Parashas Chukas: Divine Justice for Those Under Duress

Technically speaking, this is a sequel to my July 2015 post Parashas Chukas: Overlooking Sacrilegious Speech, but there's no real necessity to read that post before this one. I'll recap the essential points. I gotchu!

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Artwork: Stasis, by Seb McKinnon

Parashas Chukas: Divine Justice for Those Under Duress

A few years ago I wrote a post about the following pesukim in our parashah:

The Children of Israel, the whole assembly, arrived at the Wilderness of Tzin in the first month and the people settled in Kadesh. Miriam died there and she was buried there. There was no water for the assembly, and they gathered against Moshe and Aharon. The people quarreled with Moshe and spoke up, saying, "If only we had perished as our brethren perished before Hashem! Why have you brought the congregation of Hashem to this wilderness to die there, we and our animals? And why did you bring us up from Egypt to bring us to this evil place? - not a place of seed, or fig, or grape, or pomegranate; and there is no water to drink!" (Bamidbar 20:1-5)

I cited the Ralbag, who derives a lesson in middos (ethics) from the fact that Hashem doesn't punish Bnei Yisrael for these sacrilegious statements:

The first lesson we learn [in this section is] in middos, namely, that it is not proper to excessively denigrate a person who makes inappropriate statements at a time of suffering and lack of strength. We see that when Israel suffered greatly because of thirst, and they were afraid they would die because of the severity of their thirst, they said harsh words against Moshe - and yet, we do not find that they were punished for this. Indeed, Hashem (exalted is He) gave them water.

In that post I focused on the Ralbag's categorization of this idea as a lesson in middos. I wrote:

It is important to note that the Ralbag categorizes this lesson as a lesson in middos (character traits) rather than a lesson in deos (knowledge of how Hashem operates). In other words, Hashem's willingness to overlook Bnei Yisrael's inappropriate speech should not be regarded "merely" as some abstract principle of metaphysics. Rather, it should be looked upon as one of Hashem's middos ha'rachamim (merciful modes of behavior), which we are commanded to emulate. 

I went on to explain the implications of this lesson in how we relate to our fellow human beings, with a focus on how I intended to apply this lesson to the complaints of my own students. 

This year, when reviewing the Ralbag, I thought to myself, "What if we did derive a lesson in deos from this incident?" In other words, even though the Ralbag wants us to derive a lesson in middos from Hashem's response to Bnei Yisrael, he's not claiming that Hashem responded this way in order to teach us this lesson in middos. Presumably, Hashem did not consider Bnei Yisrael's improper statements to be a sin worthy of punishment, due to the fact that these statements were made when they were in a state of extreme suffering and weakness. There is a "principle of metaphysics" to be learned here, regarding how Hashem relates to those who deviate from the correct path on account of their state of emotional duress. 

This reminds me of another statement made by the Ralbag, which I wrote about in a post on Parashas Pinchas. The Ralbag explains that even though the Midianites and the Moabites both attempted to entice, harm, and eventually kill Bnei Yisrael, there was a fundamental difference in their motives: the Midianites were motivated by "their evil mentality," whereas the Moabites were only acting in self-defense, out of their fear that Bnei Yisrael would destroy them. The Ralbag derives a similar lesson in Divine judgment from this:

[We learn from here that] if one person is afraid of another, then there is nothing contemptible in him searching for any means by which to save himself. For this reason we find that the Moabites were not punished for enticing the Jews to sin, since the reason for their actions was their fear that the Jews would destroy them, for they were already afraid of Israel, as it is stated, “Moab became very frightened of the people, because it was numerous” (Bamidbar 22:3). For this reason, the Moabites' enticement of Israel to sin was but one of their weapons [of self-defense]. The Midianites, however, were not as afraid, and their intention in following the advice of Bilam was to rebel against Hashem; for this reason, Hashem desired that the Jews take vengeance against them.

Here, too, we have a situation in which a nation (Moav) engages in what would ordinarily be a punishable crime (seducing Bnei Yisrael and trying to destroy them) - yet, Hashem doesn't punish them because their actions stemmed from a state of extreme fear. 

This leads me to wonder: What are the parameters of this principle of Divine mercy for those who act wrongfully due to emotional distress? 

When it comes to halacha, the parameters are clear: "anoos Rachmana patrei" - "those who are in a situation of duress are halachically exempt from punishment." For example, if a woman is raped, then only the rapist is punished - not the victim. If a person is order to commit murder or be killed, then even though the halacha requires that person to give up his life rather than transgress, he is nevertheless not held accountable for committing this capital offense, since he did it under duress. If a person has a mental illness which causes him to violate halacha, then he is not held accountable for those actions that were done under the duress of his mental illness. 

My question is about how Divine mercy relates to people outside of the realm of halacha, in terms of Divine reward and punishment, or the state of the person's soul in Olam ha'ba (the World to Come), or a person's judgment on Rosh ha'Shanah and Yom ha'Kippurim, and other matters such as that. If a human being is in a terrible situation of suffering or fear, and this leads them to say blasphemous things or believe heretical thoughts, it would seem from the Ralbag that they would not be subject to Divine punishment. But how far does this extend? What if this person abandons Judaism altogether? Even worse, what if this emotional distress leads them to convert to a radical sect of Islam, and  commit murder in the name of Allah? How would Divine justice relate to such a person in these cases?

On the one hand, it seems from the Ralbag's cases that such a person would be exempt from Divine punishment. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the state of this person's soul is on par with the soul of a person who didn't commit these acts. But isn't reward and punishment based, to at least some extent, on the state of a person's soul? This is what makes it a difficult question. 

One might point out the case of tinok she'nishbah bein ha'goyim (a baby that was kidnapped and raised by non-Jews) as a possible source of insight into this matter. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Mamrim 3:3:

But the children of those [Jews] who erred, and their grandchildren whose parents led them astray, and who were born and raised in heresy - they are like a baby that was captured and raised by non-Jews, in their religion, and are considered to be anoos (under duress). And even though [such an individual] heard afterwards that he was Jewish, and he saw Jews and their religion, he is still like an anoos, for he was raised in their error. The same is true of those who cling to the ways of their forefathers who strayed. Therefore, it is proper to bring them back in teshuvah, and to draw them [close] with ways of peace until they return to the strength of Torah, and one should not be quick to slay them [as one would do in the case of the founder of a heretical sect].

Although the Rambam clearly states that a tinok she'nishbah is considered to be anoos, and someone who is raised with heretical beliefs is considered to be "like an anoos," he only talks about how we should relate to such individuals - not how God relates to them, which is what I'm asking about.

I don't have an answer to this question, but I figured I'd raise it here. As the saying goes, "a good question is half of the answer."