Mishlei 13:1 - Listening to Authority

משלי יג:א

בֵּן חָכָם מוּסַר אָב וְלֵץ לֹא שָׁמַע גְּעָרָה:

Mishlei 13:1

A wise son [listens to] the discipline of his father, but a scoffer does not listen to rebuke.

Questions / Difficulties

1. Why does the pasuk emphasize the ben chacham (wise son) listening to the discipline of his father, specifically? Wouldn't the ben chacham listen to discipline from anyone? Moreover the second half of the pasuk talks about how the leitz (scoffer) reacts to any rebuke - not just the rebuke of his father. Why the asymmetry?
2. Why does the pasuk have to tell us that the leitz doesn't listen to rebuke? This is part of his very definition! There are many pesukim in Mishlei which highlight this quality of the leitz: "One who chastises the leitz acquires shame for himself" (Mishlei 9:7), "Do not rebuke a leitz, lest he hate you" (ibid 9:8), "A leitz does not like being reproved; he will not go to the wise" (ibid. 15:12), and more. What does our pasuk add? 
3. Why does the pasuk us the word "gaarah" for rebuke? Usually I'm not bothered by such nuances in the words, but in this case, it's strange. Ordinarily, Mishlei would use more conventional terms, like "tochahah" or "mussar" or even "eitzah." The weird thing about the word "gaarah" is that it means "rebuke" but it also means "shouting" or "shrieking." What does this mean? 

Four-sentence Summary of the Main Idea

All human beings harbor a certain degree of resistance to authority. The ben chacham is able to rise above this resistance even when being disciplined by his father - the supreme psychological authority - and learn from what he has to offer. In contrast, the leitz's psychological resistance is so pronounced that he hears all rebuke as if the rebuker is yelling at him; consequently, his mind will be completely closed to criticism. The only way to get through to the leitz is to bypass his psychological resistance and get him to see the consequences of his actions with his own mind; as long as these consequences are framed in practical terms rather than superego terms (e.g. "bad" "sinful" "evil"), there is at least a remote possibility that he will listen.

Pink Hair, the Derech ha'Yachid, and Compulsory Piety

Pink Hair

As many of you know, I am a full-time teacher at a Modern Orthodox Jewish high school. Yesterday we had our end-of-the-year faculty meeting. One issue that came up - and which comes up in every faculty meeting - was tznius (modesty). Almost all Jewish schools have a tznius-based dress code, and all of them have at least some degree of trouble enforcing it. Our school is no different.

I zoned out during the initial discussion of the usual issues (i.e. skirt length, sleeve length, penalties, responsibility of enforcement). Thank God, male teachers are not responsible for enforcing the dress code, since this, itself, would be contrary to the values of tznius. But my ears perked up when this issue was brought to the table:

Note: the girl pictured above is not one of our students,
though it is an accurate depiction of the attitude displayed by some.

Apparently, towards the end of the year, one of our students dyed the tips of her hair pink. The question was raised at the faculty meeting: Should we add a "girls may not dye the tips of their hair" clause to the school's dress code?

The difference in opinion was drastic. Some faculty members were staunchly in favor of the proposed policy, others were vehemently against it, and a variety of reasons were given on both sides:

• We should ban dyed tips because it's an outright violation of tznius. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it doesn't violate tznius. 
• We should ban dyed tips because if one or two students did it, then who knows how many more will follow suit? 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because it was just one or two students; if we ban this, then many more will follow suit! 
• We should ban dyed tips because people in the community will see our girls and get a bad impression of our school. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because we've taken away enough forms of personal expression from the girls; since this doesn't violate halacha and isn't immodest, why shouldn't they be able to do this? 
• We should ban dyed tips because there must be a certain look of professional propriety among students: just as teachers are required to dress for work and the boys in Modern Orthodox schools are required to be clean-shaven, so too, our girls shouldn't be permitted to engage in radical forms of fashion. 
• We shouldn't ban dyed tips because the girls already view the dress code as oppressive, which causes them to develop a negative attitude toward the value of tznius in general; by crossing the line to banning something as "innocent" as dyed tips, we're just adding fuel to the fire. 

In my opinion, the most outrageous argument for banning dyed tips was made by a well-meaning faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I just feel like it's not tznius!" That was the sum total of her objection. I wanted to say, "The stone-throwers in Meah She'arim also legislate tznius based on their feelings," but I held my breath.

My intent in this post is not to discuss the halachos or philosophy of tznius, nor do I wish to delve into the various considerations that go into school policy legislation. I want to discuss one issue, and one issue only: mandating conduct which is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din (beyond the letter of the law). Before we can discuss this, we need a framework. For that we will turn to Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam.

The Derech ha'Yachid

Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha'Rambam wrote a sefer entitled Ha'Maspik l'Ovdei Hashem (which was published by Feldheim as a disappointingly loose translation). He begins his work with a general statement about the derech ha'Torah (path of Torah): 

[The derech ha’Torah] is comprised of two paths: the Derech ha’Am (Path of the Nation) and the Derech ha’Yachid (Path of the Individual). 

The Derech ha’Am consists in the fulfillment of the explicit mitzvos – doing the positive ones and avoiding the negative ones – in accordance with the obligation of each Jew ... The adherent of Torah needs to understand what God has commanded in His Torah to do as well as what God has prohibited to do. He must examine how the laws apply to him, and he must accept upon himself to fulfill what is incumbent upon him and to avoid what is prohibited to him. If he does not know what he has been commanded, his derech will not bring him success ...  

Thus, if a person knows what he is obligated to do and he does it, then he is considered to be walking on the straight path which Hashem has placed before him to follow. One who follows the Derech ha’Am in the fulfillment of mitzvos is called “tzadik,” “tam,” “yashar,” and “sar me’rah.” The most accurate of these terms is “tzadik,” which implies “justice” and “fulfillment of one’s obligations,” for the fulfillment of the obligatory mitzvos is the duty to which we are duty-bound by Him (may He be exalted), like the duty of a servant to fulfill the commandment of his master ...  

One who is lax regarding these statutes is called “rasha,” “poshe’a,” “rah,” and “merah,” and other terms which are self-evident and clear. Each of these terms applies to a person in accordance with the severity of his sin and his intention, his laxity or his lack of integrity. The most accurate of these terms is “rasha,” for he commits an injustice by not fulfilling his obligations towards his Master, and he does not supply his rational soul with its proper due. 

Simply put, the Derech ha'Am is what we refer to as "following halacha." However, the Derech ha'Yachid goes beyond halacha:

The Derech ha’Yachid is a way of life directed towards the objectives and underlying ideas behind the mitzvos, and in accordance with the implicit goals of the Torah and the ways of the prophets and the virtuous and the like. One who follows the Derech ha’Yachid is called “kadosh,” “chasid,” “anav” and the like. The most precise of these terms is “chasid,” which is derived from the term “chesed” meaning “voluntariness,” for he voluntarily does what he is not obligated explicitly to do in the Torah.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam expands upon his explanation of the Derech ha'Yachid by contrasting it with the Derech ha'Am and explaining why we refer to each derech by its name:

We say as follows: One who eats matzah and refrains from eating chametz on Chag ha’Matzos, and one who dwells in a sukkah and takes a lulav on Chag ha’Sukkos, and refrains from work on Shabbos and Yom ha’Kippurim, and from eating and drinking on Yom ha’Kippurim, and from laborious work on Yom Tov, and wears tzitzis and puts on tefilin and refrains from prohibited foods and prohibited sexual relations as explicitly stated in the Torah, and strictly observes the positive mitzvos in which he is obligated and does not transgress the negative mitzvos – we say of such a person that he is following the revealed Derech ha’Am. 

We say “ha’Am” (“of the nation”) because it is the same for the most distinguished members of the Jewish people as well as the masses. Just as Yehoshua bin Nun is prohibited to work on Shabbos and is obligated to dwell in a sukkah on Chag ha’Sukkos, so too, all Jews are prohibited to work on Shabbos and obligated in sukkah-dwelling on Chag ha’Sukkos – those who have already passed on from this world and those who are to come after them, until the end of the generations. We refer to it as “revealed” because every person is capable of understanding it, and therefore, all who willfully transgress it are punished. 

Beyond this we say that one who understands the underlying idea of Shabbos and its purpose, and fulfills [this underling idea and purpose] through contemplation and involvement in the study of cosmology and physics on Shabbos, and focuses his mind on physical science, and in so doing, connects to inner kedushah; and one who understands the underlying idea of tzitzis and, through wearing them, remembers the mitzvos of Hashem in order to save him from the state of forgetting towards which he is drawn, and in so doing, ascends to the true level of inner kedushah, as it is stated, “and you shall be kedoshim to your God” (Bamidbar 15:40); and one who understands the underlying idea of the prohibited foods, and consequently reduces his intake of permitted foods and is content with eating only that which is beneficial and necessary; and likewise, one who understands the underlying idea of the sexual prohibitions and accepts upon himself to fulfill that which he understands – we say of such a person that he is following the inner Derech ha’Yachid.  

We say that it is “l’yechidim” (“for individuals”) because it is a level which is not reached by every adherent of Torah. We refer to it as “inner” because its obligation is not mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and one who disregards it will not be punished by human courts. 

The Derech ha'Am is binding on and accessible to every member of the nation. The Derech ha'Yachid is neither. Only those who dedicate themselves to the study of mitzvos will be able to understand their underlying objectives and be able to refine their keeping of halacha in accordance with their knowledge. This leads to Avraham ben ha'Rambam's next point: 

It should be obvious from this that the Derech ha’Am is not subject to different levels, for there is no intermediate level between one who eats prohibited food and one who does not eat it, or between one who desecrates Shabbos and one who does not desecrate it; rather, each and every Jew either fulfills this Derech ha’Am or deviates from it.  

The only way there could be a differentiation of levels is regarding the number of mitzvos one violates, or the number of times he transgresses a particular mitzvah. For example, one who neglects many positive mitzvos and violates many prohibitions is a greater transgressor than one who neglects few mitzvos and violates few prohibitions. Likewise, two people who violate the same mitzvah would be on different levels depending on how frequently each of them repeats the action. One who did not make tzitzis for his tallis that he wears every day, or one who continually shaves the corners of his head, cannot be compared to someone who donned a garment obligated in tzitzis without tzitzis once in his life, or shaved the corners of his head one time. In this manner there can be a differentiation of levels in the Derech ha’Am.  

When I said above that for the most part there are not different levels, I implied that some explicit mitzvos actually are subject to different levels. This is because the mitzvah of yirah (fear of God), the mitzvah of ahavah (love of God), and the mitzvah of avodas ha’leiv (“service of the heart” i.e. prayer) are general mitzvos, yet are subject to a great differentiation of levels. Everyone can fulfill them on a basic level, but in their ultimate goals they split off into the two paths: the Derech ha’Am and the Derech ha’Yachid. The action-based mitzvos, on the other hand, are not subject to a differentiation of levels in their performance.  

But as regards the Derech ha’Yachid, the range between the extremes is very broad, as broad as the distance between East and West. Those who follow it are on many distinct levels, even with regards to a single mitzvah, and even a single instance.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam concludes with a beautiful example of keeping one mitzvah on different levels:

For example, consider the Shabbos-observance of three highly perfected individuals. The first person follows the Derech ha'Am, which is to keep Shabbos and to refrain from desecrating it, but adds a derech ha'yachid: namely, through reflecting, in a general way, upon the purpose of Shabbos and contemplating the creation of the universe by remembering that the heavens and earth and all of their array were created during the six days, and that there did not exist any first cause with no prior cause except for the Creator (may He be exalted and glorified), Who gave us the Shabbos.  

The second person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate these matters in all of their details; he will reflect upon everything that the first person did, but in addition, he will contemplate the entirety of existence and the components he can apprehend in particular, from the center of the earth to the far reaches of the cosmos; he will delve into the wisdom of the Creator (may He be exalted) as manifest in the creation, and he will focus specifically on that which was created on the first day, then the second day, and all the other days, in accordance with that which was stated in the section of Bereishis. 

The third person’s derech ha'yachid is as follows: he will contemplate everything that the second person did, but will delve so deeply into his scientific analysis and study that he will ascend to the level of true kedushah; he will rejoice in his Maker, due to the radiance of the shechinah with which illuminated him in his studies; he will attain proof of His Greatness from the greatness of His creations; he will comprehend the bonds between himself and his Creator, the bond of his intellect and the bond of the mitzvos, which is [one of the intended objectives] of his Creator in our observance of Shabbos, as it is stated, “It is a sign between Me and between Bnei Yisrael forever” (Shemos 31:17); he will diminish his involvement in anything which weakens this bond, and therefore, he will refrain from any eating and drinking on Shabbos which interrupts him from his studies, and he will refrain from off-topic conversation, and certainly from idle chatter. Ultimately, through this derech, he will attain an inner fear of Hashem and love of the Heavens and such a strong yearning for the Living God that even when his limbs crave nourishment, he will not sense hunger, since his soul is fattened with its portion which it has attained, as David stated, “My soul is sated as with fat and abundance” (Tehilim 63:6); sounds will resonate in his ears, but he will be too preoccupied to hear them; perceptible items might pass before his eyes, but he will not see them, as if his eyes are covered. Through his derech he will reach the realm of his desire and the hope of his soul, as it is stated, “Your Name and the remembrance of You are the desire of the soul” (Yeshaya 26:8). Without a doubt this third derech of observing Shabbos is different from the second, as the second is from the first. And certainly, there is an enormous difference between the third and first. 

According to this example you will be able to explain the other darchei ha’yechidim (paths of the unique individuals). One whose derech ha'yachid regarding prohibited foods only affects him to the point where he refrains from gorging himself on meat or becoming drunk with wine is far from one who has reached the level were “a kav of carobs was sufficient for him from one erev Shabbos to the next” (Berachos 17b). 

The same is true of the other darchei ha’yechidim: the distance between their different levels is tremendous and the difference between their followers is great.

Avraham ben ha'Rambam's presentation of the Derech ha'Torah revolutionized my view of the Torah system. Perhaps I will elaborate on that at a later time. For now, let us return to the more pressing matteres of life: should my school add "dyed tips" to its dress code?

Compulsory Piety

Let's go back to the faculty member who said, "There might not be anything halachically problematic about dyed tips, but I feel like it's not tznius." Let us assume, for the moment, that this teacher is correct, and that an argument can be made that a girl who goes out of her way to dye the tips of her hair pink is not conducting herself in accordance with the ideal of tznius. I could see myself agreeing with that.

What I cannot agree with is the ongoing trend in the frum world to force derech ha'yachid standards and practices upon the general populace. The Torah was designed with a derech ha'am and a derech ha'yachid for a very good reason. As Avraham ben ha'Rambam pointed out, the derech ha'yachid is a derech of chesed ("voluntariness"). As a person's understanding of Torah and mitzvos develops, he or she will gradually "volunteer" to supplement his or her observance of halacha with the additional strictures that are dictated by the philosophical objectives of the system. To make these strictures compulsory is to transform this derech chesed into a derech achzarius (path of cruelty).

Other policy-making factors aside, the teacher who "feels" that dyed tips are not tznius is more than welcome to impose this restriction on herself, in accordance with her own understanding of the character and purpose of tznius. It is one thing for a school to enforce halacha, but to enforce the derech ha'yachid is an entirely different matter.

Imagine what would happen if we started enforcing the derech ha'yachid in kashrus, prohibiting people from eating kosher food for pleasure or "merely" for bodily health and only permitting them to eat if we can ensure that they are eating in order to be involved in Avodas Hashem! Or imagine if we required every Jew to spend the entire Shabbos day involved in the study of physics, with minimal eating, drinking, and socializing. The derech ha'am would collapse under the weight of the enforced derech ha'yachid. People wouldn't be able to take it, and would abandon the derech ha'am altogether.

Sounds crazy, right? But this is exactly what is beginning to happen in many other areas of halacha. I don't know when this trend of standardization of middas chasidus started, but there are examples of this everywhere - not just in the world around us, but in the halachic codes which are the foundation of mainstream practice. 

For instance, let us compare the codification of a middas chasidus practice in two halachic works: the Mishneh Torah of the Rambam, and the Shulchan Aruch of R' Yosef Karo. The Rambam devotes Chapter 5 of Hilchos Deos to discussing the behavior appropriate to talmidei chachamim (Torah scholars). He opens the chapter with an introduction:

Just as a chacham is recognizable in his wisdom and character traits and is differentiated from the rest of the nation, so too, he needs to be differentiated in his actions: in his eating and drinking, in his sexual intercourse and the manner in which he uses the bathroom, in his speech, in his manner of walking, in his clothing, in the content of his words, and in his business dealings. All of these actions must be refined and perfected to a very high degree. 

The Rambam then goes on to specify how a chacham should conduct himself in each of these categories of activity. We will focus on a seemingly trivial behavior: walking. The Rambam writes in 5:8:

A talmid chachamim shouldn't walk with an upright posture and an outstretched neck, as it was stated: “walking with outstretched necks and winking eyes” (Yeshaya 3:16); nor should he walk daintily, heel to toe, like women or those who are haughty, in the manner described: “walking with dainty steps, jingling with their feet” (ibid.).

It is clear from the introduction to this chapter that this halacha about walking is lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. These instructions are for talmidei chachimim - not for average Jews. An regular Jewish fellow who walked with an outstretched neck might not be praiseworthy, but he certainly isn't involved in any halachic transgression. 

Compare this to R' Yosef Karo's formulation in the Shulchan Aruch: "It is prohibited to walk with an upright posture" (Orach Chayim 2:6). Period. End of story. If a person were reading the Shulchan Aruch, he or she would walk away with the impression that this requirement is not not just for talmidei chachamim, but for everybody - and it isn't just a lifnim mi'shuras ha'din guideline, but a full-fledged prohibition. 

There are countless other examples of mandating middas chasidus throughout the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema, not to mention the later halachic codes - and that's not even taking into account the advent of Chassidus, the rise of Chareidim, the surge of yeshivish culture, and all of the other sects and factions in the Orthodox world which push lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards. 

[Note: R' Yosef Karo, himself, discouraged the practice of reading the Shulchan Aruch without having studied the Beis Yosef first. Those who followed R' Yosef Karo's advice would be much more informed, and would most likely be able to differentiate between shuras ha'din and lifnim mi'shuras ha'din. I am merely pointing to the fact that the popularity of the Shulchan Aruch has, unfortunately, helped to spread the notion that these middas chasidus practices are part of the Derech ha'Am - just like eating matzah and keeping Shabbos.]

I am also reminded of the Rambam's statement in Shemoneh Perakim: 

Once in a while, though, some pious individuals would tend toward an extreme, such as fasting, staying awake all night, doing without meat and wine, separating from women, wearing course wool and sackcloth, dwelling on mountainsides, or withdrawing to the desert. But the only reason they did any of these things was to heal themselves, as we have explained ... 

Now, when some fools who had no idea why the pious were acting this way saw them do these things, they thought that was a good way to act, and they did likewise, in the belief that they would thus become like them. They afflicted their bodies in all kinds of ways and believed they would thus achieve personal virtues and were doing good, since (in their minds) that was how a person draws close to God - as if God is the enemy of the body, and wants to destroy it and annihilate it! 

They never realized that those were in fact bad things to do, and that they would acquire flaws that way [instead]. 

They would be like some fool who knew nothing about medicine who saw expert practitioners giving cathartics to dangerously ill patients and not allowing them to eat, and through this they were healed and their lives were quite dramatically saved. The sort of fool we are referring to would say to himself, "If those things can heal a sick person, they would certainly keep a healthy person well and even make him healthier!" And he would start to take them regularly and to do the sorts of things those ill people were doing - but would become ill instead.

The case of which the Rambam speaks here isn't exactly the same as the issue at hand, but the fool's mistake is, in my opinion, analogous to the mistake being made by those who seek to impose derech ha'yachid strictures as mandatory. Lifnim mi'shuras ha'din practices are good, but not for every person at every stage of his or her development. 

Conclusion

I see that my strong feelings on this topic have caused me to turn this blog post into somewhat of a rant. That's okay. I needed to at least start getting these thoughts out in writing, and I think I've done just that. To wrap it up, let me summarize the take-away points:

1. The derech ha'Torah is comprised of the derech ha'am (i.e. halacha) and the derech ha'yachid (i.e. keeping halacha in accordance with the objectives of the mitzvos and the Torah as a whole).
   
2. The derech ha'am is uniformly obligatory on all Jews, whereas the derech ha'yachid is to be taken on voluntarily by each individual in accordance with his level of understanding, his capacities, and his circumstances.
   
3. To impose to the derech ha'yachid onto individuals not only conflates the two drachim, but in many cases, will actually harm the individual. That individual's adherence to halacha might be compromised, since he or she will tend to view halacha as more oppressive than it actually needs to be. In the long run, this effect will spread to the society (or community) as a whole.
   
4. When legislating halacha-based school policies, we would be wise to take this phenomenon into account. A girl who dyes her hair pink might not be on a high level of tznius, but the Torah intends for her to come to that conclusion on her own, and to modify her practice at her own pace, in accordance with her own understanding. It is not our place to coerce her into keeping lifnim mi'shuras ha'din standards of tznius. This will only breed resentment towards halacha, and will very likely impede her developmental progress towards true tznius. 

I firmly believe that if we educators successfully established Avraham ben ha'Rambam's framework as the foundation of our students' view of Torah and mitzvos, we could avoid many of the problems which plague our students, our fellow Jews, and ourselves. 

Parashas Devarim: Chochmah, Binah, and Daas

Originally posted in July 2013.

Artwork: Brainstorm, by William Murai

Parashas Devarim: Chochmah, Binah, and Daas

Chochmah, binah, and daas. We encounter these terms all the time, in our tefilos and in our learning. What do they mean? This is a difficult question that I have taken up from time to time – most recently, this morning. My investigation was triggered by a comment from Rashi, and I decided to confine my research to Rashi’s view. Although my understanding is far from complete, I thought I’d present to you the sources I found, along with a few observations.

In this week’s parashah Moshe Rabbeinu begins recounting the events that transpired during the 40 years in the Midbar. One of the first incidents he mentions is the appointment of judges over Bnei Yisrael: “Provide for yourselves distinguished men, who are chachamim, nevonim, and well-known to your tribes, and I shall appoint them as your leaders.” [1]

“Chacham” refers to a person who possesses chochmah, and “navon” refers to someone who possesses “binah.” Rashi defines “navon” then provides an analogy to define the difference between a chacham and a navon:

nevonim: this refers to those who “meivin davar mitoch davar” (infer one thing from another). Arios asked R’ Yossi this question: “What is the difference between chachamim and nevonim?” R’ Yossi answered: “A chacham is like a rich money changer. When they bring him coins to examine, he examines them; when they don’t bring him coins to examine, he sits and does nothing. But a navon is like a merchant money changer. When they bring him money to examine, he examines; when they don’t bring him money to examine, he goes and brings in business on his own.” [2]

On a basic level, the main difference between the chacham and the navon is that the chacham is a dependent learner, whereas the navon is an independent learner. In other words, the chacham relies on other people to provide him with knowledge, whereas the navon is capable of deriving new insights based on what he already knows.

This basic understanding of Rashi’s view is confirmed by his comments on the introduction to Mishlei. Shlomo ha’Melech writes that Mishlei will help the “chacham to increase his learning, and the navon to acquire strategies.” [3] Rashi explains that a chacham is a “baal shemuah” (“a master of the teachings he has received”), whereas a navon “adds to what the chacham knows, since he knows how to infer one thing from another, and to add upon the teachings he has received.” [4]

Presumably, the navon is able to independently derive new knowledge because he possesses a deeper level of understanding than the chacham. This allows us to take another simple step, namely, that binah is a higher level of knowledge than chochmah.

So far, we've only examined Rashi’s view of chochmah and binah – but what about daas? This brings us to cryptic statement in Avos: “If there is no binah, there is no daas; if there is no daas, there is no binah.” [5] Once again, Rashi uses a money changer as an analogy:

“daas” is greater than “binah,” for if someone is asked a question, and he can respond, “Yes” and show his reasoning. This is “daas.” This is analogous to a person who shows a coin to a money changer and asks, “Is this coin counterfeit or authentic?” whereupon the money changer takes out of his pocket an [authentic coin] of the same type [thereby demonstrating authenticity of the coin presented to him]. “binah” refers to someone who knows how to understand, but is unable to show his reasoning. [6]

Rashi’s comments here enable us to take another step. Daas refers to complete comprehension of a certain truth, to the point where you can explain the underlying concept and support your explanation. Binah, on the other hand, refers to a more intuitive grasp of a truth, without the ability to explain you got there or why you maintain that your conclusion is correct. This level of comprehension is, by nature, incomplete – but it is a level of comprehension, nonetheless.

Rashi only defines the terms in Avos, but he doesn't explain the actual statement in the mishnah. Presumably, “if there is no binah, there is no daas” means that daas is a further development of binah, as opposed to qualitatively different type of thinking. Consequently, it is only possible to reach daas in a given area of knowledge by first attaining a binah-level of understanding. I have no idea what “if there is no daas, there is no binah” means.

That’s my current level of understanding of these terms according to Rashi. I haven’t yet reached a level of daas on these matters, but I have increased my binah, thanks to the chochmah I've received from Rashi’s comments. If you have any insights on this topic, please feel free to share them with me!

[1] Sefer Devarim 1:13
[2] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Devarim 1:13
[3] Sefer Mishlei 1:5
[4] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Mishlei 1:5
[5] Maseches Avos 3:17
[6] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Avos 3:17. There are several different commentaries on Avos whose authorship is attributed to Rashi. It is not clear which of these commentaries were written by Rashi, which were written by his students, and which are forgeries or misattributions. In this case, I’m going to assume that Rashi is the author of these comments, since other Rishonim take this to be the case here. I acknowledge the possibility that I am wrong.

Rashi on Chumash: Pshat or Not?

In the comments section of my Pshat vs. Drash post, I was asked a question about Rashi and the place of pshat in his Chumash commentary. I responded there, but I decided that this topic deserves its own post. 

Rashi on Chumash: Pshat or Not?

There appears to be a widespread belief that Rashi comes to explain the pshat, whole pshat, and nothing but the pshat. "Chumash with Rashi" is used interchangeably with "pshat of Chumash." The question is: Does Rashi come to explain the pshat alone, or does Rashi's commentary include non-pshat explanations as well?

Thankfully, Rashi wrote his "mission statement" in his commentary on Bereishis 3:8:

There are many Aggadic midrashim and our Rabbis have already organized them in their proper order in Bereishis Rabbah and in other midrashim. But I have come only to give the pshat of Scripture and the aggadah which "settles" the words of Scripture in a manner which fits them.

As you can see, Rashi doesn't simply say "I have come only to give the pshat of Scripture," but continues, "and the aggadah which 'settles' the words of Scripture in a manner which fits them." Unfortunately, this additional phrase lends itself to several different readings. In the Vayikra volume of What's Bothering Rashi? Rabbi Avigdor Bonchek spells out the three different ways to understand Rashi's statement:

Rashi is saying, in effect, that his purpose is to explain the Torah according to pshat, but that he will also turn to mirdashim if they can be seen to accord with the words of the text. It is this second half of his comment that interests us here. He clearly says that he will use midrash in his commentary. Are his comments which are based on midrash also to be considered pshat interpretation? This is an open question. There are three main views on this question. We will list them without entering into the debate in depth.

(1) One view is that all midrashim in Rashi's commentary are in the service of pshat. All of Rashi's comments, midrashim and others, are thus considered to be pshat.

(2) Another opinion is that many, perhaps most, midrashim cited by Rashi, while not literally pshat, are nevertheless grounded in the words of the verse. In these cases the text has certain "irregularities," anomalies or nuances that raise questions which need to be explained. The midrashic interpretation serves to give meaning to these "irregularities." But this does not necessarily mean that such interpretations are pshat. Perhaps they fall somewhere between pure pshat and outright drash. This view would seem to be closest to what Rashi says above when he adds: "Aggados that explain the words of the Scriptures in a manner that fits in with them."

(3) One last view is that Rashi may cite a midrash for its educational/moral/religious lesson without it necessarily being in any way part and parcel of a pshat interpretation; it may not even have any "anchor" in the words of the Torah (as do those in #2 above).

Rabbi Bonchek goes on to say: "My personal view is that the vast majority of Rashi's comments follow #2 above, though some may fall into category #3." I agree with Rabbi Bonchek: most of Rashi's use of midrash is not intended to elucidate the pshat, but is cited in order to find meaning in textual anomalies. While I certainly do not consider myself as an authority on Rashi, Rabbi Bonchek's opinion accords with my own experience learning Rashi. 

Rabbi Bonchek adds:

One other point should be made. The term pshat itself is not a clearly defined concept. It would seem that Rashi's view of pshat differs from that of the Rashbam, Joseph Bechor Shor, or the Ramban, to name a few of the classical commentators. These Rishonim view pshat in a way similar to the way we ordinarily do, i.e., interpretations based on grammar, syntax, and context. While Rashi's view of pshat is highly influenced by the Sages' view, over context. 

I do not consider myself qualified to weigh in on this issue, but it seems important to keep in mind. Perhaps this sheds light on the Rashbam's statement about the difference between his commentary and that of his grandfather, which can be found in his commentary on Bereishis 37:2:

Let those who love reason know and understand that which our Rabbis taught us (Shabbos 63a) that “a verse never departs from its pshat.” It is true that the Torah’s essential goal is to teach us and to convey knowledge of the rules of conduct and laws which are contained in the hints within the pshat, through superfluous wording, through the thirty two principles of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosi the Galilean, or the thirteen principles of Rabbi Ishmael. And, due to their piety, the earliest scholars were inclined toward the drashos, which are the essence, and as a result they never became attuned to the profundities of the pshat of Scripture … As it says “I was eighteen years old and I had studied the entire Talmud yet I had never realized that ‘a verse never departs from its pshat.’”

Similarly Rabbi Shlomo (Rashi), my mother’s father, who illumined the eyes of all the Diaspora, who wrote commentaries on the Torah, Prophets, and the Writings, set his heart to explain the pshat of the Scriptures. However, I, Shmuel, the son of his son-in-law, Meir, may the memory of the righteous be a blessing, argued with him and in front of him, and he admitted to me that if he had the time he would have written new commentaries based on the interpretations of the pshat of Scripture that are newly thought of each day.

Anyone who has learned the Rashbam on Chumash can plainly see that his standards of "pshat" differ drastically from that his grandfather. Rashbam barely utilizes midrash (if even at all), and frequently disagrees with what Rashi considers to be the "pshat." As Rabbi Bonchek pointed out, it is quite possible that the two Rishonim had different concepts and standards for what they considered to be "pshat." 

As for the Rashbam's statement that Rashi "set his heart to explain the pshat of the Scriptures," which seems to endorse Interpretation #1 of Rashi's mission statement (i.e. that all of his commentary comes to explain the pshat) - I'm not bothered by this. It is definitely true that the main goal of Rashi's commentary was to explain the pshat, and I don't think that the Rashbam's characterization of his grandfather's commentary compels us to think otherwise.

That's my position on the matter. If you come across any of the baalei Mesorah who discuss this, I would be very interested to see what they say - especially if they are other Rishonim. 

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Seduced by Particulars

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Artwork: Horizon Canopy, by Michael Komarck

Parashas Mattos/Masei: Seduced by Particulars

Bnei Yisrael had just vanquished the Midianites and were preparing to finally enter Eretz Yisrael. However, not everyone is so keen about settling in Eretz Yisrael proper. The Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven approach Moshe Rabbeinu with a request: they would like to settle outside of Eretz Yisrael, across the Yarden, where the land is ideal for their abundant livestock.

They said, "If we have found favor in your eyes, let this land be given to your servants as a heritage; do not bring us across the Yarden" (Bamidbar 32:5).

How does Moshe take this? Not very well. He condemns the Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven in no uncertain terms, even going so far as to compare them to the sinful generation of the Meraglim who angered Hashem and caused Bnei Yisrael to wander in the Wilderness for 40 years:

Moshe said to the Bnei Gad and the Bnei Reuven, "Shall your brothers go out to battle while you settle here? Why do you dissuade the heart of Bnei Yisrael from crossing to the Land that Hashem has given them? This is what your fathers did, when I sent them from Kadesh-barnea to see the Land. They went up to the valley of Eshcol and saw the Land and they dissuaded the heart of Bnei Yisrael not to come to the Land that Hashem has given them. The wrath of Hashem burned on that day, and He swore saying, 'If these men who came up from Egypt - from the age of twenty years and above - will see the ground that I swore to Avraham, to Yitzchak, and to Yaakov ... for they have not followed Me fully ... The wrath of Hashem burned against Israel and He made them wander in the Wilderness for forty years, until the end of the entire generation that did evil in the eyes of Hashem. Behold! - you have risen up in place of your fathers, a society of sinful people, to add more to the burning wrath of Hashem against Israel. For if you will turn away from after Him, He will again let it rest in the Wilderness, and you will destroy this entire people (ibid. 32:6-15)

To an impartial reader, this might seem like an overreaction. Was the request made by Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven really as bad as Moshe makes it seem? Moreover, what are we supposed to learn from their cheit? 

As usual, the Ralbag provides a unique perspective on this cheit. He writes:

[From here we learn] a lesson in middos, namely, that it is not proper for a person to be seduced by the particulars to choose one thing over another, except after great deliberation. We see that because Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven had abundant livestock, they were seduced into choosing the land to the east, over the Yarden, since that was a good location for cattle. However, this caused them to later regret [their decision] after the land had been conquered, for they saw that this might cause their descendants to stray away from Hashem. This, in turn, caused them to build an [illegal] altar, as it is stated at the end of Sefer Yehoshua (Chapter 22) [which led to major problems for them]. Additionally, they would be more vulnerable to Israel's enemies. For this reason you will find that the first people to be exiled by the king of Assyria were these tribes. Moreover, the Moabites - whose land we took over from Sichon - were continually like a thorn which afflicted Israel, as we see from the events of Yiftach, the Giladi. 

According to the Ralbag, the main take-away from the cheit of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven is not about the particular decision to settle outside of Eretz Yisrael per se, but rather, it is an insight about decision-making in general. Their mistake was allowing themselves to be "seduced by the particulars" in their decision about where to settle. As a result of that seduction, they were blind to the harm they would be causing to themselves, their brethren, and their future descendants.

Some might find this lesson to be too obvious for the Ralbag to highlight. Indeed, according to Saadia Gaon, the entire Sefer Mishlei may be viewed as a guidebook to avoid making this very mistake. Shlomo ha'Melech sums up this idea himself, saying: "There is a path which is straight before a man, but at its end are paths of death" (Mishlei 14:12). Then again, Saadia Gaon would also say that although this idea might be clear and obvious "in the eyes of the intellect," that is not the case "in the eyes of the emotions." We are all prone to being blinded by our emotions and being "seduced by the particulars." It is for this reason that we need to review and reinforce this lesson as much as possible.

But it is important to note that the error of the Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven did not occur on a personal level of decision-making, but on a societal level. It would seem that they had the best interests of their tribes and families in mind. They just weren't "thinking fourth-dimensionally" - that is to say, they weren't thinking about how their actions would affect future generations of Gadites and Reubenites. It is difficult enough guarding yourself against "seduction by the particulars" in your own lifetime, but it is even more difficult to do so when thinking about future generations. 

"Gad! Reuven! You're not thinking fourth dimensionally!"

This isn't the only instance where the Ralbag draws our attention to a poor decision made by a group of people to settle in a bad location. The Ralbag learns that this is the very reason why Hashem scattered the Dor ha'Haflagah (Generation of the Dispersion) by mixing up their language. The pesukim state:

The whole earth was of one language and of common principles. And it came to pass, when they migrated from the east, they found a valley in the land of Shinar and settled there (Bereishis 11:1-2). 

The mainstream view is that Hashem intervened because the society of the Dor ha'Haflagah was evil and corrupt, in one way or another. The Ralbag takes a radically different approach. He learns that Hashem intervened to save the human race from potential devastation. Ralbag writes:

Hashem saw that for all of mankind to be gathered in a single location would be detrimental for the continuity of the human species, for it is possible that a catastrophe would occur in that location - whether an earthquake that originated in the bowels of the earth, or a tornado that smashed mountains and broke stones, or by a meteor shower, or a flood, or other such catastrophes. If the entire human species were located in a single location on earth, there is a chance that they would be wiped out if that portion of the earth were destroyed. For this reason, it was necessary for mankind to be scattered throughout all parts of the earth, so that the species would last, and that if a disaster happened to one part, the species would be preserved through the other.

Thus, according to the Ralbag, the error of the Dor ha'Haflagah was similar to the error of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven: both groups were "seduced by the particulars" when choosing a location to make their home, and both groups were blind to the danger they posed to their offspring - a physical danger to the entire human race in one case, and a spiritual (and physical) danger to their tribes in the other case. 

At this point you might be wondering why I have chosen these two seemingly disparate incidents in Chumash as my focus in this blog post. Well, it just so happens that I was confronted with a similar situation in my own life this week. An article entitled The Really Big One was published a few days ago in The New Yorker. The article is an exposé on what is known as "the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami" - a seismic event of epic proportions which will inevitably happen sometime in the near future. Here is the picture painted by the author:

When the next very big earthquake hits, the northwest edge of the continent, from California to Canada and the continental shelf to the Cascades, will drop by as much as six feet and rebound thirty to a hundred feet to the west—losing, within minutes, all the elevation and compression it has gained over centuries. Some of that shift will take place beneath the ocean, displacing a colossal quantity of seawater ... The water will surge upward into a huge hill, then promptly collapse. One side will rush west, toward Japan. The other side will rush east, in a seven-hundred-mile liquid wall that will reach the Northwest coast, on average, fifteen minutes after the earthquake begins. By the time the shaking has ceased and the tsunami has receded, the region will be unrecognizable. Kenneth Murphy, who directs FEMA’s Region X, the division responsible for Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska, says, “Our operating assumption is that everything west of Interstate 5 will be toast.” 

In the Pacific Northwest, everything west of Interstate 5 covers some hundred and forty thousand square miles, including Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, Eugene, Salem (the capital city of Oregon), Olympia (the capital of Washington), and some seven million people. When the next full-margin rupture happens, that region will suffer the worst natural disaster in the history of North America. Roughly three thousand people died in San Francisco’s 1906 earthquake. Almost two thousand died in Hurricane Katrina. Almost three hundred died in Hurricane Sandy.FEMA projects that nearly thirteen thousand people will die in the Cascadia earthquake and tsunami. Another twenty-seven thousand will be injured, and the agency expects that it will need to provide shelter for a million displaced people, and food and water for another two and a half million. “This is one time that I’m hoping all the science is wrong, and it won’t happen for another thousand years,” Murphy says.

Later on in the article, the author reports that "the odds of the big Cascadia earthquake happening in the next fifty years are roughly one in three. The odds of the very big one are roughly one in ten." Those odds are not good, to say the least. 

As you can imagine, this article caused somewhat of a commotion on the West Coast. Judging by the other articles I skimmed, some people accepted these predictions at face value; other experts reported that the science was correct, but said that the disaster scenarios weren't nearly as bad in all areas as this author made it out to be; others preferred to believe that this disaster was still along ways off - too far off to worry.

This article hit my emotions on a very personal level. I grew up in the Pacific Northwest. My family and many of my friends still live there. I, myself, have seriously considered moving there when I'm ready to settle down. That being said, you can imagine the conflict I felt upon reading this article. 

I immediately began thinking about these findings from a practical standpoint. I found this to be much trickier than I expected. As we go through life, we become more and more adept at making cost-benefit analyses and weighing the various pros and cons. But every once in a while, we are thrown a curve-ball consideration - such as this one - which is so unique that it becomes difficult to factor into our long-term planning. 

Shortly after reading this article, my mind went to the two excerpts from the Ralbag cited in this blog post. I wondered: Am I being seduced by the wonderful particulars of the Pacific Northwest? Am I rationalizing my desire to one day move here? Am I making the same mistake that the Bnei Gad and the Bnei Reuven made when they thought that it was a good decision to settle on the other side of the Yarden? Am I exposing myself and my future progeny to physical danger in the same way as the Dor ha'Haflagah? 

For now, I believe that more investigation is in order before making any dramatic decisions. Nevertheless, I learned a valuable lesson from thinking about this article during the same week I thought about Bnei Gad, Bnei Reuven, and the Dor ha'Haflagah, namely, it is very difficult not to be seduced by the particulars when contemplating very long-term consequences which may or may not even come to pass during one's lifetime. Reading the Ralbag's lesson was one thing, but relating to it by considering this local, personal issue made that lesson much more real to me. 

This, in turn, made me realize how many of the problems facing the Jewish community are plagued by this same cheit of decision-making. Whether it's problems from within (e.g. the Jewish Day School tuition, the Shidduch crisis, the polarization of Jews to the extreme right or the extreme left) or the problems from without (e.g. U.S. relations, the Palestinians, Iran), it seems that "seduction by the particulars" inevitably exerts its sinister influence. And like the examples in Chumash, the problem is magnified by the fact we are forced to make decisions which affect us, but also shape the lives of future generations. 

I don't know what the solution is, but being the first step is always to recognize the problem, as the Ralbag did in his analysis of the events in our parashah. That is one of the many things I like about the Ralbag's approach to Torah she'bi'Chsav: not only does he bring out deep and lofty ideas in Torah and metaphysics, but he also extracts the humble practical lessons from the narrative. By contemplating and reviewing these lessons as they appear in Torah she'bi'Chsav, we can - with God's help become more adept at applying them to our everyday lives. 

Haftarah of Mattos/Masei: Becoming Hevel

Originally posted in July 2013.

Haftarah of Mattos/Masei: Becoming Hevel

What happens to you if you worship avodah zarah? I’m not talking about the halachic penalty for avodah zarah, nor am I talking about your fate in Olam ha’Ba. I’m not even asking about the hashgachic consequences of avodah zarah in Olam ha’Zeh, as far as reward and punishment are concerned. I am asking an existential question: What happens to you – to the very essence of who you are, in this world – if you worship avodah zarah?

Yirmiyahu ha’Navi provides an answer in this week’s haftarah:

כֹּה אָמַר ה' מַה מָּצְאוּ אֲבוֹתֵיכֶם בִּי עָוֶל כִּי רָחֲקוּ מֵעָלָי וַיֵּלְכוּ אַחֲרֵי הַהֶבֶל וַיֶּהְבָּלוּ

Thus said Hashem: What wrong did your forefathers find in Me, that they distanced themselves from Me, and they went after the hevel and they became hevel? [1]

I’d like to focus on two questions:

1. What does the Navi mean by “hevel” in this context? It is clear from the rest of the perek that he is referring to avodah zarah, but what idea about avodah zarah does he intend to convey by characterizing it as “hevel”?
   
2. Furthermore, what does he mean by “they became hevel”? I can understand how a person can chase after hevel, but what does it mean for a person to become hevel? 

Metzudas David defines “hevel” as “davar she’ein bo mamash” meaning “that which has no substance” or “that which has no reality.” [2] Elsewhere he explains that this use of the term “hevel” was borrowed from the literal denotation of “hevel” translates to “breath” or “air,” neither of which have any tangible substance. [3]

To my mind, this is the perfect description of avodah zarah. The entire belief system of the oved avodah zarah – comprised of false gods, supernatural beings, and mystical forces – has no existence in reality. It is hevel: nothingness, emptiness, and non-existence. This answers our first question.

In order to answer our second one, we must ask an even more basic question: What is avodah zarah? “Avodah zarah” is commonly translated as “idolatry” or "idol-worship." In truth, idol-worship is merely a particular form of avodah zarah, but not its very definition.

Essentially, avodah zarah is a derech: a certain way of relating to reality. One of best definitions of the derech avodah zarah I've heard is the one given by my rebbi. He defined avodah zarah as “relating to the products of your psyche as reality.” Unlike the Torah system, whose veracity can be demonstrated rationally, the oveid avodah zarah’s belief system rests on nothing but his own wishes, fears, and other emotions. He believes that his avodah zarah is true because he feels it is true, not because he has verified it with his mind.

According to Torah, the essence of the human being is his tzelem Elokim – the truth-seeking part of him which enables him to comprehend reality. The oveid avodah zarah lives in a manner contrary to his tzelem Elokim. He ignores the voice of his rational intellect and instead relies on his irrational imagination to tell him what exists and what doesn't exist. The Rambam explains that a person who abuses his imaginative faculty in this manner is not living as a human being, but as an animal. [4]

Now we are in a position to understand what Yirmiyahu meant when he said that those who go after avodah zarah will “become hevel.” Bruce Lee said, “As you think, so shall you become,” and that is exactly what happens here. By embracing a derech of hevel – an unthinking, subjective, imagination-driven way of determining what is real – the oveid avodah zarah has ceased to exist as a tzelem Elokim and has chosen to live as an animal. Thus, he has therefore become hevel (“non-existent” as a human being). [4]

The Torah is a system which was designed each individual’s existence as a tzelem Elokim. Avodah zarah undermines the Torah’s goal on a fundamental level. It is for this reason that Chazal said that believing in avodah zarah is equal to denying the entire Torah, and affirming the truth of Torah involves denying avodah zarah in its entirety. [5] This is also the reason why a Jew who worships avodah zarah is halachically treated as a non-Jew in almost all matters. [6] His worldview is antithetical to that of the Torah, and the Torah reclassifies him accordingly.

I hope that this understanding of avodah zarah helps you to understand why the Torah and all of the Neviim make such a big deal about it. As the month of Av approaches, it would behoove us to reflect on the fact that avodah zarah was one of the sins for which the Beis ha’Mikdash was destroyed, and that while “idol worship” has been greatly diminished since then, the derech of avodah zarah is alive and well.

[1] Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:5
[2] Rav David Altschuler (Metzudas David), Commentary on Sefer Yirmiyahu 2:5 

[3] ibid. Commentary on Sefer Koheles 1:2
[4] Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides), Commentary on the Mishnah, Chagigah 2:1  

[5] Talmud Bavli Nedarim 25a, Kiddushin 40b, Shevuos 29a, Horiyos 8a,Chullin 5a; see also Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha’Mada, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 2:4 
[6] ibid. 2:5

Pshat vs. Drash II

Introduction/Recap

In the previous installment on this topic I presented my understanding of the difference between pshat and drash, "Pshat" refers to the meaning of the words as intended by the author, whereas "drash" refers to the homiletic use of the author's words as a platform for expressing an extrinsic idea - an idea which may or may not have anything to do with the author's original intent. I supported these definitions with sources from Ibn Ezra, Ralbag, Radvaz, and Shiltei ha'Giborim.

Subsequent to writing this post, my rebbi introduced me to two more sources which support these definitions: one from the Rashba in his commentary on aggadah, and the other from the Rambam's Moreh ha'Nevuchim. Since both of them make similar points, I decided to incorporate them into a single post.

Rashba: Commentary on Aggadah, Berachos 32b

The Gemara in Berachos 32b focuses on a pasuk in Yeshayahu 49:16. Here is the pasuk (bold) in context:

Zion said, "Hashem has forsaken me; my Lord has forgotten me." Can a woman forget her baby (עוּלָהּ), or not feel compassion for the son of her womb (מֵרַחֵם בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ)? Even these (אֵלֶּה) may forget, but I (אָנֹכֵי) would not forget you. Behold, I have engraved you upon my palms; your walls are before Me always. Your children will hasten [to return], and your ruiners and your destroyers will leave you.

The Gemara expounds on the four Hebrew words I singled out above:

"Can a woman forget her baby (עוּלָהּ), or not feel compassion for the son of her womb (מֵרַחֵם בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ)?" [Hashem said:] "Can I forget the burnt offerings (עוֹלוֹת) and firstborn offerings (פִּטְרֵי רְחָמִים) that Israel has brought before Me in the Wilderness?"

The Congregation of Israel responded: "Master of the universe, since there is no forgetting before the throne of Your glory, perhaps you have not forgotten the incident of the Eigel (Golden Calf)?"

Hashem responded: "Also these (אֵלֶּה) may forget" (the midrash alludes to the incident of the Golden Calf, in which the worshipers said, "These (אֵלֶּה) are your gods, O Israel, who took you out from Egypt!"). 

Israel said before Him: "Since there is forgetfulness before the throne of Your glory, perhaps You have forgotten the Revelation at Mount Sinai?"

Hashem responded: "but I (אָנֹכֵי) would not forget you" (the midrash alludes to the first of the Ten Commandments heard at Sinai, "I (אָנֹכֵי) am Hashem, your God, etc.").

The Rashba prefaces his commentary with a general statement about midrashim.

There are those who mistakenly think that Chazal are actually interpreting the pesukim which are brought in their aggadah, in accordance with their explanations therein. For example, they explain עוּלָהּ (baby) as עוֹלָה (burnt offering), and they explain בֶּן בִּטְנָהּ (son of her womb) as פֶּטֶר רֶחֶם הַבָּא מִן הַבֶּטֶן (a firstborn issue of the the womb), and they explain אֵלֶּה (these) as אֵלֶּה אֱלֹהֶיךָ יִשְׂרָאֵל ("these are your gods, O Israel") and אָנֹכֵי (I) as אָנֹכִי ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ ("I am Hashem, your God"). This leads to mass confusion.

These [mistaken individuals] can be divided into two groups. One group is inclined towards [belief in] the opinions of Chazal and rely upon everything they say; they think that [these midrashim reflect] the true interpretations of these pesukim, since that is how the Sages present them. Another group mistakenly inclines towards kefirah (denial) [of the Chazal's authority]; they think that this was Chazal's intent in explaining these pesukim, and they ascribe error to them. This, in turn, leads to a greater mistake, for they then ascribe error to everything that Chazal taught in their explanation of the Torah and mitzvos. These are true fools - "the opposite of men of understanding" (Yeshayahu 5:21). In order to remove these two errors, I must provide insight and explain their intent in all matters such as these. 

The Rashba then goes on to give a beautiful explanation of the true meaning of the midrash (which we will omit here for the sake of brevity). He concludes by explaining why Chazal adopted this approach in their aggadah:

This is one style in aggadah, namely, that [the Sages] teach whatever it is they intend to teach, and they bring pesukim for their idea as if their intention is to interpret that pasuk in accordance with what they taught - but in truth, [the pasuk] only serves as an allusion and a mnemonic device for their own idea. 

For example, [they midrashically explain the pasuk, "וַנִּירָם אָבַד חֶשְׁבּוֹן עַד דִּיבֹן" "Their sovereignty over Cheshbon was lost" (Bamidbar 21:30) in the following manner:] "וַנִּירָם" teaches us that the wicked one says, "אין רם" (there is no Exalted One); "אָבַד חֶשְׁבּוֹן" means "אבד חשבונו של עולם" (the accounting of the world has been lost). 

In truth, the Sages had no intention to interpret these pesukim - which speak about the events of the war with Sichon - as speaking about the words, actions, and thoughts of the wicked; rather, their intention in this [midrash] and others like it is to remember the idea by remembering the pasuk, as a mnemonic device. This shows wisdom on their part, for they take important and necessary ideas which have tremendous value and firmly establish them in a language which will not be forgotten (i.e. the text of pesukim).

I'm going to hold off my comments on the Rashba until after we see the Rambam, since their statements are so similar. 

Rambam: Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:43

The final section of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim is devoted to the explanations of the reasons for the mitzvos. Before presenting his own explanation of the mitzvah of the arbaat ha'minim (the Four Species), the Rambam addresses the popular midrashic explanations. Presumably, he is referring to the midrash that the arbaat ha'minim represent the four different types of Jews, and the midrash that the arbaat ha'minim symbolize four parts of the human body which should be utilized in our service of Hashem. Here is what the Rambam has to say:

As regards the arbah minim, our Sages gave specific reasons for them by way of aggadic interpretation, the method of which is well known to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages. They use the text of the Torah only as a kind of poetical expression [for their own ideas] – not that these are the actual meaning of the text.  

With regards to these midrashic interpretations, people are divided into two groups: some people think that the midrash contains the real explanation of the text, whilst others mock it and ridicule it, since it is clear and obvious that this is not the real meaning of the text. The former struggle and fight to prove and to confirm such interpretations according to their opinion, and to hold on to them as the real meaning of the text; they consider them in the same light as the received laws from the Oral tradition. Neither of the two classes understood that our Sages employ biblical texts merely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear to every reasonable reader. This style was widespread in ancient days; all adopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain popular style].  

In reference to the words: “and you shall have a peg (יָתֵד) in addition to your weapon (אֲזֵנֶךָ)” (Devarim 23:14) our Sages teach: “Do not read אֲזֵנֶךָ (your weapon) but אָזְנֶךָ (your ear). You are thus told, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, put your fingers into your ears.”  

Now, I wonder whether those ignorant persons [who take the midrashic explanations as actual interpretations] believe that the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation of the text quoted and as the meaning of this mitzvah – that in truth, יָתֵד (peg) is used for “finger” and אֲזֵנֶךָ denotes “your ear”? I cannot think that any person whose intellect is sound can admit this. The author employed the text as a beautiful poetical phrase in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this: it is as bad to listen to lashon ha’ra as it is to say it. This lesson is poetically connected with the above text. In the same sense you must understand the phrase, "Do not read so, but so," wherever it occurs in the midrash.

According to the Rambam, the midrashic explanations of the symbolism of the arbaat ha'minim were never intended as interpretations of the pesukim or the mitzvos contained therein - just as the midrash about the shovel was never intended as an interpretation of the pasuk in Devarim. Nevertheless, people still take these midrashim as actual interpretations - both l'shvach (to praise Chazal) and l'gnai (to disparage them).

Artwork: Corrupted Roots, by Mark Hyzer

The Root of the Problem

The Rambam mentioned the common denominator between the two groups: both of them fail to realize that Chazal were using the text of the pesukim as a poetic and mnemonic device to express their own ideas. But my rebbi asked a further question: What is the root of their error? The Rambam and Rashba paint a clear picture of the symptoms, but what is the underlying disease?

I answered my rebbi's question based on the Rambam's statement about the first group: "they consider [these aggadic explanations] in the same light as the received laws from the Oral tradition." In other words, both groups fail to realize that aggadic midrashim are entirely different than the halachos of Torah she'baal Peh. These groups believe that just as we are obligated to accept the mesorah (oral tradition) from Chazal that "an eye for an eye" refers to monetary compensation rather than corporal punishment, and "pri eitz hadar" refers to an esrog, and "ve'hayu l'totafos bein einecha" is an instruction to place tefilin on one's forehead above the spot between one's eyes, so too, we are obligated to accept Chazal's statements at face value when they write that R' Elazar ben Azariah miraculously grew a white beard at the age of 18, or that Yocheved was 130 when she gave birth to Moshe, or that Moshe Rabbeinu was 18 feet tall. Both of these groups are oblivious to the crucial premise of all aggadic teachings, namely, that they were not given at Sinai, but that they are Chazal's own interpretations, which they arrived at with their own minds and formulated in their own style.

Every student should be aware of Shmuel ha'Nagid's explicit definition of aggadah in his Mevo ha'Talmud:

“Hagadah” (a.k.a. “aggadah” or “aggadic midrash”) is any explanation from the Talmud on a non-mitzvah topic - this is hagadah, and we only learn from it that which makes sense. It is incumbent upon you to know that established by the Sages as halacha regarding any mitzvah was received by Moshe Rabbeinu who received it from the Almighty, and we should not add to it nor subtract from it. But as for all of the explanations of the Scriptural verses - each of the Sages explained according to the ideas which occurred to him and what he saw with his mind. We should only learn from these explanations that which makes sense, and the rest we should not rely upon.

The members of the first group feel compelled to accept aggadic explanations in the same way that they accept Chazal's halachic teachings from Torah she'baal Peh, whereas the second group reject aggadic explanations and ultimately reject Chazal's halachic teachings from Torah she'baal Peh. Both groups assume that these teachings are of the same nature, in the same style (i.e. interpretation), and are on the same level of authority. In truth, they are not. I fully agree with Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch's statement that to believe that aggadah was given at Sinai is "a dangerous approach that poses a grave danger for the pupils who grow up believing this concept, for it very nearly opens the gates of heresy before them."

My rebbi gave a different answer. He said that the underlying disease shared by the two groups is a mistake about who Chazal are, namely, both groups believe that Chazal were not chachamim. The Rambam openly states in his introduction to Perek Chelek that the members of the first group "think that the only meaning in the wise words of Chazal is what they, themselves, understand – namely, the literal meaning." It doesn't even occur to them that Chazal are expressing great wisdom which is utterly beyond their own grasp. Consequently, they drag down the words of Chazal to the low level of their own intellects, and assume that this is what Chazal actually intended. Likewise, the Rambam writes that the members of the second group "imagine that their own intelligence is of a higher order than that of Chazal, and that Chazal were simpletons who suffered from inferior intelligence were incapable of attaining genuine wisdom." Their arrogance (in contrast to the first group) renders them even more unlikely to uncover the true wisdom of Chazal's teachings.

Neither group recognizes the chochmah of Chazal. Both groups view Chazal as possessing inferior intelligence. This causes them regard the statements of Chazal as simplistic and superficial. The members of the first group delight in this since it allows them to retain their own childish beliefs about Torah and reality, and the members of the second group enjoy mocking Chazal, rejecting their teachings, and rationalizing their own inclinations and ideas on the basis of their "superior" intelligence.

Unfortunately, these two groups are still at large, and the Jewish world is still plagued by the problems they cause. The best we can do is to turn to Rishonim, such as the Rashba and the Rambam, who truly understood Judaism, and look to them as our guides.