Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Mitzvos

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Artwork: Ring of Three Wishes, by Mark Winters

Parashas Chukas: Three Types of Reasons for Chukim

There is a well-known midrash which states that Shlomo ha'Melech understood the reasons for all of the chukim (statutes) except for the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer) in this week's parashah. [1] We have written on numerous occasions about how this midrash has been misunderstood. Even chukim have reasons, though they may not be obvious. In today's post I would like to explore what it means to "find a reason" for a chok. 

Buried deep within the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, [2] at the very end of Hilchos Me'ilah, at the very end of Sefer Avodah, is a miniature treatise on understanding the reasons for mitzvos which begins with the following injunction:

It is proper for a person to contemplate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their ultimate idea (sof inyan), according to his ability. If he doesn't find a reason (taam) and doesn't know a cause (ilah) of something, it should not be lighter in his eyes, nor should he break forth to ascend to Hashem lest He burst forth against him, nor should he think of it as a mundane matter. 

The Rambam begins by urging us to understand the sof inyan (ultimate idea) of every mitzvah. This phrase is somewhat vague. But in the very next sentence he clarifies what he meant by describing what it looks like to fall short of this ideal, saying that "he didn't find a taam (reason)" and "he didn't know an ilah (cause)." The question is: What does the Rambam mean by taam and ilah?

The Rambam [3] provides us with a clue at the end of Hilchos Temurah: 

Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are [Scriptural] decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah, it is proper to contemplate them; anything for which you can give a taam (reason), you should give a taam. The Early Sages said that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the majority of taamim for all of the chukim of the Torah.

There are several noteworthy subtleties about the Rambam's phrasing in both sources. First of all, whereas in Hilchos Me'ilah he speaks about all mitzvos - including mishpatim - in Hilchos Temurah he only talks about chukim. Secondly, when discussing the ilah (cause) of a mitzvah he uses the verb "to know," as opposed to when discusses the taam of a mitzvah, in which case he uses the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand." Even stranger is his statement "anything for which you can give a taam, give a taam," which almost sounds like he's talking about a subjective form of apologetics, rather than a genuine analysis of the mitzvah in an attempt to uncover its meaning. Lastly, in Hilchos Temurah, the Rambam says that Shlomo understood "the majority of taamim for all the chukim of the Torah," which implies that chukim have multiple taamim. Indeed, 

On the basis of these observations, I would like to suggest the following. The term "ilah" refers to the final cause of the mitzvah - the reason why the mitzvah exists, and without which, the mitzvah would not exist. In contrast, the taam of a mitzvah refers to a benefit which emerges from the mitzvah, but is not necessarily the reason why the mitzvah came into existence in the first place. 

For example, the Rambam famously held that korbanos (sacrifices) were only commanded by Hashem as a means of curtailing, limiting, and uprooting avodah zarah (idolatry) from the nation. From his explanation we have every reason to believe that the Rambam meant exactly what he wrote: had mankind done teshuvah shleimah (complete repentance) from avodah zarah prior to the time that the Torah was given, there would be no korbanos. The uprooting of avodah zarah is the ilah (cause), and all of the mitzvos involving korbanos are the alul (effect). 

Does this mean he holds that there are no other benefits or perfections to be gained from any of the korbanos? Of course not! It's hard to imagine that the Rambam would deny, for example, the Ramban's [4] explanation of how the sacrificing of the animal facilitates teshuvah by bringing us to the recognition that by midas ha'din (absolute justice) standards, we forfeit our right to exist by acting contrary to God's will. Nor would the Rambam deny the Sefer ha'Chinuch's [5] explanation, that when we slaughter the animal as part of our teshuvah process, we are acknowledging that we only came to sin because we allowed our animalistic nature to gain the upper hand. The Rambam would merely say that these explanations reflect taamim, though not the true ilah, of korbanos.

Likewise, the Rambam would undoubtedly agree that the ilah of the Pesach is to remember Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and that the ilah of Sukkos is "in order that your generations will know that I caused Bnei Yisrael to dwell in Sukkos when I took them out from Egypt" (Vayikra 23:43). Yet, in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim [6] he says that the moadim (holidays) are "appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasant gathering as people generally need; they also promote the good feeling that men should have to each other in their social and political relations." 

I believe this explains all of the anomalies we pointed out. It explains his use of the words "ilah" and "taam." It explains why the Rambam uses the verb "to know" in relation to the ilah, since the ilah is an objective fact that can be discovered through knowledge, whereas it makes more sense to use the verbs "to find," "to give," and "to understand" in relation to the taamim, due to the more speculative nature of that type of inquiry. This is also why the Rambam tells us "anything for which you can give a taam, you should give a taam," since the goal is to find as many ways to benefit from our observance of the mitzvos as possible, even if we don't understand the true ilah. This also explains how Shlomo could have understood "the majority of taamim for all of the mitzvos." In other words, if you asked him, he could give you a taam for every single mitzvah - including Parah Adumah - but he would acknowledge that there are taamim that he hasn't yet uncovered.

That takes care of two types of reasons for mitzvos. But as the title of this post implies, there is a third. In the Rambam's terminology, this third type of reason is called a "remez" (allusion). The Rambam provides two examples of this in the Mishneh Torah. The first is his explanation [7] of the remez in shofar:

Even though the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Ha'Shanah is a Scriptural decree, it contains a remez: it is as if it is saying, "Wake up, wake up you sleepers from your sleep, and you slumberers from your deep slumber! Analyze your actions, return in teshuvah, and remember your Creator" - these are the people who forget reality, due to the empty illusions of the times, and whose entire year is steeped in fantasy and emptiness which neither benefits them nor saves them - "Look into your souls and improve your ways and your actions. Each and every one of you: abandon your evil way and your scheming that is not good!" 

The second example is his explanation [8] of the remez in mikvah:

It is a clear and evident thing that tumah (halachic impurity) and taharah (halachic purity) are a Scriptural decree; they are not matters which are dictated by common sense, but are included in the chukim. Likewise, tevilah (ritual immersion) from tumah is included in the chukim, since tumah isn’t mud or excrement such that it would be removed by water, but is a Scriptural decree, and is a matter which is dependent on the intention of the heart. Therefore, the Sages said that if a person immersed but didn’t intend to purify himself, it is as if he didn’t immerse. Nevertheless, there is a remez in it: just as one who intended in his heart to be purified, and once he immersed he became purified, even though nothing changed in his body, so too, one who intends to purify his soul from spiritual impurity – namely, thoughts of iniquity and bad character traits – once he resolves in his mind to separate from those counsels, and brings is soul into the waters of knowledge, he becomes pure. This is as it says: “I will sprinkle pure waters on you and you will become purified; from all of your impurities and from all of your filth I will purify you” (Yechezkel 36:25).

According to the Rambam, a "remez" is a metaphorical or symbolic interpretation of a mitzvah. The remez differs from the taam in the same way that midrash differs from pshat - that is, the remez explanation is imposed onto the mitzvah from without, whereas the taam explanation highlights a benefit which naturally emerges from within the structure of the mitzvah. 

Now that we are aware of these three types of reasons one can give for the mitzvos, it behooves us to classify accordingly the explanations we encounter or discover. There are many people who believe they are giving a taam when it is merely a remez; sometimes we might mistake a taam for an ilah; and sometimes an ilah might be missed because we are too busy looking for a remez. 

This classification scheme can be very helpful when learning the reasons for mitzvos given by meforshim (commentators). Ask yourself which type of reason the commentator intended to give. In some cases, the commentator might have believed he was giving one type of reason, but another commentator will disagree and say he's giving a different type.

Is it possible that the definitions stated here are not what the Rambam intended by his use of these terms? Yes. But even if that is the case, I am convinced that this classification scheme will help us to follow the Rambam's advice and strive to understand the sof inyan of every mitzvah. 

[1] Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3
[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer Avodah, Hilchos Me'ilah 8:8
[3] ibid. Sefer haKorbanos, Hilchos Temurah 4:13

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 1:9

[5] Sefer ha'Chinuch, Parashas Terumah: Mitzvah #95

[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:32

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4

[8] ibid. Sefer Taharah, Hilchos Mikvaos 11:12

Parashas Chukas: No - it was NOT "Meant to Be"

Ordinarily I only write a new dvar Torah for the weekly parashah on Fridays. Today's blog post happens to be an exception to that rule. I've wanted to write about this topic for a while, and I just happened to find a Ralbag on Parashas Chukas which serves as a perfect platform for the discussion. Tomorrow's blog post will also be on Chukas.

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Artwork: Murder, by Allen Williams

Parashas Chukas: No - it was NOT "Meant to Be"

One of the greatest human tragedies is the death of one human being at the hands of another. Whether intentional (e.g. a murder, an act of terrorism, or a wartime casualty) or unintentional (e.g. vehicular manslaughter, an instance of gross negligence, or a freak accident), the sense of loss is compounded by the outrage over the involvement of human agency.

Although I haven't taken a formal survey, it seems to me that there are many Jews respond to such tragedies by saying "it was meant to be." People will say this about the full gamut of homicide, from suicide bombings, to car accidents, to complications arising from medical procedures. The "it was meant to be" sentiment will be expressed in a variety of ways. Some people exclaim "gam zu l'tovah," which they erroneously translate as "this, too, is for the best," or they invoke the even more common false notion that "everything is hashgachah pratis." Others give some variant of the allegedly more comforting explanation of "God wanted this person to be with Him" or the more neutral "it was his time to go." Others chalk it up to other common falsehoods, such as "this person must have fulfilled his tafkid (life's purpose) and that's why he died" or "her soul needed a tikkun (correction), and now it's free to move on." 

Although there is a lot that can be said here, I would like to limit the scope of our analysis from the outset. We will NOT be discussing this issue from the standpoint of God's justice or reward and punishment. We will NOT be dealing with the concept of God's Omniscience or Omnipotence. We will NOT address the question of what is or is not hashgachah pratis. We will NOT be discussing reincarnation or any of the doctrines that are based thereupon.We will certainly NOT discuss how to comfort someone who has experienced such a loss, or how to deal with such hardships in one's own life. 

The objective of this post is to make one point: just because one person dies prematurely at the hands of another doesn't mean that "it was meant to be." Or, to put it in positive terms: Judaism does hold that a person's life can be taken before his or her time. And what is true of death, which is the ultimate loss, certainly applies to other forms of harm and suffering that are brought about by human action.

My impetus for writing about this topic was the Ralbag's comparison of the Parah Adumah (Red Heifer) at the beginning of Parashas Chukas with the Eglah Arufah (Axed Calf) at the end of Parashas Shoftim. There are several structural similarities between these two mitzvah-institutions, most notably:

• Both involve cows: the Parah Adumah an adult female, and the Eglah Arufah a young calf.
• Both are associated with human death: the Parah Adumah is the means by which we purify people from tumas meis (halachic impurity brought about by a human corpse), and the Eglah Arufah is brought to atone for an unsolved murder of a human being.
• Both are associated with a prohibition of work: the Parah Adumah must not have work done with it, and the land on which the Eglah Arufah is killed may not be worked.

The Ralbag [1] explains that the difference in the age requirement of the Parah Adumah and the Eglah Arufah is intended to clarify Judaism's stance on premature death. He writes:

The [Eglah Arufah] is a young calf and the [Parah Adumah] is an adult cow in order to teach us that the killer caused this person to die prematurely - that is, the person whose corpse was found in the field, whose assailant is unknown - because many people have erred, thinking that this (i.e. premature death) is impossible. This [error] leads to great harm in the Torah's beliefs, and in philosophy, and in matters [2] of ethics and practical decision-making, and denies the reality of the possible - but this is not the place for this inquiry.

In other words, when we carry out the procedure of Eglah Arufah in response to an unsolved murder, the young calf whose life we cut short is supposed to remind us that this victim's life was cut short by the murderer. This reinforces the Torah's view that this person's death was not "meant to be," but occurred prematurely. 

According to the Ralbag, the belief that a person's death was "meant to be" leads to "great harm" in four areas. First and foremost, such a belief undermines the beliefs of Torah - specifically, the yesode (fundamental principle) of bechirah chofshis (free will), as the Ralbag specifies elsewhere. [3] Secondly, this belief is not consistent with philosophical truth (though there are philosophers that arose after the Ralbag who would disagree). Third, it causes harm in the realm of ethics and practical decision-making. Fourth, it is predicated upon a denial of the category of "the possible" (by presupposing that everything that can happen is either "necessary" or "impossible"). 

The clearest and most comprehensive treatment of Judaism's view of bechirah in Rishonic literature (that I know of) is the Rambam's presentation in the eighth chapter of the Shemoneh Perakim. As it so happens, he addresses each of the four points mentioned by the Ralbag. He even mentions our case, about murder. Instead of summarizing each of these points on my own, I'm going to let the Rambam speak for himself, with my own paragraph breaks for clarity:

It is important for you to know that our Torah is in agreement with Greek philosophy, which have been substantiated by true proofs, that man's actions are in his control; no one compels him to do anything, and nothing other than himself ever inclines him toward a character virtue or flaw - other than a predisposition, which, as we explained, would [merely] make him find it easier or harder to do a specific thing [but doesn't necessitate any action on his part].

If man were compelled in his actions, then all of the Torah's commands and prohibitions would be utterly pointless, since man would not have freedom in his actions. 

Likewise, all study, education, and craft-related training would also be in vain, since - according to this theory - man would have something external to himself compelling him to do a certain action, or to know a certain subject, or to have a certain trait.

Reward and punishment - whether society's or God's - would be absolutely unjust. For if one person ("Shimon") killed another ("Reuven") because he was forced or compelled to kill, and his victim was forced or compelled to be killed, then why should [the killer] Shimon be punished? And how could it ever be said that God, Who is just and fair, punished someone for doing something he was compelled to do and could not help but do, even if he didn't want to? 

Besides, any precautions we would take - like building houses, acquiring food, fleeing when frightened, and the like - would be pointless, since it would be "meant to be" by [Divine] decree. 

All of this is nonsense and absolutely invalid; it runs counter to rationality and common sense, tears down the wall of Torah, and deems Hashem to be unjust - God forbid! 

But the truth, beyond any doubt, is that all of man's actions are in his own hands. If he wants to do something, he can; and if he doesn't want to, he doesn't have to. There is no compulsion or force upon him. Therefore, the mitzvos are binding. 

[Hashem] said, "Behold - I have placed before you today the life and the good, and the death and the bad ... [therefore, choose life]" (Devarim 30:15-19), thus placing the choice in our hands. And there is necessarily punishment for transgression and reward for obedience, [as it is stated:] "[You will receive blessing] if you obey [the mitzvos of Hashem, your God], and [you will be cursed] if you disobey]" (ibid. 11:26-28). And there is an obligation to learn and to teach, [as it is stated:] "Teach them to your children" (ibid. 11:19), and "learn them, observe them, and do them" (ibid. 5:1). [There is an obligation] as well to do everything else that is involved in the learning and fulfillment of mitzvos.

One is also obligated to take all of the precautions [against harm or damage] enumerated in the Book of Truth, which says, "Make a maakeh (guardrail) for your roof ... lest someone fall" (Devarim 22:8); "[Let him go back to his house,] for he may die in battle" (ibid. 20:5-7); "[If you take your neighbor's garment as collateral, bring it back to him by sundown, for that is his only covering ...] What would he then sleep with?" (Shemos 22:26); "Do not take lower or upper millstones as a pledge" (Devarim 24:6). And there are many other statements in the Torah and the Books of the Prophets on this subject of taking precautions. 

As for the Sages' statement that "ha'kol bi'ydei shamayim chutz mi'yiras shamayim" - "Everything is in the hands of heaven except for fear of heaven" (Berachos 33b) - this, too, is correct, and follows what we have said.

Many people erroneously believe that a person is compelled to do certain things that are actually open to choice, for example, marrying a particular woman or acquiring a certain amount of money by stealing - but that is incorrect. For it is a mitzvah to marry a woman permissible to you by means of a kesubah (wedding contract) and kiddushin in order to have children, and God does not compel in the observance of mitzvos. In addition, if there were some wrongdoing in marrying her [i.e., if someone were to marry a woman who were prohibited to him], it would be a transgression, and God does not decree that a person transgress. The same would be true if one stole money from a person or robbed or defrauded him, then denied it and took an oath about the money [declaring it to be his own]. If one claimed that God decreed that the money be taken from the other person's hands and placed in his, it would be saying that God decreed a transgression, but that is not so. 

Rather, all of a person's actions are in his own hands, and through them obedience and disobedience will undoubtedly be demonstrated. For as we explained in the second chapter, Torah-based commands and prohibitions only apply to the deeds one is free to act upon or not. As such, the "fear of heaven" which is not in the hands of heaven, but is rather given to man, as we have explained, lies in this part of the soul.

And the statement that "everything [is in the hands of heaven]" is not intended literally; what they were referring to were natural phenomena which man has no control over, like being tall or short, whether it will rain or be dry, whether the air will be foul or pure, and everything else that occurs in the [natural] world, rather than through man's actions.

But the point the Sages made, that obedience or disobedience [i.e. the fear of heaven] are not by the decree of God or by His will, but rather by man's will, were deduced from the words of Jeremiah, who said, "Neither bad nor good comes from the mouth of the Most High" (Eichah 3:38) where "bad" refers to bad deeds and "good" refers to good deeds. That means to say that God does not decree whether a person will do bad deeds or good deeds.  

That being so, it is only right that man mourns for and regrets all his sins and transgressions, since he has done wrong of his own volition, as [Yirmiyahu] said, "What should a living man mourn for, a mortal man? For his sins" (ibid. 3:39). He then goes on to say that the cure for this illness therefore lies in our own hands. For just as we disobeyed by choice, so too, we can turn aside from our bad deeds. Hence he concluded with, "Let us search and examine our ways, and return to Hashem. Let us life up our hearts with our hands to God, in heaven" (ibid. 3:40-41).

There you have it. Let's summarize by applying the Rambam's analysis to the case of a premature death at the hands of another person. If someone was killed, whether intentionally or unintentionally, we do not say that "it was meant to be," for this would undermine the fundamental principle of free will on which the entire Torah is premised. To say that this person's death was "meant to be" would mean that the killer was somehow forced or compelled in his actions. If that were the case, how could he be held culpable by God or by human courts? Furthermore, from the standpoint of the victim, we cannot say that an untimely death was "meant to be" without reducing all of our preparatory and precautionary measures to absurdity. It would be senseless for the Torah to tell us to build a fence around our roof to prevent people from falling, or to send back the fearful person from battle, or to seek medical attention for illness and injury.

Rather, as Chazal said, "everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven" and, as the Rambam explained, "the fear of heaven" includes any and every action that directly or indirectly involves a mitzvah or a transgression. This certainly applies to a case in which one person caused the death of another.

Some might object to all of this, saying, "What's the big fuss? Let people think that it was meant to be! After all, they don't realize the philosophical implications of what they are saying. They just want to take solace in a belief that will comfort them."

To my mind, this is what differentiates Judaism from other systems of belief. Other belief systems are the products of the human psyche, with all of its wishes, fantasies, and insecurities. Even non-religious people tend to adapt or reject beliefs on this subjective basis. Judaism is different. We strive to base our beliefs on objective knowledge, truth, and reality, to the best of our understanding. We do not accept or reject something as true based on how pleasing or displeasing it is, or how much we want it to be true. To the contrary, we aim to determine our beliefs by using our God-given intellect to understand the universe - based on our own analysis, in light of our knowledge of Torah - and to accept the truth even if it clashes with our desires and preferences.

Again, I would like to emphasize the questions that this article intentionally did not aim to answer. We haven't addressed questions of God's justice, reward and punishment, Omniscience, Omnipotence, hashgachah pratis, the fate of the soul, or how to provide comfort to the bereaved. Each of these topics is "longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Iyov 11:9), and should be investigated with deliberation and clarity.

But certain investigations cannot begin until the mistaken assumptions which hinder them are cut down, and - like the life of the Eglah Arufah which is cut short by the free choice of the ax-wielder - so too, it is our duty as purveyors of Torah knowledge must cut down the erroneous beliefs which preclude philosophical growth and maturity. 

[1] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 19

[2] The phrase used by the Ralbag here is inyanim ha'mediniyim; since, in Gersonidean terminology, this includes interpersonal ethics and personal decision-making, I decided to translate it as "ethics and practical decision-making."

[3] see, for instance, Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on Sefer Melachim I, Toeles #24 

Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos

The following is a translation of a full chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed (3:26) in which the Rambam establishes some fundamental principles about the reasons for mitzvos. This post stands on its own, but is also the basis of tomorrow's post, entitled: "Are Mitzvos Arbitrary?" The paragraph divisions and headings are mine. 

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Rambam: On the Reasons for Mitzvos (Guide for the Perplexed 3:26)

All Mitzvos Have Reasons

Just as religious scholars are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. 

Some of them hold that the commandments have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the precepts: they are commanded because they are useful. 

All of us, the common people as well as the scholars, believe that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of God's wisdom are incomprehensible. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim (statutes) and mishpatim (judgments) of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10). 

Even Chukim Have Reasons

There are mitzvos which are called chukim (statutes), such as the prohibition of wearing garments of wool and linen [mixed together] (shaatnez), boiling meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim]. Regarding these the Sages said: “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them” (Yoma 67b).

The multitude of Sages generally do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, a specific, beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge.

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those commandments whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim.

Concealed Reasons

The Sages continually say: “ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you)” (Yerushalmi Peah 1:4). In other words, this mitzvah is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, this is due to a deficiency in your understanding.

You certainly know the famous saying that the reasons for all of the mitzvos were known to Shlomo except that of the parah adumah (red heifer). Our Sages also said that Hashem concealed the reasons for the mitzvos lest people should make light of them, as Shlomo did in respect to three mitzvos, the reasons for which are clearly stated. All of [the Sages’] words follow this fundamental principle, and it is indicated by the text of the pesukim.

A Puzzling Statement

I have, however, found one utterance made by them in Bereishis Rabbah (Section 44) from which, at first glance, it would appear that some mitzvos have no other reason but the fact that they are commanded, and that no other objective is intended by them, and that they do not serve any real purpose. I mean the following passage: 

What difference does it make to Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu whether an animal is slaughtered by shechitah (cutting the front of the neck) or by nechirah ("poleaxing it" i.e. chopping the back of its neck)? Surely the mitzvos were only given in order to test human beings, as it is stated: "The word of Hashem is tested (lit. refined)" (Tehilim 18:31). 

Although this passage is exceedingly strange and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I will explain it - as you shall soon hear - in such a manner that I do not stray at all from their words and do not depart from the unanimous fundamental principle, namely, that all mitzvos serve a real, beneficial objective, [as it is stated:] "for it is not an empty thing for you," and as it is stated:"I did not tell the descendants of Yaakov to seek Me for nothing; I am Hashem, Who speaks righteousness" (Yeshayahu 45:19). 

Resolution of the Difficulty

I will now tell you what all people with sound minds ought to maintain in this respect, namely, that all of the mitzvos have specific reasons as far as their general character is concerned, and were commanded for a specific purpose; but as regards to their particulars - that is where we say that they have no reason other than being commanded. 

For example: killing animals for the purpose of obtaining nutrition is clearly beneficial, as we intend to show (see 3:48). However, that the killing should not be performed by nechirah but by shechitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the esophagus and the windpipe in a certain place - these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man. In this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is no difference] between killing the animal by shechitah or by nechirah. 

I give this instance only because it has been mentioned by our Sages, but in reality [there is some reason for these regulations:] once it has become necessary to eat the flesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to ensure an easy death and to effect it by suitable means; while decapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, shechitah can be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure an easy death our Sages insisted that the knife should be well sharpened.

Another Example

A better example of the point we made about [reasons for] the particulars of mitzvos is korbanos (sacrifices). The law that korbanos should be brought is tremendously beneficial, as will be shown by us (see 3:46), but we cannot say why one korban should be a lamb whilst another is a ram, and why a fixed number of them should be brought. Those who trouble themselves to find reasons for any of these details are chasing after a huge delusion - one which not only fails to remove any difficulties, but increases them. Anyone who believes that these [details of the laws] have a purpose is as far from the truth as one who assumes that the entire mitzvah is without any real purpose. 

It is important for you to know that chochmah (wisdom) demanded it - or, if you prefer, say that necessity dictated - that there should be parts [of the mitzvos] for which reasons are inapplicable; it is, as it were, inherently impossible for the mitzvah not to have something of this type.

That this cannot be avoided may be seen from the following: You ask, "Why must a lamb be sacrificed and not a ram?" But the same question would be asked why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb - so long as one particular kind is required. The same is to be said as to the question why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight: the same question might have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twenty lambs - so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed. It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can potentially receive different forms, but actually receives only one of them: we must not ask why it has this form and not another which is likewise possible, because we should have to ask the same question if instead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possible forms. Note this, and understand it. 

The repeated assertion of our Sages that there are reasons for all mitzvos, and the tradition that Solomon knew them, refers to the general purpose of the mitzvos, but one should not inquire about their details.

Rambam's Plan for Explaining Mitzvos

This being the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred and thirteen mitzvos into a number of classes: each class will include many mitzvos of the same kind, or related to each other by their character. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and show its undoubted and undisputed benefit; then I shall discuss each mitzvah in the class, and expound its reason. Only very few will be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unable to trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in some cases even the reasons for many of the conditions and details, as far as these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. But in order to fully explain these reasons I must preface this with several chapters; in these I will discuss principles which form the basis of my theory. I will now begin these chapters.

Parashas Chukas: The Reason for Parah Adumah

Originally posted in July 2013.

Parashas Chukas: The Reason for Parah Adumah

Parashas Chukas begins with the mysterious mitzvah of the parah adumah (red heifer). We are commanded to sacrifice and burn a parah adumah so that its ash should be available for anyone who needs to be purified from tumas meis (halachic impurity resulting from coming in contact with a corpse). This parah must meet a highly specific list of requirements in order to be eligible for the mitzvah. For example: it must be completely red; it must be tamim (“perfect”) without any physical blemishes; it must be purchased using communal funds – not the general "Sanctuary maintenance" funds; and it must never have borne a yoke on its neck or performed any labor. [1] The aim of this short dvar Torah is to explain one of the basic reasons for the parah adumah.

To this one might object: “How is that even possible? I was taught that nobody knows the reason for the parah adumah – not even Shlomo ha’Melech!” This is partially correct, but not entirely. It is true that Shlomo ha’Melech understood the reasons for all 613 mitzvos except for the parah adumah, as was taught in the Midrash Tanchumah. [2] However, that very same midrash teaches: “The Holy One, blessed is He, told Moshe: ‘To you I will reveal the reason for the parah, but not to others.’” [3] Upon reflection, this makes sense: Moshe Rabbeinu was on the highest level of knowledge, and was taught the entire Torah by Hashem. Of course he understood the reasons for all of the mitzvos!

Not only that, but the same midrash goes on to state that the hidden reasons for all of the mitzvos, including parah adumah, were understood by R’ Akiva and his colleagues. Although the midrash appears to contradict itself, one thing is clear: the reason for the parah adumah may be difficult to grasp, but it can be understood, and has been, by a number of chachamim.

But wait – there’s more! Rashi, himself, provides an explanation for parah adumah in his Chumash commentary, and that is what we will focus on here. Rashi begins by explaining why this korban must be a female, whereas all other communal korbanos are male:

This can be compared to the son of a maidservant who soiled the king’s palace. They said, “Let this mother come and clean up the mess!” Similarly, let the parah come and atone for the [Golden] Calf. [4]

This is the crux of Rashi’s approach: the parah adumah was designed as a kaparah (atonement) for the Cheit ha’Eigel (Sin of the Golden Calf). Rashi then goes on to explain each requirement of the parah adumah in accordance with this theory.

The color red represents sin, as it is stated, “If [your sins] have become as red as crimson, they will become [white] as wool.” [5] The physical perfection of the parah is an allusion to Bnei Yisrael, who were “perfect” until they became “blemished” by the Cheit ha’Eigel. The requirement to purchase the parah from communal funds parallels the fact that Bnei Yisrael donated their own jewelry to make the Eigel. The requirement that the parah must never have borne a yoke alludes to the fact that Bnei Yisrael cast off the Ole Shamayim (Yoke of Heaven) when they worshiped the Eigel. Rashi goes on to explain all of the other requirements of the parah adumah in this manner.

We have only scratched the surface of understanding the reasons behind parah adumah according to Rashi’s theory. However, what is (perhaps) more important than Rashi’s particular ideas is his overall approach to chukim. In spite of our tradition that only a few individuals throughout history understood the reason for parah adumah, Rashi nevertheless analyzed the subject with his own mind. By analyzing the major structural components of the mitzvah as taught in Torah she’baal Peh (the Oral Torah), and drawing upon his knowledge of clues in Torah she’bi’Chsav (the Written Torah), Rashi was able to arrive at his own theory about the intended purpose of this enigmatic mitzvah.

Rashi’s approach to the parah adumah may serve as a model for how we approach all chukim. The Rambam writes: “Even though all of the chukim of the Torah are decrees … it is proper to think into them and to provide reasons for them wherever you are able to do so.” [6] If we seek to understand the chukim of our Torah, we must analyze them with our own minds through the lenses of Torah she’bi’Chsav and Torah she’baal Peh, guided by the Talmudic traditions of Chazal – just as Rashi, Rebbi Akiva, and Shlomo ha’Melech did.

May we all merit to discover reasons for all of the chukim, so that we may reap the full benefits intended by the One Who commanded them!

[1] Sefer Bamidbar 19:1-22

[2] Tanchumah: Chukas 6; Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3; Koheles Rabbah 7:23; Psikta d’Rav Kahana 4.

[3] Tanchumah: Chukas 8; Bamidbar Rabbah 19:6; Psikta d’Rav Kahanah ibid.

[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo Yitzchaki (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 19:22; the midrashim which are the basis for Rashi’s explanation can be found in the Midrash Aggadah and Tanchuma 8, as well as in Bamidbar Rabbah 19:8.

[5] Sefer Yeshayahu 1:18

[6] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Korbanos, Hilchot Temurah 4:14

Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra)

I must preface this post with a disclaimer: I don't understand what a "soul" is. Years ago I used to think I understood the Torah's view on the concept of "soul," but the more I learned, the more I realized the breadth and depth of the topic, and of my own ignorance and metaphysical naiveté. 

Here is what I do know:

1. The word "soul" is used equivocally. It can mean different things in different contexts. Although there are different words for "soul" (e.g. nefesh, ruach, neshamah), even these terms aren't necessarily consistent in their usage, and each must be interpreted based on its context. 
   
   
2. The human soul has something to do with the tzelem Elokim, which has something to do with the human intellect, but I am at a loss to explain how these three things are related.
   
   
3. There is also some relationship between the human soul and free will, and I find free will to be an even more daunting topic than the soul.
   
   
4. There is a lot of machlokes on this topic among the meforshim, and it is very difficult to discern which of the meforshim are working with the same premises and which of them are working with a completely different set of premises.

And that's about it. Beyond these four points, I feel that I am still "groping in darkness and not in light ... staggering like a drunkard" (cf. Iyov 12:24-25) on this topic. 

Thus, I have decided to take the same approach with this subject as I did with Sefer Mishlei: rather than trying to form grand theories and a complete understanding of the topic, I will instead approach the topic step by step, one idea at a time. If I (am zocheh to) do this for a number of decades, perhaps a clearer picture will begin to emerge. 

Having said all of that, I would like to present one idea about the soul from the Ibn Ezra. Please regard this as merely a clue in our investigation of the vast mystery story of the soul.

Do Babies Have Souls? (Ibn Ezra)

That's the question. How would you answer it on a multiple choice quiz with these choices?

          (A) yes
          (B) no
          (C) maybe
          (D) potentially

Let's cut right to the chase. According to the Ibn Ezra, the answer is (D) potentially. Or, to be more precise, babies have potential souls - not actual souls.

The Ibn Ezra states his view in his commentary on Tehilim 8:3. Here is the perek in its entirety:

(1) For the conductor, on the gittis, a psalm by David. (2) Hashem, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth, [You] Who places Your majesty on the heavens. (3) Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings You have established strength, because of Your enemies, to silence foe and avenger. (4) When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers, the moon and the stars that You have set in place, [I think,] (5) "What is frail man that You should remember him, and the son of mortal man that You should be mindful of him?" (6) Yet, You have made him but slightly less than the angels, and crowned him with glory and splendor. (7) You give him dominion over Your handiwork, You placed everything under his feet: (8) sheep and cattle, all of them, even the beasts of the field; (9) the birds of the sky and the fish of the sea; for [man] even traverses the lanes of the sea. (10) Hashem, our Master, how mighty is Your Name throughout the earth!

The question on our pasuk is: How is Hashem's strength established through "the mouths of babes and sucklings"? What does this even mean? 

Ibn Ezra begins by quoting the explanation of R' Moshe ha'Darshan, who learns that the pasuk is referring to the literal mouths of the babies, through which they obtain nourishment:

R' Moshe says that out of the mouth of babes means that the babes themselves will praise You even though they cannot speak, for You sustain them. You make them fruitful and You multiply and increase their body’s height and width.

Rabbi H. Norman Strickman, in his footnotes on the Ibn Ezra's commentary, understands R' Moshe ha'Darshan as follows: "The way children grow bears witness to the existence of a Creator. Thus the babes, as it were, declare that there is a God." 

However, the Ibn Ezra disagrees with this approach, and states his own view:

However, in my opinion Scripture reads, “out of the mouth of babes” because man is the most glorious being created in this world. “Out of the mouth of babes” refers to the time that a child first begins to speak. Its meaning is that the power of the rational soul first appears in the body when the child begins to speak. The rational soul develops to the point where it can learn of the power of its Creator by logical thinking. Indeed the soul grows in strength day by day. This is the meaning of, “has Thou founded strength.”

A baby is born with only the potential for rational thinking, which is what the Ibn Ezra means when he speaks of a "soul." This potential is first actualized when the child begins to speak, and continues to develop from that point forward. In this manner, the child builds and cultivates his own soul, which ultimately brings him to recognize his Creator.

The Ibn Ezra's interpretation is in line with Targum Onkelos's translation of the statement, "[God] blew into [man's] nostrils the breath of life, and man became a nefesh chayah (living soul)" (Bereishis 2:7) as "and man became a ruach memalela (speaking spirit)." The human soul and the ability to speak are inextricably linked, and as one develops, so does the other.

And that, my friends, is all I've got for today. Just one piece of the puzzle of the soul. I don't know where this idea fits into the grand scheme of things. I don't know what bearing it has on such topics as the immortality of the soul, the incorporeality of the soul, Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), reward and punishment, the relationship between mind and body, etc. etc. etc. Those questions must be left for another time.

This morning I came across a passage in the Sefer ha'Chinuch that made me smile. After expressing great apprehension at the prospect of writing about the mitzvah of Parah Adumah (Red Heifer), the Sefer ha'Chinuch offers a few speculations. Immediately thereafter, he apologizes for his boldness, and downplays what he just wrote, saying:

This is not a clarification to provide any comprehension whatsoever of the matter. It is only the love of holiness and the eagerness to achieve a knowledge of the hidden that moves the quill to write.

That sentiment resonated with me while writing this post. Remember, friends: this blog is nothing more and nothing less than a venue for me to think out loud, and to discuss ideas with others who are interested. If you are looking for certainty, expertise, and "authoritative knowledge," then I would be happy to refer you to other resources. 

Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom?

This week's dvar Torah covers a basic but fundamental issue: whether or not chukim have reasons. Enjoy!

Parashas Chukas: Chukim - Decrees of Whim or Wisdom

"This is the chukah (decree) of the Torah, which Hashem has commanded etc." (Bamidbar 19:2)

What are chukim? Rashi's most comprehensive answer can be found in Parashas Beshalach [1]:

[Chukim are] matters that are only the decree of the King, without any reason, and with which the yetzer ha'ra (evil inclination) finds fault, saying, “What [cause for] prohibition is there in these? Why were they prohibited?” Examples include [the prohibitions of] wearing shaatnez [a mixture of wool and linen] and eating pork, and the parah adumah (red heifer) and the like.

On the surface, Rashi would seem to maintain that chukim are mitzvos which have no reasons. He reiterates this definition several times throughout his commentary [2].

The Ramban doesn't accept this reading of Rashi. After quoting Rashi's definition of a chok as "a decree of the King for which there is no reason," Ramban proceeds to clarify what Rashi really meant [3]:

Their intention is not that a decree of the King of kings would have no reason, for “every word of God is refined” (Mishlei 30:5). Rather, chukim are like the decrees of a king which he enacts in his kingdom without revealing their beneficial purpose to the nation. [Consequently,] the masses do not take delight in them, but are critical of them in their hearts, and accept them out of the fear of the kingship. The same is true of the chukim of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu: they are the esoteric matters which are contained in his Torah, which the masses – in their minds – do not delight in, like they do with the mishpatim. But [in truth] all of them have a good rationale and completely beneficial [reason].

According to the Ramban, Rashi didn't mean that the chukim of the Torah actually have no reason. Rather, Rashi was describing how the masses perceive the chukim. All mitzvos have reasons, but whereas the reasons for mishpatim are revealed, the reasons for the chukim are concealed. 

The Rambam is just as explicit as the Ramban in his rejection of the notion that chukim have no reasons [4]:

Just as theologians are divided on the question of whether the actions of God are the result of His Wisdom, or only of His Will without being intended for any purpose whatsoever, so they are also divided as regards the purpose of the mitzvos which God gave us. Some of them hold that the mitzvos have no purpose at all and are only dictated by the whim of God. Others are of the opinion that all commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdom and serve a certain aim. Consequently there is a reason for each one of the mitzvos: they are commanded because they are beneficial.  

All of us, the masses as well as the elite individuals, maintain that there is a reason for every mitzvah, although there are mitzvos the reason of which is unknown to us, and in which the ways of [Divine] wisdom are not known. This view is distinctly expressed in Scripture, as it is stated, "chukim and mishpatim of justice" (Devarim 4:8), “The mishpatim of Hashem are true and righteous altogether” (Tehilim 19:10).

The Rambam then goes on to explain the difference between chukim and mishpatim:

There are mitzvos which are called chukim – such as the prohibitions of shaatnez and [cooking] meat and milk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness on Yom ha’Kippurim] – about which the Sages said [5], “I, [Hashem,] have ordained these for you; you do not have permission to be suspicious of them, and the satan flings accusations on account of them, and the gentile nations argue against them.” 

The multitude of Sages do not think that such mitzvos have no reason whatsoever and serve no purpose, for this would lead us to assume that God's actions are in vain. On the contrary, they maintain that even these chukim have a reason – that is to say, an absolutely beneficial reason – even if it eludes us, owing either to the weakness of our intellect or the deficiency of our knowledge. 

Consequently, the Sages are of the opinion that there are reasons for every mitzvah: every positive or negative precept serves a beneficial purpose. In some cases the usefulness is evident, for example, the prohibition of murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, for example, the prohibition of orlah (deriving benefit from the fruit of a tree in the first three years) or kilai ha’kerem (deriving benefit from the produce of a mixed-species vineyard). Those mitzvos whose purpose is generally evident are called mishpatim, and those whose purpose is not generally clear are called chukim. 

The Sages [6] continually say: “'ki lo davar reik hu mi’kem – for it is not an empty thing for you’ (Devarim 32:47) – and if you find it to be a davar reik (empty thing), it is mi’kem (lit. from you).” In other words, this commandment is not an empty thing without any beneficial purpose, and if it appears to you that any one of the mitzvos is like this, it is due to a deficiency in your understanding. 

Elsewhere the Rambam articulates the underlying premise of those who believe that mitzvos have no reasons [7]: 

There are people who find it difficult to give a reason for any of the mitzvos, and who prefer not to analyze the commandments and prohibitions at all. They are led to adopt this approach by a certain disease in their soul, the existence of which they perceive, but which they are unable to describe or explain, namely, they imagine that if these mitzvos were beneficial in this [worldly] existence in any way whatsoever, and if they were commanded because of this benefit, then it would be as though they originated in the thought and reason of some intelligent being; but [if] these matters are not subject to rationality and do not bring about a benefit, they would undoubtedly be attributed to God, because no thought of man could have produced them.  

According to the theory of those weak-minded people, man is more perfect than his Creator, for what man says or does has a certain purpose, whereas the actions of God are different, for He commands us to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to do what is harmless. May He be exalted and elevated above [this erroneous notion]!  

The exact opposite is true: the entire purpose [of the Torah] is to benefit us, as we have explained in that which is stated: “[Hashem commanded us to perform all these decrees, to fear Hashem, our God,] for our good, all the days, to give us life, as this very day” (Devarim 6:24). And it is stated: “[You shall safeguard them and perform them, for it is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations,] who shall hear all these decrees and who shall say, ‘Surely a wise and discerning people is this great nation!’” (ibid. 4:6). Thus, He clearly stated that even the individual chukim point to wisdom and understanding in the eyes of all the nations. But if no reason could be found for these chukim and if they did not yield benefit or remove harm, then why should he who believes in them and does them be [considered] wise, understanding, and excellent, and why should such an individual be a wonderment to all of the nations?  

The Rambam concludes with a rule of thumb for uncovering the reasons for chukim:

Rather, the matter is undoubtedly as we have said, namely, that every one of the 613 mitzvos serves to inculcate a true view or remove a false view, or to establish righteous conduct [in society] or remove an injustice, or to train us in a good character trait or to caution us against an evil character trait. Everything is dependent on these three things: hashkafos (our view of reality), middos (character traits), and actions which shape society … Thus, these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for each and every mitzvah.

It is possible that Rashi meant exactly what he wrote, and that the believes that chukim have no reasons. Nevertheless, the Ramban and the Rambam build a strong case for the argument that all mitzvos have reasons, and that Rashi would agree. 

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak, Commentary on Sefer Shemos 15:26

[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Bereishis 26:5 and Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Vayikra 19:19

[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:26

[5] Talmud Bavli, Yoma 67b

[6] Talmud Yerushalmi, Peah 1:4

[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:31