Haftaras Parashas Devarim: Permanent Stains

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Haftaras Parashas Devarim: Permanent Stains

The haftarah for Shabbos Chazon (i.e. the Shabbos before Tishah b'Av) is the first chapter of Sefer Yeshayahu. The navi (prophet) begins with a scathing censure of the citizens of Yerushalayim and Yehudah. He labels them as "rebels," decries their refusal to know God, calls them "a sinful nation, a people weighed down by iniquity, evil offspring, destructive children" who have "forsaken Hashem and turned their back [to Him]" (Yeshayahu 1:4). He tells them that their sacrifices, their holidays, and their prayers are worthless and are abhorrent to Him because "[their] hands are filled with blood" (ibid. 1:15). He refers to his fellow Jews as "chiefs of Sedom ... people of Amorah" (ibid. 1:10), urging them:

Wash yourselves, purify yourselves, remove the evil of your deeds from before My eyes; cease doing evil. Learn to do good, seek justice, vindicate the victim, render justice to the orphan, take up the grievance of the widow. (ibid. 1:16-17)

But then, in the midst of this harsh rebuke, he delivers a message of hope:

"Come, now, let us discuss together," says Hashem, "If your sins are like scarlet they will become as white as snow; if they have become red as crimson, they will become [white] as wool. If you are willing and obey, you will eat the goodness of the land. But if you refuse and rebel, you will be devoured by the sword" - for the mouth of Hashem has spoken. (ibid. 1:18-20)

The Abravanel [1] explains the import of this message:

The correct [explanation] to me is that because the navi rebuked the people of Yehudah and Yerushalayim so much, and called them “chiefs of Sedom, people of Amorah,” “wicked offspring, corrupt children,” he was worried that perhaps they would give up hope from [doing] teshuvah. Therefore, he spoke to their hearts, [saying:] “Come, let us discuss.” It is as if he had said, “My brothers and friends! Let us come, now, and accept rebuke by returning to Hashem” – for this (i.e. doing teshuvah) is the true acceptance of rebuke … And he informed them that even though their sins are like scarlet – that is, red from the blood of the victims of murder and oppression – then if they accepted rebuke, [their garments] would immediately be whitened like snow and like wool, and there wouldn’t remain any mark at all, for the color white signifies purity.

This message is consistent with our understanding of Judaism's stance on teshuvah. Hashem is always willing to accept our teshuvah and forgive our sins. He is "the Gracious One, abundant to forgive," as we say three times a day. This theme permeates the liturgy on Yom ha'Kippurim, especially in Neilah. The Rambam [2] writes at the end of his list of the 24 things which prevent teshuvah:

All of these things: even though they hold back teshuvah, they do not prevent teshuvah. Rather, if a person did teshuvah from them, then he is baal teshuvah, and he has a portion in Olam ha’Ba (the World to Come).

So what is the problem here? The problem doesn't stem from the way Yeshayahu talks about teshuvah. The problem is the way Yirmiyahu talks about teshuvah. He says, in Hashem's name:

For I have always broken your yoke and torn off your straps, and you have said, "I will not transgress!" Yet upon every lofty hill and under every leafy tree you wander like a harlot. I had planted you from a choice vine, entirely of faithful seed; how, then, have you turned yourself into an inferior, alien vine before Me? Even if you were to cleanse yourself with nitre (i.e. stain-remover) and use much soap, your iniquity has become a stain before Me - the word of my Lord, Hashem-Elokim. (Yirmiyahu 2:20-22)

The same analogy is used by these two neviim (prophets), but the message is the opposite: according to Yeshayahu, our iniquity is like a stain that can be removed; according to Yirmiyahu, it is like a stain that can't be removed. 

Now, one might try to resolve this by saying that these two neviim were speaking at different times in Jewish history, separated by nearly 200 years: Yeshayahu was the first navi to prophesy about the destruction of Yerushalayim, and Yirmiyahu was the last. Similarly, one can answer that these two neviim were speaking to two different groups of Jews; the Jews in Yirmiyahu's time were undoubtedly more corrupt than the Jews addressed by Yeshayahu.

The reason why this answer fails is that Yirmiyahu, himself, delivers Yeshayahu's same message later on in his sefer, saying: "Cleanse your heart from evil, O Yerushalayim, so that you may be saved; how long will you lodge your iniquitous thoughts within yourself?" (ibid. 4:14). Apparently, their hearts can be cleansed from iniquity, even according to Yirmiyahu!

Chazal (Rosh ha'Shanah 18a) note this internal contradiction and offer a cryptic resolution:

It is written: "cleanse your heart from evil" and it is written: "even if you were to cleanse yourself with nitre and use much soap, your iniquity is a stain before Me"! ... There is no contradiction: here [in the latter case] we are dealing with a [Divine] verdict accompanied by a [Divine] oath, whereas there [in the former case] we are dealing with a [Divine] verdict that is not accompanied by a [Divine] oath.

According to Chazal, we can cleanse ourselves from iniquity even after the Divine verdict has been sealed, but only if this verdict was not accompanied by a Divine oath. If a Divine verdict is sealed with a Divine oath, then the iniquity cannot be cleansed. As an example of the latter, they cite the case of the House of Eli: "Therefore, I have sworn concerning the House of Eli that the iniquity of the House of Eli would never be atoned for by sacrifice or minchah-offering" (I Shmuel 3:14). 

The Abravanel doesn't accept Chazal's answer:

If we were to say like the words of Chazal – that “your iniquity is a stain before Me” because it was a Divine verdict accompanied by an oath, which cannot be overturned, and the teshuvah cannot be accepted – then a huge difficulty is posed to us by the repeated sending of the neviim and their rebukes, and all their words would be in vain and for no purpose, for if the decree were true, the diligence of the neviim would be false. Moreover, [according to Chazal’s answer], this severely weakens the doctrine about the virtue of teshuvah that we have received [through the Oral Tradition, namely,] that nothing stands in the way [of teshuvah].

In other words, if teshuvah cannot atone for a sin when the Divine verdict was accompanied by an oath - as in the case of Yirmiyahu 2:22, according to Chazal's reading - then the sending of the neviim urging the people to do teshuvah was pointless! Furthermore, this answer flies in the face of everything we know about the unstoppable power of teshuvah!

Instead, the Abravanel offers two answers: first the Radak's, and then his own. The Radak [3] resolves the contradiction based not on the acceptance of teshuvah, but on the process of kaparah (atonement) for different levels of sin:

Based on the divisions of kaparah (atonement) expounded by Rebbi Yishmael (Yoma 86a), the view of the Radak is proper and acceptable. [He answers] that if the Jews of that generation did teshuvah, they would be saved from the enemy and would not have gone into exile, but they [still] would have received [some degree of] punishment for their iniquities – whether by plague, or by famine, or by other catastrophes while they were still on their land. This is because there are iniquities for which teshuvah alone is not sufficient to provide kaparah; [in some cases the teshuvah must be accompanied] with yisurin (afflictions) that cleanse [the remnants of the iniquities] or with death. Regarding the possibility of saving the people from exile by means of teshuvah, [Yirmiyahu] said: “cleanse your heart from evil so that you may be saved.” Regarding the other punishments which cleanse iniquities it was stated here: “even if you cleanse … [your iniquity is a stain before Me.”

The Radak's answer is that teshuvah is always accepted - completely and fully - but this doesn't mean that the teshuvah will remove all of the punishments or consequences. In some cases, the sinners may need to endure suffering or even death in order to provide full kaparah. Accordingly, it would seem that in Yeshayahu's time, Bnei Yisrael could have done teshuvah and attained complete kaparah, whereas in Yirmiyahu's time, their teshuvah would have successfully "cleansed their hearts from evil," but there would remain a stain which could only be removed through additional suffering.

The Abravanel answers through a subtle reading of the metaphor which dissolves the contradiction:

But according to my own opinion, this question doesn’t apply to our pasuk, for here it did not state: “if you cleanse your heart from evil" - which alludes to true teshuvah - as he said in the other pasuk: “cleanse your heart from evil.” He didn’t say that in this pasuk because the navi didn’t intend to say here that even if they did teshuvah it wouldn’t benefit them. 

Rather, his intent was to say that the people of his generation were wicked in secret, but outwardly portrayed themselves as pious. Regarding this he said to them that even though they do outward acts of piety, Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu knows their secret wicked actions. This is the meaning of: “even if you cleanse yourself with nitre and use lots of soap” – which are things used to whiten clothing. Behold! Despite all of the outward actions that you do with deception and fraud, “your iniquity is a stain before Me” – in other words, your hidden iniquity is a stain and a blemish before Me.

There is a difference between cleansing your clothing (i.e. doing external acts of piety) and cleansing your heart (i.e. doing real teshuvah, thereby changing yourself). The navi here doesn't say "you can't cleanse your heart" but rather "even if you cleanse your clothing, the sin of your heart is a stain before Me." 

Personally, I prefer the Abravanel's interpretation over the Radak's. Time and again we see the Navi rebuking Klal Yisrael for engaging in external forms of teshuvah while retaining their inner corruption. A great example of this can be found in another one of Yeshayahu's prophecies, which we read as the haftarah on the morning of Yom ha'Kippurim:

Cry out vociferously, do not restrain yourself; raise your voice like a shofar - proclaim to My people their willful sins, to the House of Jacob their transgressions. They pretend to seek Me every day and to desire to know My ways, like a nation that acts righteously and has not forsaken the justice of its God; they inquire of Me about the laws of justice, as if they desire the nearness of God, [asking,] "Why did we fast and You did not see? Why did we afflict ourselves, and You did not know?"

Behold! On your fast day you seek out personal gain and you extort all your debts. Because you fast for grievance and strife, to streak [each other] with a wicked fist; you do not fast as befits this day, to make your voice heard above. Can such be a fast I choose, a day when man merely afflicts himself? Can it be merely bowing one's head like a bulrush and spreading sackcloth and ashes?

Surely this is the fast I choose: to break open the shackles of wickedness, to undo the bonds of justice, and to let the oppressed go free, and to annul all perversion. Surely you should break your bread for the hungry, and bring the moaning poor [to your] home; when you see a naked person, clothe him; and do not hide yourself from your kin. 

This provides us with valuable practical insight: having a religious self-image can be an obstacle to teshuvah. The Jews in Yeshayahu's time - and, according to the Abravanel, in Yirmiyahu's time as well - viewed themselves as pious and religious. They brought their korbanos, they observed the moadim (holidays), they made their aliyos l'regel (festival pilgrimages), they davened, and they learned. This is precisely why Hashem's rebuke in our haftarah was calculated to shatter their pious self-image, which which was reinforced with outward actions of piety and the scrupulous observance. Yeshayahu's central message in our haftarah may be summed up as: "Who do you think you are?" He goes on to dismantle every characteristic that the Jews of his time used to prop up their righteous façade:

"You think you are loyal? You are rebels! You think you're special because you're the descendants of the Avos? You are like the citizens of Sedom and Amorah! You think you're righteous because you are scrupulous in the avodah ba'Mikdash (Temple service)? Your avodah is worthless to me. I am sick of your korbanos, your moadim, your aliyah l'regel, and I refuse to listen to your tefilos - all so long as you continue to harbor inward corruption and injustice towards your fellow man. Yerushalayim was once a city of righteousness and faithfulness. Now it is a city of murderers and liars." 

This "assault on self-image" is a harsh tool, but an effective one. My chavrusa gave an apt analogy: if you point out policy problems among the respective parties of conservative Republicans or liberal Democrats, this will be very easy for them to shrug off these critiques - but if you accuse the Republicans of being hell-bent socialists intent on destroying America or if you accuse Democrats of being villainous fascists who oppress minorities, that'll get their attention. And if you are skillful enough in making your case, you might succeed in getting them to question the veracity of their own self-image and identity. 

This is what many of the neviim sought to do in their rebukes of Klal Yisrael. If they merely pointed out specific aveiros (transgressions) and avonos (iniquities), it would be very easy for the Jews to shrug and say: "Sure, I agree that this is a problem, but there's always room for improvement." No real teshuvah would take place; any teshuvah they did would be confined to their outward actions - their clothing, rather than their heart. Instead, the neviim framed their rebukes in terms of identity: "Is that who you think you are? You are exactly the opposite." Once their self-image is shattered, the real teshuvah process can begin.

This is a core objective of the annual ymei taanis (fast days). Rather than wait for a national catastrophe to befall our people and compel us to engage in a national soul-searching, we use the national tzaros (catastrophes) of the past to prompt this type of introspection in the present, at regular intervals. Who are we, as a nation? Who are we supposed to be, and how have we become what we have become? 

This is also why we read haftaros such as this one today. Nevuah has ceased from our nation, as a result of our iniquities, but the contents of nevuah are more relevant than ever. The question is whether we will listen to the words of the navi and ask ourselves: “Who are we, as a nation? Who are we supposed to be, and how have we become what we have become?” 

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu 1:18; this goes for all Abravanel references in this post

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 4:6

[3] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Yeshayahu; I've chosen to quote the Abravanel's summary of the Radak's view, since it's a little bit clearer

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

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Artwork: Visions of Beyond, by Terese Nielsen

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh? (Rambam)

The Question

My students have, on numerous occasions, asked me questions about ruach ha'kodesh (lit. "the holy spirit"), such as: "Is it true that Rashi had ruach ha'kodesh?" or "Didn't the meforshim get their explanations from ruach ha'kodesh?" or "How can the rabbis be wrong if they had ruach ha'kodesh?" 

On the one hand, it seems as though my students view ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah (prophecy) as interchangeable terms. On the other hand, if I asked them point blank: "Are you under the impression that Rashi was a navi?" or "Is the Ramban's commentary on Chumash an example of nevuah?" they would most certainly say "no." And yet, if I asked them to define or explain the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah, they would be at a loss.

I do not believe my students are alone in this regard. I suspect that many Jews are unfamiliar with the difference between ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. I certainly was until I looked into the matter. I also don't blame anyone for their lack of clarity on these topics. Not only are the concepts themselves extremely deep and lofty, but it's even difficult to track down the relevant sources! And, to make things even more difficult, sometimes the term "ruach ha'kodesh" is used to describe nevuah! I can understand why people are confused. 

The purpose of this post is not to provide the answer to the question in the title. I'm not even going to attempt to present a comprehensive digest of all - or even most - of the shitos (views), since I've barely scratched the surface of this subject in my own learning. 

Instead, I'm going to present the answer that I give to my own students, which is based on the writings of the Rambam. My goal is to provide them with enough information about nevuah and ruach ha'kodesh to be able to differentiate the two concepts in their minds.

What is Nevuah?

If I am not mistaken, the first time the Rambam defines nevuah is in his presentation of the Thirteen Ikkarim (fundamental principles) in his Introduction to Perek Chelek: [1] 

The Sixth Fundamental Principle is nevuah, namely, to know that within this human species there exist men who possess highly developed traits and great perfection, whose souls develop the capacity to receive the form of the intellect, and their human intellects join with the Active Intellect, and it emanates over them in abundant emanation - these are the neviim, this is nevuah, and this is its concept. And the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy, and our goal is not the explanation of the particulars of each of these fundamental principles and an elucidation of the method of knowing them, for this would encompass all of branches of knowledge. Rather, we shall only mention them for informational purposes. And there are many verses which testify to the prophecy of the prophets.

If your reaction to reading this is, "Say what?" then don't worry. Like I said, our goal here is not to fully understand what nevuah is, but to know enough to be convinced that ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah are not the same thing.

The Rambam's treatment of nevuah in the Mishneh Torah [2] spans four chapters, and is too long to even attempt to summarize here. Instead, I've selected a few halachos from those four chapters which flesh out the concept of nevuah: 

7:1 – One of the fundamentals of the religion is to know that God prophetically communicates to mankind …when the spirit [of nevuah] rests upon him, his soul mingles with the level of angels which are called “ishim” and he becomes another person, and he understands with his mind that he is not as he once was, but that he has ascended above the level of other chachamim …

7:2 – … When [neviim] prophesy, their limbs quake, their bodily power weakens, their thoughts become scrambled, and their mind becomes free to contemplate what they see …

7:3 – The matters that are made known to the navi in a prophetic vision are conveyed to him by way of mashal (allegory), and immediately the interpretation of the mashal becomes engraved in his mind in the prophetic vision, and he knows what it is …

7:7 – It is possible that the navi’s nevuah is for him alone, to expand his mind and increase his knowledge, until he knows things that he didn’t know from those great things (i.e. physics and metaphysics), and it is possible that he is sent to a segment of the population – to the residents of a city or a kingdom – to prepare them and to inform them what to do, or to prevent them [from continuing] the evil actions in their hands – and when [the navi] is sent [for this reason], he is given a sign and wonder in order to make known to the people that God sent him in truth.

10:3 – … all the words of a navi are fulfilled, as it is stated: “for no word of Hashem will fall to the earth” (II Melachim 10:10); likewise it is stated: “The [false] prophet with a dream tells [his] dream, but the one with my word speaks My word of truth. How can the chaff compare to the kernel? – the word of Hashem” (Yirmiyahu 23:28) – in other words, the words of sorcerers and dreamers are like chaff mixed in with a little bit of grain, whereas the word of Hashem has no chaff at all.

The Rambam further elucidates nevuah by differentiating the nevuah of a regular navi from the nevuah of Moshe Rabbeinu. I'll cite his presentation of these differences in the Introduction to Perek Chelek, with all of the details and proofs omitted, for the sake of brevity:

The prophecy of Moshe, our master, differs from the prophecy of the other prophets in four ways:  

The first difference is that each and every navi was only spoken to by Hashem by way of an intermediary, but Moshe was without an intermediary ... 

The second difference is that every navi only receives his nevuah vision while asleep ... or during the day after the prophet falls under a trance into a state in which all of his senses have been suspended and his mind is blank just like in sleep ... but the word came to Moshe in the daytime when he was standing ... 

The third difference is that when a navi receives a nevuah, even though it is through a vision and by means of an angel, his powers weaken and his bodily frame becomes disarranged and an overpowering fear falls upon him as if he were going to die ... but this was not the case with Moshe. Rather, the word came to him and no weakness occurred in him at all ...

The fourth difference is that the vision does not come to all the prophets at their own desire but only at the will of Hashem ... However, Moshe, our master, was able to say at any time that he wished ...

To summarize: nevuah is a type of knowledge conveyed from Hashem to the mind of the navi (via angels) in mashal form. As the Rambam said, "the explanation of this fundamental principle in complete form is exceedingly lengthy" and a full explanation "would encompass all of branches of knowledge." Nevertheless, the basic information here is sufficient for our purposes. 

What is Ruach ha'Kodesh?

Now let's turn to the Rambam's definition of ruach ha'kodesh, as stated in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim.[3] I'm only going to cite the first part of this chapter, with my own paragraph breaks and underlines: 

After the preceding explanation of the true reality of nevuah according to the requirements of philosophical speculation combined with the explanation supplied by our Torah, it behooves me to mention to you the degrees of nevuah according to these two sources. 

Now not everybody who is found in one of the degrees, which I call the degrees of nevuah, is a navi. For the first and second degree are steppingstones toward nevuah, and someone who has attained one of them is not to be considered as a navi belonging to the class of neviim discussed in the preceding chapters. And even though he may sometimes be called a navi, this term is applied to him in a general sort of way, because he is very close to the neviim …

1st Degree – Ruach Hashem: The first of the degrees of nevuah consists in the fact that an individual receives or is accompanied by a divine help that moves and activates him to an exceedingly good and valuable act – such as the saving of a community of virtuous people from a community of evildoers, or the saving of a virtuous and great man, or the conferring of benefits on numerous people. The individual in question finds in himself something that moves and incites him to the action, and that is called “ruach Hashem” (“the spirit of Hashem”). And it is said of the individual who was in such a state that “the spirit of Hashem was upon him” or that “the spirit of Hashem clothed him” or that “the spirit of Hashem rested upon him” or that “Hashem was with him,” or other similar expressions are applied to him. That is the level of all the judges of Israel, of whom it is said in general that: “And when Hashem raised them up as judges, then Hashem was with the judge, and delivered them” (Shoftim 2:18) … 

Know that such a force did not abandon Moshe Rabbeinu from the moment he reached the age of maturity. It was because of this that he was moved to slay the Egyptian and to reprove the one who was in the wrong among the two men that struggled. The strength of this force in him shows in the fact that when – after having been filled with fear and having fled – he came to Midian as a stranger full of fear and saw some wrong that was done, he could not refrain from putting an end to it and was incapable of patience with regard to it … 

Such a ruach Hashem by no means caused one of these people to speak of anything; rather its object was to move the one strengthened by it to a certain action: not to any chance action, but to an action that provides assistance a wronged one – whether it be one great man or a community – or to an action that leads to that result. 

And just as not everyone who has seen a true dream is a navi, not everyone who has received [divine] assistance in some chance matter – such as the acquisition of property or the achievement of an end that concerns him alone – can be said to have been accompanied by ruach Hashem, or that “Hashem is with him,” or to have done what he has done “through ruach ha’kodesh.” We only say this about one who has performed a good action of capital import or an action that leads to that result; as, for instance, the success of Joseph in the house of the Egyptian, which was, as is clear, the first cause for great things that occurred afterwards.

2nd Degree – Ruach ha’Kodesh: It consists in the fact that an individual finds that a certain thing has descended upon him and that another force has come upon him and has made him speak, so that he talks in words of wisdom, or praise, or in beneficial statements of rebuke, or concerning political or divine matters – and all this while he is awake and his senses function as usual. Such an individual is said to speak through ruach ha’kodesh (“holy spirit”). 

It is through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh that David composed Tehilim, and Shlomo composed Mishlei and Koheles and Shir ha’Shirim. Daniel and Iyov and Divrei ha’Yamim and all the other Kesuvim (Writings) have likewise been composed through this kind of ruach ha’kodesh. For this reason people call them Kesuvim, meaning thereby that they are written through ruach ha’kodesh.

As you can see from this source, in light of the other sources, the Rambam is very explicit in differentiating ruach ha'kodesh from nevuah. Here is a list of differences:

• nevuah is nevuah, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is "a steppingstone to nevuah" which is merely called nevuah
• in this sense it may be said that ruach ha'kodesh is "on a lower level" than nevuah
• in nevuah there is actual content conveyed from Hashem to man, whereas ruach ha'kodesh is a force which moves a person to speak profound statements of his own
• nevuah can only be received while asleep or in a trance, whereas a person receives ruach ha'kodesh while awake and in full possession of his sensory faculties
• nevuah comes in the form of mashal, whereas ruach ha'kodesh produces words
• in Nach, the books classified in Neviim contain words of nevuah whereas the books classified in Kesuvim contain words of ruach ha'kodesh

These differences are stark. Ruach ha'kodesh is not nevuah.

Support from the Sefer ha'Ikkarim

While I don't know enough to say that the Sefer ha'Ikkarim's [4] view of ruach ha'kodesh is identical to that of the Rambam, it certainly seems to be in the same vein. He begins with a description of the four levels of intellect. Level 5 is ruach ha'kodesh, and Level 6 is the first degree of nevuah. Again, I will not cite the entire chapter, but only enough to provide context for his treatment of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah. The paragraph breaks, paragraph titles (including level numbers), and underlines are mine:

We must now explain the existence of prophecy and its various grades, so that believers may find it easier to understand the existence of prophecy and the different degrees thereof.

Level 1 - Senses: At the moment of birth the individual is devoid of all understanding. The first things that are formed in him are the five external senses, touch, taste, smell, hearing, sight. The individual does not get these all at once, but one at a time. At the moment of his appearance in the outer world he perceives only with the coarsest of the senses, that of touch. The objects of his perception at this stage are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, softness and hardness, roughness and smoothness and the like. After a further interval of time after birth, he perceives a finer and more ‘important class of objects, namely tastes, like sweet, bitter, sour, astringent, sharp, and so on. Later on he perceives another class of things still finer, namely the odors, the agreeable and the disagreeable, etc. Later still he perceives with the sense of hearing a class of objects that is still finer than those of the sense of smell, and that may be perceived at a greater distance, such as sounds and tones, and their various kinds, etc. Still later he perceives with the sense of sight another class of existents finer than all the rest, which can be perceived at a greater distance than the others, such as colors and forms according to their various kinds, and so on. One of these five senses cannot perceive the objects of the others. Thus, the sense of sight cannot perceive sounds, or tones or odors; nor can the senses of smell and taste perceive colors and sounds.

Level 2 - Memory: After he has advanced a considerable time and has become habituated to the five senses, he rises to a higher degree than that of perceiving the objects of the various senses. He now has the power of recognizing a thing when it is no longer actually perceived. He recognizes what he has once perceived when he sees it again, and though the thing has disappeared he remembers the knowledge which is impressed on his imagination and recognizes the object. This power of apprehension he acquires through the medium of the first faculty.

Level 3 - Intellectual Apprehension: As he grows older still, he attains to a higher degree by means of the first powers, a new gate opens before him, and he acquires the power of intellectual apprehension. He strips the sensible object of its particular qualities and apprehends the general essence. For example, he takes animality and rationality in a human being and judges that these are common to the whole species and are different from those particular qualities which differ in different individuals.

Level 4 - Intellectual Comprehension: As he advances further in years and acquires information, another gate opens before him which he has not entered hitherto. He now makes a distinction between substance and accident, and between the necessary, the possible and the impossible. He combines rational principles not based upon sense perception with each other, and acquires all the sciences, which he could not have acquired by means of the powers mentioned before.

These four stages form the limit of the human intellect, beyond which it cannot go. Some individuals do not reach the highest stage, but stop with the second or the third. These then are the powers which the generality of men have.

Level 5 - Ruach ha'Kodesh: But it is possible that in addition to these powers, still another gate may open to a person and still another degree may be attainable by him of which he has no idea. For just as, if a person who has never seen them were told about lights and colors, he would not be able to imagine them and would not understand the different colors, as a eunuch cannot imagine the pleasure of sexual intercourse, so it is possible that though by the custom of nature man does not attain a greater degree than the four mentioned, nevertheless the mind may conceive of a higher degree. And experience testifies to this. For we see that beyond the four degrees above mentioned, a new gate opens before a given person which his own nature never imagined, and he speaks words of wisdom or words of song and praise to God in pure and fluent style such as he was incapable of hitherto. Everyone who hears him wonders at his knowledge and the manner of his expression, while he himself does not know whence this power came to him, as a child learns to speak without knowing whence the power came. But everybody recognizes his superiority in this respect. This degree is called ruach ha’kodesh.

Level 6 - Developed Imagination: Now just as the human intellect stops at the four degrees above mentioned and does not pass beyond, so there are persons who stop at the degree of ruach ha’kodesh and do not pass beyond it. There are persons whose imagination is strong by nature or who do certain things to strengthen it, like the practices of the diviners or the woman with the familiar spirit. As a result of this they have imaginative visions. There are others who have true dreams, like Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, the chief butler and the chief baker. By reason of these powers some of them think they are prophets. They are the persons of whom the prophet in Scripture says that they “prophesy out of their own heart.” For though they sometimes speak the truth, they are bound sometimes to speak falsehood. Thus Ezekiel says, “Woe unto the vile prophets, that follow their own spirit, … They have seen vanity and lying divination, that say: The Lord saith; and the Lord hath not sent them, yet they hope that the word would be confirmed.” The intimation is that it is impossible, for though their words may be partly true, they can not but be partly false, for such is the nature of the power of imagination, the source of dreams. Our Rabbis say: As there is no wheat without straw, so there is no dream without foolishness.

Level 7 - 1st Degree of Nevuah: When, however, the rational power prevails over the imagination, then the person sees true dreams without foolishness. The explanation is given by the Rabbis: “Raba asked the question, How reconcile the statement, ‘And the dreams speak falsely,’ with the expression, ‘I do speak with him in a dream?’ His answer is, the two passages are not incompatible. The one passage refers to dreams that come through the medium of an angel, the other to those that come through the medium of a demon.” Angel stands for the rational power, demon for the power of imagination. If the rational power prevails over the power of imagination, the person sees true dreams or visions which communicate to him information he never had before. In the measure in which the rational power prevails over the imagination is the person better or less well prepared for nevuah. There are persons whose rational power is stronger than the imagination, but the superiority is not great, and hence the power of imagination maintains its strength. And therefore though the rational power is prepared to receive the nevuah, yet on account of the strength of the imagination and its opposition to the rational power, the person receives the [prophetic] overflow in trembling and pain. His limbs shake, his sinews tend to dissolve, and a great trembling comes over him, that his soul almost leaves him. And after all that pain the nevuah comes to the rational power in a dream or vision of the night, and the person dreams prophetic dreams and learns things he has never known before — ideas about the separate substances, or particular notions, or universal ideas of existence, and the like. This is the first degree of nevuah.

Similar to the Rambam, ruach ha'kodesh is identified as a level of intellection which is prior to nevuah, and the descriptions of each phenomenon mirror what the Rambam wrote.

Concluding Thoughts

So when my students ask me whether Rashi or the other meforshim had ruach ha'kodesh, I summarize the definitions of ruach ha'kodesh and nevuah presented here, making sure that they at least walk away with an awareness that the two phenomena are distinct. Then I answer their question by saying that it is entirely possible that chachamim (wise people) throughout the ages spoke or wrote with ruach ha'kodesh, even after the time that nevuah ceased. 

However, I do not think this has any ramifications on how we learn. Even if, for example, the Raavad [5] claims that his critique of the Rambam's shitah (view) is backed by ruach ha'kodesh, that doesn't mean that the Rambam needs to abandon his opinion, nor does it necessitate that we side with the Raavad.

Similarly, this does not mean that Chazal - and certainly the Geonim, Rishonim, and Achronim - were infallible. One need look no further than Vayikra Chapter 4 (about the sin-offerings brought by a Sanhedrin that errs) or the story of the Achnai Ovens (Bava Metzia 59b) to see that Chazal can err - despite the fact that they were inevitably moved by ruach ha'kodesh.

That pretty much exhausts my knowledge of ruach ha'kodesh. Perhaps one day we will explore views of ruach ha'kodesh which differ from that of the Rambam. 

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Sanhedrin Chapter 10, Introduction

[2] ibid. Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapters 7-10

[3] ibid. Moreh ha'Nevuchim 2:45; the paragraph breaks are mine

[4] Rabbeinu Yosef Albo, Sefer ha'Ikkarim 3:10; ordinarily I would translate this on my own, but I'm pressed for time, so I've decided to use the translation on www.sefaria.org (Jewish Publication Society of America: 1929)

[5] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Daud, Critiques on Mishneh Torah: Sefer Zmanim, Hilchos Shofar, v'Sukkah, v'Lulav 8:5

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

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Artwork: The Mirari Conjecture, by James Arnold

Mishlei 3:19-26 - Mishleic Security in God

Some of my students decided to start learning Mishlei on their own this summer. They recently contacted me and asked for my assistance in learning the pasuk: "Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" (Mishlei 3:19). They said that they had made some headway, but the ideas they came up with "didn't feel like Mishlei ideas."

I responded by affirming their observation: yes, the main idea of Mishlei 3:19 doesn't feel like a Mishlei idea, nor should it. Why not? Because this pasuk is from the first nine chapters of Mishlei, which serve a different purpose and are written in a different style than "regular Mishlei."

I wrote about this in my How to Learn Mishlei: A Step-by-step Guide. Chapters 1-9 constitute Shlomo ha'Melech's introductory discourse. The pesukim in chapters 1-9 were written to be learned paragraph by paragraph, sequentially. In contrast, the pesukim in chapters 10-29 are "standalone proverbs" which can be learned in any order, without any regard to their context within the sefer.

For this reason, I urge newer Mishlei students to skip chapters 1-9 and begin with chapters 10-29. These pesukim are easier to learn because they can be analyzed on their own. Moreover, it is also easier to approach chapters 1-9 after building up a basic "Mishleic intuition" from "standard Mishlei" pesukim, which will serve as a guide through the introductory material.

Although I usually write about standalone pesukim from chapters 10-29, I decided to switch it up for this week's Mishlei post and write about the pasuk that my students are learning, in order to illustrate just how different these introductory chapters can be.

The first step is to figure out the unit of which Mishlei 3:19 is a part. It's clearly not related to the pesukim before it, since that unit ends with the paragraph break at 3:18. It's also clear that 3:19 is connected to 3:20 at the very least, and the use of the pronoun "them" in 3:21 suggests that 3:19-20 is connected to 3:21-26. The pesukim after 26 seem to be their own thing.

Thus, the cluster of pesukim we'll be working with is this:

משלי ג:יט-כו

(יט) יְיָ בְּחָכְמָה יָסַד אָרֶץ כּוֹנֵן שָׁמַיִם בִּתְבוּנָה: (כ) בְּדַעְתּוֹ תְּהוֹמוֹת נִבְקָעוּ וּשְׁחָקִים יִרְעֲפוּ טָל: (כא) בְּנִי אַל יָלֻזוּ מֵעֵינֶיךָ נְצֹר תֻּשִׁיָּה וּמְזִמָּה: (כב) וְיִהְיוּ חַיִּים לְנַפְשֶׁךָ וְחֵן לְגַרְגְּרֹתֶיךָ: (כג) אָז תֵּלֵךְ לָבֶטַח דַּרְכֶּךָ וְרַגְלְךָ לֹא תִגּוֹף: (כד) אִם תִּשְׁכַּב לֹא תִפְחָד וְשָׁכַבְתָּ וְעָרְבָה שְׁנָתֶךָ: (כה) אַל תִּירָא מִפַּחַד פִּתְאֹם וּמִשֹּׁאַת רְשָׁעִים כִּי תָבֹא: (כו) כִּי יְיָ יִהְיֶה בְכִסְלֶךָ וְשָׁמַר רַגְלְךָ מִלָּכֶד:

Mishlei 3:19-26

(19) Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding. (20) With His knowledge the depths were cleaved, and the heavens drip dew. (21) My son – do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought, (22) and they will be life for your soul, and a graceful [ornament] for your neck. (23) Then you will walk securely on your path, and your foot will not falter. (24) When you lie down, you will not be afraid; you will lie down your sleep will be sweet. (25) Do not be afraid of sudden terror, nor the darkness of the wicked when it comes, (26) for Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement.

When learning "standard Mishlei" pesukim from chapters 10-29, we try to ask all the questions we can. If we did that on this paragraph, we'd easily be overwhelmed. Instead, it is advisable to focus on getting the main idea of the paragraph as a whole - much like we do in our approach to Sefer Tehilim - and then examine the details in light of that main idea.

The major questions on this paragraph as a whole are:

(1) What are the first two pesukim saying? This certainly doesn't seem to be a practical decision-making idea, since it's about Hashem's creation of the world. These pesukim seem to be more appropriate for Tehilim or Bereishis than Mishlei!

(2) What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? I am assuming that there is a connection because of how 21 begins: "Do not let them deviate from your eyes" - with the "them" referring to the chochmah, tevunah, and daas mentioned in 19-20.

(3) How do all of the benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21? In other words, how do these effects (i.e. "they will be life for your soul ... and He will guard your foot from ensnarement") result from these causes ("do not let them deviate from your eyes; guard wisdom and strategic thought")?

Before we move on to the main idea, I just want to underscore how different these questions are from the kinds of questions we normally ask. For example, if we approached pesukim 22-26 as we would approach "regular Mishlei" (i.e. chapters 10-29), then we'd focus on all of the specifics - but since our pesukim come from Chapters 1-9, we need to prioritize the main idea over the details. 

It's not always clear which questions are major and which are minor. For example, one could expand on Question #1 by asking: "What are the definitions of chochmah (wisdom), tevunah (understanding), and daas (knowledge)?" or "Why is chochmah associated to Hashem's founding of the earth, tevunah to His establishing the heavens, and daas to His causing them to drip with dew?" An argument could be made that these are major questions which are critical for understanding the main idea. However, my intuition tells me that these questions are minor. Pesukim 19-20 are basically saying "Hashem created the universe with knowledge," and the terms used are synonyms.

[Okay - now it's time to think! Continue reading when you're ready.]

Due to the difference in style between "regular Mishlei" and the introductory chapters, I think it's best if I answer each of the three questions individually, and then summarize the main idea in 1-4 sentences - much like I do in my posts on Tehilim.

Answer to Question #1: What are the first two pesukim saying? 

The Meiri [1] offers several explanations of these two pesukim, but his final explanation appeals to me the most:

There are those who explain that the phrase "with chochmah" here refers to the [design of the] earth, meaning to say that He created it in accordance with chochmah - that is, with [laws of] nature that do not deviate from their creation, and which are responsible for the establishment and continued existence of the earth, [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the orders of the moon and stars which provide light at night, etc.

Turns out that the Meiri was quoting the Sefer Chukah, [2] whose explanation is spelled out a bit more:

"Hashem founded the earth with wisdom; He established the heavens with understanding" [means] that from the day He created them, they do not deviate from their ways, nor does any part of His design deteriorate, such that he would need to fix it - unlike human beings, who build a building, only to have it deteriorate years later and be in need of repair. The Creator (blessed is He) created all of His works with wisdom, and firmly established the earth through nature and [laws of] cause-and-effect - [such as] the rotation of the earth, the rising and setting of the sun, the order of the moon and the stars to provide light at night - and each and every one of them stands at its post and performs His commands. 

In other words, these two pesukim convey the idea that Hashem created the world and endowed it with lawful principles of cause and effect, which are consistent, perfect, and harmonious in their preservation of the universe, obedient to the will of the Creator. The terms chochmah, tevunah, and daas here all refer to the quality of intelligent lawfulness that is manifest everywhere in the universe. 

Answer to Question #2: What is the relationship between 19-20 and 21? 

Mishlei's premise, as stated in Saadia Gaon's Introduction to Mishlei, is that man is unique on account of his tzelem Elokim (i.e. truth-seeking intellect), which allows him to comprehend abstract knowledge, and to make decisions based on long-term benefits and consequences. 

In light of this premise, and the premise stated in 19-20 that the universe operates by natural cause-and-effect, it follows that man should utilize his intellect to understand the lawfulness of the world around him, in order to align himself with it to the best of his ability to maximize long-term pleasure and minimize long-term pain (again, as Saadia Gaon wrote in his Introduction to Mishlei). 

This manifests itself in two ways: "guard[ing] wisdom," which refers to avoiding actions and decisions which lead to harmful consequences, and "strategic thought," which refers to using knowledge of the laws of nature to bring about benefits that one wouldn't have otherwise received. But these two things will only be possible if he exercises Mishleic vigilance, "not letting [wisdom, understanding, and knowledge] deviate from his eyes." 

This might also be why the emphasis is on the "eyes": it's not enough to know, in abstract, that the universe operates by lawful cause and effect; you need to be able to see opportunities to implement Mishleic thinking in the sensory particulars of everyday life. 

Answer to Question #3: How do all of the wonderful benefits listed in 22-26 result from implementing the advice in 21?

These pesukim are a breakdown of the two general categories mentioned in the previous pasuk (i.e. "guarding wisdom and strategic design"). I don't know whether this is a comprehensive list or just a series of particular examples. Here's what my intuition tells me about each item on the list:

"they will be life for your soul" - If "soul" means your physical life, then this is a reference to all the ways that Mishlei literally prolongs your life by helping you make intelligent decisions to improve your physical health and to deter you from taking unwarranted risks and engaging in unhealthy practices or behavior. If "soul" means your mind, then this is referring to the enjoyment of Mishleic thinking, which will become the central pleasure of your life. (Judging by the rest of the list, I'd say that the first explanation is the correct one.) 

"and a graceful [ornament] for your neck" - If I recall correctly, "neck" in Mishlei refers to your larynx (a.k.a. vocal cords). [3] Mishlei will change the way you speak, the contents of your speech, and when you exercise your speech - all in a manner which will give you the quality of "grace" (i.e. people will naturally be drawn to you because of the benefits and pleasantness they derive from the effects of Mishlei on your personality, and the beneficial results of Mishlei in your life [4]). 

"you will walk securely on your path" - I think "your path" refers to the general direction you take in life (i.e. the goals you pursue), which will be "secured" by your intelligent decision-making. 

"your foot will not falter" - I doubt this means that you won't make mistakes, since that would be humanly impossible. Rather, I think it means that even when you do make mistakes, you will learn from them and benefit from the insight you gain. Thus, in the long run, even your mistakes will enhance the quality of your life. Either that, or it just means that you will make fewer mistakes than a person who doesn't learn Mishlei. 

"if you lie down, you will not be afraid" - As a student of Mishlei, you will have a healthy recognition and acceptance of what is in your control and what is not in your control; you will take all of the precautions to protect yourself from threats that are within your control, and you will accept that whatever is out of your control is out of your control, to the extent that when you go to sleep (i.e. a state of complete lack of control, and therefore, complete vulnerability), you will still feel secure that you have done everything in your ability to protect yourself from harm.

"when you lie down and your sleep will be sweet" - This physical security will also lead to an emotionally secure state of mind, which will enable you to have a restful sleep, free from those late-night bouts of stress, fear, and anxiety about the worries of the day. 

"do not be afraid of sudden terror, and the darkness of the wicked when it comes" - Even when unexpected catastrophes happen, whether natural ("sudden terror," such as hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.) or brought about by human beings ("darkness of the wicked," such as assaults, robbery, war, the Holocaust, etc.), you need not be afraid; as a student of Mishlei, you will use the same decision-making approach in these situations as you would under normal conditions, and will be sure to achieve the best results that are in your control to achieve. 

"Hashem will be your security, and He will guard your foot from ensnarement" - I believe that this pasuk is framed in terms of Hashem in order to chiastically conclude this cluster of pesukim as it began. How does one take security in Hashem? By aligning oneself with Hashem's chochmah, tevunah, and daas which constitute the fabric of His universe. To the extent that you trust in His will, as manifest in the laws of nature, you will feel secure, and not become ensnared in the consequences of bad decisions, or in the stress and anxiety that results from non-Mishleic thinking.

Having said all of that, here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

The basis of Mishleic security in Hashem is the recognition that He created the universe in accordance with laws of cause and effect – laws which are universal, consistent, and rational (i.e. they can be known and understood by human beings). The Mishlei student’s trust in Hashem is based on the reliability of His will as manifest in these laws of nature. By using wisdom and strategic thinking to align himself with these natural laws, thinking and speaking about them constantly and harnessing them to his advantage, he will achieve both physical and emotional security – physical security from making the best decisions within the realm of his control based on the best of his knowledge, and emotional security derived from his trust in Hashem’s will, and from his knowledge that he has done everything in his power to make the best decision he can. And even when he makes a mistake, which will inevitably happen, he will learn from it, and use the insights he gained to improve his decision-making in the future.

There you have it. See how different this feels from a "regular Mishlei" idea? It's far more general and less focused on particular practical decision-making strategies. I also hope you can see what I meant when I said that I encourage students not to learn these introductory chapters until after they've developed their Mishleic intuition by learning chapters 10-29 for a while.

[1] Rabbeinu Menachem ben Shlomo Meiri, Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 3:19

[2] Rabbeinu Yosef Kimchi, Sefer Chukah on Mishlei 3:19

[3] see, for example, Rabbeinu Yonah on Mishlei 1:9

[4] I heard a great example of this yesterday from my Mishlei rebbi, who recently spent nearly an entire week in the hospital. He told me that many nurses and doctors came up to him and told him that he is the best and most pleasant patient they've ever had. My Mishlei rebbi attributed this to the effects of Mishlei on his personality, which we spent a while discussing and analyzing.

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

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Left: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 4, in February 1921
Right: [Great] Uncle William, at the age of 101, in July 2018

Honoring Our Non-Jewish Elders

Uncle William

My brother and I recently returned from our annual trip to Hawaii, where our mom's side of the family has lived for several generations. My mom's father was one of thirteen siblings, the oldest of whom was born in 1902. Of those thirteen siblings, only one is still alive: [Great] Uncle William (whom we refer to as "Uncle William," even though he's my grandfather's brother). 

Uncle William was born on April 1st, 1917.

Yes, your math is correct: this past April 1st was his 101st birthday. 

Let's put Uncle William's personal timeline into perspective by using American history and American innovation as a basis of comparison. The year Uncle William was born, Woodrow Wilson was president (#28), and Liliuokalani, the last Queen of Hawaii, was still alive. Hawaii wouldn't become a state until 42 years later. Television wasn't invented until Uncle William was almost 10 years old. He was a teenager during the Great Depression, and in his mid-20's he witnessed the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. He still holds it against FDR for taking America off the gold standard in 1933. He was too old to be in the Korean War, which started in his mid-30's, and he was nearly 60 when the Vietnam War ended. He was 75 at the birth of the World Wide Web, and he was 84 on 9/11. 

Impressive, no?

Uncle William worked as a furniture repair man for most of his life, and only retired at the age of 95, when he started having a hard time getting up after sitting down on the floor to work. He remained active into his 90's, riding his bike into town, trading up his vehicle for a new one (because "the old car didn't fit my lifestyle"), and mowing his own lawn ("it takes me three days").

All the while, his mental faculties didn't dull in the slightest. While not a towering intellectual or even a deep thinker, Uncle William definitely has a reflective soul. Although he didn't go to college or graduate from high school (my grandfather was the only one of his siblings to do that), Uncle William was a reader - especially of newspapers. He followed the news to the point where we could ask him for his opinion on any current event, and he would have something thoughtful to say. (For the record: he didn't like Obama because he was a politician and didn't like Trump because "he's just a big mouth" and he thinks that America is going downhill because Democracy appeals to the lowest common denominator; when we asked him who America's last great leader was, he said, "Clinton was good ... the man - not the wife.")

Unfortunately, Uncle William had a prostate issue two years ago, and needed to start using a catheter, which slowed him down. Things started going downhill from there. He had made it to the age of 98 living on his own, but was finally forced to hire an attendant to help him. By the time we visited him this summer his vision and hearing had deteriorated, and he now has 24-hour care.

And yet, he's still mentally with it! We talked with him for about an hour, and said that we'd visit him next summer ("If I'm still around!").

After visiting Uncle William this summer, I found myself wondering: "What would Torah say? How would Judaism frame my interaction with a man of Uncle William's age?"

I decided I'd look into it. This is what I found.

The Halacha of Honoring Non-Jewish Elders

The "halachic address" of our topic is the mitzvas aseh (positive commandment) of "mipnei seivah takum," which is derived from the pasuk: "In the presence of old age you shall rise, and you shall honor the presence of a sage, and you shall revere your God - I am Hashem" (Vayikra 19:32). Here is the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [1] summary of the basic mitzvah:

[The 257th mitzvah is] to honor chachamim (the wise) and rise before them, as it is stated: "you shall rise up before seivah (lit. white hair)," which Onkelos translated as: "you shall rise up before one who knows Torah." Our Sages of blessed memory explained "and you shall honor the presence of a zakein (lit. elder)" as referring to none other than zeh she'kanah chochmah (one who has acquired wisdom). The reason why Scripture expresses "chacham" as "zakein" is because a young chacham has seen through his chochmah (wisdom) what an elder has seen through the multitude of his years.

While the primary form of this mitzvah is to honor chachamim, we follow the opinion of R' Issi ben Yehudah in the Gemara who says that "[this pasuk] implies all [types of] seivah" which even includes elders who are not chachamim. Here is the Rambam's [2] codification of this secondary component of the mitzvah, which includes the case at hand:

We stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah (an elder who is very advanced in age) even though he is not a chacham (wise man). Even a young chacham should stand in the presence of a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah – though he is not obligated to stand to his full stature, but only enough to show respect to him. And even a non-Jewish elder we honor with words, and we lend him a supporting hand, as it is stated: “rise up in the presence of old age” – which implies old age in any sense of the term.

The Shulchan Aruch [3] brings down the Rambam's formulation almost verbatim. Although there is some debate as to what age would qualify someone as a zakein ha'muflag b'ziknah - with opinions ranging from 60, to 70, to 90 - I suspect everyone would agree that Uncle William's age of 101 years places him firmly within this halachic category.

The source of the Rambam's halacha is the Gemara in Kiddushin (33a), which states:

R’ Yochanan would rise up in the presence of a non-Jewish elder, saying: “How many experiences he has endured!” Rava would not rise up, but he would show him honor. Abaye would lend his hand to [such] elders.

The Rambam paskins (halachically rules) in accordance with Rava and Abaye that although we do not stand up for a zakein goy (non-Jewish elder) as we would for a zaken Yisrael (Jewish elder), we show him honor in other ways: verbally and by providing assistance.

Although the Rambam's citation of our pasuk and subsequent explanation might seem to imply that he holds that honoring a zakein goy is part of the mitzvah de'oraisa (Biblical obligation), it is pretty clear that this isn't what he actually holds. If it were, then there would be no differentiation between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael. Rather, showing honor to a zakein goy is either a mitzvah mi'de'rabbanan [4] (Rabbinic mitzvah), or something we do out of darchei shalom [5] ("ways of peace," intended to maintain peace between Jews and non-Jews). This explains why we differentiate between a zakein goy and a zakein Yisrael - to show that the two acts of giving kavod do not share the same halachic nature.

The Philosophy Behind the Halacha

The Sefer ha'Chinuch offers the following reason for this mitzvah as a whole (i.e. to honor chachamim):

At the root of this mitzvah lies the reason that the main purpose of man's having been created in the world is for the sake of chochmah, so that he will recognize his Creator, therefore, it is fitting for people to honor one who has attained this. As a result, others will be inspired about it. It is based on this reason that Issi ben Yehudah said in the Gemara Kiddushin that even an uneducated elder - i.e. one who is not wise - is included in this mitzvah, for it is befitting to honor him because in his multitude of years he has seen and recognized some of the works and wonders of Hashem, and this is worthy of honor. This is why Rebbi Yochanan said there in the Gemara Kiddushin: "the halacha is in accordance with Issi ben Yehudah" - on the condition that [the elder] is not a confirmed sinner, in which case, he has deprived himself of honor.

Even though we have established that the obligation of honoring a zakein goy is not a part of the mitzvah de'oraisa, the reason behind this act of honor is definitely related. As stated above, R' Yochanan explained his reason for standing in the presence of a zakein goy, saying: "How many (harpatkei) experiences he has endured!" Rashi [6] explains the unusual term "harpatkei":

harpatkei [means] experiences and troubles; and they have seen many miracles and wonders.

According to Rashi, we honor a zakein goy not for any type of specialized chochmah that he may or may not have. Rather, we honor him for the chochmah that he has gained from his life-experience and the wondrous phenomena he has had the opportunity to witness. This would certainly apply to non-Jew elders, no matter where they're from.

Rav Hirsch [7] provides a similar explanation, differentiating between the two reasons for honoring an elder, which he relates to the two words used to denote "old age" (i.e. seivah and ziknah):

He who honors seivah honors experience; that is, he honors the natural human perception that matures through the repeated events of life and nature. He who honors ziknah honors wisdom; that is, he honors the understanding of life and nature that is obtained from God's Word. For God's Word reveals the Divine source and purpose of life and nature, and their significance for our mission. We must pay tribute to both: the clear and circumspect human intellect, which matures through experience; and the spirit of God, which proceeds from the Torah. And whenever we find them, in the aged and in the wise, we are to show our homage by rising and honoring.  

The Ralbag [8] seems to learn our pasuk as teaching two separate mitzvos: "in the presence of old age you shall rise" commands us to honor elders, regardless of their wisdom, and "honor the presence of a sage" commands us to honor chachamim. He explains the first mitzvah very similarly to the Sefer ha'Chinuch, but throws in a Gersonidean twist at the end:

"in the presence of old age you shall rise" is a mitzvas aseh to rise up in the presence of every aged person, in order to honor him. There is a benefit in this: on account of this, those who are young in days will listen to the words of the aged, and their words will be precious to them, and they will behave in accordance with their discipline. For the aged, due to the multitude of worldly events that they have witnessed, will come to know by way of experience many principles of decision-making and ethics. Thus, one who listens to these words will be saved from many afflictions that would have befallen him, were it not for the advice of the aged. Furthermore, [one who honors the aged] will take it to heart to give great honor to Hashem, Who is Eternal - Who never didn't exist, and will never depart [from existence]. 

In other words, this mitzvah operates on two levels. On a practical level, the mitzvah facilitates the bequeathal of valuable life lessons from the older generation to the younger. On a philosophical/psychological level, this mitzvah trains us to have reverence for existence, which - according to the Ralbag - will ultimately strengthen our reverence for Hashem, Whose Existence is Eternal.

Ibn Ezra, [9] however, has a radically different take on this mitzvah:

The meaning of "in the presence of old age you shall rise" is on account of a dead person, because an elder is close to death, since his body is considered to be as though it is dead ... the meaning of "you shall fear your God" is that He will punish you in the days of old age.

According to the Ibn Ezra, we stand up in the presence of the elderly not to show them honor, but to remind ourselves of our impending death!

Concluding Thoughts

As is often the case with taamei ha'mitzvos (reasons for mitzvos), it is entirely possible for multiple explanations to be correct. All of these explanations ring true based on the time I've spent with Uncle William.

Have my encounters with Uncle William led me to value and revere the unique type of wisdom he has attained as a result of his long life? Yes. Am I more inclined to listen closely to his words than I would if I heard them from someone closer to my age? Yes. When I see him, do I become more cognizant of the finitude of my own life, and the eventuality of my own eventual death? Definitely.

And guess what? I even got to perform the mitzvah this trip by lending him a helping hand when he wanted to move to a different chair!

I realize that this blog post didn't break new ground or anything. I just think that it's a great example of how halacha enriches every area of my life, and I wanted to share that example with you.


[1] Sefer ha'Chinuch: Parashas Kedoshim, Mitzvah #257
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:9
[3] Rav Yosef Karo, Shulchan Aruch: Yoreh Deah 244:7
[4] Rav Yoel Sirkis (Bach), Bayis Chadash: Yoreh Deah 244
[5] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Yaakov (Semag), Sefer Mitzvos Gadol: Aseh #13
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Kiddushin 33
[7] Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[8] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Vayikra 19:32
[9] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Vayikra 19:32

Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

Originally published in August 2012. This version has been toned down significantly.

Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post. 

Excessive Righteousness and Foolish Piety

My Shul Rabbi's Message to Congregants 

When my family and I were on our journey to Orthodox Judaism, we were fortunate to find the perfect shul with the perfect rabbi. The shul was filled with Jews from across the spectrum - Chasidish, Modern Orthodox, Zionist, Yeshivish - and the majority of the congregation was, and still is, comprised of baalei teshuvah (non-observant Jews who became observant).

As you might imagine, it might be very daunting for a shul rabbi to please such a diverse crowd - but our shul rabbi is a master. He is completely non-judgmental, and makes everyone feel welcome. His shiurim (classes) and his conversation are filled with enough explanation to make baalei teshuvah feel welcome, and sufficient references to advanced material to please the scholarly crowd.

But there is one message that is often reiterated by our shul rabbi which (I believe) is intended equally for baalei teshuvah and yeshivish students alike: "Don't be too religious." Yes, he says this partially in jest, but usually does so when a congregant inquires about a halacha which is actually just a chumrah (stringency).

I used to think that our rabbi coined this phrase on his own. It wasn't until the first time I read Koheles that I realized he was borrowing the language of the pasuk: "Do not be overly righteous or excessively wise - why should you make yourself desolate?" (Koheles 7:16).

We'll return to this at the end of the post.

Blurry Glasses 

A few years ago my chavrusa (learning partner) brought a short article to my attention:

Soon, it will no longer be necessary for charedi men to walk around while covering their eyes with their hands to avoid seeing women.

Recently, a new start-up company has begun marketing and selling special glasses in charedi neighborhoods such as Meah Shearim. The purpose of the glasses is to prevent charedi men from seeing immodestly-dressed women.

The glasses contain blurry lenses that obscure the wearer’s vision and do allow men not to (sic) see more than three meters. For those who already wear glasses, the company has designed stickers that can be affixed to the existing pair of glasses which will obscure the vision.

Yedioth Ahronot reports that the glasses, designed for the charedi community, are intended for charedi men who must go to places where women will be present. The new patent cost the inventors only NIS 25. The patent includes non-prescription glasses and the obscuring stickers. The glasses with the blurry lenses contain perforations at the bottom of the lenses enabling charedi men to look down at the ground through the perforation and still see where they are walking.

My chavrusa pointed out that the subject of this article is straight out of a Gemara (Sotah 22b) we once learned. When sitting down to write this blog post, I found myself paralyzed by the numerous directions it might take. But I think I'll just content myself with citing the text of the Gemara, drawing the connection, and making a few observations here and there - without attempting any grand theories or explanations.

The Scourges of Prushim Ruin the World

In order to fully appreciate the Gemara, we'll need to see it in the context of the Mishnah, which appears on 20a. The last clause of the Mishnah reads:

[R' Yehoshua] used to say: a chasid shoteh (foolish pietist), a rasha arum (cunning evildoer), an ishah prushah, and the scourges of prushim - these are the ruiners [or alternatively: "destroyers"] of the world.

The Gemara explains that each of these terms refers to a personality-type which expresses itself in specific behaviors. For instance, "chasid shoteh" is a man who refuses to save a the life of a drowning woman because he doesn't want to gaze at women. "Rasha arum" is a person who explains his argument to the judge before his fellow litigant arrives, which the Meiri universalizes to mean "someone who strategically harms others for his own benefit in undetectable ways." An "ishah prushah" is the subject of a machlokes (disagreement), which we won't get into now. We will focus on the last item in the list: "scourges of prushim," which is somewhat related to the first. 

I think it will be beneficial to read the Rambam's commentary on this Mishnah, since he gives us a better idea of the types of people we are talking about. The Rambam [1] first explains the term "chasid shoteh":

The Talmud explains that this refers to an individual who exhibits an exaggerated level of [halachic or pseudo-halachic] precaution and scrupulousness to the point where he becomes disgusting in the eyes of people, and he does actions which are not obligatory. It is as if the Mishnah said that he is "shoteh b'chasiduso" ("foolish in his piety"). The Sages said in the Gemara Yerushalmi that anyone who is exempt from something and does it anyway is considered a hedyot (ignoramus, probably related to the Greek idiōtēs).

Similarly, the Meiri [2] defines the chasid shoteh as "a person who makes himself excessively pious in a manner which causes harm, either to himself or to others." He adds a few more examples of this type of behavior: "someone who fasts every day ... someone who sees a baby drowning in a river and says, 'Let me take off my tefillin first' [before he jumps in to save him]."

Next, the Rambam addresses the ambiguity of the term "prushim" (lit. "those who are separated"). The difficulty is that "Prushim" (with an uppercase "P") refers to the Phraisees who opposed the Sadducees during the era of the second Beis ha'Mikdash, whereas "prushim" (with a lowercase "p") means "ascetics." The Rambam first explains the origin of the term and then how it is used in our Mishnah and the accompanying Gemara:

The Sages, of blessed memory, called themselves “Prushim” on account of their separating themselves from vices, abominations, and the pursuit of the phenomena of Olam ha'Zeh (This World) which preoccupy the rest of mankind; instead, they turn towards life in Olam ha'Ba (The World to Come) and lofty matters.

However, there is another type of person who decorates himself with these things and makes himself appear in other people’s eyes that he has separated himself from these lowly and abominable things, while at the same time, these very same things permeate his character, and he only separates himself from them on account of some worldly motive.

This is what the Sages are referring to when they say, “there are seven prushim [who ruin the world],” and they enumerate anyone who makes himself seem pious, due to one of these worldly motivations – for example, so that people should honor him, or that Hashem shouldn’t cause him to lose his money and bring harm to him. In the opinion of the Sages, there is no true parush except for one who serves God out of love, like Avraham Avinu; the other six are despicable, since they add onto their preexisting obligations and exaggerate their external superficialities in order to deceive people.

Therefore, because they add to the Torah and make it despicable, they are nicknamed “scourges” and the Sages refer to them as “the scourges of the prushim.” The Sages said that they are the “destroyers of the world (mechalei olam)” or “ruiners of the world (mevalei olam)” because these things are harmful to man’s existence. 

It should be noted that the Mishnah and Gemara are only condemning those "prushim" whose piety is a sham - not to those who have truly reached the true virtue of prishus, who are praised by Chazal and looked upon with favor in the eyes of Hashem. We'll refer to these as "bad prushim."

The Seven Types of Bad Prushim 

Now we are ready for the Gemara in Sotah 22b, which begins by quoting the braisa referenced by the Rambam above:

The Rabbis have taught in a Braisa: There are seven types of [bad] prushim: (1) the Shechemite Parush, (2) the Scuffed Parush, (3) the Bloodletting Parush, (4) the Pestle Parush, (5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush, (6) the Parush out of Love, and (7) the Parush out of Fear.

The Gemara then goes on to define each of these terms. I will include the text of the Gemara, followed by Rashi's commentary [3] in brackets:

(1) the Shechemite Parush is one who does an act of Shechem. [Rashi: they circumcised themselves not for the sake of heaven; likewise, this parush's actions are for his own gratification - so that people should honor him - and they are not for the sake of heaven.]

(2) the Scraped Parush: he is the one who knocks his feet together. [Rashi: he walks in a lowly manner, heel to toe, and he doesn't lift his eyes from the ground; as a result of this, he scrapes his toes against the rocks.]

(3) the Bloodletting Parush: he is the one who causes his blood to flow against the walls. [Rashi: he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women, and as a result of this, he crashes his head into the wall and draws blood.]

(4) the “Pestle” Parush: Rabbah bar Shila said that he is one [whose head is] bowed like [a pestle in] a mortar. [Rashi: he walks hunched over.]

(5) the “What-is-my-obligation-that-I-may-do-it!” Parush: [Rashi explains this question to mean: "Teach me what my obligation is and I will do it."] 

[Based on this initial definition, the Gemara asks:] But isn't this is a virtue?! [The Gemara answers:] No, for this person says, “What further obligation is there for me, that I may do it?” [Rashi: "What more can I do that I haven't done?" - and he makes himself appear as though he has fulfilled everything.] 

(6) the Parush out of Love [Rashi: out of love of the reward of the mitzvos, but not out of love for the mitzvos of the Creator] 

(7) the Parush out of Fear [Rashi: out of fear of punishment; rather, what is incumbent upon a person? - To do the mitzvos of Hashem, blessed is He, out of love, as Hashem, our God, commanded us, and the reward will ultimately come.]

It would be very interesting to define all seven prushim and to understand the mentality of each personality type. It would be also be interesting to identify the modern day correlatives. Perhaps we'll do this in a subsequent post, if I can figure all of them out.

It seems clear which category our blurred-glasses-wearing brethren have stumbled into: the "Bloodletting Parush" category. Rashi's description fits perfectly: "he makes himself like one who closes his eyes so as not to look at women." I wonder whether Rashi's use of this somewhat awkward wording ("makes himself like one who closes his eyes") implies that type of parush only pretends to close his eyes. 

Either way, Rashi seems to learn the Gemara's criticism of Bloodletting Prushim to have something to do with the physical harm they bring upon themselves by their misguided attempts to eschew (what they regard to be) situations of sin. True, halacha must be followed no matter what the cost, but if a person's adherence to halacha routinely leads to physical injury, then one must wonder whether that person is actually keeping halacha, or if it is his yetzer ha'ra masquerading under the guise of religiosity. 

Lo Lishmah Exceptions

After mentioning the last two categories of prushim (i.e. the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear), the Gemara comments:

Abaye and Rava said to the tanna [who was reciting the braisa:] “Do not mention the Parush out of Love and the Parush out of Fear [in the list of bad prushim], for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A person should always involve himself in Torah and mitzvos even she’lo lishmah (not for their own sake), because from she’lo lishmah, he will come to involvement lishmah (for their own sake).” 

According to Abaye and Rava, it was a mistake to include a Parush out of Love and a Parush out of Fear along with the other five individuals mentioned in the braisa. They argued that although it is not ideal to keep halacha out of love of reward or fear of punishment, these are nevertheless valid she'lo lishmah motivations which may lead a person to eventually keep Torah and mitzvos lishmah.

What I find interesting is that Abaye and Rava did not say this about the other five types of prushim. Apparently, their motivations for keeping halacha are not she'lo lishmahs which can lead to lishmah. What is the basis for this distinction? I do not yet have an answer for this. We'll leave it as a question.

Pious Garb

The last point we will consider in this post is about the retribution for this type of prushim behavior, which our Gemara goes on to state:

Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak said: “That which is hidden is hidden and that which is revealed is revealed, but the Great Beis Din will punish those who wrap themselves in gundei.” 

Rashi explains "gundei" to refer to taleisim (plural of "tallis" or "prayer shawl"). He explains the Gemara as follows:

That which is hidden is hidden from people and that which is revealed is revealed [to people]; nevertheless, to the Great Beis Din (i.e. the Heavenly Tribunal), everything is revealed, and it will exact retribution from those who wrap themselves in taleisos and make themselves appear to be prushim when they really are not prushim.

The Aruch, [4] however, learns that the word "gundei" refers to black cloaks. Apparently, even in the time of the Gemara, these types of "bad prushim" wore black in order to appear pious.

What idea is Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak teaching us in this statement? I can't say for certain, but I will take one speculative step. Why do Chazal need to reassure us that a certain aveirah will not go unpunished? Because it must be that on some level we feel that this aveirah will go unpunished. Why might we feel this way about prushim?

Perhaps the answer is simple: we are easily swayed by appearances. If we weren't easily swayed by appearances, everyone would easily see through the facades of these "bad prushim." Even those who know that wearing a black hat and a white beard has absolutely nothing to do with the state of a person's soul vis-a-vis God, it can sometimes be difficult to really feel that this is true. Perhaps this is why Rav Nachman ben Yitzchak emphasizes must tell us that our view is only partial: we only see the outward actions of these people, but not their inner state, and it is their inner state - their knowledge and their true values - which are the real basis of the Divine judgment.

Concluding Thoughts

There you have it: Chazal's diagnosis of "the scourges of prushim." There is much left to think about. But if there's one point that we walk away with, I think it should be this: that these are not new problems. The same personalities we see in the world around us were also walking around in Chazal's time. Chazal knew about them, discussed them, and recorded their thoughts in writing. If we, as a nation, ever hope to remove these ills from our society, we would be wise to understand their teachings on these matters.

And yet, for all of the insights yielded by Chazal's analysis, my shul rabbi's quip ("Don't be too religious") packs a pithier punch. Like Shlomo ha'Melech's warning ("Don't be overly righteous"), his statement prompts us to look at ourselves and examine what we mean by "religious." I'm sure Chazal would approve.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Sotah 3:4
[2] Rabbeinu Menachem ha'Meiri, Beis ha'Bechirah, Sotah Chapter 3
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Sotah
[4] Rabbeinu Nosson ben Yechiel (ha'Aruch), Sefer ha'Aruch