesh story, Moshe's theory was correct: the violation of Shabbos is not liable for the least-severe death penalty of chenek, as it would seem from the initial presentation of the halachos in Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh. Instead, Shabbos desecration is liable for skilah - the most severe punishment of them all - due to the relationship between avodah zarah and the public desecration of Shabbos.
In light of this Tosafos, perhaps we can resolve our difficulty. Why didn't Hashem inform Moshe and Bnei Yisrael of the precise specific penalty for Shabbos desecration? Apparently, because it was necessary for Moshe to arrive at this conclusion on his own based on the relationship between Shabbos and avodah zarah. And since it was necessary for Moshe to confirm his theory by consulting Hashem, thereby putting the death sentence of the desecrator on hold, the whole incident of the mekoshesh took on the character of a "breaking news story" and garnered a tremendous amount of publicity. Not only was this the first time anyone had violated Shabbos, but the entire nation was forced to wait with bated breath for the fate of the transgressor to be decreed by the Almighty, Himself. And when that ruling was finally handed down, Moshe Rabbeinu (with an emphasis on "Rabbeinu") almost certainly used this as an opportunity to draw attention to the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.
Thus, not only did this divinely orchestrated publicity stunt underscore the severity of Shabbos desecration in the eyes of the entire nation, but it also brought awareness to the important principle that Shabbos-desecration and avodah zarah are conceptually linked, and are equal in their severity.
In case you don't buy this theory, it just so happens that another Rishon (early medieval authority) arrived at the same conclusion - albeit through an entirely different route. I am speaking of the Ralbag, who also learns that the story of the mekoshesh eitzim was placed in our parashah to highlight the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.
The Ralbag arrives at his conclusion not from an analysis of the event itself, but from the placement of this story within the parashah. The topic which appears right before the story of the mekoshesh is - you guessed it - avodah zarah! In these preceding pesukim the Torah presents the laws of korbanos (sacrifices) to atone for unintentional public avodah zarah and for individual worship of avodah zarah. The pesukim immediately before the story of the mekoshesh teach the penalty for intentional worship of avodah zarah:
A person who shall act high-handedly, whether native or proselyte, he blasphemed Hashem - that person shall be cut off from among his people, for he scorned the word of Hashem and broke His commandment; that person will surely be cut off, his sin is upon him (ibid. 15:30-31)The Ralbag (commentary on Bamidbar 15:32) provides the following explanation of this juxtaposition:
It seems as though [the topic] of Shabbos desecration was juxtaposed to the topic of avodah zarah on account of the similarity between them. One who desecrates Shabbos is, in a certain sense, denying the entire Torah, for the root upon which the Torah is built is conviction in the creation of the universe, for this [conviction] establishes two major premises for us: (1) that Hashem Exists, and (2) that He brought the universe into being. When we believe this, this will bring us to believe in what the Torah has commanded. The mitzvah of Shabbos comes to teach us regarding these two fundamental principles.
According to the Ralbag, the observance of Shabbos serves as a public affirmation of Hashem's Existence and His creation of the universe. Thus, the intentional desecration of Shabbos is tantamount to a renunciation of these principles - and all the more so when this desecration takes place in public.
I think this also addresses a point which I have heard expressed from time to time. People sometimes feel that it is WAY too harsh to administer the death penalty for the violation of Shabbos. "Really? Picking up sticks on Saturday is punishable by death?! That's crazy!" The Ralbag's explanation reminds us that unlike other capital offenses, for which the action itself is inherently harmful, the desecration of Shabbos is destructive because of what it represents. Just as (lehavdil) someone who burns the American flag is making a political/philosophical statement against the foundational principles of the entire nation, so too, a person who intentionally violates Shabbos is effectively denouncing the fundamental principles upon which the Torah is based.
There is a lot more to write about the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah, but that shall have to wait until another time, in another blog post. For now, let us content ourselves with the lessons learned from the story of the mekoshesh eitzim, and be thankful that his death was not in vain.
I'm curious if the Tosfos explain why the pasuk then used the phrase "mos yumas". It seems based on the Torah Sh'balPeh Moshe should (or could) have used chenek and been done with it and the Am would have missed out on this important lesson. Seems like the pasuk was intentionally misleading. If it would have used a different vague word the intended outcome would have played out with more certainty.
ReplyDeleteGood point! It would seem that according to Tosafos, the pasuk used an intentionally misleading phrase.
DeleteWould the person who is bothered by the harshness of the death penalty for transgressing Shabbat, be any less bothered by a harsh punishment for burning an American flag?
ReplyDeleteNot necessarily, but the comparison is still helpful because it breaks down the misconception of chillul Shabbos as a meaningless punishable offense and places it in the category of a meaningful punishable offense.
DeleteGoing along with the flag-burning analogy: if someone saw the police arrest a man who burned a piece of cloth, they'd think that the law was crazy - but if they realized that the cloth was a symbol of the government and nation, and that burning it was an act of rebellion, then they'd understand why it is a crime.
That's the level of perspective-shift that the analogy was intended to trigger.