Parashas Chukas: Moshe Rabbeinu's Sin

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Parashas Chukas: Moshe Rabbeinu's Sin

In this week's parashah we read one of the most tragic episodes in Sefer Bamidbar:

Bnei Yisrael, the whole assembly, arrived at the Midbar Tzin in the first month and the people settled in Kadeish. Miriam died there and she was buried there. There was no water for the assembly, and they gathered against Moshe and Aharon. The people quarreled with Moshe and spoke up, saying, "If only we had perished as our brethren perished before Hashem! Why have you brought the congregation of Hashem to this wilderness to die there, we and our animals? And why did you bring us up from Egypt to bring us to this evil place? - not a place of seed, or fig, or grape, or pomegranate; and there is no water to drink!" Moshe and Aharon went from the presence of the congregation to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and fell on their faces. The glory of Hashem appeared to them. 

Hashem spoke to Moshe, saying, "Take the staff and gather together the assembly, you and Aharon your brother, and speak to the rock before their eyes that it shall give its waters. You shall bring forth for them water from the rock and give drink to the assembly and to their animals." Moshe took the staff from before Hashem, as He had commanded him. Moshe and Aharon gathered the congregation before the rock and he said to them, "Listen now, O rebels, shall we bring forth water for you from this rock?" Then Moshe raised his arm and struck the rock with his staff twice; abundant water came forth and the assembly and their animals drank.

 Hashem said to Moshe and to Aharon, "Because you did not believe in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of Bnei Yisrael, therefore you will not bring this congregation to the Land that I have given them." They are the waters of strife, where Bnei Yisrael contended with Hashem, and He was sanctified through them.

There are certain things which seem to be unanimous: (1) Moshe Rabbeinu sinned, (2) his sin is identified in this week's parashah, (3) the punishment for his sin was being barred entry into the Land of Israel. Beyond that, there is much machlokes (disagreement). Ask your average parashah-conscious Jew to identify Moshe's sin, and you might receive one or two responses - or three, if you're lucky.

Thankfully, the Abravanel [1] - in typical Abravanel fashion - conveniently summarizes ten opionions of his predecessors' and highlights the difficulties with each of them before sharing his own view on the matter. In this post I will paraphrase (not translate) the Abravanel's summaries and the difficulties he raises with all of the other views besides his own. I will not add any of my own insights to the Abravanel's treatment of the subject. Nevertheless, this post will serve as a valuable step for anyone who desires to understand the cheit (sin) of Moshe Rabbeinu. In other words, this is a "set table" style post rather than a "light bulb" style post, and is intended to pave the way for a more in-depth analysis.

Now we are ready for the Abravanel's summaries:

Eleven Opinions and their Difficulties

(1) Chazal [2] / Rashi [3]: Moshe hit the rock instead of speaking to it. This opinion cited by Rashi is probably the most well-known. Hashem had commanded Moshe: "speak to the rock." Had he simply done that, Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu would have been sanctified in the eyes of the congregation. People would have said: "If this rock - which doesn't speak and doesn't hear - fulfills the word of Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu, kal va'chomer ourselves!"

Difficulties: The Ramban [4] objects to this view, saying that when Hashem instructed Moshe to "take the staff," it was implied that he should hit the rock; if Hashem had wanted him merely to speak to the rock, then of what relevance was the staff? Furthermore, speaking to the rock would have resulted in a greater miracle than hitting it. Lastly, how does Rashi interpret Hashem's criticism of Moshe: "you have trespassed against Me" (Devarim 32:51)?

(2) Chazal [5]: Moshe disrespected Bnei Yisrael by saying: "Listen, now, you rebels." Chazal learn from here that degrading the congregation is tantamount to chilul ha'Shem (desecration of God's Name).

Difficulties: The Ibn Ezra [6] objects to this view on the basis of Moshe Rabbeinu's statement in Sefer Devarim, "You have been rebels against Hashem from the day that I knew you!" (Devarim 9:24) - which is even more degrading to Bnei Yisrael than his statement here. If disrespecting Bnei Yisrael was his sin, why would he repeat his error?

(3) Rambam [7]: Moshe needlessly got angry with Bnei Yisrael. In addition to anger being a bad midah (character trait) in and of itself, Moshe's anger also caused Bnei Yisrael to think that Hashem was angry with them, when He really was not.

Difficulties: The Ramban [4] objected to this on the basis of the statements: "]because] you rebelled against My word" (Bamidbar 27:14) and "[because] you did not believe in Me," which indicate that Moshe was punished for lack of emunah - not for anger. Moreover, Moshe should have received an even greater punishment when he got needlessly angry at the soldiers: "Moshe was angry with the commanders of the army" (Bamidbar 31:14). Rather, his statement here: "listen now, O rebels" should be understood as a rebuke - not a statement made in anger.

(4) Rabbeinu Chananel [4]: Moshe said "we shall bring forth water" instead of "Hashem shall bring forth water," making it seem as though he was taking credit for the miracle.

Difficulties: The Abravanel refutes this reading based on grammatical considerations. He learns that the pasuk: "ha'min ha'selah ha'zeh notzi lachem mayim" should be read with the hey ha'teimah - not as "Shall we bring forth water for you from this rock?" but rather "Are we the ones who will bring forth water for you from this rock?!" In other words, this is the opposite of Rabbeinu Chananel's claim: Moshe was emphatically stating that this miracle was not accomplished through his own power, but by Hashem. 

(5) "People" [6]: Moshe hit the rock twice instead of once; if he had struck the rock only one time, as Hashem instructed him, he wouldn't have gotten punished.

Difficulties: Ibn Ezra [8] highlights a problem with this theory, which also applies to several of the other views: if this was Moshe's sin, then why was Aharon punished? Aharon didn't hit the rock at all!

(6) "Some People" [8]: Moshe and Aharon didn't sing shirah (a song of praise) over the water from the rock, whereas Bnei Yisrael did. Later on in the chapter we read "Then Israel sang this song: Come up, O well! Call out to it! Well that the princes dug, that the nobles of the people excavated, through a lawgiver, with their staffs, a gift from the wilderness" (Bamidbar 21:17-18).

Difficulties: Abravanel points out that Bnei Yisrael's song didn't take place until much later on - and if so, how could Hashem punish Moshe and Aharon now for not singing shirah over the water?

(7) "Other People" [8]: Moshe brought forth water from a different rock than the one that Bnei Yisrael selected. This is what he meant by, "Shall we bring forth water from this rock?" Moshe was afraid to deviate from the word of Hashem - but since he didn't use the rock that Bnei Yisrael expected the water to come from, he was punished. This is the meaning of: "because you did not believe in Me to sanctify Me."

Difficulties: The pasuk said, "you rebelled against My word" so how could obedience to Hashem be characterized as "rebellion"?

(8) Ibn Ezra [8] / Ran [9]: Moshe, in his anger, broke his connection with Hashem, which allowed him to perform miracles.

Difficulties: The Abravanel characterizes this opinion as "a conglomeration of the other views." Moshe Rabbeinu got angry (Opinion #3) and hit the rock (Opinion #1). and when the water didn't come out, he hit it a second time (Opinion #5).

(9) Sefer ha'Ikkarim [10]: Moshe should have taken initiative and commanded the rock to give water without turning to Hashem for advice, since which would have led to a greater kidush ha'Shem (sanctification of Hashem's Name) and would have increased Bnei Yisrael's emunah; because Moshe and Aharon failed to seize this opportunity, Hashem ascribes these sins to them.

Difficulty: The first time the people complained about water, Moshe awaited Hashem's command, and did what He said. If that wasn't a sin, then why should this be a sin?

(10) "A Contemporary Thinker" [1]: Moshe and Aharon didn't sin; rather, they were not permitted to enter the Land because their generation wasn't worthy to have them as leaders. This is why the pasuk says: "you will not bring this congregation to the Land" rather than "you shall not enter the land." Just as we find pesukim which indicate that Moshe sinned, so too, we find pesukim which indicate that he didn't sin: "But Hashem became angry with me because of you, and He did not listen to me" (Devarim 3:26), "They provoked at the waters of strife, and Moshe suffered because of them" (Tehilim 106:32), It would be irrational to think that someone as perfected as Moshe would sin. All of the pesukim about Moshe's sin should be understood in the same sense as "Achan ... took of the consecrated property, and the wrath of Hashem flared against Bnei Yisrael" (Yehoshua 7:1) and "Israel has sinned; they have also violated My Covenant that I commanded them; they have also taken from the consecrated property, etc." (ibid. 7:11). It is clear that Achan was the only one who sinned - and yet, all of Klal Yisrael are described as having sinned. Similarly, when Bnei Yisrael sinned and rebelled, Moshe and Aharon were included among them, even though they didn't actually participate in this sin.

Difficulties: The Abravanel rejects this view because it contradict the pesukim that overtly make reference to Moshe's sins - especially "because you trespassed against Me among the Children of Israel at the waters of strife at Kadeish, in the Midbar Tzin; because you did not sanctify Me among Bnei Yisrael" (Devarim 32:51).

(11) Abravanel: Moshe and Aharon weren't punished for any sin that occurred now; rather, they were punished now for sins that occurred earlier - Aharon for the Cheit ha'Egel (Sin of the Golden Calf) and Moshe for the Cheit ha'Meraglim (Sin of the Spies).

Even though Aharon didn't worship the eigel, and even though all of his intentions were good, nevertheless, he was still a contributing cause to Klal Yisrael's involvement in avodah zarah. Since his sin wasn't as severe as those who actually worshiped the eigel, and in order to protect Aharon's kavod (honor), his punishment was delayed and concealed.

Moshe's cheit was that when Bnei Yisrael asked him to send spies, they only asked: "Let us take men ahead of us and let them spy out the Land, and bring word back to us: the road on which we should ascend and the cities to which we should come" (Devarim 1:22). When Hashem sanctioned the sending of the spies, He only instructed the to "Send forth men, if you please, and let them spy out the Land of Canaan that I give to Bnei Yisrael" (ibid. 13:2). But Moshe added mission objectives of his own: "See the Land - how is it? and the people that dwells in it - is it strong or weak? is it few or numerous? And how is the Land in which it dwells - is it good or is it bad? And how are the cities in which it dwells - are they open or are they fortified? And how is the land - is it fertile or is it lean? are there trees in it or not?" (ibid. 13:18-19). And even though his intention in adding these objectives was good - so that Bnei Yisrael would have a greater appreciation of Hashem's might and beneficence when He helps them conquer the Land - nevertheless, it was these mission objectives which created an opening for the meraglim to sow doubt in the minds of Bnei Yisrael. Because Moshe contributed to this cheit, and because for someone on Moshe's level "an unintentional error counts as intentional" (Avos 4:16), he was punished by being barred entry into Eretz Yisrael.

When Bnei Yisrael were in Kadeish and Midbar Tzin, and they complained about the lack of water, they pointed out that Moshe and Aharon were causes of many deaths of Bnei Yisrael in the Midbar. In response, Hashem commanded Moshe and Aharon to summon the nation, and instructed Moshe to speak to the rock to bring forth water. But when Moshe transgressed by hitting the rock instead of speaking to it, Hashem punished him and Aharon - not for the sin of hitting the rock (which wouldn't have warranted such a severe punishment), but for their earlier sins, whose punishments He had concealed and delayed out of respect for Moshe and Aharon. This may be likened to a son who commits a major offense, and whose father suspends his punishment to protect his son's dignity. But later, when the son commits a subsequent minor offense, the father punishes him - not for the minor offense, but for the original major offense.

Difficulties: Not surprisingly, the Abravanel maintains that there are no difficulties with this view. 

The Abravanel's answer is creative, and seems to address many - if not all - of the difficulties faced by the other views. Do you find his answer compelling?

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary to Sefer Bamidbar 20:11
[2] Midrash Aggadah (specific citation unknown)
[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary to Sefer Bamidbar 20:12
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary to Sefer Bamidbar 20:7
[5] Pesikta d'Rav Kahana, Piska 24
[6] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 20:8
[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Shemoneh Perakim: Perek 4
[8] Rabbeinu Avraham ibn Ezra, Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 20:8
[9] Rabbeinu Nissim ben Reuven, Derashos ha'Ran: #8
[10] Rabbeinu Yosef Albo, Sefer ha'Ikkarim 4:22

My Gemara Rebbi's Advice to the Graduates of 2012

Originally published in May 2012. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Divert, by Igor Kieryluk

My Gemara Rebbi's Advice to the Graduates of 2012

I have had the privilege of teaching high school Gemara alongside my own Gemara rebbi from yeshiva, whose shiur I was in for six years. We share the same group of students: I teach Gemara to them in 9th and 10th grade, and he teaches them Gemara in 11th and 12th grade.

Last week was the final week of classes for 12th graders. My rebbi sent them a farewell email, which included some valuable words of advice. I am grateful that he gave me permission to share those words with my readers. Here is the email in its entirety (for the sake of context and flavor), with my underlining for emphasis:

Dear Seniors, 

At our last class I did not have time to adequately formulate my farewell message to you and I would like to use this opportunity to take a second chance to convey my thoughts to you. Although we have only been together for a very short time over a few months it has been my pleasure and honor to be your teacher. You all have impressed me with your intelligence, your sincere interest in learning and your appreciation of Torah and knowledge. I know that you are nervous about leaving the comfort and safety of high school and entering a new uncharted phase of your life but I want you to know that I am sure that each one of you will continue to succeed in your endeavors. I am not saying that it will be easy, or that you won't feel discouraged at times but you should always have confidence in the abilities which I have seen in you. I want to give you one piece of advice. When you see people who seem really smart or have great memories or some other talent, who are very impressive, you should never feel inferior or inadequate. Do not become unduly impressed with appearances and never surrender your right to think for yourself and trust in your own mind. It is often the case that there is a deep wisdom that is not found with the fast mind but resides in the slow, careful, methodical thinker. Please feel free to keep in touch, I would love to hear from you in the future and do not hesitate to ask for anything you think I could help with. Best wishes and I hope to see you at graduation. 

- PC

Very important advice (in my opinion) for high school students and for the rest of us. I am thankful to God for granting me the opportunity to have this lesson instilled in me firsthand by learning from and observing my rebbi throughout my formative years in yeshiva.

Mishlei 17:1 - Meat of Conflict

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Mel Gibson in Signs (2002)

Mishlei 17:1 - Meat of Conflict

משלי יז:א

טוֹב פַּת חֲרֵבָה וְשַׁלְוָה בָהּ מִבַּיִת מָלֵא זִבְחֵי רִיב:

Mishlei 17:1 – Pleasure, Pain, and Peace of Mind

Better a dry piece of bread with peace in it than a house filled with meat of conflict.

[Note: the word "zevach" literally means "offering" or "sacrifice," but most of the commentators translate it in this context as "meat."] 

The questions are:

1. How can bread have peace "in it"? Peace is something that exists between human beings; it is not a nutrient found in food.
2. What is "meat of conflict"? Does this meat generate conflict? Is it a product of conflict? Is it consumed amid conflict? Are people arguing about the meat?
3. "Better" in what sense? The term "better" is meaningless unless one identifies the quality being measured and compared. 
4. Why "a dry piece of bread" vs. "a house filled with meat"? What is the significance of these qualitative and quantitative qualifiers?
5. What practical decision-making idea do we learn from this pasuk? We should ask about every pasuk, but in most pesukim we are given at least some clue as to how the idea can be implemented in practice. On the surface, is difficult to see the practicality in this pasuk.

[I recommend stopping here, thinking about the pasuk and these questions for the next day or two, and then coming back and reading the rest of the post.]

Before I share my own understanding of this pasuk, I'd like to make a methodology point. I explained in my earlier post, Mishlei Methodology: Meiri - Nigleh and Nistar, that we should train ourselves to take every pasuk as literally as possible unless we are forced to take it as a mashal (metaphor). Although Mishlei certainly can be learned metaphorically, as the title of the book implies, but it is far too easy to slip into "unbridled free-association mode," and convince oneself that one is learning the wisdom of Shlomo ha'Melech when one is actually just making up ideas. Sticking to a literal reading is a good way to anchor oneself in 

Despite my continual reiteration of this methodology principle in my Mishlei classes, my students usually assume that this pasuk should be taken metaphorically. They are inclined to think this because of Questions #1 and 2. I disagree. 

Here is my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

The enjoyment and satisfaction of a physical experience is highly dependent on one’s psychological state of mind. If one has a troubled or conflicted state of mind, then even an abundance of the highest quality food (e.g. “a house filled with meat”) will bring no gratification, but if one has a peaceful state of mind, then even a small and simple pleasure (e.g. “a dry piece of bread”) will bring delight and satisfaction. Those who are wise will factor in this psychological reality in their pleasure-seeking plans; those who are foolish, and fail to take this into account, will pay the price of diminished enjoyment. This idea should be kept in mind when planning particular sessions of physical pleasure, and when planning one’s long-term lifestyle; for example, a person might make a lot of money from a high-stress job, but if that stress prevents him or her from enjoying life, then is it still worth it?

My favorite depiction of this is in the movie Signs (2002). Mel Gibson plays an ex-priest who rejected his religion when his wife died in a tragic accident. In this scene Mel Gibson's character tells his family that they can have whatever they want for dinner. Cut to dinner time. All of the family members are gathered around the table, and as Mel Gibson's character is about to dig in, his son suggests that they pray. Mel Gibson's character refuses to pray, and his refusal sets off a chain reaction of conflict, negativity, and crying which quickly spirals out of control. Finally, he reaches his breaking point and yells, "Now, we are going to enjoy this meal. No one can stop us from enjoying this meal, SO ENJOY IT." He then proceeds to angrily seize food and scarf it down while trying not to cry - and is clearly not getting any pleasure from the feast.

Evidently, there was someone who could stop him from enjoying his meal: himself. 

Adler: On Teaching and Learning

Today I would like to share with you the essay which has had the greatest impact on me as a teacher. It was written by Mortimer Adler. I think that all teachers would benefit tremendously from reading it. I have chosen to present the whole essay here without comment. However, I have underlined my favorite passages. 

This essay, entitled Teaching and Learning, was originally published in Parnassus: Essays in Honor of Jacques Barzun, edited by Dora B. Weiner and William R. Keylor, New York, Harper & Row, 1976, pp. 57-65

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Adler, like many chachamim I know, was a fan of pipes.

Adler: On Teaching and Learning

Happily there is something stable and clear and useful behind this phantasmagoria of Education -- the nature of subject matter and the practice of teaching. …

… the whole aim of good teaching is to turn the young learner, by nature a little copycat, into an independent, self-propelling creature, who cannot merely learn but study. … This is to turn pupils into students, and it can be done on any rung of the ladder of learning.

          -- Jacques Barzun, Teacher in America

In the context of these passages, Jacques Barzun observes that we all know, or should know, that it is impossible to "teach" democracy, or citizenship or a happy married life; that not all subjects are teachable; that many who are regarded and probably regard themselves as professional teachers "are merely connected with education"; and that, while teaching "is not a lost art … the regard for it is a lost tradition." I hope what I have to say about teaching and learning will confirm and illuminate these observations, especially the point made in the second passage quoted above; namely, that the good teacher should aim to make his tutelage totally dispensable by transforming those he teaches into independent learners.

I would like to dwell for a moment on the contrast which Jacques draws between Education and teaching. In my judgment, Education (with a capital E) is a secondary subject, and a dull one to boot. Countless long and intricate books have been written on the subject, few of them good, none of them great. In contrast, the literature on the art of teaching and the role of the teacher is minuscule. It consists mainly not of books or treatises, but of little gems to be found in the context of discourse on other subjects. It begins with a few passages in the dialogues of Plato and the treatises of Aristotle; it continues with a short tract by Augustine and with a few questions answered by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica; and it includes, in modern times, some insights to be found in the writings of Comenius, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, William James and John Dewey.

Contemporary "educational psychology" of the scientific variety may have made contributions to the subject, but I doubt it. At best those contributions will add footnotes to the main points I wish to make about the nature and function of the teacher in the process of human learning. If what I have to say about teaching restores respect for the art, and imparts an understanding of how difficult it is to practice that art effectively, it may also help us to realize how superficial all educational plans, programs and policies must necessarily be when they do not recognize that the number of good teachers available to carry them out will always fall far short of the number required to achieve the appointed objectives.

All learning is either by instruction or by discovery; that is, with or without the aid of teachers. The teachers who serve as instructors may be alive and in direct contact with those whom they instruct, as is always the case in classrooms or tutorials, or they may be present to the learner only in the form of books. The teacher who instructs by his writings cannot engage in discussion with those who are reading his works in order to learn; he can ask them initial questions, but he cannot ask any second questions -- questions about the answers they give to his initial questions. He is, therefore, seriously limited in his performance of the art of teaching, though he may have done what he could to apply the rules of that art in his effort to communicate what he knows.

That the effort to communicate what a man knows is not, in itself, effective teaching follows from the fact that such efforts are seldom if ever successful and, at best, they succeed only in part. Successful teaching occurs only when the mind of the learner passes from a state of ignorance or error to a state of knowledge. The knowledge acquired may be either something already known by the teacher, or something about which he himself is inquiring. In either case, the transformation effected in the mind of the learner is learning by instruction only if another human being has taken certain deliberate steps to bring about that transformation. What the teacher does must be deliberately calculated to change the mind of the learner. Merely motivating someone to learn is not enough; stimulation is not teaching.

Since whatever can be learned by instruction must necessarily have been learned first by discovery, without the aid of teachers, it follows that teachers are, absolutely speaking, dispensable. Nevertheless, they are useful because most human beings need instruction to learn what they could have learned by discovering it for themselves. If we recognize, as we should, that genuine learning cannot occur without activity on the part of the learner (passive absorption or rote memorization does not deserve to be called learning), then we must also recognize that all learning is a process of discovery on the part of the learner.

This alters our understanding of the distinction between learning by discovery and learning by instruction. If the latter is not to be identified with passive absorption or rote memorization, then the distinction divides all active learning into two kinds -- unaided discovery, discovery without the aid of teachers, on the one hand; and aided discovery, or discovery deliberately assisted by teachers, on the other. In both cases, the principal cause of learning is activity on the part of the learner engaged in the process of discovery; when instruction occurs, the teacher is at best only an instrumental cause operating to guide or facilitate the process of discovery on the part of the learner. To suppose that the teacher is ever more than an instrumental cause is to suppose that the activity of a teacher can by itself suffice to cause learning to occur in another person even though the latter remains entirely passive. This would view the learner as a patient being acted upon rather than as an agent whose activity is both primary and indispensable. In contrast, the instrumental activity of the teacher is always secondary and dispensable.

These basic insights are epitomized by Socrates when, in the Theaetetus, he describes his role as a teacher by analogy with the service performed by a midwife who does nothing more than assist the pregnant mother to give birth with less pain and more assurance. So, according to Socrates, the teacher assists the inquiring mind of the learner to give birth to knowledge, facilitating the process of discovery on the learner's part. If the learner suffers birth pangs because errors block the way, then, as Socrates tells us in the Meno, the teacher may have to take strenuous measures to reduce the learner from a state of error to one of admitted ignorance (by "benumbing" the mind of the learner), so that motion toward learning can proceed unhampered by obstacles.

Before we consider how the good teacher, following the model of Socrates, cooperates with the activity of the learner, which will develop from our understanding of teaching as a cooperative art, let me call attention to two erroneous uses of the word "teach." It is often said that "experience teaches," but however much we may learn from experience, it teaches us nothing. Only human beings teach. We also frequently say that a man is self-taught -- an autodidact -- or that he has taught himself this or that. He may have learned this or that entirely by himself; all of his learning may have been unaided discovery. But to say that it occurred without the aid of teachers is not to say that he taught himself. One individual can be taught only by another.

Teaching, like farming and healing, is a cooperative art. Understanding this, Comenius in The Great Didactic again and again compares the cultivation of the mind with the cultivation of the field; so, too, Plato compares the teacher's art with the physician's.

In arts such as shoemaking and shipbuilding, painting and sculpture (arts which I call "operative" to distinguish them from the three cooperative arts), the artist is the principal cause of the product produced. Nature may supply the materials to be fashioned or transformed, and may even supply models to imitate, but without the intervention of the artist's skill and causal efficacy, nature would not produce shoes, ships, paintings or statues.

Unlike the operative artist, who aims either at beauty or utility, the cooperative artist merely helps nature to produce results that it is able to produce by its own powers, without the assistance of the artist -- without the intervention of the artist's accessory causality. Fruits and grains grow naturally; the farmer intervenes merely to assure that these natural products grow with regularity and, perhaps, to increase their quantity. The body has the power to heal itself -- to maintain health and regain health; the physician who adopts the Hippocratic conception of the healing art attempts to support and reinforce the natural processes of the body. The mind, like the body, has the power to achieve what is good for itself -- knowledge and understanding. Learning would go on if there were no teachers, just as healing and growing would go on if there were no physicians and farmers.

Like the farmer and the physician, the teacher must be sensitive to the natural process that his art should help bring to its fullest fruition -- the natural process of learning. It is the nature of human learning that determines the strategy and tactics of teaching. Since learning which results in expanded knowledge and improved understanding (rather than memorized facts) is essentially a process of discovery, the teacher's art consists largely in devices whereby one individual can help another to lift himself up from a state of knowing and understanding less to knowing and understanding more. Left to his own devices, the learner would not get very far unless he asked himself questions, perceived problems to be solved, suffered puzzlement over dilemmas, put himself under the necessity of following out the implications of this hypothesis or that, made observations and weighed the evidence for alternative hypotheses, and so on. The teacher, aware of these indispensable steps in the process by which he himself has moved his own mind up the ladder of learning, devises ways to help another individual engage in a similar process; and he applies them with sensitivity to the state of that other person's mind and with awareness of whatever special difficulties the other must overcome in order to make headway.

Discipline in the traditional liberal arts imparts the skills by which an individual becomes adept at learning. They are the arts of reading and writing, of speaking and listening, of observing, measuring and calculating -- the arts of grammar, rhetoric and logic, the mathematical arts, and the arts of investigation. Without some proficiency in these arts, no one can learn very much, whether assisted or not by the use of books and the tutelage of teachers. Unless the teacher is himself a skilled learner, a master of the liberal arts which are the arts of learning, he cannot help those he attempts to teach acquire the skills of learning; nor can his superior skill in learning provide the learner with the help he needs in the process of discovery. The teacher must put himself sympathetically in the position of a learner who is less advanced than himself, less advanced both in skill and in knowledge or understanding. From that vantage point, he must somehow reenact -- or stimulate -- for the learner the activities he himself engaged in to achieve his present state of mind.

The Hippocratic understanding of healing as a cooperative art provides us with analogical insights into the cooperative art of teaching. Hippocrates distinguished between three forms of therapy: control of the patient's regimen, the use of drugs or other forms of medication, and recourse to surgery when that drastic remedy cannot be avoided. He regarded the first of these as the primary technique of the physician as a cooperative artist, for, unlike medication, it introduces no foreign substances into the body and, unlike surgery, it does no violence to it. By controlling the patient's regimen -- his diet, his hours, his activities, his environment -- the physician helps the body to heal itself by its natural processes.

In the sphere of teaching, the analogue of surgery is indoctrination, the result of which is rote memorization, or some passive absorption of information without any understanding of it. Indoctrination does violence to the mind, as surgery does violence to the body, the only difference being that there is never any excuse for indoctrination, while there can be justification for surgery. The restoration of health may be facilitated by surgery when that drastic remedy is needed, but knowledge and understanding can never be produced by indoctrination. Even so, Hippocrates did not regard the surgeon as a physician, though the physician may find it necessary to have recourse to his services. The physician and the surgeon are distinguished by the line that divides the cooperative from the operative artist. By the same criterion, the indoctrinator is not a teacher.

Lecturing is that form of teaching which is analogous to the use of drugs and medication in the practice of medicine. No violence may be done to the mind if the lecturer eschews any attempt at indoctrination, but the lecture, even when it is attended to with maximum effort on the part of the auditor, is something that the mind must first absorb before it can begin to digest and assimilate what is thus taken in. If passively attended to and passively absorbed by the memory, the lecture has the same effect as indoctrination, even if the lecturer scrupulously intended to avoid that result. At its best, the lecture cannot be more than an occasion for learning, a challenge to the mind of the auditor, an invitation to inquiry. The lecture, in short, is no better than the book as a teacher -- an oral rather than a written communication of knowledge. Like the author, the lecturer cannot ask the second and subsequent questions, and unless these are asked, persistently and vigorously, the learner is not aided by a teacher in his own process of discovery. Unlike the indoctrinator, the lecturer may have the same aim as the teacher, but his manner of teaching is at best second-rate.

Analogous to the fully cooperative therapeutic technique of controlling the patient's regimen is the fully cooperative pedagogical technique of engaging the learner in discussion -- teaching by asking instead of teaching by telling, asking questions not merely to elicit answers for the sake of grading them (as in a quiz session, which is not teaching at all), but asking questions that challenge the answers elicited, and asking still more questions that open up new avenues of inquiry. Lectures audited and books read may provide the materials for teaching by discussion, and there may be advanced learners, highly skilled in the liberal arts, who can learn from lectures and books without the aid of teachers. But for those who need the help that good teachers can provide, listening to lectures or reading books without discussing them yields little profit to the mind. The help that the good teacher provides takes the form of conducting the needed discussion. Socrates did that without any use of books or lectures, and there may be others who have taught by asking questions without employing any "teaching materials" to ask questions about; yet for the most part even the best teachers find lectures heard and books read useful accessories to teaching by discussion.

Holding up Socrates as the model requires us to consider the one basic issue in the theory of teaching. Like most basic theoretical issues, it first emerged as an apparent difference of opinion between Plato and Aristotle. Their different conceptions of the teacher and of teaching are exemplified in the difference between the Platonic and the Aristotelian styles of philosophical exposition, between the dialogue and the treatise.

For Plato, the teacher is, like Socrates, one who is engaged in the pursuit of truth because he does not possess it, one who is inquiring because he does not know or understand something, to know or understand which is the object of his inquiry. For Aristotle, the teacher is a person like himself, one who knows or understands something and who communicates his knowledge or understanding of it. The mind of the student, according to Aristotle, has the potentiality of knowing or understanding what the mind of the teacher actually knows or understands, and teaching consists in those acts on the part of the teacher by which he reduces the mind of the student from potentiality to actuality in a certain respect.

On the face of it, it would appear that Aristotle conceived of teaching as an operative rather than as a cooperative art, and regarded giving lectures or writing books as effective methods of teaching rather than as second-rate efforts even at their best. However, we have no reason to think that Aristotle rejected the fundamental truth that all learning is a process of discovery involving activity on the part of the learner, which is both primary and indispensable. He would agree that, when learning occurs with the aid of a teacher, the activity of the teacher cannot be more than a secondary and instrumental cause. The teacher who actually knows something must put himself in the position of inquiring to aid inquiry on the part of the learner, who must inquire in order to learn.

That being the case, the lectures that a teacher gives or the treatises he writes may express the knowledge he actually possesses, but they are only the first step in effective teaching. The lecture or treatise by itself will seldom if ever reduce the student's mind from potentially knowing or understanding what the teacher knows or understands to actually knowing or understanding it. To effect that transformation, the teacher must ask questions that probe and move the mind of the learner in a variety of ways. As evidence that Aristotle was aware of this, it should be noted that his treatises are full of questions -- questions that are pivotal in his exposition of any subject. The treatises cannot, of course, ask the second and subsequent questions which would emerge in a well-conducted discussion.

It must also be remembered that Socrates' pretension to ignorance is at least partly ironical, the irony itself being employed as a teaching device. Oftentimes in the dialogues, Socrates reveals himself as knowing what, at other moments, he is careful not to claim he knows. That he knows more than those whom he interrogates goes without saying: he knows better than they the object of the inquiry, and he knows better than they how to inquire about it. Such knowledge makes the teacher more competent as a learner or inquirer than those whom he is trying to help in the process of learning. If, in addition, one detects in the Platonic doctrine of learning as reminiscence (exemplified by Socrates' questioning of the slave boy in the Meno) something equivalent to the Aristotelian doctrine of learning as the actualization of potential knowledge or understanding, then the one basic issue in the theory of teaching turns out to be an apparent rather than a real disagreement between Platonists and Aristotelians.

Space remains for only a brief statement of some of the implications of the theory of the teacher and of teaching to be found in traditional sources. The reader may perceive other consequences of the theory for educational programs, policies and practices, but the following seem to me to be of prime importance.

1. Just as the physician caring for the health of his patients treats one person at a time, so, too, the teacher operates under ideal conditions only when he cooperates with the learning process of one person at a time. Any increase beyond that in the number of persons being simultaneously served by the teacher reduces the efficacy of his efforts, and when the number exceeds two or three, his efficiency decreases almost to the vanishing point.

2. Many -- perhaps most -- of the people who are officially engaged in the educational system, in one capacity or another, do very little teaching in the strict sense of that term. In any educational institution, be it school, college or university, the number of those who are teachers in more than name only is relatively small; of those, the amount of time they can devote to teaching is slight, and the conditions under which they teach render their efforts much less effective than they would be under ideal conditions.

3. If, in our educational institutions from grade school through the university, everyone who held the office of teacher were in fact truly a teacher and were afforded optimal conditions for teaching, many, if not most, of the educational problems that have concerned us in this century would either disappear or become solvable.

4. If, in every hour of teaching, the teacher, even one who is already very learned, were himself to enjoy some increment of learning, the effectiveness of teaching would be maximized. To the extent that those who regard themselves as teachers teach without any increment of learning for themselves, they are likely to fail in their efforts to assist others in the process of learning.

5. In a democratic society, with universal suffrage and universal schooling, the educational system cannot possibly hope to have an adequate number of teachers in the strict sense of that term. To cope with this inadequacy, two remedies may be available. One lies in the fact that the bright students need less help from teachers than those less well endowed; they are better able to learn by unaided discovery. The second remedy is more drastic: that every advanced student should undertake to teach, individually, someone not as far advanced. Not only would this provide every student with a teacher, but it would make every student a better learner, for having to teach a subject to someone else increases one's own understanding of it.

6. Though experience does not teach, it is an aid to learning and, therefore, to teaching. It follows from this that mature persons, of larger and more varied experience, are more teachable than the immature, though the latter may be more trainable. To increase the teachability of students in our educational institutions, policies should be formulated and expedients adopted that would tend to increase their maturity before their schooling is completed. This might be accomplished by some years of non-attendance at schools after the completion of secondary schooling and by provision of facilities for continuing education after the completion of college or university.

7. Since it involves the application of one's highest faculties for the benefit of the mind of another, the gift made by a dedicated and devoted teacher is, as Augustine remarked, "the greatest act of charity."

A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

Disclaimer: In my high school classes, I strive to craft my lessons to fit the minds of the particular students I'm teaching. When I learn one-on-one with a student, my lessons are extremely tailor-made. 

Since this blog post originated in one-on-one learning with a student, I wasn't sure whether it would be worthwhile to write it up, since I designed it specifically for that student. Ultimately, I decided that it would be good to write it out for the sake of my own clarity, and once I was doing that, I figured I might as well share it as a blog post. Maybe others will find it valuable.

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A Visual Representation of Science and Torah

I recently had a discussion with a science-savvy student of mine who asked the following question - in more or less these words:

In science, when scientists find something that doesn't make sense based on their current understanding of the world, they keep thinking about it and theorizing and experimenting; eventually they realize that they need to either modify or abandon their prior theory and come up with a new theory in order to solve the problem. 

In Torah, however, we don't do this. Even if we see something that seems crazy, irrational, or morally objectionable, we don't reject Torah or Judaism. Why not? What's the difference between Judaism and science? And how many problems in the Torah would you have to see in order to conclude that the whole thing is false?

I immediately recognized the flawed premises of this student's reasoning, and I almost responded with the first answer that popped into my head. But I caught myself. I sensed that this student was touching upon something important - and that if I could extract that kernel of truth AND show him where his analogy fell short AND answer his question, then he would emerge with a clearer understanding of both Torah and science. 

I spent a few days thinking about how to approach this student's question and finally - while I was proctoring my Gemara final - I had an epiphany. I realized that if I could come up with a visual depiction of how science works and compare it side-by-side with a visual depiction of how Torah works, then I could show him (a) how these two ways of gaining knowledge of reality are far more similar than he realized, and (b) I can answer his question in a way that would satisfy his scientific mind. 

A Visual Depiction of Science

Here's what I came up with for science. I'll walk you through it below:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" (i.e. that which exists), which is what we are trying to know and understand through science; strictly speaking, the "reality" part in the science diagram should say "physical reality" since science doesn't go beyond the physical - but for the sake of consistency, I labeled this part as "reality" on both diagrams

Horizon of Ignorance: this represents the gap between our understanding of reality and reality itself, - a gap which science continually strives to diminish and eventually close.

The Senses / The Mind: at the very bottom of the diagram we have "the senses" (the five senses of sight, sound, touch, smell, and taste according to the traditional count, plus some or all of the non-traditional senses according to our modern understanding) and "the mind" (i.e. our ability to think logically and rationally); these constitute the epistemological foundation of the scientific method; if one maintained that either the senses or the mind were incapable of giving us knowledge about reality, then all scientific knowledge would be null and void. 

Empirical Data: from the day we are born, we are bombarded with loads of sensory data, but this empirical information is only a surface-level knowledge of reality.

Scientific Thinking: the scientist is the one who seeks out the lawfulness underlying the myriad particulars; instead of attempting to write an entire discourse on scientific thinking, I'll just quote from my Gemara rebbi's eloquent explanation in his essay on Scientific and Halachic Thought:

In the scientific method every particular is viewed as an expression of a universal principle - not as a separate localized reality. An apple falling from a tree to the ground is not an apple-ground phenomenon but an interaction between their underlying substances. We look for the simplest explanations of the widest range of events, not for a complex patchwork of explanations each fitting a single event. Thus explanations based on the particulars of apple and earth are rejected in favor of explanations based on the universal matter each possesses. This method naturally leads to simpler principles that unify more and more particular cases. As Einstein and Infeld state in the Evolution of Physics, (which is an excellent book on the subject of scientific thought and methodology), "[The scientist] certainly believes that, as his knowledge increases, his picture of reality will become simpler and simpler and will explain a wider and wider range of his sensuous impressions (P. 31).” ... 

What is the basis for this approach? It is the belief that all of the universe is composed of fundamental building blocks under the influence of fundamental forces with all of the observable phenomena being their various expressions. It is this search for what lies beneath that demands a universal law of nature, the law of the fundamentals, with each advance striking deeper. ... 

The scientific process is one of moving from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal, from a strange chaotic world to a system of laws governing outcomes in a clearly predictable way.  

This is what I mean by "scientific thinking" - not the particular theories about the universe that are developed in each successive generation of scientists, but the general way of thinking about the universe which gives rise to those theories. 

Scientific Theories: these are the particular theories that emerge from scientific thinking and aim to explain reality, in whole or in part; there "macro theories" which attempt to explain the foundations of the universe (e.g. Newtonian "classical mechanics," Einstein's theory of relativity, Planck's quantum mechanics) as well as the "micro theories" which aim to explain localized phenomena (e.g. Kepler's laws of planetary motion, Darwin's theory of natural selection, the theory of climate change).

Conceptual Understanding: the aim of these theories is to give us a conceptual understanding of reality, thereby pushing back the Horizon of Ignorance and bringing us closer to objective truth.

New Empirical Data: in many cases, these scientific theories will also help us discover new empirical facts and/or new methods of uncovering more new empirical facts.

New Questions and Difficulties: while these scientific theories enlighten our minds, solve problems, and push back the Horizon of Influence, they (along with the new empirical data) raise new questions and difficulties of which we were previously unaware; at first, scientists will attempt to solve these problems within their current theoretical framework, but eventually ...

Scientific Life-cycle: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt scientists to come up with new theories, and the entire cycle will begin again. My Gemara rebbi described this process as follows:

Something interesting occurs near the end of a philosophic regime. The idea that was an intellectual boon to science at its inception, allowing for new freedoms of thought, can become in its decline an intellectual shackle forcing every phenomenon to conform to its terms. To the conventional thinkers it is no longer a tool of new insights and fresh ideas rather it becomes an ideology of its own. The loyal rally around it and craft creative if not brilliant ways of fitting the unruly phenomena into the old terms no matter how tenuous or far fetched. Ironically, this is the opposite approach of the methodology that spawned the very idea they are defending. Whereas the original breakthrough started with a set of problems from which were derived a new universal, this method starts with a universal and insist on particular kinds of solutions which are in line with the philosophy. Eventually a new breakthrough is needed to once again reduce the complexity created.

The questions and difficulties which prompt this rethinking of the prevailing scientific theories will also, in many cases, lead to a reconsideration of the empirical data, since scientists will realize that their perception of that data was biased or clouded by the reigning scientific framework. For example, when it was believed that the earth was the center of the solar system, all empirical observations of the heavens were tainted by this bias; when people believed in spontaneous generation, their empirical observations supported their belief that maggots were generated out of putrid flesh. These beliefs were eventually disproved, and when that happened, the empirical data had to be reconsidered in light of the new theoretical model.

Step #1 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #1 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties compel us to modify or eliminate the very scientific theories which yielded them in the first place, thereby continuing the life-cycle of scientific understanding.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular scientific theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the general approach of scientific thinking as a whole.

For example, classical mechanics was dethroned as "a theory of everything" by the theory of relativity; the limitations of the theory of relativity were brought to light by quantum - but at no point did the problems with these particular scientific theories cause scientist to doubt or question the validity of scientific thinking as a whole. To the contrary - the fact that scientific thinking led to the discovery of these theories AND the questions and difficulties AND enabled new theories to arise is evidence of the validity of scientific thinking.

And that is my visual depiction of science. I'm sure there are imperfections with my diagram, but it served my purposes just fine.

A Visual Depiction of Torah

Here's what I came up with for Torah:

Here's what each part means:

Reality: at the top of the diagram we have "reality" - not just physical reality, but metaphysical reality as well.

Horizon of Ignorance: see explanation above; according to the Ralbag, this Horizon of Ignorance exists in our understanding of Torah in the same way that it does in science; I wrote about this at length in The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah.

The Senses / The Mind: the senses and the mind constitute the epistemological foundation of Torah - the same as in science; this point is explained very clearly in the essay Torah from Sinai.

Contents of Torah: for the sake of simplicity, we will say that "Contents of Torah" refers to the Torah she'bi'Chsav (Written Torah) and Torah she'baal Peh (Oral Torah) that were given to Moshe at Sinai, plus the Neviim (Prophets) and Kesuvim (Writings); in truth, there is more included here than just that, but we'll stick with this definition to avoid complications.

The Revelation at Sinai: our basis for accepting the Contents of Torah as Divinely authored is the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai; our acceptance of this event is based on a rational argument that was best explained in the essay Torah from Sinai; Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb also wrote a version of this argument in Living Up to the Truth: Chapter 6 and Rabbi Lawrence Kelemen wrote an essay version of this entitled A Rational Approach to the Torah's Divine Origin, in addition to his book Permission to Receive.

Rational/Scientific Thinking: in the same way that scientific thinking is applied to empirical data to generate scientific theories, so too, rational thinking is applied to the "data" of the Torah's contents to generate Torah theories; I refer to this as "rational/scientific thinking" to emphasize that the type of conceptual understanding we are looking for is similar to that in science.

Torah Theories: by "Torah theories" I am referring to a conceptual understanding of reality that is arrived at via the contents of Torah; I refer to these as "theories" because they are the product of human thinking, which is fallible and incomplete (again, I refer you to my post: The Limits of Our Understanding of Torah).

Conceptual Understanding: as is the case in science, our goal in learning Torah is to arrive at the most accurate conceptual understanding of reality that is humanly possible.

New Understanding of Torah's Contents: here we see a major difference between science and Torah; in science new theories lead to the discovery of brand new facts, but in Torah, there are no "new facts"; however, our new understanding sometimes leads to a total reevaluation of the Torah's contents, to the point where the factual data we once worked with is completely reinterpreted.

A great example of this is the Ramban's interpretation of the rainbow in Parashas Noach. He acknowledges that a literal reading of the pesukim would lead us to believe that rainbows weren't created until after the flood. But then he says:

But we are compelled to believe the words of the Greek [scientists] that rainbows are a natural phenomenon resulting from the sun’s rays passing through moist air, for in [any] container of water that is [set] before sunlight there can be seen something that resembles a rainbow.

The Ramban then goes and reinterprets the pesukim in light of our "updated" understanding of how rainbows work. To my mind, this is an example of how the "facts" of Torah are not set in stone, but are still subject to change in light of advances in our understanding of reality. We will never receive new pesukim or new Torah she'baal Peh from Hashem, but our understanding of what He gave us continues to evolve as our knowledge of Torah and the universe continues to grow.

New Questions and Difficulties: our new understanding of reality and the contents of Torah will raise new questions and difficulties - just as in science; in some cases we will be able to answer these by developing our current Torah theories, but in other cases ...

Life-cycle of Torah Understanding: ... these questions and difficulties will prompt us to go back to the proverbial drawing board, and come up with new theories which address the problems. Unlike in the scientific community, where this life-cycle plays out on a community-wide level with a very small percentage of individuals pioneering new major theories, the life-cycle of Torah understanding plays out on a community-wide AND individual level. The great baalei Mesorah have made contributions of Torah theories which have shaped all of Klal Yisrael's understanding of Torah - but at the same time, each individual Jew goes through his or her personal odyssey of understanding Torah as well.

Step #2 of My Answer: The statements on the left and right of the diagram constitute Step #2 (out of 3) of my answer to the question asked by my student:

• Questions and difficulties might compel us to modify or eliminate parts of our theoretical understanding of Torah and its content.
• Although these questions and difficulties will force us to reject particular Torah theories, they do NOT cause us to doubt or deny the basis of the Revelation at Sinai or the veracity of the Torah's contents. 

This is the crux of my answer. For example, let us say that a person was bothered by the story of Adam and Chava in Gan Eden. A few hundred years ago, there would be no problem saying that the first human beings were Adam and Chava, that they were the progenitors of the human species, and they lived 5,777 years ago. However, in light of what we now know about anthropology and evolution, it is difficult to accept the Torah's account at face value.

In the premise of my student's question, he voiced the possibility that a problem like this would cause us to doubt or deny the authenticity of the Torah as a whole. I disagree. At most, this difficulty would cause us to modify or reject our current theoretical understanding of those pesukim in the Torah - perhaps even going so far as to say (like some Rishonim who shall remain unnamed) that the Gan Eden story is a mashal. But this problem would not shake or undermine the basis of our acceptance of Torah, which is the Revelation at Sinai. 

Step #3 of My Answer: I happened to have been sitting near my Gemara rebbi when I made these diagrams. I showed them to him and asked what he would change or add. He approved of my diagram and explanation, but added an important point. 

Generally speaking it's true that the questions and difficulties which emerge from scientific advancements will not undermine scientific thinking as a whole. However, on rare occasions, thinkers will come to the realization that there are problems with the paradigm of scientific thinking as a whole. This will lead to a total revolution in the way we approach science. When this happens, nearly all of the knowledge and understanding that was arrived at through the former paradigm will be rendered invalid. 

For example, Aristotelian thought dominated science (a.k.a. "natural philosophy") for over a thousand years. The way that Aristotle and the other "natural philosophers" thought about the world and the types of theories they came up with bear almost no resemblance to the scientific theories of the scientific thinkers after the scientific revolution. The Aristotelian paradigm was so off base that we now reject all of this theories about the physical world as non-scientific. If Aristotle was right about anything in science, it was by accident. 

What would be the equivalent of this type of "scientific revolution" in Torah? As we said, it wouldn't come about through particular questions or difficulties in our theoretical understanding of the Torah's contents. Rather, such a revolution could only stem from problems with the rational basis of our acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai itself. If one had a valid reason for rejecting the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, then this would undermine the validity of all our Torah knowledge. 

This is one of the reasons why I favor the Torah from Sinai version of this "proof of Torah mi'Sinai" over the others, since the author demonstrates that if we deny the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, we would ipso facto have to deny all of historical knowledge - and indeed, all secondhand knowledge as well. In my opinion, he makes a valid argument.

Summary and Conclusion

My student asked why we don't reject Judaism when we encounter problems in the same way that we reject scientific theories when we encounter problems with them. My answer essentially boils down to the fact that there is a distinction between scientific thinking and scientific theories; problems only cause us to reject scientific theories - but we do not reject the scientific way of thinking which enabled us to come up with those theories. So too in Torah: problems may cause us to reject particular Torah theories, but they would not cause us to reject the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai, which is the basis of our acceptance of the Torah. 

My student was satisfied with this answer. I hope you found value in it as well!

Parashas Korach: What Happened to Korach?

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Artwork: Wrath of God, by Titus Lunter

Parashas Korach: What Happened to Korach?

Introduction

“What happened to Korach?” It’s a simple question, and one might would assume it has a simple answer. I’d wager that if you took a poll, most Jews would respond: “Hashem made a miracle, causing the earth to swallow Korach and his followers alive.” That’s what I thought until I actually looked into the issue and realized that the answer isn’t so simple. 

Review of the Facts

First, let’s review the sequence of events. As you read this summary, be on the lookout for an answer to our question: 

Korach, Dasan and Aviram, Ohn ben Peles, and 250 leaders stand up in opposition to Moshe Rabbeinu and Aharon, saying, “It is too much for you, for the entire assembly – all of them are holy. Why do you exalt yourselves over the congregation of Hashem?” (Bamidbar 16:3). [Note: Many meforshim say that these 250 leaders were firstborns who were bitter about the fact that their role of serving in the Mikdash was taken away and given to the Leviim and Kohanim; that’s why they joined Korach in his attempt to “take back” the kehunah (priesthood) from the Kohanim.]

Moshe responds, “Tomorrow Hashem will make known who is His own and the holy one, and He will him draw close, and whomever He will choose, He will draw close to Himself” (ibid. 16:5). Moshe instructs these men to take fire-pans and bring ketores (incense) before Hashem, Who will make known His choice through His acceptance or rejection of the ketores. 

Moshe rebukes Korach. He calls him out on his populist campaign and exposes his true motive: the desire to seize the kehunah gedolah (high priesthood) from Aharon, which Korach felt was his birthright. 

Moshe attempts to reason with Dasan and Aviram; they spurn him, insult him, challenge his authority, and accuse him of despotism. Moshe is angry, and turns to Hashem. 

The next day, Korach and his 250 followers congregate in front of the Ohel Moed (Tent of Meeting); Korach assembles the rest of Bnei Yisrael to witness what will happen, with Dasan and Aviram and their followers standing nearby. 

Hashem declares His intent to destroy ALL of Klal Yisrael. Moshe intercedes on their behalf. Hashem responds by telling Moshe to urge Bnei Yisrael to distance themselves from around the tents of Korach, Dasan, and Aviram, and not touch anything of theirs, “lest they perish because of all their sins” (ibid. 16:26). 

Moshe announces that a test will be done to establish “that Hashem sent me to perform all these acts, that it was not from my heart.” If these men die a normal death, then Moshe’s status as shliach (messenger) of Hashem is a sham – but if Hashem miraculously causes the earth to swallow up these men and their possessions, “then it will be known that these men provoked Hashem” (ibid. 16:30). 

Immediately, “the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households, and all the people who were with Korach, and the entire wealth; they and all that was theirs descended alive to the pit; the earth covered them over and they were lost from the congregation” (ibid. 16:32-33). 

Bnei Yisrael flee, fearing that the earth will swallow them as well. 

The chapter ends with the fate of Korach’s group: “A flame came forth from Hashem and consumed the 250 men who were offering the incense” (ibid. 16:35).

Ambiguity in the Torah she'bi'Chsav’s Account

Notice anything? The pesukim never explicitly say what happened to Korach. In fact, there is a great deal of textual ambiguity. On the one hand, the pesukim imply that Korach was among “those wicked men” (ibid. 16:26) who were swallowed up with Dasan and Aviram. If Korach’s followers, household, and wealth were swallowed, it is certainly reasonable to assume that Korach himself was swallowed. On the other hand, the pesukim state that Korach was trying to prove that he deserved to be the kohen gadol, and Moshe’s whole test of offering the ketores was seemingly designed around Korach’s challenge. On that basis, it would be reasonable to assume that Korach was among the 250 men who offered the ketores and he was burned in the fire, like they were.

The three other accounts of the Korach Rebellion in Tanach only add layers to this ambiguity. Later on in Sefer Bamidbar (Parashas Pinchas) the Torah states: 

Dasan and Aviram [were the ones] who were summoned by the assembly, who contended against Moshe and Aharon among the assembly of Korach, when they contended against Hashem. Then the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and Korach with the death of the assembly, when the fire consumed the 250 men – and they became a sign. But the sons of Korach did not die (Bamidbar 26:9-11).

It seems clear from here that Korach did get swallowed up along with Dasan and Aviram, and was not burned in the fire with the 250 men. Yet, in Sefer Devarim, when Moshe lists the miraculous events that occurred in Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and in the Midbar (Wilderness), he says: 

[Remember] what He did to Dasan and Aviram, the sons of Eliav ben Reuven, when the earth opened its mouth wide and swallowed them, and their households, and their tents, and all the fortunes at their feet, in the midst of all Israel (Devarim 11:6).

No mention of Korach whatsoever. Similarly, when David ha’Melech is going over the miraculous events of Yetzias Mitzrayim and the Midbar in Sefer Tehilim, he writes:

They were jealous of Moshe in the camp, and of Aharon, Hashem’s holy one. The earth opened and swallowed Dasan, and covered over the company of Aviram. And a fire burned amid their company, a flame set the wicked ablaze (Tehilim 106:15-17).

Again, there is no mention of Korach being swallowed up in the earth – or being burned in the fire, for that matter. Only Dasan and Aviram are identified as being swallowed up, and the pasuk doesn’t specify which “wicked” people were burned. 

Chazal’s Answer

As we might expect, Chazal noted these difficulties and offered two possible answers to our question – neither of which is what we would expect. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 10a states:

… Rebbi Yochanan said: Korach was not among those who were swallowed [by the earth] NOR was he among those who were burned. He wasn’t among those who were swallowed, as it is written: “All of the people who belonged to Korach” – [which implies them] but not Korach. He wasn’t among those who were burned, as it was written: “when the fire consumed the 250 men” – [which implies that the fire consumed them] but not Korach. 

It was taught in a Braisa: Korach was among those who were burned AND he was among those who were swallowed. He was among those who were swallowed, as it is written: “and the earth swallowed them and Korach.” He was among those who were burned, as it is written: “a fire went forth from before Hashem and consumed the 250 men” – and Korach was with them [since he, too, was vying for the kehunah].

Neither R’ Yochanan nor the author of the Braisa maintain that Korach was only swallowed up or only burned. Either he was swallowed AND burned, or he was neither. 

A couple of factual loose ends remain. According to R’ Yochanan, how did Korach die? Rashi [1] explains:

he was not among those who were swallowed nor was he among those who were burned – rather, he died in the plague. 

According to Rashi, R’ Yochanan holds that Korach died in the plague described in the next chapter, in which 14,000 of Bnei Yisrael died as a punishment for complaining against Moshe and Aharon and accusing them of killing the 250 leaders who offered the incense. 

And according to the Braisa, how is it possible that Korach was burned to death AND swallowed alive? Rashi explains:

He was among those who were burned and he was among those who were swallowed – his soul was burned (i.e. the fire killed him) but his body was still intact, and afterwards [his body] rolled to the place of those who were swallowed, and it was swallowed, as it is written in Parashas Pinchas: “and it swallowed them, and Korach with them” … and Korach was with them. [the Braisa cites a proof] from that which was written: “and it consumed the 250 men who offered the incense” – and Korach was among those who offered the incense, as it is written: “250 fire-pans – and you, and Aharon, each man with his fire-pan.”

The Significance of this Machlokes

The very existence of this machlokes, combined with the fact that both views are defensible from a textual standpoint, indicates that nobody actually knows for sure what happened to Korach. Each of the sides is speculating and citing textual evidence for support. 

The question for us is: What is this machlokes really about? What is the crux of the machlokes? Surely R’ Yochanan and the author of the Braisa would concede that the text is ambiguous. That being said, what non-textual argument would each side bring to support his view? 

[Methodological reminder: this is a midrash we're dealing with here, and the purpose of midrashim is to teach ideas - not history. That's why we're interested in what we learn from this midrash rather than what actually happened.]

Maharal’s Explanation of the Braisa

The Maharal [2] provides a solid explanation of the Braisa:

It is important for you to know that Dasan and Aviram, who quarreled with Moshe, did not seek the kehunah at all; they were just sinful and evil men who wanted to quarrel with Moshe. 

However, the 250 men did seek the kehunah, as is clear from the pasuk: “the 250 men who offered incense.” Therefore, Dasan and Aviram were swallowed … but the 250 men were not swallowed, but burned … for this is what is befitting for someone who seeks [a position of] greatness and distinction which is not appropriate for him. Their intent was not for the sake of opposing [Moshe’s authority], but because they wanted the prominence and distinction of the kehunah. All of this is evident from the pesukim, and there is no need to go on at length about it. 

Korach was the cause of the quarrel [with Moshe] and he was the cause of the 250 men wanting the kehunah … in the Braisa it was taught that both [punishments befell] him, since both sins were found in him.

This explanation is quite intuitive. There were really two chataim (sins) here: quarreling with Moshe, and seeking the kehunah. Those who sinned by starting up with Moshe (i.e. Dasan and Aviram) were punished by being swallowed by the earth; those who sinned by illicitly offering the ketores because they wanted the kehunah (i.e. the 250 men) were punished by being burned; and since Korach led both groups, and partook of both chataim, he received both punishments. 

Maharal’s Explanation of R’ Yochanan

This leaves us with R’ Yochanan. Why, according to R’ Yochanan, should Korach have suffered neither punishment, and instead, died in the subsequent plague, along with the 14,000 other members of Bnei Yisrael who didn’t have an active role in either of the two groups of sinners? 

The Maharal offers an answer along the lines of his explanation of the Braisa:

If Korach had been swallowed, he wouldn’t have received the punishment that was befitting of the 250 men who sought the kehunah – and if he had been burned, he wouldn’t have received the punishment that was befitting for him because of his quarrel, for he did join with Dasan and Aviram. Therefore [R’ Yochanan] said that he wasn’t among those who were swallowed nor was he among those who were burned; instead, death [simply] came to him, and by dying a regular death, it was equal to both [of the other punishments].

According to the Maharal, since Korach was in an awkward position of deserving both punishments, he simply died, so as not to detract from either of the two punishments by subjecting him to the other one. 

Moreover, it would seem that unlike Rashi, who holds that Korach died in the plague sent by Hashem to kill Bnei Yisrael, the Maharal holds that he died a regular “natural” death. 

Difficulties with the Maharal’s Answer

In my humble opinion, this answer is difficult, and feels a bit forced – especially in light of the Braisa’s intuitive account. The punishment received by each group was midah kneged midah (measure for measure). The 250 men who brought a “strange fire” were burned in a fire sent by Hashem, “a God Who is like a consuming fire” (Devarim 4:42). According to the Abravanel [3], Dasan and Aviram’s punishment was midah kneged midah because “just as they opened their mouths without restraint to damage Moshe Rabbeinu’s authority and lower his status in the eyes of the nation, Hashem caused the earth to open its mouth and cause them to descend to the utmost depths.” 

Considering the educational midah kneged midah nature of these punishments, it doesn’t seem satisfying to say, “Korach deserved both punishments, but since he couldn’t get both, he just died a regular death.” 

Furthermore, the author of the Braisa would object to the premise of R’ Yochanan’s position, saying: “What do you mean ‘he couldn’t get both punishments’? Hashem burned his soul and then caused his body to be swallowed by the earth. What’s so difficult about that?”

Chasam Sofer’s Explanation of R’ Yochanan

The Chasam Sofer [4] offers a different explanation for R’ Yochanan, which hinges on an often overlooked aspect of Korach’s punishment that we glossed over in the pesukim:

… the earth opened its mouth and swallowed them and their households, and all the people who were with Korach, and the entire wealth; they and all that was theirs descended alive to the pit; the earth covered them over and they were lost from the congregation.

The Chasam Sofer writes:

Korach was one of the wealthiest people; everyone honored him, and the 250 princes of Israel followed after his counsel. But now, in a single moment, he found himself standing naked as the day he was born, deprived of all his tremendous wealth without a single thing remaining, for everything – even a sewing-needle – was swallowed in the earth, and all of his relatives and friends were either swallowed or burned; even his sons did teshuvah and distanced themselves from him. There is no greater degradation than this. Its taste is far more bitter than death, and worse than being swallowed or burned. 

According to the Chasam Sofer, Korach’s punishment was midah kneged midah. He sinned by staging a coup to seize the kehunah gedolah for the sake of personal glory, and he was punished by having every last vestige of personal glory taken away from him. This, to my mind, is a more satisfying explanation of R’ Yochanan’s view. 

The Crux of the Machlokes

In light of the Chasam Sofer’s explanation, it turns out that the machlokes is really more unified than it initially seemed. Both the Braisa and R’ Yochanan agree (a) that there were two groups of sinners, (b) that each group’s punishment was midah kneged midah, (c) that Korach was leading cause of both chataim, and (d) that Korach’s punishment was also midah kneged midah. 

The machlokes between the Braisa and R’ Yochanan centers on the question: As the cause of both chataim, what form would Korach’s midah kneged midah punishment take? 

According to the Braisa, Korach simply received both midah kneged midah punishments. In contrast, R’ Yochanan maintained that the combination of these two midah kneged midah punishments would result in some deficiency – either because the message would be diluted, as the Maharal implied with his explanation, or because Korach’s sin as the leader was more severe than that of his followers, or because there was some superadded element within Korach’s sin which was not present in either of the two groups of his followers. Either way, Korach’s midah kneged midah punishment took on a form specific to him – one which singled him out from both groups, removed him from the community at large, and most importantly, stripped him of all the glory and power he so desperately sought, leaving him with absolutely nothing – “a fate worse than death” for a man of Korach’s ambitions.

Conclusion

That’s all I’ve got at this point. Perhaps someone can sharpen the definition of the machlokes. 

Either way, I think this is a great example of how we shouldn’t rely on our “elementary school level” recollection of the classic episodes in Torah, but should always read the text with fresh eyes and a fresh mind – and when we find “new” problems, we should search for answers and insights from the baalei Mesorah who preceded us and blazed these trails of understanding.

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sanhedrin 110a

[2] Rav Judah Loew ben Bezalel, Chidushei Agados l’Maharal on Sanhedrin 110a

[3] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Bamidbar 16:30

[4] Rav Moshe Schreiber, Toras Moshe: Parashas Korach, cited in Daf al Daf to Sanhedrin 110a