Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

In truth this is more of a dvar Torah on Parashas Nitzavim. I was going to save this for Parashas Nitzavim itself, but that time of year is usually occupied with other important ideas to write about, so I decided to go for it this week. 

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Artwork: Spectral Gateguards, by Wayne England

Parashas Vaeschanan: Which Souls Were at Sinai?

The Impetus for This Post

Earlier this week I participated in a Facebook discussion on the various forms of subtle discrimination against geirim (converts) which persist in the Jewish community. I mentioned that one of my personal pet peeves is when born-Jews hear that I am a ger and say something like, "Your neshamah (soul) was definitely at Sinai!" I casually remarked that I don't believe in "Jewish souls" (a topic I intend to write about next week), and even if I did, I don't believe that the souls of geirim were present at Maamad Har Sinai (the Revelation at Sinai).

In response to this statement someone asked, "So you don't believe that your soul was at Mt. Sinai with all the other Jewish souls (including those of geirim), when the Torah was given?" to which I replied with an emphatic: "No - nor do I believe that the souls of all Jews were at Sinai."

That's when I decided to write a blog post on this topic. 

Souls at Sinai

In Parashas Nitzavim the Torah says: 

"Not with you alone do I seal this covenant and this imprecation, but with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." (Devarim 29:13-14)

The Abravanel [1] raises a major question:

Who gave the Dor ha'Midbar (Generation of the Wilderness), who stood at Har Sinai, the power to obligate their children who would come after them by saying, "naaseh v'nishmah - we will do and we will obey" (Shemos 24:7), thereby causing [their offspring] to enter into the covenant with Hashem and making them swear upon their souls that they would not violate it forever, to the point where they obligated them in all the words of the Torah and the covenant which they sealed, and to punish their offspring after them?

My students often ask this question in a slightly different way: "Why don't we get a choice whether or not to be Jewish? How is it fair that our ancestors accepted the Torah for us?"

We will not take up the Abravanel's answer to this question in this post. My apologies for those who were interested in what he has to say. The only reason I brought up the Abravanel's question is so that I can quote his refutation of the incorrect answer he's heard. He writes: 

It is not proper to allow ourselves to be appeased by what the Early Sages (of blessed memory) said, that all of the souls who would ever exist until the end of all generations  - all of them were at Sinai, and all of them affirmed and accepted this covenant [upon themselves] with an imprecation and an oath. 

Why doesn't the Abravanel accept Chazal's answer at face value? He explains:

It is difficult for the intellect to believe this. How could there be souls [that were present at Sinai] without bodies? Mitzvos are only obligatory upon a soul combined with a body, which we refer to as "man," as it is stated: "that man should do [the mitzvos] and live by them" (Vayikra 18:5). And the dead are free [from obligation in mitzvos], because when their souls separate from their bodies, they are no longer "man." Moreover, mitzvos are a chovas ha'guf (obligation that is incumbent upon the person himself), and we cannot obligate someone who isn't present. 

It's also not enough to answer like the one who says that this group of 600,000 people included all [possible] forms and appearances and all possible [personality] dispositions, and from that point and onward, it is impossible to find a person in the latter generations whose appearance and form were not present [at Sinai] in body and in soul. This would not explain how any man could have sworn an oath at Har Sinai. 

It is difficult for the intellect to accept [these answers], and they are conceptually and inherently weak.

Undoubtedly, the Abravanel's dismantling of this answer will be jaw-dropping for those who have been raised to take this midrash literally. This is a great example of how quick people are to unthinkingly embrace midrashic explanations which cater to the imagination. The difficulties raised by the Abravanel are obvious: How can souls be "present" without bodies? How can a bodiless soul accept mitzvos which were given to human beings? How could such an oath be halachically binding? Yet, these questions don't even occur to most people because the notion of all Jewish souls gathered at Sinai - past, present, and future - is so emotionally appealing.

Before we attempt to figure out what Chazal meant, let's review the major sources inside.

The Midrashim

As far as I can tell, there are three major sources of the notion that "all Jews were at Sinai" in the classic midrashic literature. The first two sources are very similar, and will be examined as one; the third midrash has a different focus, and will be addressed later.

The first source can be found in Shemos Rabbah 28:6:

"And God spoke all of these words, saying etc." (Shemos 20:1). R' Yitzchak said: Everything that neviim (prophets) would prophesy in future generations was received at Har Sinai, for Moshe said to Israel: "with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today." It does not say "whoever is not standing here with us today," but "whoever is not with us today." These are the souls that would be created in the future, which do not have substance, and therefore cannot be said to "stand." Even though they were not present at that time, each and every one of them received what was his ... and even the chachamim (wise men) in each and every generation received what was his at Sinai.

A cursory reading might lead one to jump to conclusions: "Ha! You see? Even those souls who were yet to be created were present at Sinai, even though they didn't have bodies!" But upon careful reading we see that Chazal make a distinction: these unborn souls "were not present at that time," and yet, "each and every one of them received what was his" - just as all future neviim received their prophecies, and just as all future chachamim received their wisdom. This needs to be understood. What do Chazal mean? You're telling me that all nevuah and all chochmah was given at Sinai?

To further complicate things, there's a sparser version of this midrash in Midrash Tanchuma (Nitzavim 8) which states:

"not with you alone (Devarim 29:13) - but even the future generations to come were present [at Sinai], as it is stated, "with whoever is here, standing with us ... and with whoever is not here with us today." Why did it say "whoever is here" and "whoever is not here"? Because all souls were there, but the body [corresponding to each soul] had not yet been created; therefore, it didn't say "standing."

This is probably the source that the Abravanel was referring to, since it mentions the issue of souls without bodies. And this midrash explicitly states that all future souls were actually present at Sinai, without bodies.

Nevertheless, we see that this didn't stop the Abravanel from disagreeing. He didn't accept this midrash at face value, due to the difficulties he enumerated.

The question for us is: What do these midrashim mean? Unless you believe that unborn souls can float around at Har Sinai, accept mitzvos, and enter into legally binding oaths and covenants, then what idea are Chazal teaching us in these cryptic statements?

The Idea

I discussed this question with my Mishlei rebbi this morning. He said he'd have to think about it some more, but he gave me his first impression. He suggested that Chazal are teaching a fundamental idea: the basis for our acceptance of the Torah is the Revelation at Sinai, and this basis is open and accessible to all human beings. When Hashem told Moshe: "Behold! I will come to you in the thickness of the cloud, so that the people will hear as I speak to you, and they will also believe in you forever" (Shemos 19:9), He was acknowledging that the Revelation at Sinai would serve as a rational basis for accepting nevuas Moshe (Mosaic prophecy) for all people, in all future generations.

At first I dismissed this interpretation as being overly simple. I thought: "Really? These midrashim are just telling us that Sinai is for everyone? That's it?"

But then I realized the profound implications of this idea. In other religions, the basis of acceptance is only accessible to a select group. In some cases it is the individual priests or prophets who have a special relationship with the god(s) or spirits, and the average person can only connect to the divine through these elite leaders. In other cases the average person must undergo a special "spiritual experience" or attain a transcendental state to establish a foundation for their faith. 

In Judaism, however, the basis of our acceptance is open to everyone with a tzelem Elokim (intellect). There is no special spiritual experience, no listening to mystical inner voices, and no blind faith or divine grace - just the human mind. Using the same criteria by which we evaluate all secondhand knowledge and all historical events, we can rationally demonstrate the historicity of the Revelation at Sinai - and with it, all the contents of Torah.

This also explains what the midrash means when it says that all prophecies of the neviim and all wisdom of the chachamim was given at Sinai. The Rambam [2] and the Ramban [3] explain at length that the only reason we accept other people as neviim is because of the criteria spelled out in the Torah. In other words, we only accept someone as a navi because of the Revelation at Sinai. It is in this sense that all nevuah was "given" at Sinai, since Sinai is the only reason we accept any subsequent nevuah.

So too, the chochmas ha'Torah (Torah wisdom) that our chachamim possess is predicated upon the acceptance of the Revelation at Sinai. When the midrash says "chochmah" it's not talking about the type of chochmah that can be derived outside of Torah - as Chazal say: "If someone tells you that there is chochmah among the goyim, believe him" (Eichah Rabbah 2:13). Rather, the "chochmah" that our midrash is referring to is specifically chochmas ha'Torah, which we only accept because of Sinai. 

This also explains the midrashic sources which use our pasuk in Nitzavim to explain the inclusion of geirim in the acceptance of Torah. For example, the Tosefta (Sotah 7:5) says:

We only [have a proof that] "you [Jews]" accepted Torah. How do we know that the generations that will come after you and convert are also included? Because it is stated: "Not with you alone [do I seal this covenant]" but "with whoever is not here with us today."

One can imagine a religion in which native born Jews are considered to have a special connection to Hashem because their ancestors stood at Sinai, but geirim are relegated to a lower status. That is not how our religion works. When it comes to the Revelation at Sinai and the acceptance of the Covenant, the Jew and the ger are on equal footing.

While this doesn't answer the Abravanel's question about how our ancestors could have accepted the Torah to obligate future generations, it does provide a good explanation for the notion that "all future generations of Jews were present at Maamad Har Sinai."

Snake at Sinai

Another midrash about who was present at Sinai appears in several places in the writings of Chazal (Yevamos 103b, Avodah Zarah 22b, Yalkut Shimoni Bereishis 28, and more). The most complete version can be found in Shabbos 145b-146a:

Why are idolaters mezuhamim (lustful / sexually unrestrained)? Because they didn't stand at Har Sinai, for at the time that the nachash (snake) approached Chava it injected zuhamah (lustfulness / lack of sexual restraint) into her. As for the Jews who stood at Sinai - their zuhamah departed; as for the idolaters who did not stand at Sinai - their zuhamah did not depart. Rav Acha the son of Rava asked Rav Ashi: "What about the geirim?" He responded: "Even though they weren't there, their mazalos (lit. "constellations" or "natural forces") were there, as it is written: 'with whoever is here, standing with us today before Hashem, our God, and with whoever is not here with us today' (Devarim 29:14)."

Note that this midrash differentiates between Jews who WERE at Sinai (or whose ancestors were at Sinai), and geirim, who were NOT at Sinai. If it were true that geirim have Jewish souls, or that the souls of geirim were at Sinai, then the midrash wouldn't need to say that the mazalos of geirim were at Sinai (whatever that means). Either the Gemara wouldn't have mentioned geirim at all (since they would be included with the rest of the Jews), or it would have simply said that the neshamos (souls) of geirim were at Sinai.

The interesting thing about this midrash is that it isn't dealing with the topic of kabbalas ha'mitzvos (acceptance of the commandments), or Hashem's covenant with the Jews. Rather, the midrash is dealing with the difference in dispositions between Jews and idolaters insofar as sexual immorality is concerned. The version of this midrash in Avodah Zarah 22b follows it up by listing deviant sexual practices which were common among idolaters but not found among the Jewish people. It is in this context that the Gemara raises the question about geirim: What about people who descended from idolaters, but have joined the Jewish people? Do they partake of this strain of zuhamah or not - and if not, then how did they remove it? What idea is this midrash teaching us?

The premise of this midrash is that zuhamah has been a part of human nature ever since the cheit of Adam and Chava. [4] When the midrash says that the nachash injected zuhamah into Chava, this is a reference to the transformation of human nature which occurred as a result of the cheit (sin), as I wrote about in Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av. As a result of this transformation, human beings became encumbered by an overpowering sexual taavah (lust), which was strengthened by the desires and fantasies that resulted from the cheit. 

On the basis of this understanding, a friend of mine suggested the following interpretation:

Jews have an inherent edge over non-Jews in controlling taavah because of the impact Torah has on our lives by bringing us an awareness of God (I think that's what it means "who stood at Har Sinai"). The Gemara is trying to figure out how it is possible that geirim even exist. How is it possible that some people are drawn to Torah without having the structure of Torah built into the fabric of their family lives (i.e. Mesorah) like we do?

The answer to this question must be that God made it that even non-Jews were endowed with a faculty that can be attracted to truth. So although they didn't "stand at Har Sinai" themselves and are not the direct beneficiaries of a built in system of Torah, they were given a faculty that has the potential to be attracted to Torah. Maybe that's it means that their mazal was there - mazal as in constellation/nature.

I don't know whether this is a valid interpretation of "mazal" (since I understood "mazal" to refer to specific external conditions which affect human behavior, rather than the nature of man as a tzelem Elokim), but I definitely like the approach.

Conclusion

The misguided belief that "all Jewish souls - even the souls of geirim - were at Sinai" is as prevalent (if not more prevalent) than knowledge of what the pesukim say happened at Sinai. I find this to be very sad. This belief perpetuates false ideas about the soul, solidifies harmful prejudices against geirim, and sets students up for midrashic betrayal. Worst of all, it dilutes the potency of Maamad Har Sinai by infusing the Torah's historical account with a mythological aura. The more the popular conception of Maamad Har Sinai deviates from the account stated in the pesukim, the more endangered the proof of Torah mi'Sinai becomes.

Some popular midrashim do little harm, and should be left alone. Not this one. Even if we don't understand what Chazal were teaching in these midrashim, the Abravanel's objections should be popularized to counteract the prevailing view.

[1] Don Yitzchak Abravanel, Commentary on Sefer Devarim: Questions on Parashas Nitzavim

[2] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah Chapter 8

[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 13:2-4

[4] It is interesting to note that according to this midrash, the zuhamah was injected into Adam and Chava before she ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad. This fits in with our understanding of the cheit, and how it affected mankind.

Mishlei 19:18 - Childish Parenting (and a Teaching Tip)

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Childish Parenting (and a Teaching Tip)

משלי יט:יח

יַסֵּר בִּנְךָ כִּי יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה, וְאֶל הֲמִיתוֹ אַל תִּשָּׂא נַפְשֶׁךָ:

Mishlei 19:18

Discipline your son, for there is hope; do not let yourself be swayed by his protest. 

This pasuk and its questions are fairly straightforward:

(1) Why does the reader of this pasuk need to be told "for there is hope"? Why would he or she think that there is no hope?  

(2) Similarly, why does this parent need to be told "do not let yourself be swayed by his protest"? Why would he or she be swayed by the child's protest? 

(3) What is the unifying idea of this pasuk? It is clear that the subject of our pasuk has something to do with the reasons why parents are reluctant to discipline their children. But are these to be understood as two "random" reasons why a parent might refrain from disciplining his or her child, or is there a more specific subject which dictates Shlomo ha'Melech's selection of specifically these two reasons? 

[Thinking time! There's a unique challenge presented by pesukim which seem obvious. It takes a certain amount of intellectual dexterity to see past the simplistic, surface-level message of the pasuk to uncover the deeper idea.]

Here's my four-sentence summary of the main idea:

There are only two reasons why parents who desire to discipline their children refrain from doing so: (1) the feeling that the child is already set in his or her ways, and there is no hope that he or she will change; (2) the negative feelings triggered by the prospect of causing pain and suffering to the child - especially when the protests and cries. Both deterrents stem from an extremely short-sighted – and therefore, childish – perspective. In truth, a young child is not set in his or her ways, and there is still hope that he or she can change, although things might seem hopeless at the present; the child’s behavior and personality can still be influenced in the long-run by the parent’s discipline or lack thereof, for better or for worse. The parent’s decision to discipline or not discipline the child should be based on the long-term benefits and consequences – not on the emotional state or reactions of the child at the present, since children are, by nature, immature, shortsighted, and resistant to any form of discipline which involves immediate pain and conflict; to cater to the child’s short-term perspective will only hinder his or her development and emotional maturation.

I am convinced of the truth of this interpretation, with the exception of one word: "only." If I omitted that word from my summary (i.e. "Two of the reasons why parents refrain from disciplining their children are etc."), I don't see how anyone could object to the idea. That being said, why did I choose to jeopardize my explanation by qualifying it with the word "only"?

I have two responses to this question. The first is that I was compelled to add the qualifier of "only" by Question #3. To my mind, if there were many reasons why a well-meaning parent would refrain from disciplining his or her child, then why would Shlomo ha'Melech focus only on these two? I find it intuitively dissatisfying to say, "He just chose these two as examples out of many candidates" or even "He thinks these are the two major reasons, but he would agree that there are others" To my mind, this type of explanation would dilute the chidush (novelty) quality of the main idea.

The second reason why I prefer the riskier "only" interpretation over the "safer," more open-ended explanation has more to do with my approach as a teacher of Mishlei than as a student of Mishlei. Consider how these two possible explanations of this pasuk would play out in a Mishlei class. If I taught my students that Shlomo ha'Melech was giving us two out of many rationalizations that parents use to justify their decision to not discipline their children, then it would be very easy for my students to nod their heads, accept this interpretation, and move on.

By qualifying my explanation with the word "only," this transforms my interpretation of the pasuk into a challenge. Now my students will be driven to debate the merits of the universal theory that I am claiming Shlomo ha'Melech held - something they couldn't do if we assumed that Shlomo ha'Melech was just giving us an idea about particulars. Now a student might object to my explanation, saying, "Wait a minute. What if a mother refrains from disciplining her son because her mother objects to this discipline! That doesn't fit into either of your two categories!" Another student might defend this by saying, "Maybe the 'do not let yourself be swayed by his protest' is actually a broader category, which includes anyone's protest - not just the child's." A third student might ask: "But what about a case in which a father is afraid to discipline his daughter because he has a meek, non-confrontational personality in general? That doesn't fit into either of your two categories either!" to which a fourth student might point out: "In that case, the obstacle is not the parent's belief that the child can't change, but rather, it is the parent's belief that his own personality can't be changed. Both stem from a stubborn view of the immutability of human nature."

As you can see, this type of discussion would lead to a deeper analysis of the subject than we would have reached through the more conservative explanation. Is it possible that my interpretation is wrong? Yes. And am I increasing my chances of being disproven by my students? Certainly. But will the students learn more if I give my more tentative explanation? OH YEAH!

I picked up this teaching tip from my Gemara rebbi. He once told us that he would prefer to give an inferior sevara (conceptual theory) in shiur (class) if that sevara would yield a greater benefit to his students in terms of methodology - even if he would have to retract that sevara later on. The same is true in my Mishlei class: sometimes I will take an approach that is more speculative and less certain if I know that it will lead to more depth, more discussion, more methodology, or more benefit of any kind. And sometimes I won't take such an approach due to the downsides of teaching a less-than-perfect idea to my students. Each situation is different.

Anyway, I thought this pasuk would be a good opportunity to share this methodology point. 

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

This post is a sequel to yesterday's post: Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and our Shame. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Artwork: Grove of the Burnwillows, by Cliff Childs

Tishah b'Av 5777: Adam ha'Rishon and Tishah b'Av

Review of Yesterday's Blog Post

In yesterday's post we attempted to understand Kinah #19, which is based on the pasuk: "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah (righteousness) and ours is the boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness)" (Daniel 9:7). 

First we defined the central terms of tzedakah and boshes ha'panim. "Tzedakah" refers to "providing a creature with its needs" and boshes ha'panim refers to the type of self-reflective shame which stems from a recognition of how foolishly we have acted. 

We explained the implication of saying that tzedakah "belongs" to Hashem. As the Creator, Hashem's tzedakah is fundamentally different from human tzedakah: He created all creatures, all resources, and determined how their needs are met, whereas we humans merely allocate the resources that Hashem created. We explained that our boshes ha'panim "belongs" to us because it is the result of our free will, which is caused entirely by ourselves. 

Lastly, we explained the theme of the kinah in light of this understanding. Throughout the history of Bnei Yisrael, Hashem has repeatedly provided us with tools and situations designed to facilitate our metaphysical development into a mamleches kohanim v'goy kadosh ("a kingdom of priests and a holy nation"). Not only have we neglected to avail ourselves of this divine assistance, but we have fled in the opposite direction - towards our detriment, rather than our betterment.

In today's blog post I would like to explore another way to learn our kinah - one which is far more speculative. There are two possibilities: either this idea is actually a deeper explanation of our kinah, or it has nothing to do with the kinah per se, but nevertheless provides a deeper insight into the events of Tishah b'Av as a whole. 

Alternative Approach to Question #4: Shamefacedness Belongs to Us

We asked the question: What does it mean that boshes ha'panim belongs to us? In what sense is boshes ha'panim uniquely ours? We answered this question by saying that since boshes ha'panim stems from our exercise of free will, and since free will is entirely self-caused, then the boshes ha'panim belongs exclusively to us, and cannot be attributed to Hashem in any way.

But there is another answer: boshes ha'panim was not part of Hashem's initial plan for creation, but only came about as a result of man. Before the cheit of Adam and Chava, human beings were incapable of feeling bushah (shame), as it is stated: "The two of them were naked, the man and his wife, and they were not ashamed" (Bereishis 2:25). But immediately after the cheit: "The eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked; and they sewed together a fig leaf and made for themselves aprons" (ibid. 3:7). 

It is in this sense that boshes ha'panim "belongs" to human beings. If Hashem "had His way" (so to speak), there would be no phenomenon of bushah and no condition of boshes ha'panim. We caused shamefacedness to come into being, and this is why it is "ours." 

The Nature of Bushah

In order to grasp the implications of this concept, we need to understand what it means to live in the post-cheit world of bushah. What is the difference between man before the cheit and man after the cheit?

Needless to say, this is a huge topic. We will only delve into it in order to answer the question stated above. The Rambam provides a full explanation of this in the second chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed, which we will now cite - but we will focus specifically on his explanation of bushah. 

The Rambam begins with a question that was posed to him:

Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance. The problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention … 

The objector said: “It would appear at first sight from the plain meaning of Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation – which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil – but that Adam’s disobedience to the command of God caused him to acquire that great perfection which is the uniqueness of man, that is, the power of distinguishing between good and evil – the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the bestowal of a perfection to which he had not attained previously, namely, the perfection of intellect. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.” Such was the intent and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. 

The question was: How can the Torah say that man lacked knowledge, then disobeyed God, and was granted intellect as a "punishment"? Isn't this the greatest reward?

Now mark our reply, which was as follows … The intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Torah states that “man was created in the form and like the likeness of God” (Bereishis 1:22). On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed and commanded by God, as it is said: “And Hashem-Elokim commanded Adam” (ibid. 2:16) – for no commandments are given to the animals or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. However, the terms “good” and “bad” are terms used in the study of subjective values, not in that of objective truths. For it is not correct to say in reference to the proposition “the heavens are spherical,” that it is “good” or to declare the assertion that “the earth is flat” to be “bad,” but we say of the one “it is true,” of the other “it is false.” Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emes and sheker, and of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tov and ra. It is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false – a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. 

When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason – on account of which it is said: “Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels” (Tehillim 8:6) – he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of subjective values, to the extent that the most obviously inappropriate thing – that is, to appear in a state of nudity – was not considered inappropriate; he could not comprehend why it should be so. 

After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give in to the desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said, “And the woman saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes” (Bereishis 3:6), he consequently lost part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on account of his reason; and, having obtained knowledge of the subjective values, he become wholly absorbed in the study of what is “good” and “bad.” Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. 

Hence we read, “And you shall be like elohim, knowing good and bad,” and not “knowing” or “discerning the true and the false,” for in objective truths we can only apply the words “true and false,” but never “good and bad.” Furthermore observe the passage, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked” (ibid. 3:7): it is not said, “And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw,” for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as bad … 

In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise. This was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and fantasies, as we have already stated above, and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labor, as it is said, “Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee” (ibid. 3:18), “By the sweat of thy brow,” etc., and in explanation of this the text continues, “And Hashem-Elokim drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken.” He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: “Thou shalt eat the grass of the field” (ibid.). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says, “Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast” (Tehillim 49:19). May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed.

To summarize: before the cheit, man possessed a fully functioning intellect and operated totally within the world of objective truth (emes and sheker). He wasn't able to comprehend good and bad as subjective values (e.g. "and the woman saw that the tree was good for eating, and desirable to the eyes, and delightful as a means of intelligence"), but only as objective reality ("And God saw all that He had made, and behold! it was very good" e.g. "it is not good for man to be alone"). 

After the cheit, when man "followed his desires and fantasies," he became steeped in the world subjective values (tov and ra) which his mind imposed upon objective reality. It is no longer possible to simply know objective reality and seek out objective good and avoid objective bad. Instead, we must continually contend with our conscience, which labels things as "good" and "bad" based on its own set of criteria (desires, fantasies, upbringing, society, etc.). Since these labels do not necessarily correspond to reality, we must sift through them and sort out whether what we feel is good actually is good and whether what we feel is bad actually is bad. The conscience serves a valuable purpose of keeping the instinctual part of the yetzer ha'ra in check, but it also interferes with our perception of reality, which leads to a host of problems.

Although the post-cheit transformation of human nature has a far-reaching impact on all of our knowledge and all of our emotions, the Torah expressed this entire change by focusing on one emotion: bushah. When the Torah says "the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized that they were naked," this is a shorthand way of saying all of the concepts the Rambam taught us about how the conscience affected our view of reality.

Before the cheit Adam and Chava were not ashamed of their nakedness. Why would they be? From an emes and sheker objective reality standpoint, there is nothing wrong with nakedness. Animals are naked and engage in reproduction to perpetuate their species, and humans should be no different. But after the cheit, when man's view of reality became clouded by the veils of his many desires, fantasies and imperfections, nudity became a source of shame, due to its association all of the strong desires and fantasies associated with sex. In a tov and ra framework, nudity is "bad," and therefore, shameful.

In this vein, when we say "ours is the boshes ha'panim" we are alluding to the fact that we live in a world of bushah, in which our perception of objective reality is warped by our subjective values, and that this is entirely our fault. Hashem created us without bushah, but we - through our cheit - brought the bushah upon ourselves.

Alternative Answer to Question #5: Hashem's Tzedakah vs. Our Shame

Rather than focusing on Hashem's acts of tzedakah in providing Bnei Yisrael with developmental tools and the boshes ha'panim of our free-will decisions to reject this tzedakah, we can now suggest a different theme. The subject of this kinah is the contrast between the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah - which was intended to help Bnei Yisrael develop as a nation - and Bnei Yisrael's rejection of that tzedakah due to their corrupt subjective values. The boshes ha'panim refers to our recognition of how foolish we were to get caught up in our subjective worldview to the extent that we squandered all of the opportunities that Hashem gave us, for our benefit.

According to this approach, the emphasis of this kinah is not on the outcomes of Bnei Yisrael's behavior (i.e. national development vs. national regression) but on the causes of their transgressions (i.e. instead of recognizing the objective reality of Hashem's tzedakah and taking advantage of it, we turned away from that objective reality in our pursuit of subjective good and bad). 

Let's look at a few examples of the kinah in light of this new approach: 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because God went out to redeem us as a people unto Himself; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because they [our forefathers] rebelled on the shore of the Sea of Reeds, the nation sinning against its God. 

As we recall every Pesach, Hashem redeemed us from physical and intellectual servitude. He saved us from the harsh and bitter slavery and granted us bodily freedom. He saved us from being enslaved to the avodah zarah (idolatry) of Egypt - which was built on falsehood, and fueled by fears and fantasies - and brought us to the das ha'emes ("religion of reality"). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond at the Sea of Reeds? By denying the redemptive nature of our liberation and yearning to return to Egyptian servitude: "What is it that you have done to us to take us out of Egypt? Is this not the statement that we made to you in Egypt, saying: 'Let us be, and we will serve Egypt' - for it is better that we should serve Egypt than that we should die in this wilderness!" (Shemos 14:11-12). So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we accused our Redeemer of bringing us from a better condition to a worse one. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You feed us [the mahn] that tasted like dough fried in honey; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because on the day [we made the Golden Calf], we brought it an offering of fine flour with oil and honey. 

Not only did Hashem miraculously provide sustenance for us in the Midbar (Wilderness), but He did so in a manner that satisfied our psychological need to enjoy our food. Moreover, He provided our food in a way that trained us in a lifestyle of kedushah (the ability to rise above our animalistic nature). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By making avodah zarah and attempting to appease it with offerings corresponding to our own palate. So distorted was our view of tov and ra that we turned away from the True God who fed us daily and served a god who was the product of our own psyche. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of [how You waged war for us with] Sichon and God and all the kings of Canaan; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Achan who appropriated for himself from the forbidden loot [of Jericho] and found no excuse [for his crime]. 

Hashem helped the small nation of former slaves defeat the mighty kings and armies of Canaan. The odds were against us, but Hashem waged war for us. All we had to do was follow Yehoshua's instructions not to take any of the spoils, which were to be consecrated for Hashem. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By lusting after "a lovely Babylonian garment" (Yehoshua 7:21) and some silver and gold. So distorted was Achan's view of tov and ra that he prioritized riches over the lives of his Jewish brethren. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

The other stanzas can be learned in a similar fashion. This approach compliments, rather than contradicts, our last approach. I believe that it also yields a greater insight into the underlying causes of these chataim, and puts us in a better position to do teshuvah.

Support for this Approach

After this approach occurred to me I was bothered by a nagging doubt. I wondered: "Maybe I've taken this too far. After all, Tishah b'Av is entirely about the Jewish people - not humanity as a whole. Why am I going all the way back to Adam ha'Rishon, who predated even the Avos? Our kinah doesn't even mention Adam ha'Rishon! It may be true that the cheit of Adam and Chava was historically where boshes ha'panim came from, but should our explanation of this kinah rely so heavily on an understanding of the bushah that resulted from the cheit of Adam and Chava? That seems like a real stretch."

I decided to see if I could find any support in the mesorah for this thematic connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the cheit of Bnei Yisrael. I figured that if I was making a valid connection between the cheit of Adam and Chava and the chataim of Bnei Yisrael, then surely someone would have mentioned it.

Eventually I stumbled upon a lead. The first half of the first pask in Eichah reads: "Eichah! The city sits in solitude. The one that was great with people has become like a widow" (Eichah 1:1). The Targum [1], which weaves midrashim into the translation of the text, "translates" this pasuk as follows: 

How can it have been decreed upon Yerushalayim and upon the congregation to be punished with exile and to eulogize them with, "Eichah" - just as Adam and Chava were judged and kicked out of Gan Eden, and ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu eulogized them with, "Eichah"?

"Hmm," I thought, "interesting that the Targum midrashically associates the sin and punishment of Yerushalayim with the sin and punishment of Adam and Chava." But I still wasn't convinced that had a real support for my approach .... until I stumbled upon a midrash in Eichah Rabbah.

First, a little bit of background. The authors of the midrashim didn't limit themselves to offering midrashic explanations on individual pesukim. Additionally, they gave "pesichtos" ("proems" or "prefatory midrashic explanations") on the entire sefer. These pesichtos usually take the form of drashos on pesukim from other sefarim, which the authors use to develop an idea or theme that is intended to serve as a framework for reading the entire sefer at hand. 

The following midrash is a pesichta on Megilas Eichah. It was intended to provide an approach for understanding the entire sefer. Here is what the midrash says:

R' Abahu began [his discussion of Eichah by citing the pasuk:] "They are like a man (k'adam) who has broken a covenant" (Hoshea 6:7). [R' Abahu expounded:] This refers to Adam ha'Rishon. Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu said, "I brought him into the Gan Eden, I commended him, he violated My commandment, and I sentenced him to being cast out and sent out, and I lamented over him, "Eichah."  

[R' Abahu then cites Scriptural evidence for each of these claims:] "I brought him into Gan Eden, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim took the man and placed him in Gan Eden' (Bereishis 2:15), and He commanded him, as it is stated: 'Hashem-Elokim commanded the man, saying, "From every tree of the garden [you may freely eat, but of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad you must not eat from]"' (ibid. 2:16-17), and he violated His commandment, as it is stated: 'Have you eaten of the tree from which I commanded [you not to eat]?' (ibid. 3:11), and I sentenced him to being cast out, as it is stated: 'He cast out the man' (ibid. 3:24), and I sentenced him to being sent out, 'Hashem sent them out from Gan Eden' (ibid. 3:23), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them, as it is stated: 'And He said to him, 'Where are you? (אַיֶּכָּה)'  (ibid. 3:9) - which is written as 'Eichah?' (אֵיכָה). 

"The same [happened] with the children [of Adam ha'Rishon:] I brought them into Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: 'I brought them into a fruitful land' (Yirmiyahu 2:7), and I commanded them, as it is stated: 'Command Bnei Yisrael' (Vayikra 24:2), and they violated My commandment, as it is stated: 'All of Israel violated Your Torah' (Daniel 9:11), and I sentenced them to being cast out, 'I will cast them out from My house' (Hoshea 9:15), and I sentenced them with being sent out, as it is stated: 'Send [them] away from My presence, ad let them go!' (Yirmiyahu 15:1), and I lamented 'Eichah?' over them: 'How can she sit in solitude' (Eichah 1:1)."

To my mind, THIS is a proof that my approach has merit - if not in relation to Kinah #19, then certainly for understanding the destruction of the Beis ha'Mikdash. According to R' Abahu, Eichah should be read with the comparison between Adam's cheit and Bnei Yisrael's cheit at the forefront of our minds.

When we think about it, this fits in perfectly with our understanding of the kinah. Hashem's placement of Adam ha'Rishon in Gan Eden was an act of tzedakah. Adam was given everything he needed: delicious and abundant fruit to eat, a natural world rich with chochmah to learn, a wife for companionship (and procreation), a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a mitzvah to keep them on the right path. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra, Adam and Chava lost that beneficial tzedakah-setup, and were exiled into a world in which developing their tzelem Elokim would be an uphill battle.

So too, Bnei Yisrael were given everything they needed: a fruitful land to supply their physical needs, a Torah rich with chochmah to learn, a nation descended from the Avos with whom to build a society, a task with which they were charged to improve the world, and a regimen of 613 mitzvos to develop their tzelem Elokim to its greatest potential. But by giving in to the world of subjective tov and ra time after time after time - as detailed by the paytan in our kinah - we lost our Beis ha'Mikdash and were exiled out of our Land into a world in which developing our tzelem Elokim is an extremely difficult uphill battle.

Still, what do we gain from this comparison? Why did R' Abahu feel the need to frame Bnei Yisrael as Bnei Adam ha'Rishon in order to understand Eichah? What do we gain from reading the kinah from this perspective?

I'd like to suggest one possible answer. There are innumerable benefits of the Torah regimen, and there is no question that we desperately need it. However, there are also challenges that come from the fact that the Torah is a regimen. One of these challenges is "losing sight of the forest for the trees" - namely, getting so caught up in the details of the regimen that we forget the purpose of the regimen.

It isn't enough to ask ourselves, "What aveiros (transgressions) have we done, and how can we meet the halachic standards that are expected of us?" This type of teshuvah may be beneficial, but it stops short of the essence. Full teshuvah requires us to examine and correct the distorted subjective views of tov and ra which led us to sin in the first place. In other words, we must approach teshuvah not only from the perspective of Torah, but from the perspective of Adam ha'Rishon.

For example, if a person decides to do teshuvah on speaking lashon ha'ra, it's not enough to inquire, "What are the halachos of lashon ha'ra and what steps can I take to stop myself from speaking it?" This type of teshuvah is lacking because it doesn't even touch the underlying values of tov and ra which lead us to speak lashon ha'ra in the first place. It addresses the symptoms, but not the causes. Instead, one must ask, "What warped notion of tov and ra leads me to believe that engaging in malicious speech about my fellow Jew is not ra? What messed up ideas of tov and ra do I have which allows me to excuse my own lashon ha'ra but condemn the lashon ha'ra that is spoken about me? Why do I believe that public opinion matters at all? Why do I think it's okay to use another human being as a source of amusement in conversation at his expense?"

R' Abahu frames the tragedy of the churban as a repetition of the tragedy of Gan Eden in order to help us realize that Bnei Yisrael's sins stemmed from a more underlying problem: their subjective values of tov and ra. It is only from this perspective that we, as a nation, can do complete teshuvah and merit the ultimate redemption.

Conclusion

This is all I have to say about Kinah #19 and R' Abahu's pesichta. As I said before, these two sources may or may not be related. Perhaps yesterday's interpretation of Kinah #19 is correct, and today's post is merely an explanation of R' Abahu's midrash. Either way, I hope you gained some insight into the nature of man, the sins of Bnei Yisrael, and our path to teshuvah.

I will conclude with the words of Yeshayahu ha'Navi which echo R' Abahu's comparison:

"For Hashem will comfort Tzion, He will comfort all her ruins; He will make her wilderness like Eden and her wasteland like a garden of Hashem; joy and gladness will be found there, thanksgiving and the sound of music." (Yeshayahu 51:3)

May we merit the restoration of Yerushalayim speedily, in our days. 

Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and Our Shame

Disclaimer: This post is an attempt to explain one of the kinos (lamentations/dirges/elegies) we say on the morning of Tishah b'Av. I do not claim to have any special knowledge or expertise in kinnos. The only experience I have is the analysis I wrote of another kinah two years ago (Tishah b'Av 5775: Woe Unto Us!). In particular, I feel apprehensive that I am reading too much into the kinah. With something like Mishlei or Avos I have a sense of what a "Mishlei idea" or an "Avos idea" looks like, but I don't feel I'm quite there yet with kinos. That being said, take this post with more grains of salt than you do my other posts. 

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Artwork: Light of Day, by Drew Tucker

Tishah b'Av 5777: Hashem's Tzedakah and Our Shame

Kinah #19

This year, in preparation for Tishah b'Av, I chose to focus on Kinah #19. Below is a translation of the entire thing. As you read through, ask yourself two questions: "What is the main theme or idea of this kinah?" and "How is this designed to facilitate aveilus (mourning) in a manner which leads to national teshuvah?"

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah (righteousness), because of the wondrous signs You have displayed from then until now; and ours is the boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness), because of the trials with which You sought to refine us, [but as a result of our failure] You despised us. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You have taken [our] nation from amidst another nation, with miracles; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of the hypocrisy to be found within us as we emulated [Egypt's abominable] deeds. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because God went out to redeem us as a people unto Himself; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because they [our forefathers] rebelled on the shore of the Sea of Reeds, the nation sinning against its God. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, when we recall the proclamation, "You are witnesses, and I am God!"; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because we blasphemed Hashem in [the Wilderness of] Sin [when we demanded of Aharon,] "Arise and create a god for us!" 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You feed us [the mahn] that tasted like dough fried in honey; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because on the day [we made the Golden Calf], we brought it an offering of fine flour with oil and honey. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You provided us with the mahn, the well, and the pillar of clouds; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because our forefathers grumbled in their tents about [the mahn and called it] the destructive bread. 

Yours, my Lord, is the righteousness, because in the Wilderness we lacked nothing; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because we defied You at Lavan, Chatzeros, and Di-Zahav as related [by Moshe]. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of [how You waged war for us with] Sichon and God and all the kings of Canaan; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Achan who appropriated for himself from the forbidden loot [of Jericho] and found no excuse [for his crime]. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of all that You accomplished through the fourteen savior [-Judges]; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of Michah's idol through which we transgressed. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You erected [Tabernacles] at Shiloh, Nov, Giv'on, and the Eternal Temple [in Jerusalem]; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because the evil in our midst caused each one's destruction, and in their loss we have been humiliated. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because although the destructions of the two Temples were caused by our corruption, we ourselves were spared; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because we should have returned in teshuvah to You wholeheartedly, so that You would return to us with compassion. 

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because of the [almost] nine centuries throughout which You withheld Your anger [over our sins] and didn't broadcast it; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because [Daniel] the man of delights pleaded with You [to end the Babylonian Exile after a mere seventy years, even though we were not worthy,] saying, "Incline Your ear, O my God, and hear!" (Daniel 9:18).

The theme of this kinah is contained in the refrain: "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah ... and ours is the boshes ha'panim." This phrase comes from a pasuk in Sefer Daniel. The pasuk appears in the context of Daniel's prayer to Hashem on behalf of the Jews in the Babylonian exile, after the destruction of the first Beis ha'Mikdash (Holy Temple). The full pesukim couplet reads:

"Yours, my Lord, is the righteousness, and ours is the shamefacedness, as of this very day - to the men of Judah and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem and to all of Israel, those near and those far, in all of the lands to which You have driven them, because of their betrayal with which they have betrayed You. Hashem, to us is the shamefacedness - to our kings, to our officers, and to our forefathers - for we have sinned against You" (Daniel 9:7-8). 

In order to understand the kinah and the impact it was intended to have, we need to make sense of this refrain. [1] Once we figure out the main idea, this will unlock the meaning of the rest of the kinah.

The Questions

There are five major questions here:

(1) What is tzedakah (righteousness)? This term is often thought of in the context of charity, but as we'll see, this isn't really the primary meaning - at least, not as "charity" is commonly understood. 

(2) What does it mean that tzedakah "belongs to Hashem"? Daniel could have simply said something like: "Hashem is the tzadik" (Shemos 9:27), as Paroh said when he acknowledged Hashem's righteousness.  Alternatively, he could have said: "Hashem is a tzadik in all of His ways" (Tehilim 145:17), as David ha'Melech did when he wanted to praise Hashem's righteousness. Why did Daniel choose to speak about tzedakah as though it is something that belongs to Hashem, like a possession? Doesn't righteousness also belong to us - or at least, to the tzadikim (righteous people) among us?  

To those who are inclined to dismiss this question because they don't think the pasuk ought to be this way, see footnote [2].

(3) What is boshes ha'panim (shamefacedness)? In our blog post What is Bushah? we examined several uses of the term "bushah" - some with a positive connotation, and others with a negative one. In this kinah, it is clear that "boshes ha'panim" is a response to the recognition of something bad that Bnei Yisrael did. All of the statements that the paytan (author of the kinah) associated with boshes ha'panim are things that we ought to be ashamed of. But what, exactly, is the nature of this boshes ha'panim?

(4) What does it mean that boshes panim "belongs to us"? Similar to Question #2, why didn't Daniel simply say, "We are ashamed"? Why did he express this by saying that the shamefacedness belongs to us?

(5) What was Daniel's intention in contrasting Hashem's tzedakah with our boshes ha'panim? And, by extension, what was the paytan's intention in structuring his kinah on the basis of this juxtaposition?

We will now answer these questions one at a time, in order.

Answer to Question #1: Definition of Tzedakah

The clearest definition of tzedakah I have seen is stated by the Rambam [3] in the penultimate chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed. He writes:

The word “tzedakah” is derived from tzedek, which means “righteousness” (or “justice” [4]). The meaning of “tzedakah” is to grant to everyone who has a right to something that which he has a right to, and to give to every existing thing that which is proper for its existence.

In short, tzedakah refers to the provision of needs - whether needs determined by a legal system, or by the laws of nature and the design of the organism. This concept is exemplified by the requirements of the Torah-level mitzvah of tzedakah, namely, to provide the poor person with "dey machsoro asher yechsar lo - whatever he is lacking" (Devarim 15:8). We are obligated to make sure that the poor person is given food, water, shelter, clothing, a spouse - and, to an extent, we must also address his or her psychological needs.

Technically speaking, according to the Rambam's first definition, it would be an act of tzedakah to give a hired man his wages, or to pay off a debt; according to his second definition, it would be an act of tzedakah to water a plant, to feed an animal, or to help a human being who is suffering. [5]

This is why I object to translating "tzedakah" as "charity." According to the Rambam, tzedakah is much broader than that, and encompasses all needs of all creations.

Answer to Question #2: Hashem's Tzedakah (in Contrast to Ours)

The Rambam's definition of tzedakah strengthens our Question #2: What does it mean that tzedakah "belongs" to Hashem? Don't we also have tzedakah?

The answer is that Hashem's tzedakah is fundamentally different from human tzedakah. The Rambam alludes to this in the aforementioned chapter of the Guide when he explains how the term "tzadik" is used in reference to Hashem:

We have already explained in discussing the impropriety of [ascribing] attributes to God, for every attribute with which Hashem is described in the books of the Prophets is [really] an attribute of His actions. Thus ... He is called tzadik ("righteous") on account of His mercy with the weak, in providing for every living being according to its faculties.

In that last phrase the Rambam is alluding to a profound example of Hashem's tzedakah. The Radak elaborates on this example in his commentary to Ashrei on the pesukim: "The eyes of all look to You with hope and You give them their food in its proper time. You open Your hand and satisfy the desire of every living thing. Hashem is tzadik in all of His ways and kind in all of His deeds" (Tehilim 145:15-17). Radak [6] explains:

You have created all of the physical creatures below, and You have created their food - for there are those that eat vegetation, those that eat seeds, and those that eat other living creatures - and the eyes of all of them depend on You and hope towards You, "and You provide them with food in their time" (ibid.) via the chain of causality ... 

"Hashem is righteous," for He gives each one its food with righteousness and uprightness; even though one living being will prey upon and eat another living being - like a cat and a mouse, and a lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and the other wild animals who eat other wild animals, and the birds [of prey] who eat other birds - everything is with righteousness from Him, because He also provides food for the wild animals and birds who are preyed upon during their lifetime, but when their time comes to die, their death is "programmed" to happen in a manner that is beneficial for others.

We are inclined to think of Hashem's tzedakah in His interaction with human beings, but David ha'Melech points to the phenomenon of ecosystems as a prime example of Hashem's tzedakah. Each and every creature is provided with exactly what it needs to survive and thrive in a manner that sustains the whole. Even though the individual organisms will perish, the ecosystem as a whole perseveres, and each and every creature is taken care of. Hashem even equips each creature with its own methods of preserving its species. Hashem "opens His hand" via His systems of nature and provides "every living thing" with "dey machsoro asher yechsar lo - whatever it is lacking." 

It is in this sense that Hashem's tzedakah differs qualitatively from our tzedakah. Hashem created ALL creatures AND created the resources which sustain them AND created the laws of nature which govern the manner of their provision AND created the faculties that these animals use to obtain their food. In other words, the entire phenomenon of tzedakah vis a vis all living creatures "belongs" to Hashem, insofar as He is the Creator. 

In contrast, we human beings do NOT create the recipients of our tzedakah and do NOT create the resources they need and do NOT create the laws which govern the manner of their provision or the faculties by which they obtain their needs. Our only role is merely to act as the shluchim (agents) of His will who move the material resources from one place to another, in order to supply other humans with what they need from the resources that have been given to us by Hashem, in accordance with His laws. 

True tzedakah belongs to Hashem, and human tzedakah is but a pale shadow. This is what Daniel means when he says, "To You, my Lord, is the tzedakah." 

Answers to Question #3: Definition of Boshes ha'Panim

Generally speaking, "shame" refers to a painful feeling of humiliation that comes from the recognition that one has acted improperly. 

There are two types of shame: (1) the shame that one feels immediately upon doing something wrong or foolish, and (2) the shame that emerges at a later time, as an outcome of the teshuvah process, after recognizing the full extent of the mistake and the harm that it caused. For the sake of simplicity, let us refer to the first type as "reactive shame" and the second type as "reflective shame."

Reactive shame stems purely from the conscience. As such, it might have a valid basis, or it might be totally baseless. Reflective shame originates in the conscience, but is ultimately a result of self-knowledge. 

The conscience-saddled kid who gets caught with his hand in the cookie jar experiences a reactive shame. In the moment of shame, he's not necessarily thinking about the causes or consequences of his decision. The only thing that goes through his mind is: "Oh no! I got caught! SHAME!!! BAD!!! I'M BADDDD!!!" 

In contrast, the 25-year-old who thinks back to how he behaved when he was an immature 15-year-old is filled with a reflective shame. He thinks to himself, "My goodness, I can't believe I acted so foolishly, and said the types of things I said, and thought the types of things I thought! I was SOOO immature back then! I had no idea what was flying! Thank God I grew out of that phase and am a different person now!" 

According to my understanding, the type of shame that is part of the teshuvah process is the reflective type of shame. This is the type of shame that comes from the post-teshuvah recognition that "I am another person, and I am not the same person who did those actions." [7] This is the same which stems from knowledge - not mere guilt.

This "reflective shame" is the type of shame that Daniel was referring to, and that the paytan wrote about in each stanza of our kinah. It is a shame spurred by the recognition of how terribly our forefathers behaved despite the righteousness shown to them by Hashem, and how we have followed in their footsteps. (We will elaborate on this point in detail in our answer to Question #5.)

I suspect that the phrase "ours is the shamefacedness" is used as opposed to "ours is the shame" (without the "-facedness") because we aren't talking about specific instances of shameful actions. Rather, we are talking about our recognition of a trend of shamefulness which carried on for millennia - since Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt) and on until the present day. Thus, not only do we experience sporadic bouts of shame from our actions and the actions of our forefathers, but this experience of shame has become a part of our very character. We have become shamefaced people because of our innumerable shameful actions. 

Answer to Question #4: Shamefacedness Belongs to Us

In our answer to Questions #1 and 2 we saw the definition of tzedakah and understood how there is a type of tzedakah that uniquely "belongs" to Hashem. Now that we have seen the definition of boshes ha'panim, how are we to understand the statement that "boshes ha'panim belongs to us"? In what sense is boshes ha'panim uniquely ours?

The answer can be found in Rashi's commentary [8] on our pasuk in Daniel:

ours is the shamefacedness - it is proper for us to be ashamed by what befell us, since we caused it to happen to ourselves.

There is only one phenomenon in this world which "belongs" entirely to us: our own free will. Chazal teach: "ha'kol bi'ydei shamayim chutz mi'yiras shamayim - everything is in the hands of heaven (i.e. in Hashem's control) except for fear of heaven (i.e. our free will)" (Berachos 33b). According to Rashi, our boshes ha'panim belongs entirely to us because we are the sole cause of our sins for which we have been punished.

The Rambam expands upon this point in his discussion of free will in Hilchos Teshuvah. After introducing the concept of free will and refuting the notion that a person's actions are predetermined, the Rambam [9] writes:

There is nothing which compels [man] or decrees upon him [to do a specific action], nor is there anything which pulls him to one of the two paths; rather he – by himself and with his mind – inclines himself to whichever path he desires. This is what Yirmiyahu said: “From the mouth of the Most High do not come forth the bad and the good” (Eichah 3:38), meaning to say, the Creator does not decree upon man, neither to be good nor to be bad.

Consequently, this sinner is the one who harms himself, and therefore it is appropriate for him to cry and bemoan that which he has done to himself, and the bad [consequences] he has brought upon his soul. This is what was written afterwards: “What should a living man bemoan? A man for his sins” (ibid. 3:39). [Yirmiyahu] then returns and says: since the choice is in our hands, and we committed all of this wickedness with our own minds, it is appropriate for us to return in teshuvah and to abandon our wickedness, for the choice is in our hands now; this is what was written afterwards: “Let us search and analyze our ways, and we will return unto Hashem” (ibid. 3:40).

We "own" our boshes ha'panim in the sense that we are the sole cause of our sins. We are completely responsible for what we have done and what we have suffered as a result. 

Answer to Question #5: Hashem's Tzedakah vs. Our Shame

Now we are almost in a position to understand the theme of this kinah. But there is one more point that is necessary to clarify with regards to tzedakah.

In our explanation of tzedakah we noted that Hashem's tzedakah expresses itself in the ecosystems of nature, which provide for all of the needs of the plants, animals, and other organisms therein. But Daniel's tefilah and our kinah are not about other organisms, but human beings - and Bnei Yisrael in particular! How does Hashem's tzedakah express itself in His relationship to Bnei Yisrael? 

The answer is that everything that Hashem has done for (and to) Bnei Yisrael has been for the sake of our development as a nation of truth-seeking human beings. Just as Hashem provides for the physical needs of His physical creations, so too, He provides for the metaphysical needs of His creations which have a metaphysical element (i.e. the tzelem Elokimi / soul / intellect). The Ralbag expresses this example of tzedakah beautifully in the introductory paragraph of his commentary on Torah:

Blessed and exalted be the Rock, Who, with His Understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge, gives existence to all existing things – the existence of which manifests a chochmah (wisdom) and chaninah (beneficence) that none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, Who, out of His desire to benefit these existences and to bring them from deficient existence to complete existence, directed His hashgachah (providence) upon these lowly existences, developing them stage by stage until He reached the existence of man. In addition to directing His hashgachah on man’s existence in the wondrous design of his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which his [physical] existence is preserved, He did not refrain from directing His hashgachah on man by guiding him on the path to true perfection – man’s ultimate state of existence, for the sake of which this lowly material existence was endowed with tzurah (design) to the extent that it is. He did this by giving us the divine Torah, which is a nimus (regimen) that brings those who practice it properly to the true success.

With the other physical organisms on earth Hashem DID stop at providing them with "the wondrous design of their anatomy, their abilities, and the faculties by which their physical existence is preserved," since their existence is purely physical. But in the case of mankind, Hashem did NOT stop with providing us with the tools to preserve our physical existence, but He also gave us a tool (i.e. the Torah) to ensure that we develop the metaphysical aspect of our existence as well. 

All of the instances of hashgachah throughout Bnei Yisrael's history - from the Avos, through Yetzias Mitzrayim, to the giving of the Torah at Sinai, to the sojourn in the Midbar (Wilderness), to the conquest of Eretz Yisrael and beyond - all of these events were for the sake of our spiritual development. 

This, I believe, is the framework in which we are intended to read Kinah #19. Each stanza identifies an instance of Hashem's tzedakah (i.e. the steps He took to facilitate our development as a nation of truth-seekers). In each case, not only did Bnei Yisrael neglect to avail themselves of this divine assistance, but they went in the opposite direction, by their own free will. This pattern of national regression, despite Hashem's tzedakah-driven efforts to assist us, is truly shameful. And because we only have ourselves to blame, the boshes ha'panim is ours. 

Rather than walk through the entire kinah, I've selected a few examples which showcase this approach:

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You have taken [our] nation from amidst another nation, with miracles; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because of the hypocrisy to be found within us as we emulated [Egypt's abominable] deeds.

Prior to Yetzias Mitzrayim Bnei Yisrael had all but assimilated into Egyptian society; our once distinct cultural-ideological identity was hanging by a few threads. But because He promised Avraham that He would redeem his offspring, Hashem intervened in our national fate, differentiated between Israel and Egypt, gave us mitzvos (Pesach and milah), took us out with a strong hand and an outstretched arm, and redeemed us as His people. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? By repeatedly longing to return to Egypt, complaining about the Exodus, and emulating the behaviors of the abominable nation from whom we were extracted. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, when we recall the proclamation, "You are witnesses, and I am God!"; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because we blasphemed Hashem in [the Wilderness of] Sin [when we demanded of Aharon,] "Arise and create a god for us!" 

When we stood at Sinai, the entire nation witnessed Hashem speaking to Moshe. At that moment we became witnesses to the reality of "I am Hashem, your God ... you shall not have other gods before Me" (Shemos 20:2-3). No other nation ever has or ever will hear the voice of God speaking to an entire nation as Bnei Yisrael did on that day. He did this for us to establish the foundation of Toras Moshe, the reality of nevuah (prophecy), and to instill a national experience of yiras Hashem (fear of God) - all for the sake of our national development as "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (ibid. 19:6). "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? Less than 40 days later, we turned our backs on the truth we had witnessed, made our own gods, and demanded to be taken back to Egypt. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah, because You provided us with the mahn, the well, and the pillar of clouds; and ours is the boshes ha'panim, because our forefathers grumbled in their tents about [the mahn and called it] the destructive bread. 

Had we been left to fend for ourselves during our sojourn in the Midbar - "an unsown land" (Yirmiyahu 2:2)  - we would have died in a matter of days. But Hashem, in His abundant mercy, sustained us, nourished us, and protected us in a miraculous manner. Not only did He care for our physical needs, but by giving us mitzvos and lessons which pertained to our daily "bread," He attempted to refine us spiritually as well. "Yours, my Lord, is the tzedakah." And how did we respond? Like a spoiled child: by taking His kindness for granted, complaining about the journey and the miraculous food, and lacking trust that He would protect us. "ours is the boshes ha'panim."

The other stanzas can be learned in a similar manner. In this kinah we lament the fact that our forefathers neglected all of the developmental tools and experiences that Hashem provided and ran in the opposite direction, away from "the true success" towards oblivion. And if we are honest with ourselves, we will recognize these same flaws in ourselves, and that these flaws are what continues to hold us back from the teshuvah that is required for the ultimate redemption.

Another Approach ... Next Time

When I was learning through this kinah with my chavrusa we stumbled upon what we believe is a deeper way of learning the idea of the refrain - specifically, the meaning of "ours is the boshes ha'panim." However, due to the length of this post - and the fact that it is currently 11pm on the night of Tishah b'Av - I think it would best if we left this alternative interpretation for another blog post.

[1] On a methodological note: ordinarily I would seek to understand this pasuk in its context, and then use that insight to guide my understanding of how the paytan used it in his kinah. In this case, I tried that, but didn't get very far. So instead, I just focused on the words of the pasuk and ignored the context. 
[2] Some might object to Questions #2 and 4, saying, "I don't think these are really questions. The phrases 'to you' and 'to us' is just an idiom. It's not expressing a notion that righteousness belongs to Hashem or that shamefacedness belongs to us. It's just saying that Hashem is righteous and we are ashamed!" I worried about this possibility as well. But then I found a midrash in Shemos Rabbah (Ki Sisa 41) which interprets our pasuk in Daniel in terms of ownership, comparing to the pasuk, "To Hashem belongs the earth and its fullness" (Tehilim 24:6), which it then expounds, saying, "The earth is His, the fruits are His, etc." To my mind, Chazal's juxtaposition of these two pesukim is a sufficient basis for reading our pasuk in Daniel as "tzedakah belongs to You" and "shamefacedness belongs to us" rather than "Hashem is righteous" and "we are shamefaced."
[3] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:53
[4] It is difficult to know what the Rambam means by this word, since he wrote the Moreh ha'Nevuchim in Arabic and is trying to define a Hebrew term with an Arabic term.
[5] The Rambam actually gives a different reason why helping others is tzedakah, but that is beyond the scope of this blog post.
[6] Rabbeinu David Kimchi (Radak), Commentary on Sefer Tehilim 145:15,17
[7] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Mishneh Torah; Sefer ha'Mada, Hilchos Teshuvah 2:4
[8] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Daniel 9:7. I feel I should add that this answer was suggested by my chavrusa before we saw the Rashi. 
[9] ibid. 5:2