Friday, June 29, 2018

Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

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Artwork: Skirsdag Flayer, by Austin Hsu


Parashas Balak: Bilam as a Teacher of Ethics

Earlier this week I made the following comment on Facebook: "We all have our least-favorite parshiyos, and Balak is mine." A friend of mine, no doubt trying to appeal to my interests, replied that he views Balak as one of the "Mishlei parshiyot, illustrating archetypes of various, mostly negative, character traits." His comment got me thinking. I associated to a mishnah in Avos 5:19 (or 22):
Whoever has the following three traits is among the students of Avraham Avniu, and [whoever has] three different traits is among the students of the wicked Bilam. Those who have an ayin tovah (good eye), a ruach nemuchah (humble spirit), and a nefesh shefalah (lowly soul) are among the students of Avraham Avinu. Those who have an ayin raah (bad eye), a ruach gevohah (arrogant spirit), and a nefesh rechavah (greedy soul) are among the students of the wicked Bilam. 
How are the students of Avraham Avinu different from the students of the wicked Bilam? The students of Avraham Avinu enjoy [the fruits of their good deeds] in Olam ha'Zeh (This World) and inherit Olam ha'Ba (the World to Come), as it is stated: "To cause those who love Me to inherent [an everlasting] possession (i.e. Olam ha'Ba), and I will fill their storehouses (in Olam ha'Zeh)" (Mishlei 8:21). But the students of the wicked Bilam inherit Gehinom and descend into the Be'er Shachas (the Well of Destruction), as it is stated: "And You, O God, shall lower them into the well of destruction, men of bloodshed and deceit shall not live out half their days; but as for me, I will trust in You" (Tehilim 55:54).
The Rambam [1] provides a full elucidation of this mishnah:
We have already explained several times that "ayin tovah" means histapkus (contentedness with what one has) "nefesh shefalah" refers to prishus (separation from sexual indulgence), and "ruach nemuchah" refers to anavah mufleges (excessive humility), as has been explained in the previous chapter. 
The three [other traits mentioned by the mishnah] are the opposite: lehitus ha'mamon (craving after money), which is "ayin raah," taavas ha'mishgal (sexual lust) is "nefesh rechavah," and gaavah (haughtiness) is "ruach gevohah." 
The three [aforementioned] virtues are widely known to be associated with Avraham Avinu. Therefore, anyone who has these three virtues is called "a student of Avraham," since he conducts himself with [Avraham's] traits. Likewise, anyone who has these three vices is "a student of Bilam," since he conducts himself with [the latter's] traits. 
I will now mention the places in which these virtues are explained in relation to Avraham Avinu and these vices in relation to Bilam - all of which are pesukim in the Torah
Avraham Avinu's ayin tovah is [reflected] in his statement to the King of Sedom: "Neither a thread nor a shoelace will I take from anything that is yours" (Bereishis 14:23), for this is the utmost degree of histapkus, for he gave up a huge amount of money and didn't profit from it even in the slightest degree. "Prishus" we see from his statement to Sarah when he came to Egypt: "Behold! Now I know that you are a woman of beautiful appearance" (ibid. 12:11), and the [Oral Torah's] explanation comes [and explains] that he had never fully gazed at her beauty before that day, which is the utmost degree of prishus. It also said regarding Hagar, after he married her: "Behold! Your maidservant is in your hand" (ibid. 16:6), which implies that he had no involvement in enjoying her or behaving flirtatiously with her [prior to then]; and when Sarah asked to send her away with Yishmael, the pasuk testifies that it this was only difficult for him because of the matter of Yishmael alone, in order to clear him of the suspicion that he was sexually inclined towards [Hagar] - all of these are signs of prishus - as it was stated, "and the matter concerning Avram's son greatly displeased him" (ibid. 21:11). As for humility - this is [reflected] in his statement: "I am dust and ashes" (ibid. 18:27)
Bilam's craving for money was publicized when he came from Aram Naharayim on account of the money with which he was hired to harm Israel, as it is stated: "and because he hired Bilam ben Beor from Pesor in Aram Naharayim to curse you" (Devarim 23:5). The sexual lust [of Bilam] is reflected in how he advised Balak to set loose the [Midianite] women to engage in promiscuity with Israel and to be harlots; were it not for this disposition of sexual lust in his soul - which the matter was pleasing and desirable to him - he wouldn't have commanded [them] to do this, for a person's commandments are the reflection of his mind, since good people do not command others to do bad things, but to avoid them. The pasuk says: "Behold! - they caused Bnei Yisrael, by the word of Bilam, to commit a betrayal against Hashem regarding the matter of Peor" (Bamidbar 31:16), and the Sages said: "Bilam would have sexual relations with his donkey" (Sanhedrin 105a). Without a doubt, someone whose thoughts were this way would have [engaged in such] actions. But his haughtiness is [reflected] in the statement "The words of the one who hears the sayings of God [and knows the knowledge of the Supreme One, who sees the vision of Shaddai, while fallen and with uncovered eyes" (Bamidbar 24:16).
My friend's statement about the contents of Parashas Balak is correct: Chazal's interpretation of Parashas Balak is quite Mishleic indeed!

But this raises a question: Why did Chazal in Avos even need to explain these virtues and vices through Avraham and Bilam? Why couldn't the mishnah have just said: "Anyone who has these three traits is praiseworthy ... anyone who has these three vices is worthy of condemnation," or something like that? Why did Chazal frame these ethical teachings in terms of specific individuals?

The Ralbag [2] answers this question in his explanation of the Torah regimen and its parts:
The second part [of the Torah regimen] encompasses ethical-political wisdom in those areas in which commandment and prohibition are not possible, due to the improbability of attaining perfection of this nature among the masses of people to the same degree as it is possible [to attain perfection] in the realm of Torah-mitzvos. 
For example, if the Torah commanded us to only get angry over something that is worth getting angry about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; or to only be happy about what is worthy of being happy about, and in the proper measure, and in the proper place, and at the proper time; and to only overpower someone who is proper to overpower, and in the proper measure, and at the proper place, and at the proper time; and likewise with all of the other traits and dispositions – [if the Torah did this,] all people would be in a continual state of sin, with the exception of an extreme minority. 
Matters of this nature are not fitting to be subject to command and prohibition, for this will bring people to be more lax in their fulfillment of the other mitzvos, once they see that it is impossible to fulfill many mitzvos of the Torah. For this reason, the Torah teaches us about these matters by telling us stories of our predecessors, who were widely known for their perfection of behavior, in order to guide us to follow in their footsteps and to emulate their behavior. And [the Torah] also told us stories of some of the despicable actions they did, and the harmful consequences that came from them, in order that we avoid doing these actions
According to the Ralbag, Hashem could have legislated ethical-political middos-development through halacha - that is, He could have commanded us in laws regulating anger and joy which were as detailed as the laws regulating kashrut and Shabbos - but He didn't do this. Why not? Because it would be impossible for people to adhere to this degree of self-control in their emotions, reactions, and dispositions, and they would inevitably sin. And because people would violate these laws constantly, and be in a constant state of sin, the observance of Torah as a whole would suffer, since people would begin regarding the other areas of halacha with greater laxity and less diligence out of sheer hopelessness.

In order to solve this problem, Hashem incorporated ethical-political development into the Torah regimen through role-models, both good and bad. There are several advantages to this method of inculcating ethics:
(1) This allows for a more flexible, personalized, circumstances-dependent path of ethical-political development for each individual, rather than the rigid, uniform, exacting medium of halachic legislation.
(2) By embedding these ethical-political guidelines in concrete cases involving actual people, it becomes much easier for students of all levels to learn from the behavior of these role models on a variety of levels. Instead of learning abstract principles about humility and haughtiness, the students of Torah can look at people like Avraham, Moshe, Bilam, and Haman, and derive developmentally appropriate lessons from the concrete examples, all in accordance with the developmental level of the student. 
(3) Psychologically there are a number of advantages to learning proper and improper middos from role models - too many to specify in this blog post. Perhaps the best proof of this is that the Torah commandment which obligates to develop good middos is "ve'halachta bi'drachav" - "you shall walk in His ways" (Devarim 28:9). Hashem didn't simply say, "Get good middos!" but rather, "Emulate My ways." Hashem was even willing to compromise the presentation of His Oneness by exponentially multiplying the number of anthropomorphic descriptions of Him in the Torah. That is how important it was to Him (so to speak) to utilize this method of ethical instruction in His Torah. 
This sheds a new light on why the Rambam devoted so much space to bringing proofs from the pesukim to show how the three virtues and three vices are reflected in the Torah's accounts of Avraham and Bilam. His objective isn't just to bring proofs for the mishnah's contentions, but to direct our attention to read the Scriptural narratives about these two people through the ethical lens provided by the mishnah.

According to the Ralbag, we should read ALL of the narratives in the Torah about ALL of the main figures through this ethical lens. Indeed, the Ralbag follows this approach in his Nach commentaries. At the end of every section, he identifies toaliyos b'middos (ethical lessons) that we learn from the behavior and decisions of the Torah's tzadikim (righteous people) and reshaim (wicked people).

And this brings us back to my initial feelings about Parashas Balak. Not only was my friend correct to point me to the Mishleic nature of this parashah, but in doing so, he reminded me that this framework can and should be applied to ALL of the Torah's narrative accounts.

Apparently, Parashas Balak is more interesting than I realized! I just needed the right approach.

[1] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah: Avos Chapter 5
[2] Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom (Ralbag / Gersonides), Commentary on the Torah: Introduction

Thursday, June 28, 2018

Rambam: On Teaching Young Children about Hashem

This blog post was originally published in June, 2007. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Photo: very early color photograph taken by Sergey Mikhailovich Prokudin-Gorskii
of a Jewish teacher and his students in Samarkand, circa 1909-1915


Rambam: On Teaching Young Children about Hashem

In this post we will present the Rambam's answers to two questions about early childhood chinuch (education) on the mitzvah of Yichud Hashem (God's Oneness). The two questions are:
  1. Which ideas about Hashem should be taught to young children, and which should not - or cannot - be taught until they reach the requisite level of intellectual maturity?
  2. How should these ideas be taught?

The Rambam answers the first question in the Guide for the Perplexed 1:35:
In the same way as all people must be informed, and even children must be trained in the belief that God is One, and that none besides Him is to be worshiped, so must all be taught by simple authority that God is incorporeal; that there is no similarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures: that His existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the wisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is not merely quantitative, but absolute, as between two individuals of two different classes .... This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary persons who must believe that there is a perfect Being, who is neither a body nor a force in a body, and that He is the Deity, that no sort of deficiency and therefore no affection whatever can attain Him ...
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with His creatures, that He is not subject to external influence; these are things which must be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must be taught by way of tradition to children and women, to the stupid and ignorant, as they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and that He alone is to be worshiped. Without incorporeality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but composed of matter and form which are two separate things by definition, and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible ... 
Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the true interpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand that the same term admits of two different interpretations, may simply be told that the Scriptural passage is clearly understood by the wise, but that they should content themselves with knowing that God is incorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence, as passivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from all change, that He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself, that no definition includes Him together with any other being, that the words of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met with may be explained on this principle. This may suffice for that class of persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that God is corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of material objects, just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that God does not exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may be worshiped.
According to the Rambam, we are obligated to teach children these fundamental ideas about Hashem as soon as they are capable of understanding them. Even before they reach that level of intellectual maturity, we must teach them these ideas by rote. Just as we teach a child is trained to believe that God is One and that only He is to be worshiped, he must also be trained to believe that God is incorporeal, has no emotions, doesn't exist in any place, cannot change, and bears absolutely no resemblance to any of His creations. And if the child asks questions about passages in the Chumash, the answers to which he is incapable of understanding, we must assure him that the verses are not to be taken literally, and that there are chachamim (wise individuals) who understand their true meaning.

I find this answer to be very interesting. I think it's fair to say that it is a common practice in Jewish households to introduce children to the basic notion of monotheism at a very early age: the basic idea that God is One, and is the only One we worship. It would be rare to find a Jewish child who is aware that we worship Hashem, but thinks that Hashem refers to a multiplicity of gods, or that we worship gods other than Hashem. Either way the child doesn't fully grasp what we mean by the term "Hashem," but he or she has been taught by rote that this is what Jews believe. The Rambam maintains that we should extend this rote form of monotheism to include the other yesodei ha'Torah (fundamentals of Torah) which comprise Judaism's unique concept of Yichud Hashem. Even though many of these ideas are far too abstract for children to understand, we nevertheless instill the statements which correspond to these ideas in Jewish children from a very young age. 

The Rambam's answer to the second question - the question of how to teach these ideas to young children - can be found in the halachos of Mitzvas Sipur Yetzias Mitzrayim (the mitzvah to tell of the Exodus from Egypt on the night of Passover). The Rambam writes in Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 7:2
It is a mitzvah to teach the children about the Exodus from Egypt even if they do not ask, as it is stated, “And you shall tell your son” (Exodus 13:8). The father should teach in accordance with the mind of the son. How? If the son is very young or stupid, he should say to him, “My son, all of us were slaves – like this maidservant or like this manservant – in Egypt, and on this night, the Holy One, Blessed is He, redeemed us and we went out to freedom.” And if the son is mature and intelligent, he should tell him what happened to us in Egypt, and the miracles that were wrought for us through Moshe Rabbeinu – in accordance with the mind of the son
The key principle is: lefi daato shel ben, aviv melamdo - the father should teach in accordance with the mind of his child. It would be meaningless to tell a child, "Pantheism is heresy. In truth, Hashem is incorporeal, and therefore cannot partake of accidental qualities such as location." But if a child asks, "Where is Hashem?" the parent might say something to the effect of: "Well, do you know where time is? Time isn't in any place, but it is real. Do you know where right and wrong are? Right and wrong aren't in any place, but they are both real. Hashem is also real, even though He isn't in any place." Of course, this is just an example. It may be that even this explanation is too abstract for the child. In each situation, the teacher or parent must strive to present the idea in accordance with the mind of the child.

Notice that the injunction to teach according to the mind of the child does not only refer to the formulation of the ideas, but to the media through which the ideas are presented. An older child may be able to learn through discussion, but a younger child may need to be taught with visual aids, rhyming songs, cartoons, and the like. I know parents who taught their kids fundamental ideas in metaphysics through puppet shows.

Needless to say, this post was not intended to be a comprehensive guide to early Torah education. But discussing the principles of education like these will better prepare us for the arduous but vital task of educating Jewish children.

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

Tehilim 146: Do Not Trust in Noble Benefactors

This can be read as a standalone post, but is also a follow-up to How to Learn Tehilim (Psalms), which I recommend reading first if you haven't already done so.

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Artwork: Noble Benefactor, by DiTerlizzi
(note that the word nedivim can be translated as "nobles," "benefactors," or "generous people"

Tehilim 146: Do Not Trust in Noble Benefactors

תהלים פרק קמו

(א) הַלְלוּיָהּ הַלְלִי נַפְשִׁי אֶת יְיָ: (ב) אֲהַלְלָה יְיָ בְּחַיָּי אֲזַמְּרָה לֵאלֹהַי בְּעוֹדִי: (ג) אַל תִּבְטְחוּ בִנְדִיבִים בְּבֶן אָדָם שֶׁאֵין לוֹ תְשׁוּעָה: (ד) תֵּצֵא רוּחוֹ יָשֻׁב לְאַדְמָתוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא אָבְדוּ עֶשְׁתֹּנֹתָיו: (ה) אַשְׁרֵי שֶׁאֵל יַעֲקֹב בְּעֶזְרוֹ שִׂבְרוֹ עַל יְיָ אֱלֹהָיו: (ו) עֹשֶׂה שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ אֶת הַיָּם וְאֶת כָּל אֲשֶׁר בָּם הַשֹּׁמֵר אֱמֶת לְעוֹלָם: (ז) עֹשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט לַעֲשׁוּקִים נֹתֵן לֶחֶם לָרְעֵבִים יְיָ מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים: (ח) יְיָ פֹּקֵחַ עִוְרִים יְיָ זֹקֵף כְּפוּפִים יְיָ אֹהֵב צַדִּיקִים: (ט) יְיָ שֹׁמֵר אֶת גֵּרִים יָתוֹם וְאַלְמָנָה יְעוֹדֵד וְדֶרֶךְ רְשָׁעִים יְעַוֵּת: (י) יִמְלֹךְ יְיָ לְעוֹלָם אֱלֹהַיִךְ צִיּוֹן לְדֹר וָדֹר הַלְלוּיָהּ:

Here is the text of Tehilim 146, which we say every morning after Ashrei:
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! (2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: (3) "Do not trust in noble benefactors - in a human being, for he holds no salvation. (4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish. (5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God. (6) He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it, Who guards truth forever. (7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. (10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah."
Time to tackle our four questions! (see How to Learn Tehilim for a full presentation of the methodology we will be using)

Question #1: What is this perek (chapter) about as a whole?

As usual, we will start start by identifying the pivot point. I believe the pivot point is between verses 4 and 5. The first part of the perek seems to be about the mortality of man. David acknowledges his own mortality, and then urges people not to trust in mortal man:
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! (2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: (3) "Do not trust in noble benefactors - in a human being, for he holds no salvation. (4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish.
The rest of the perek expresses the praises of God, with an emphasis on how He helps those who are weak or disadvantaged:
(5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God. (6) He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it, Who guards truth forever. (7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. (10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah."
The major question is: What is the unity of these two themes? 

[If you're playing along at home, now's the time to pause the tape and think about the main idea on your own. When you're ready, continue watching!]

Here is the 1-4 sentence summary of the main idea, according to our understanding:
This perek is about why (and how) we should place our bitachon (trust/security/reliance) in Hashem rather than in man. Man is a mortal - and, therefore, a contingent - being; no matter how grandiose his plans may be, they can all be brought to an end in an instant with his death, and there is nothing he can do to stop it. The only One in Whom we can place our bitachon is "the maker of the heavens and the earth" - the Being Who is not contingent, but upon Whom everything else depends for its continued existence. The way to develop our trust in Hashem is to recognize mortality and vulnerability of all human beings, and that all goodness and salvation is dependent on Hashem; the truth of this recognition should be reinforced through praise and song, as David does here.
Question #3: Is this perek true, in whole or in part?

As I did in my write-up of Tehilim 23, I'm going to address Question #3 before Question #2, since there are a couple of questions on the main idea we need to resolve in order to fully appreciate the particulars.

Perhaps the most glaring question on this perek is: "Really? Are you really telling me that if I am wrongfully exploited then I shouldn't trust my lawyer ("[Hashem] does justice for the exploited"), or if I have a problem with my eyes then I shouldn't trust my ophthalmologist ("Hashem gives sight to the blind"), or if my back is sore then I shouldn't trust my orthopedic specialist ("Hashem straightens the bent")  - all because these human beings might die? Isn't that going kind of overboard?"

In order to answer this question, we need to understand the unrealistically high expectations associated with psychological security and insecurity. Wikipedia actually does a fairly good job of providing an operational definition of "emotional insecurity":
Emotional insecurity or simply insecurity is a feeling of general unease or nervousness that may be triggered by perceiving of oneself to be vulnerable or inferior in some way, or a sense of vulnerability or instability which threatens one's self-image or ego.
Accordingly, the level of emotional security we seek is absolute. So long as there is any sense of vulnerability whatsoever, then the insecurity can take hold. We do not feel secure until we feel totally secure.

With this foundation, we can answer our question. David isn't saying that you shouldn't trust in a particular person because you should be worried that he's going to suddenly drop dead. When it comes to practical decision-making, it is rational to operate on the basis of probability, and unless you have reason to assume that a person will drop dead, then you should practically rely on that person. Rather, David's aim is to shatter our absolute trust in human beings by pointing out the one vulnerability we can't escape: death. In other words, it's not that we should assume that the people we trust are going to die, but the fact that they can die invalidates them as the basis for our bitachon.

The second major question on the main idea has to do with free will, and may be stated as follows: "How is it possible to practically rely on human beings and simultaneously have bitachon in Hashem? Isn't a contradiction? If you truly trust in Hashem, then what does it mean 'to rely on human beings,' and if you are relying on human beings, how can you trust in Hashem?"

The Radak [1] answers our question in his commentary on verse 3:
"Do not trust in noble benefactors - in accordance with Yirmiyahu's approach of: "[Thus said Hashem: Accursed is the man who trusts in people and makes flesh his strength] and turns his heart away from Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 17:5). Rather, if he trusts in man, he should place his fundamental trust in God (blessed is He) Who instilled in the noble benefactor the desire to help him.
The Radak understands [2] the pasuk in Yirmiyahu to mean that a person is only curse-worthy if he removes his heart from Hashem completely, and only trusts in human beings. If, however, a person trusts in human beings with the recognition that their dependability is, itself, dependent on Hashem, then this is acceptable.

This raises yet another question: How is their dependability dependent on Hashem? The second half of the Radak's commentary on verse 3 answers this. Even though the individual human being is the one who ultimately makes the decision to help, the desire - or disposition, or impetus, or enabling circumstance - to help was given to that person by Hashem. Were it not for that person's upbringing, or his genetics, or his exposure to certain people or teachings which influenced the development of his generosity, or the situation he was in, or the situation you were in, etc. etc. he would not have displayed the generosity in question. It all traces back to Hashem.

A chavrusa of mine gave an analogy which might help illustrate this point. Imagine working hard to beat a difficult video game and finally doing it. Your natural reaction would be to rejoice in your victory and to feel proud of your accomplishment. However, upon reflection, you would realize that the path to victory only succeeded because of the specific parameters set by the programmer. Had the programmer wished to increase the difficulty level, or change the path to victory to make it impossible for you to win, he could have done so, and you would not have accomplished what you did. Thus, even though you can take credit for the decisions you made in order to beat the game, the credit for the victory does not belong entirely to you. In fact, a rather large measure goes to the programmer.

Now, imagine if the programmer had live access to the game, and could respond to each in-game decision you made by allowing it to succeed as you envisioned it, or by modifying the conditions to thwart your ambition in real-time. Clearly if this were the case, you would not be able to take full credit in your victory, since it was clear that you were only able to win because your programmer opponent allowed for it.

The same is true in our world. You - or the person you rely upon - might be tempted to take full credit for your success or salvation. But upon further contemplation you will realize that this success or salvation was only made possible by the Programmer of the laws of nature, and allowed by His decision not to intervene. This recognition leads to a humble mentality, in which one recognizes that ultimately, success and salvation belong to "the Maker of the heavens and the earth" - not to mankind.

Once we recognize this, the particular praises in verses 7-9 make sense. Although these salvations (i.e. justice for the exploited, bread for the hungry, releasing for the bound, etc.) are brought about through human agency, it is Hashem Who makes this possible - whether by the laws of nature, or by His personal supervision. This recognition enables us to trust in Hashem, even when relying on human beings.

Question #2: What is being said in detail, and how?

As I did last time, I will now provide a brief commentary on each pasuk with the goal of showing how each part develops or reflects the main idea.
(1) Halleluyah, praise Hashem, O my soul! At first glance this sounds like a vanilla expression of praise of the kind we usually see in Tehilim. Upon closer examination we realize that David is urging himself to praise Hashem. Why would he do that? The fact that he has to tell himself to praise Hashem suggests that there is some resistance on his part which must be overcome. I believe that this resistance stems from the old enemy: the mentality of "kochi v'otzem yadi"  - "my ability and the strength of my own hand made me this wealth" (Devarim 8:17). So long as a person takes credit for his own successes, it is impossible to place one's trust in Hashem. The first step must be to overcome this self-glorification by forcing oneself to recognize that it is Hashem "Who gives you the ability to make wealth" (ibid. 8:18)
(2) I will praise Hashem during my lifetime; I will sing to my God while I am still [alive]: But even within the act of praising Hashem there is ample room for distortion. It is very easy to fall into the mode praising Hashem as "the One Who gives me good things" while simultaneously preserving an illicit feeling of independence - as if "I exist independently but I get stuff from God." In order to counteract this, David incorporates the recognition of his own mortality into his praise of Hashem. He recognizes that insofar as Hashem is the continual cause of his own existence, it would only be proper to devote what life he has to praising the "the Life of the worlds." This is the true level of praise: to recognize that not only the good I receive comes from Hashem, but that the I who receives this good is sustained by Hashem.
(3) Do not trust in noble benefactors. David specifies the class of "nedivim" (which may be translated as "nobles," "benefactors," or "generous people"), since they are the ones in whom we are most likely to take security. Next, he clarifies that the reason why we shouldn't place our security in them, for a noble is but a human being, who holds no salvation. Why does he hold no salvation? Because ...
(4) His spirit will depart; he will return to his earth; on that day his plans will perish. The Radak offers a poetic commentary on this pasuk, saying: "How could salvation 'belong to man' if he can't even save his own spirit?! For his spirit can depart immediately, and return to his earth, and whatever he had planned, he will not be able to do, because the spirit that sustained him has departed!" This is in line with our explanation in our answer to Question #3.
(5) Happy is the one whose help is the God of Jacob; his hope is on Hashem, his God.  Here David introduces the theme of trusting in Hashem. He refers to Him as "the God of Jacob" either because Yaakov demonstrated trust in Hashem, or because he lived a life of suffering, and frequently had to implement the principles of this perek
(6) Why is Hashem, alone, the One in Whom we can trust? Because He is the maker of the heavens and the earth, the sea and everything that is in it. Everything that happens in the world can only happen in accordance with His will, whether by the laws of nature or by Hashem's personal supervision. Who guards truth forever - that is to say, His will is absolutely reliable, since it operates in accordance with chochmah (wisdom), tzedek (righteousness), and mishpat (justice).
(7) He does justice for the exploited, He gives bread to the hungry, Hashem releases the bound, (8) Hashem gives sight to the blind, Hashem straightens the bent, Hashem loves the righteous, (9) Hashem guards strangers, He encourages the orphan and the widow, but He twists the path of the wicked. Undoubtedly there are insights to be gained here about how Hashem operates, but the general purpose of these pesukim is to illustrate the derech (method) by which we develop bitachon in Hashem - namely, by praising Him and recognizing that He is the ultimate cause of all forms of salvation and rehabilitation. The methodological premise of both Tehilim and Mishlei are illustrated here: the only way to affect the emotions is to go over example after example of particulars. I don't even think there's a necessity to say that the praises in these pesukim constitute a complete set or reflect a unified idea. I think these are just examples of David carrying out the directive he stated in the opening pasuk: "praise Hashem, O my soul!" (which is why, in my translation, I placed pesukim 3-10 in quotation marks).
(10) Hashem will reign as king forever – your God, O Zion – from generation to generation, Halleluyah." This is the only pasuk I don't understand in light of the approach we've taken. I understand it according to those meforshim who learn our perek to be about Bnei Yisrael at the time of moshiach, but I don't understand why "your God, O Zion" would be invoked if the perek is about bitachon in Hashem for all human beings, as the rest of the perek suggests. Perhaps this pasuk is directed specifically towards the Jew who, by virtue of his knowledge and practice of Torah, his membership in the Jewish people, his following in the footsteps of the Avos, has access to a greater degree of Divine protection, and can reach even higher levels of bitachon

Question #4: What of it?

The practical implications of this perek are clear. David's objective is for us to wean ourselves from trust in human beings, and to rewire our bitachon to attach to Hashem. In addition to providing the arguments to back his claim, he also shows us that our praising of Hashem is a mechanism by which we can cultivate this bitachon.

At first I was skeptical about this - until I realized that we do this with human beings all the time. Imagine you were just diagnosed with a rare medical condition. All of the insecurities begin to creep in. A friend of yours mentions the name of doctor. You aren't moved, since you don't know anything about this doctor, so you ask around. You begin hearing things: "Oh, Dr. So-and-so? He's the BEST!" "Dr. So-and-so is regarded as the top doctor in his field!" "My aunt had the same condition, and Dr. So-and-so was able to help her make a full recovery." As you hear more and more praises, your view begins to change. You suddenly find yourself taking security in Dr. So-and-so. How did that change come about? Through praise, and praise alone.

David is suggesting that we take the same approach when praising Hashem. By contemplating and verbalizing these praises of Hashem - on a daily basis, and when faced with situations of vulnerability, adversity, and lack - we slowly but surely build up our bitachon in Him. And the more we recognize the fragility of human beings, the more we wean ourselves from bitachon in man.

Concluding Thoughts

Fortunately, Tehilim 146 is something we say every day, as part of Pesukei d'Zimra. As such, we have a unique opportunity to incorporate these ideas into our worldview. For this reason, it is especially important to think into the ideas of this perek - the main idea and the particular pesukim - and get them crystal clear, so that every morning we can review them, internalize them, and live by them.

[1] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Tehilim 146:3
[2] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 17:5. Also, see Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam's Ha'Maspik l'Ovdei Hashem: Shaar ha'Bitachon, where he elaborates on this interpretation. I would have incorporated it into this blog post, but I don't have access to all of my books at the present time. I believe he says something to the effect of: "If the pasuk only said, 'Accursed is the man who trusts in people' then the majority of humanity would be doomed! Instead, it added: 'and turns his heart away from Hashem.' In other words, the navi is only condemning those who trust exclusively in man, but those who trust in man and in Hashem are not accursed."

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Bruner and the Rambam: an Unlikely Alliance

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Yes, I know that this is not actually what the Rambam looked like.
I wrote a post back in 2009 entitled Torah Study as Natural Discovery. The reading I did during that time eventually developed into what would be the final paper I wrote for my final class in graduate school in July of 2011. I recently rediscovered that paper and was pleasantly surprised to note that while many of my views have changed over the past seven years, I still pretty much agree with everything I wrote in that paper - so much so that I decided to post it here on my blog.

I definitely learned a lot in the process of researching and writing this paper, and the insights I gained significantly shaped my approach to teaching. Although I haven't fully implemented the ideas presented here in my own classroom, I can point to a number of educational practices which characterize my teaching that I owe to the unlikely alliance of Bruner and the Rambam.

Because this was a term paper, it is much longer than my usual blog posts. I considered splitting it up into two parts, but decided that it would make the paper feel less unified. I hope you find it to be a worthwhile read!

Bruner and the Rambam: an Unlikely Alliance

Foreword

The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of using the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah as the basis of a new Torah curriculum in accordance with the educational theories of Jerome Bruner. This paper is comprised of three parts. In the first and largest part, we will review Bruner’s insights into the learning process; we will focus on the insights he introduced in Structures in Learning (1963), which were fully developed in The Process of Education (1977). In the second part we will demonstrate how the novel organizational scheme of the Mishneh Torah renders it a viable basis for a Brunerian curriculum. In the third part we will offer a few suggestions on how to incorporate the Mishneh Torah into an actual curriculum. 

Before we begin, however, we will set the stage by examining the educational crisis which faced the Rambam during his lifetime, the effects of which continue to this day.

Introduction

The Rambam concludes the introduction of the Mishneh Torah [1] with a grim observation about the state of Torah education in his time: 
In our times, severe troubles come one after another, and all are in distress; the wisdom of our wise men has disappeared, and the understanding of our discerning men is hidden. Thus, the commentaries, the responses to questions, and the settled laws that the Geonim wrote, which had once seemed clear, have in our times become hard to understand, so that only a few properly understand them. And one hardly needs to mention the Talmud itself – the Babylonian Talmud, the Jerusalem Talmud, the Sifra, the Sifre, and the Toseftos – which all require a broad mind, a wise soul, and a long time, before one can correctly know from them what is forbidden or permitted and the other laws of the Torah.
The Rambam saw that his Jewish brethren suffered from an educational crisis of epidemic proportions. All but the most erudite scholars had drowned in the sea of the Oral Torah – the classical texts, the commentaries, and the other various writings from the Geonim. Halacha had become inaccessible not only in the realm of theoretical study, but in practice as well. The average Jew was at a loss to determine “what is forbidden or permitted and the other laws of the Torah.” In his Maamar Techiyas ha’Meisim the Rambam writes: 
I was most zealous for the Lord God of Israel when I saw before me before me a nation that does not have a comprehensive book of truth, nor true and accurate philosophical ideas.
In his introduction to the Sefer ha’Mitzvos, the Rambam even goes so far as to apply the following words of the prophet: “To all of you the prophecy is like the words of a sealed book, which one gives to a literate person, saying, ‘Please read this,’ and he says, ‘I cannot, for it is sealed’" (Yeshayahu 29:11). The Rambam saw that the laws of the Torah had become “like the words a sealed book” in his time – one which even those who are literate are unable to read. 

It was this sad state of affairs that motivated him to write the Mishneh Torah, “to clear the paths and remove the obstacles from before the students of the law, so that their minds will not become faint by the overabundance of debate and argumentation.” [2] In a rather dramatic fashion, the Rambam concludes his introduction [3] to the Mishneh Torah with a mission statement: 
For this reason, I, Moshe son of the Rav Maimon the Sephardi, found that the current situation is unbearable; and so, relying on the help of the Rock, blessed be He, I intently studied all these books, for I saw fit to write what can be determined from all of these works in regard to what is forbidden and permitted, and unclean and clean, and the other rules of the Torah -- everything in clear language and concise style, so that the whole Oral Torah would become thoroughly known to all; without bringing problems and solutions or differences of view, but rather clear, convincing, and correct statements, in accordance with the legal rules drawn from all of these works and commentaries that have appeared from the time of Rabbeinu ha’Kadosh to the present.
Unfortunately, the same problems which plagued the Jewish people in the Rambam’s era continue to plague us today. To countless of students across the religious (and irreligious) spectrum, Judaism is nothing but a hodgepodge of particulars. I have encountered many students who are ignorant of the most basic distinctions. They are unable to distinguish between Torah law, Rabbinic law, custom, and societal trends. They are unaware of the fact that halacha and philosophy occupy two totally different realms within Judaism, and that one does not necessarily influence the other. They are unable to differentiate between the letter of the law and the ethical principles which go beyond the letter of the law. They fail to distinguish mitzvos from chumros (stringencies), nor can they detect the various superstitions that masquerade as Jewish practice. They make grievous errors in the fundamentals of Judaism while embracing the literal (and often absurd) meanings of midrashic statements as gospel. 

Perhaps the most tragic outcome of this educational crisis is not the lack of knowledge per se, but the extinguishing of the desire to learn. Students have been so inundated with information that they are either paralyzed or jaded. They have no sense of independence in thinking, and their natural curiosity has been extinguished. They relate to Judaism as a body of unrelated facts, believing that the only difference between a scholar and a layman is how much information he has memorized. Worst of all, they see no connection between the Judaism they are taught and the lives they live. To them, Judaism has little to do with “the real world.” 

These are the problems the Rambam intended to solve with his composition of the Mishneh Torah. Although his vision has not yet been realized, it is never too late. We can still unlock the tremendous potential of the Mishneh Torah and revolutionize the way Torah is taught and learned. The key to unlocking this potential can be found in the writings of Jerome Bruner – a man who lived nearly 800 years after the Rambam, but who shared the same curricular insights. 

Part I – Bruner’s Theories of Learning

Structures in Learning (1963) [4]

Learning by Discovery

Bruner begins his article, Structures in Learning (1963), by describing a novel approach to teaching the geography of the Central states to a group of fifth graders. Like most geography courses, these students had previously only been exposed to a method of teaching based on rote memorization. As expected, this proved to be a bore. Refusing to accept that this is simply how geography “must be taught,” these teachers asked themselves: Could geography be taught as a rational discipline? Could students learn the material in such a manner that they would have to figure out not only where things are located why they are there? In short, could students learn to see geography “through a geographer’s eyes”? 

The teachers devised an experimental lesson plan. Students were given a blank map of the Central states; the topography and natural resources were shown, but the names and locations of cities were omitted. The students – who had no prior knowledge of the geography of the Central states – were then given the task of locating Chicago; there told only that Chicago is the largest city in the North Central states. Over the course of the next 45 minutes, each child proposed his or her theories as to the location of Chicago, and each one supported his or her theories with reasoning. Finally, students were shown the “real” map (with the names of the cities) and were able to see how close their guesses had been. Bruner then summarizes the results: 

Chicago had not been located. But the location of cities was no longer a matter of unthinking chance for this group of children ... What had the children learned? A way of thinking about geography, a way of dealing with its raw data. They had learned that there is some relationship between the requirements of living and man's habitat. If that is all they got out of their geography lesson, that is plenty. Did they remember which is Lake Huron? Lake Superior? Lake Michigan? Do you? 

This is what it means to teach geography “as a rational discipline.” Students who learn geography in this manner will not relate to geographical information as an infinite (and often irrelevant) set of arbitrary facts to be memorized by rote. Instead, they will come to realize that geography (and indeed, all knowledge) is characterized by “an internal connectedness, a meaningfulness.” These geography teachers learned that in order “for facts to be appreciated and understood and remembered, they must be fitted into that internal meaningful context.”

Bruner refers to this approach as learning by discovery. Rather than being “fed” the knowledge in verbal form by a lecturing teacher, the student is led to discover the facts, the internal structure, and the underlying principles of the subject with his or her own mind. The teacher’s role, then, is to facilitate discovery on the part of the student – to guide the student to experience “aha!” moments of genuine insight. Bruner, quoting Newton, describes this experience as encountering “islands of truth in an uncharted sea of ignorance.” It doesn’t matter whether the sea has been charted by the “experts.” What matters is that the student engages in his or her own exploration and independent charting.

The Benefits of Learning by Discovery

Bruner discusses four benefits of learning by discovery. The first he calls intellectual potency. This refers to the propensity “to search out and find regularities and relationships in his environment.” In order to do this, the student “needs to be armed with the expectancy that there is something for him to find and, once aroused by this expectancy, he must devise his own ways of searching and finding.” In order to do so, the student must naturally evolve into a “constructivist” – one who continually organizes and reorganizes the knowledge he gains in an effort to uncover the underlying lawfulness which he knows is there. 

The second benefit of learning by discovery is the development of techniques of inquiry. Children who are educated in this manner will begin to develop “heuristics of discovery.” They will learn how to organize facts in a manner that is ripe for insight. They’ll learn how to ask fruitful questions and how to go about searching for the answers. They will also develop their intellectual intuition and a “feel” for the subject. “Rather than a formal approach to the relevance of variables in their search,” Bruner writes, “they depend on their sense of what things among an ensemble of things ‘smell right’ as being of the proper order of magnitude or scope of severity.” 

The third benefit is that students will dramatically improve their memory processes. Bruner notes that “the principal problem of human memory is not storage, but retrieval.” The approach of learning by discovery naturally results in enhanced memory, since all knowledge is immediately incorporated into meaningful structures of the child’s own making. “In sum,” Bruner writes, the “very attitudes and activities that characterize ‘figuring out’ or ‘discovering’ things for himself also seem to have the effect of making material easier to remember.” 

The fourth benefit of a discovery-based approach – and, arguably, the most significant –is that it promotes intrinsic motivation for learning. Aristotle famously wrote: “man, by nature, desires to know,” and a discovery-based approach to learning is the ideal way to satisfy that desire. Since exploration and discovery are inherently exciting, rewarding, and challenging, the need for extrinsic motivators is minimal:
[If] a child is able to approach learning as a task of discovering something rather than “learning about it” he will tend to find a more personally meaningful reward in his own competency and self-achievement in the subject than he will find in the approval of others.
Bruner concludes his article by paraphrasing Maimonides (of all people!), who said that if intellectual excellence is the most important of man’s perfections, then the highest endeavor of an educator is to enable the student to know that which he or she discovers for himself or herself. The object of every curriculum should be to facilitate each student’s development into an independent discoverer. 

The Process of Education (1977) [5]

The ideas set forth in Structures in Learning reach their full development in The Process of Education. The book is divided into four sections, each of which deals with a different theme. The four themes are: (1) the role of structure in learning, (2) readiness for learning, (3) the nature of intuition, and (4) the desire to learn. The fourth theme is beyond the scope of this paper, and will not be discussed here. 

(1) The Role of Structure in Learning

Bruner’s first thesis is that the structure of a curriculum should be determined by the fundamentals of its subject matter (p.11). Every subject has, at its core, a relatively small number of basic assumptions, foundational principles, and general attitudes or outlooks. Bruner maintains that all content must be taught in the context of these fundamentals. To “[teach] specific topics or skills without making clear their context in the broader fundamental structure of a field of knowledge is uneconomical” (p. 31).

Bruner marshals four reasons to support his contention; these reasons echo the four benefits mention in Structures in Learning. The first reason pertains to facility of comprehension: “understanding fundamentals makes a subject more comprehensible” (p. 23). Bruner acknowledges that this point is almost a tautology, for “what is meant by ‘fundamental’ in this sense is precisely that an idea has wide as well as powerful applicability” (p. 18). For example, one of the fundamental organizing concepts in biology is the question, “What function does this thing serve?” As the student makes progress in biology, he learns to ask this question more and more subtly, and relates more and more things to it (p. 28). A biology curriculum organized around this question will help the student to contextualize and process information in a manner harmonious with the mode of inquiry natural to the discipline. 

The second reason for teaching fundamentals pertains to memory: “unless detail is placed into a structured pattern, it is rapidly forgotten” (p. 24). According to Bruner, a “century of intensive research” (which he does not cite) has demonstrated that detailed material is conserved in memory by use of simplified, organized modes of representation. The most efficient way to retain factual knowledge is by organizing facts in terms of the principles and ideas from which they may be derived (p. 32). For instance, it is much easier to remember the formula f=ma than to memorize dozens of particular number values for the force generated by accelerating bodies of various masses. Bruner observes that a “good theory is the vehicle not only for understanding a phenomenon now but also for remembering it tomorrow” (p. 25). This is a further instance of instructional economy. 

The third reason has to do with what Bruner calls transfer of principles and attitudes. This consists of “learning initially not a skill but a general idea, which can then be used as a basis for recognizing subsequent problems as special cases of the idea originally mastered” (p. 17). A student who acquires the fundamental principles, attitudes, and structure of a discipline is better able to generalize, broaden, and deepen his understanding as he makes progress in the field. “To understand something as a specific instance of a more general case ... is to have learned not only a specific thing but also a model for understanding other things like it that one may encounter” (p. 25). Thus, every new concept acts as an “upgrade” of the overall paradigm, thereby enabling the learner to continually and simultaneously expand his knowledge base and his ability to gain new knowledge. 

The fourth reason for teaching fundamentals has to do with maintaining contemporaneousness: “by constantly reexamining material taught in elementary and secondary schools for its fundamental character, one is able to narrow the gap between ‘advanced’ knowledge and ‘elementary’ knowledge” (p. 25-26). This helps circumvent a common problem in K-12 education, namely, “that material learned earlier is either out of date or misleading by virtue of its lagging too far behind developments in a field” (p. 26). This is especially true of the sciences, but occurs in other disciplines as well. This, in turn, allows for greater communication between the novices and experts in the field.

Bruner recognizes that his vision of a “fundamentals-driven curriculum” poses two challenges. First, there is the problem of how to rewrite the basic subjects and revamp their teaching materials in such a way that the fundamentals are given a central role. Bruner admits that good curricula can only be designed by the best minds in the field (p. 19). Only these “scholars and scientists, working in conjunction with experienced teachers and students of child development, can prepare curricula of the sort we have been considering” (p. 32). He acknowledges that enlisting the aid of such individuals may be difficult, but he is optimistic about the future. Second, there is the problem of matching the levels of these materials to the capacities of different students of different abilities at each grade level (p. 18). This requires a great deal of time and effort, and can only be accomplished by those who have mastery over the subject matter and intimate familiarity with the knowledge and capacities of the students at each grade level. 

(2) Readiness for Learning

Bruner’s second thesis is that “the foundations of any subject may be taught to anybody at any age in some form” (p. 12). He does not mean to imply these foundations can be fully mastered by young children, but rather that they “can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development” and that “these first representations can later be made more powerful and precise the more easily by virtue of this early learning” (p. 33). In order to be in command of these basic ideas and to use them effectively, the student must continually deepen his understanding of them and learn to use them in progressively more complex forms (p. 13). Bruner acknowledges that there is no evidence to contradict his thesis and considerable evidence to support it (p. 33), to which he devotes many pages. 

Next, Bruner goes on to describe the learning process itself, which he breaks down into “three almost simultaneous processes.” The first is the acquisition of new information – information which can be described as “a refinement of previous knowledge” that often “runs counter to or is a replacement for what the person has previously known implicitly or explicitly.” A second aspect of learning is transformation – “the process of manipulating knowledge to make it fit new tasks” through extrapolation, interpolation, or conversion into another form. A third learning process is evaluation – “checking whether the way we have manipulated information is adequate to the task” (p. 48). Ideally, every learning episode should utilize all three processes. “At its best,” Bruner writes, “a learning episode reflects what has gone before it and permits one to generalize beyond it” (p. 49). 

Bruner concludes this section with his famous proposal of a “spiral curriculum” – an idea which follows directly from his first two theses: 

If the hypothesis with which this section was introduced is true – that any subject can be taught to any child in some honest form – then it should follow that a curriculum ought to be built around the great issues, principles, and values that a society deems worthy of the continual concern of its members (p. 52). 

Surprisingly, Bruner spends only a mere three pages discussing the Spiral Curriculum, in which he does not introduce any new principles, but merely sketches some examples of what a spiral curriculum would look like. However, he does set forth the following revolutionary criteria for inclusion in the spiral curriculum: one must ask “Is this subject, when fully developed, worth an adult’s knowing?” and “Does having known this subject as a child make a person a better adult?” He concludes with a bold assertion: “If the answer to both questions is negative or ambiguous, then the material is cluttering the curriculum” (p. 52). 

(3) Intuitive and Analytical Thinking

Bruner’s third thesis is that intuitive thinking is “is a much-neglected and essential feature of productive thinking not only in formal academic disciplines but also in everyday life” (p. 13). For this reason, intuitive thinking ought to be encouraged and cultivated throughout a student’s formal education. Bruner is critical of the emphasis in formal learning and formal examination upon “explicit formulations, upon the ability of the student to reproduce verbal or numerical formulae.” The stress placed on verbal memorization tends to marginalize “the student who, by his operations and conclusions, reveals a deep grasp of a subject but not much ability to ‘say how it goes’” (p. 55). 

After emphasizing that relatively little is known about the nature of “intuitive thinking” (p. 55), Bruner provides a comprehensive account of how intuitive thinking differs from analytic thinking. Analytic thinking involves the conscious, step by step application of cognitive operations, such as “deductive reasoning, often using mathematical or logic and an explicit plan of attack” (p. 57) or “a step-by-step process of induction and experiment, utilizing principles of research design and statistical analysis” (p. 58). 

In contrast to analytic thinking, intuitive thinking characteristically does not advance in careful, well-defined steps. Indeed, it tends to involve maneuvers based seemingly on an implicit perception of the total problem. The thinker arrives at an answer, which may be right or wrong, with little if any awareness of the process by which he reached it. He rarely can provide an adequate account of how he obtained his answer, and he may be unaware of just what aspects of the problem situation he was responding to (p. 58).

Intuitive thinking and analytic thinking are complementary, and each has its advantages and disadvantages. “Through intuitive thinking the individual may often arrive at solutions to problems which he would not achieve at all, or at best more slowly, through analytic thinking.” These solutions should be treated as tentative hypotheses which are then checked through analytic methods. While “the intuitive thinker may even invent or discover problems that the analyst would not” it is the “analyst who gives these problems the proper formalism” (p. 58). Bruner adds that the “good intuiter may have been born with something special, but his effectiveness rests upon a solid knowledge of the subject, a familiarity that gives intuition something to work with” (p. 57-58). 

The advantage of intuitive thinking lies in this ability to quickly generate hypotheses, thereby yielding “a tentative ordering of a body of knowledge” which gives us “a basis for moving ahead in our testing of reality” (p. 60). Intuitive thinking also enables the thinker to make “good guesses whether something is so” and to determine “which of several approaches to a problem will prove fruitful” (p. 56). The downside is that the intuitive mode “may lead to some big errors as well – bigger than those that result from the more painstaking, step-by-step analysis used by [the analyst]” (p. 62). The risk of error is compounded by the feeling that often accompanies intuitive moves, the “feeling that the ordering of facts is self-evident” even before the validity of the hypothesis is tested (p. 60). 

Instead of proposing methods of teaching intuition, Bruner identifies the key questions which ought to be considered by teachers and curriculum designers – questions which require more research to answer. For example, “Is the development of intuitive thinking in students more likely if their teachers think intuitively?” (p. 61) Bruner thinks it “unlikely that a student would develop or have confidence in his intuitive methods of thinking if he never saw them used effectively by his elders” and adds: 

The teacher who is willing to guess at answers to questions asked by the class and then subject his guesses to critical analysis may be more apt to build those habits into his students than would a teacher who analyzes everything for the class in advance. (p. 62).

Another excellent question raised by Bruner is whether the teaching of heuristic procedures facilitates intuitive thinking. A heuristic procedure is “a nonrigorous method of achieving solutions to problems” (p. 63). For example, should students be explicitly taught strategies such as: “When you cannot see how to proceed with the problem, try to think of a simpler problem that is similar to it; then use the plan for solving the simpler problem as a plan for solving the more complicated problem”? 

Or should the student learn the technique without actually verbalizing it to himself in that way? It is possible, of course, that the ancient proverb about the caterpillar who could not walk when he tried to say how he did it may apply here. The student who becomes obsessively aware of the heuristic rules he used to make his intuitive leaps may reduce the process to an analytic one. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that general heuristic rules – the use of analogy, the appeal to symmetry, the examination of limiting conditions, the visualization of the solution – when they have been used frequently will be anything but a support to intuitive thinking. (p. 63).

When it comes to day-to-day pedagogic decisions, perhaps the most pertinent question is: “Should students be encouraged to guess, in the interest of learning eventually how to make intelligent conjectures?” Bruner acknowledges that there are “certain kinds of situations where guessing is desirable and where it may facilitate the development of intuitive thinking to some reasonable degree” (p. 64). At the same time, he cautions: 

Certainly one would not like to educate students to do nothing but guess, for guessing should always be followed up by as much verification and confirmation as necessary; but too stringent a penalty on guessing may restrain thinking of any sort and keep it plodding rather than permitting it to make occasional leaps. (p. 64).

Bruner explains that “when the student sees the consequences of error as too grave and the consequences of success as too chancy, he will freeze into analytic procedures even though they may not be appropriate” (p. 65). Bruner observes that the present system of rewards and punishments may “inhibit the use of intuitive thinking” since “it tends to emphasize the correct answer” (p. 66).

On the basis of these questions and considerations, Bruner offers several guidelines for teachers. First and foremost, the teacher should provide the students with opportunities to practice making educated guesses with minimal threat of penalty. Second, the teacher must also strive to build self-confidence and “willingness to make honest mistakes in the effort to solve problems” (p. 65). Third, teachers should train students “in recognizing the plausibility of guesses” to be able to tell “that an answer at least is of the right order of magnitude, or that it is possible rather than impossible” (p. 64). Perhaps the most difficult task of the teacher is to have sufficient intellectual sensitivity “to distinguish an intuitive mistake – an interestingly wrong leap – from a stupid or ignorant mistake” and the emotional sensitivity to “give approval and correction simultaneously to the intuitive student” (p. 68). 

Conclusion

Bruner writes that “every subject has a structure, a rightness, a beauty.” Learning ought to be driven by the genuine search for this structure, and that search must be conducted independently by each and every student. “It is this structure that provides the underlying simplicity of things, and it is by learning its nature that we come to appreciate the intrinsic meaning of a subject.” Although the discovery must be made by the student, the teacher can create a “structure-sensitive curriculum” which facilitates the process of discovery on the part of the student. The ideal curriculum for this is a “spiral curriculum” which is built upon the fundamental principles of the discipline and follows the natural structure of the subject matter.

Part II – Mishneh Torah: Teaching Torah as a Rational Discipline

Having familiarized ourselves with Bruner’s approach of learning by discovery and his guidelines for developing a discovery-based curriculum, we are now in a position to explore how, and to what extent, the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah may serve as the foundation of a new Torah curriculum. Can Torah be taught as a rational discipline? Would such an approach be a way to counteract the educational problems that have plagued teachers of Torah for centuries The Rambam would answer both with a resounding, “Yes!” Indeed, this is exactly what he set out to accomplish with the Mishneh Torah. 

The Role of Structure in the Mishneh Torah

The Mishneh Torah is a unique work in many regards. One of its most salient features is its organizational scheme. The Rambam, like Bruner, was keenly aware of the importance of structure in learning. It was this very recognition that caused him to grapple with the question of how to organize the Mishneh Torah. The first time he mentions this question is in his introduction to the Sefer ha’Mitzvos, in which he presents his “game plan” for writing the Mishneh Torah
As I directed my attention toward this goal [of composing the Mishneh Torah], I began thinking about how the division of this work, and the arrangement of its parts, were to be done. [I wondered:] should I divide it in accordance with the divisions of the Mishnah and follow in its footsteps, or should I divide it in some other way, arranging the subjects at the beginning or at the end of the work as logic will dictate, since this is the proper and easier way for learning?
Ultimately, the Rambam sided in favor of pedagogical efficacy over traditionalism. He decided to utilize an entirely novel organization based on a hierarchical topical classification of the entire corpus of Judaic law. The Rambam explains his organizational scheme in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah
I have seen fit to divide this work into halachos (groupings of mitzvos) according to their various inyanim (topics), and I divide the groups into perakim (chapters) dealing with one topic; each chapter I divide into halachos ketanos (small paragraphs of one or a few particular laws), so that they may be ordered by memory. 
Among the groups in the various topics, some groups include the detailed laws of a single Biblical mitzvah, when the mitzvah comes with many oral traditions that make up a single topic; and other groups include the detailed laws of many Biblical mitzvos, when all the mitzvos are on one topic: for the organization of this work is according to topics, and is not according to the counting of mitzvos, as will be clear to one who reads it.
The Mishneh Torah’s four-tiered organization may be represented as follows: 
1. Sefer (Book) 
          a. Hilchos (Grouping of Mitzvos[6] 
                    i. Perek (Chapter) 
                              1. Halachos Ketanos (Particular Laws)
The highest level of classification is that of sefer. The Rambam grouped each of the 613 mitzvos into one of fourteen themes, each of which was given its own sefer. After listing the 613 mitzvos in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah, the Rambam defines the theme of each sefer. The beginning of each book is “crowned” with verse or set of verses from the Written Torah which embodies the theme of the sefer. For example, the Rambam introduces his second book with the verse, “O how I have loved Your Torah! All day long it is my conversation” (Tehilim 119:97) and the following explanation of its contents: 
I have included in the second book the mitzvos which are continual, which we have been commanded in order to love God and to remember Him continually, such as the recitation of the shema, prayer, tefilin, blessings; circumcision is included among them, for it is a sign in our flesh to remind us continually at a time when neither tefilin nor tzitzit and the like are present. I have called this sefer by the title “Sefer Ahavah” (the Book of Love). 
The next level of classification is that of the hilchos. In his introduction to the Sefer ha’Mitzvos he explains that each of the hilchos sections would contain a number of mitzvos “either because there is some general topic which embraces them, or because many mitzvos relate to one objective.” Each section of hilchos is broken down into a sequence of perakim which explain the mitzvos in a logical order. Finally, each perek is divided into halachos ketanos, each of which contains one, two, or several laws. These, too, are divided topically and arranged in a logical sequence. 

Why did the Rambam insist upon this topical organizational scheme? Many readers of the Mishneh Torah take its classificatory system for granted, or assume that the Rambam organized the material this way merely for the convenience of the reader – much like a very detailed table of contents. This couldn’t be further from the truth, as is evident from the Rambam’s explicit statements about the organization of the Mishneh Torah, and from the Rambam’s continual reiteration of this organization throughout the Mishneh Torah. The most explicit statement by the Rambam about the purpose of his organization can be found in his Maamar Techiyas ha’Meisim:
We did the same also in our great work entitled the Mishneh Torah, whose true worth will be recognized only by those who are wise among the adherents of the religion, when they have good intellects and recognition of the methods of the composition, and who can recognize both the extent to which these laws which we have collected had been scattered and how we arranged them in order. We have also stated therein all the Torah principles and Talmudic principles, and we have intended thereby that all those who are called disciples of the wise, or Geonim, or whatever you wish to call them, should build their branches [i.e. legal details] on Talmudic roots, so that their Torah knowledge should be ordered in their minds and their learning should be readily accessible in its entirety. 
The Rambam here mentions two reasons for adopting this organizational scheme: (1) so that Torah knowledge should be ordered in the minds of the students, and (2) so that their learning should be readily accessible in its entirety. These reasons correspond to the benefits of a structure-sensitive curriculum mentioned by Bruner in The Process of Education, namely, that placing information in a meaningful structure facilitates both comprehension and memory. 

That the Rambam intended for his organization to serve as more than a mere table of contents is indicated by the sheer number of times the Rambam repeats his ordering throughout the Mishneh Torah. After his introduction and list of the 613 mitzvos, the Rambam identifies the title and scope of each sefer. He then breaks each sefer down into its component hilchos sections and enumerates the mitzvos aseh (positive commandments) and mitzvos lo taaseh (negative commandments) which will be explained in each section. At the beginning of every sefer, he reiterates the number and order of hilchos sections included therein. At the beginning of each hilchos section, he once again enumerates the mitzvos aseh and lo taaseh that will be explained in that section. Finally, at the end of each sefer, he notes the total number of chapters in the sefer, and then lists each of the hilchos sections and the number of chapters therein. 

It is clear from the continual repetition of the structure that the Rambam intended for his organizational scheme to be on the mind of the reader at all times. The student of the Mishneh Torah should never lose sight of the context of the halacha ketanah he is learning. At any given moment he should be aware of the place that halacha ketanah occupies within the order of the of the perek, the place of that perek within the “Hilchos” section, the place of that hilchos section within the sefer, and the place of that sefer within the Mishneh Torah. By constantly encountering this organization at every step of the way, the reader of the Mishneh Torah will not only understand the material more clearly, but he will come to appreciate the beauty of the Torah’s structure. 

In addition to facilitating comprehension, the Rambam also intended for his organizational scheme to aid memory – a point which he emphasizes time and again. In his letter to Rav Yosef, the Rambam writes that the “main goal” of his writing a compendium of the entire corpus of halacha was “to facilitate its memorization.” In his introduction to the Sefer ha’Mitzvos he writes that he opted for a topical organization “to render it easy for one who wishes to learn something from it by heart.” Likewise, in the introduction to the Mishneh Torah, he explains that the division of the perakim into halachos was “so that they may be ordered orally” (i.e. easily remembered). In his letter to Rav Pinchas ha’Dayan, the Rambam elaborates on the need for such a compendium to aid memory: 
This was my ultimate intention in composing my work, because it is beyond all human capacity to remember the whole Talmud Bavli and Yerushalmi, and all the Baraisas, three works which are the major sources for the laws.
The combined effect of these two benefits (i.e. comprehension and memory) will result in helping the student to develop “Mishneh Torah eyes.” Just as the geographer sees the world through the lenses of his discipline, so too, the student of the Mishneh Torah will see the world through the framework of Torah as organized by the Rambam. Additionally, we must remember that the Rambam characterized the Mishneh Torah as a comprehensive book of Oral Torah, and he defined “Oral Torah” as the explanation of the Written Torah. Thus, if the classificatory scheme of the Mishneh Torah is internalized, the student’s reading of the Written Torah will also be enhanced. Whenever he reads a section of the Written Torah, his mind will automatically associate to the corresponding area of the Mishneh Torah, thereby enabling him to truly learn the Oral Torah as a commentary on the Written Torah, as intended by the Author. Perhaps this is what the Rambam intended with the following statement in the Maamar Techiyas ha’Meisim
And when we ventured to undertake this project [of the Mishneh Torah] we saw that it would be wrong to aim at our goal of interpreting and facilitating the branches of the laws, and at the same time to neglect its roots, without explain them or guiding [the reader] to their truth . . . [Rather, the explication of the laws] should be built on yesodei ha’Torah (Torah foundations), and [the readers] should not cast the knowledge of God behind them, but should direct their utmost efforts and zeal to that which will bring them perfection and enable them to draw nearer to their Creator, not to the things that the masses deem to be perfection.
In other words, the Rambam conceived of the Mishneh Torah not only as a practical halachic compendium, or even a theoretical aid to studying the Written Torah. Rather, he saw the Mishneh Torah as a guide to life – a means of perfecting oneself and drawing close to God. For this reason, the Rambam typically concludes each sefer and many hilchos with a philosophical idea which reflects back on the theme of the entire section. This allows the student to gain insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the halachos, thereby enabling him to use the mitzvos as vehicles of attaining human perfection. 

Mishneh Torah as a Means of “Torah-learning Readiness”

Bruner firmly believes that “the foundations of any subject may be taught to anybody at any age in some form.” The Rambam agrees. Indeed, he even goes so far as to codify this principle as halacha in Hilchot Chametz u’Matzah 7:2:
It is a mitzvah to teach one’s sons, even if they do not ask, as it is stated, “And you shall tell your son” (Shemos 13:8). The father must teach according to the mind of the son. How so? If the son is young or unintelligent, he should say to him, “My son, we were all slaves in Egypt – like this maidservant, or this slave – and on this night the Holy One, Blessed is He, redeemed us, and we went out to freedom.” If the son is mature and wise, he should impart to him the knowledge of what happened to us in Egypt, and the miracles that were done for us through Moshe Rabbeinu, all according to the mind of the son. 
The fundamental ideas and laws which form the curriculum of the Pesach seder can and must be taught to each and every student on his intellectual and psychological level, in accordance with his unique mind. 

What is true for the Pesach seder is true for the entire corpus of halcha. In Hilchos Yesodei ha’Torah 4:13 the Rambam writes that in contrast to knowledge of physics and metaphysics, which can only be known by the greatest scholars, knowledge of “the explanation of the prohibited and the permitted and the like, regarding the other mitzvos” is “possible to be known by everyone –great and small, man and woman, broad-minded and narrow-minded.” The study of halacha is not limited to the so-called “experts,” but can and should be learned by all students on all levels. 

Moreover, it is clear from the Rambam’s statement in the introduction to the Mishneh Torah that he wrote it “so that the whole Oral Torah would become thoroughly known to all” in order “that all the laws should be accessible to the small and to the great in the laws of each and every mitzvah and the laws of the legislations of the Torah scholars and prophets.” This stands in contrast to the classical works of Oral Law (i.e. Talmud Bavli, Talmud Yerushalmi, Sifra, Sifre, Tosefta) “which all require a broad mind, a wise soul, and a long time, before one can correctly know from them what is forbidden or permitted and the other laws of the Torah.” This is also why the Rambam composed the Mishneh Torah “in the language of the Mishnah, so that it should be easily understood by most of the people,” instead of Aramaic, the language of the Talmud, “since only a few individuals among us understand it today, and even the erudite in the Talmud find many of its words foreign and remote.” 

It would seem, then, that the Mishneh Torah is ideally suited to serve as the basis of a spiral curriculum. Let us see whether it meets Bruner’s criteria. Is it “built around the great issues, principles, and values that a society deems worthy of the continual concern of its members”? Yes. Not only does the Mishneh Torah cover the entire corpus of Jewish law, but it also serves as “a comprehensive book of truth” with “true and accurate (philosophical) ideas” which “brings [the readers to] perfection and enables them to draw nearer to their Creator, not to the things that the masses deem to be perfection.”

Does the Mishneh Torah satisfy Bruner’s criteria of, “Is this subject, when fully developed, worth an adult’s knowing?” and “Does having known this subject as a child make a person a better adult?” Most definitely. Not only that, but the Mishneh Torah satisfies Bruner’s requirement of economy, as the Rambam writes in his Maamar Techiyas ha’Meitim
All our works are concise and to the point. We have no intention of writing bulky books nor of spending time on that which is useless. Hence when we explain anything, we explain only what is necessary and only in the measure required to understand it, and whatever we write is in summary form ... You, my readers, already know that I always tend to omit disputes and debates. Were I able to condense the entire Talmud into a single chapter, I would not do so in two.
It may seem like a stretch to refer to the 1,000-chapter Mishneh Torah as “concise,” but compared to the tens of thousands of pages which comprise the major sources of the Oral Law, then the brevity is truly a wonder to behold. 

Mishneh Torah and Intuition

On the surface it might seem that the Rambam did not intend for the Mishneh Torah to be used to train students in intuitive thinking. Upon closer examination, however, we see that he did. As demonstrated above, the Rambam intended for the Mishneh Torah to be learned by students on all levels as a standalone work. The Rambam explicitly states this in his introduction to the Mishneh Torah
This is so that all the laws should be accessible to the small and to the great in the laws of each and every commandment and the laws of the legislations of the Torah scholars and prophets: in short, so that a person should need no other work in the world in any of the laws of Israel; but that this work might collect the entire Oral Torah, including the positive legislations, the customs, and the negative legislations enacted from the time of Moshe Rabbeinu until the writing of the Talmud, as the Geonim interpreted it for us in all of the works of commentary they wrote after the Talmud. Thus, I have called this work the “Restatement of the Oral Torah,” for a person reads the Written Torah first and then reads this work, and knows from it the entire Oral Torah, without needing to read any other book between them. 
What, then, is a student to do if he encounters a case which is not mentioned explicitly in the Mishneh Torah? How can the Rambam say that one “should need no other work in the world in any of the laws of Israel”? The answer to this question can be found in an often overlooked statement in the introduction to the Sefer Ha’Mitzvos
And I would include in it everything of the Torah that has been established and confirmed, omitting no question which might arise, or at least I would mention the principle by means of which that question can easily be resolved without too deep reflection.
In other words, the Rambam intended for the Mishneh Torah to be so comprehensive that the students who studied it would be able to adjudicate new cases based on their own understanding of the halachos therein. In order to do this, the student must develop a fine-tuned halachic intuition. Evidently, the Rambam maintains that such intuition can be developed by studying the Mishneh Torah, and the Mishneh Torah alone! Indeed, the Rambam maintains that the development of this skill is a critical component of the mitzvas aseh of Talmud Torah (Torah study), as he writes in Hilchos Talmud Torah 1:11: 
A man is obligated to divide his learning into thirds: one third in the Written Torah, one third in the Oral Torah, and in the other third he should understand and conceptualize the end of a principle from its beginning; he should derive one principle from another, compare one principle to another, and he should apply the methods by which the Torah is expounded until he understands the essential manner of these methods, and how the prohibited and permitted and the like are derived from the principles which were learned from the Oral Tradition. This endeavor is called “talmud.”
Thus, one who follows this tripartite program of talmud Torah will – according to the Rambam – gain the requisite level of intuition necessary to adjudicate halacha on his own.

Part III – Practical Applications

How can the Mishneh Torah serve as the basis of an actual curriculum? It is not enough to point out the parallels between Bruner’s theories and the Mishneh Torah’s design. We must find ways to use the tool the Rambam has given us to solve the problems he set out to conquer. 

It will be most useful for us to consider this question in two frameworks: macro and micro. On the macro level, the student should be introduced to the classificatory scheme of the Mishneh Torah as early as possible. At first, they should become familiarized with the themes of the fourteen seforim. Next, they should start learning the themes of the hilchos sections within each sefer and the mitzvos included in each section. The sooner these classifications are internalized, the sooner the student will begin developing “Mishneh Torah eyes.” With the structure of the Mishneh Torah embedded in his mind, all of the knowledge that the student encounters will find its place within a meaningful context, thereby enhancing both comprehension and memory, as mentioned above.

Once the student has this basic foundation, the student should focus on whichever mitzvos are considered “relevant” – either to the subject being taught, or to the daily practice of halacha. At this point, it is up to the teacher and student to decide whether to strive for breadth (i.e. to master all sections of the Mishneh Torah and know all 613 mitzvos) or structural depth (i.e. to focus on particular hilchos divisions, and to learn the topics of the perakim and eventually the contents of the halachos ketanos). Again, this will be determined by the objectives of the teacher and the course. 

How should the organizational scheme of the Mishneh Torah be taught? In my opinion, the best way to do this is through a combination of rote memorization and actual application. At first glance, the use of rote memorization seems to run contrary to Bruner’s ideal. In truth, however, this is purely a matter of efficiency. In the same way that the biology student is conditioned to ask, “What function does this thing serve?” so too, the student of the Mishneh Torah should be conditioned to get into the habit of asking, “Where would the Rambam classify this in the Mishneh Torah?” Whenever a new topic is broached, students should be encouraged to guess where the topic is treated in the Mishneh Torah, and to offer support for their theories. Then, just like in the geography lesson, the teacher can reveal the “real” classification, thereby giving students an opportunity to hone their intuition and gain a firsthand appreciation of the Rambam’s classification system. 

The micro level is somewhat more difficult to teach. When encountering a new topic, students can be given the opportunity to answer the question, “What do you think this mitzvah entails?” or “How would you design this mitzvah?” After fleshing out their theories and discussing them, they can then look at the Rambam’s formulation and analyze the differences. At the very least, the teacher should show them the formulation in the Sefer ha’Mitzvos, the formulation in the Reshimos (i.e. the list of mitzvos at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah), the formulation in the Koseres, and the first few halachos ketanos of the first perakim of each mitzvah – enough to get a sense of what that mitzvah entails. Inevitably, there will be differences in the students’ formulations and the actual halacha. By analyzing and discussing these differences, students will begin to form a “halachic intuition.” They’ll develop a sense of what feels “halachic” and what feels more philosophical or ethical. This sense will serve them well in their attempts to orient themselves within Judaism. 

Additionally, there is another way for students to train their intuition, namely, by asking themselves, “What would the Rambam say about this issue?” Remember, the Rambam intended the Mishneh Torah to serve as a guide not only for halachic rulings, but for guidance in life as well. The Rambam’s opinion on philosophical matters can be derived from the Mishneh Torah, for those who are familiar with its structure and sensitive to its language. Of course, it must be made clear to students that we do not typically hold like the Rambam in halachic matters, and only a posek is qualified to give actual psak. Nevertheless, as a theoretical exercise, the Mishneh Torah is a good practice book for arriving at elementary psak and gaining an intuition as to how psak halachah works. 

Conclusion

We have only begun to scratch the surface of the Mishneh Torah’s potential as the foundation of a curriculum. Thanks to Bruner’s insights, we can see what the Rambam aimed to achieve, and we can appreciate why he structured the Mishneh Torah as he did. May we merit to utilize the Mishneh Torah to its full potential, and end the educational epidemic that has afflicted the Jewish people and caused the Torah to be regarded as “a sealed book.” 

[1] Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, 37 
[2] Letter to R’ Yonatan ha’Kohen of Lunel 
[3] Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, 38 
[4] Bruner, J.S. “Structures in Learning,” NEA Journal, LII (March, 1963), 27. 
[5] Bruner, J. S. (1977). The process of education: A landmark in educational theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
[6] Grammatically, I should refer to this as “halachos” but I don’t want this term to be confused with the colloquial term “halachos.” For this reason, I will continue to refer to this classificatory level as “Hilchos.”