Some Musings on Achdus (Jewish Unity)

Originally posted in July 2013

Some Musings on Achdus (Jewish Unity)

The term "achdus" (Jewish unity) often comes up in discussions about social and political issues concerning the Jewish community. This concept is often invoked with unspoken qualifiers, such as "absolute achdus" or "unconditional achdus" or "achdus irrespective of our differences." Such calls for achdus are often bolstered with statements such as "kol Yisrael areivim zeh la'zeh" ("Every Jew is responsible for one another") and "ve'ahavta l'reiecha kamocha" ("You shall love your fellow [Jew] as yourself"). Some go so far as to hurl accusations of sinas chinam (baseless hatred) at anyone whose views are perceived as a threat to this achdus.

There is a simple truth which could stand to be reiterated from time to time: there is good achdus and bad achdus. In order to achieve the former, we must be able to understand, identify, and avoid the latter. That is the topic of this blog post.

We can examine this distinction from many different angles, but in this post we will focus on the statement of Hillel in Avos 2:4: "Al tifrosh min ha'tzibur" ("Do not separate from the community"). The Rishonim take a number of different approaches on this mishnah. I will now present excerpts from the commentaries of three Rishonim. As you read through their explanations, see if you can spot the common denominator. 

We will begin with the commentary of Rabbeinu Yonah:

When the community is involved with a mitzvah, this a crown for the Life of Worlds and an honor for His entire dominion, for when the multitude of the nation gathers to fulfill His mitzvos, it is a "glory for the King" (Mishlei 14:28), and it isn't right to separate from them, as it is stated, "He became King over Yeshurun when the numbers of the nation gathered - the tribes of Israel in unity" (Devarim 33:5). 

All of this applies to when the congregation is following a good path and is gathered to do mitzvos. But when the congregation turns to a bad path and their actions are corrupt, it is not right to join with them, and one who separates from them is praiseworthy. Concerning this, Yirmiyahu ha'Navi said: "If only someone would give me a travelers' lodge in the wilderness, then I would forsake my people and leave them, for they are all adulterers, a band of traitors" (Yirmiyahu 9:1). 

Next, the Meiri:

There are those who explain "do not separate from the community" in reference to their customs (i.e. a person shouldn't deviate from the customs of the community). This isn't a valid interpretation, for if [their customs] are good, then the same would apply even to an individual (i.e. one shouldn't deviate from the good customs of even a single person), but if they are bad, it is proper to rebuke them and to guide him on the straight path - that is, if he is worthy [to rebuke them]. But if he is not worthy [to rebuke them] or if they don't listen to him, then it is definitely proper to separate from them, and even to distance oneself from them exceedingly, in order to be saved from their companionship - even if he is their relative or close friend, as it was stated, "Go for yourself, from your land and from your birthplace" (Bereishis 12:1). And if he doesn't do this, he should be fearful for his soul, lest he perish on account of the sin of the city (cf. Bereishis 19:15). 

Lastly, the Rashbatz:

When the actions of the community are corrupt, one who separates from them is praiseworthy. Concerning this, Yirmiyahu ha'Navi said: "If only someone would give me a travelers' lodge in the wilderness, then I would forsake my people and leave them, for they are all adulterers etc." (Yirmiyahu 9:1). And David said: "I hated the gathering of evildoers, and I did not sit with the wicked" (Tehilim 26:5). And Yeshaya said: "Don't talk about a 'unified group,' for everything this people speaks of is a 'unified group'" (Yeshaya 8:12, translated according to Metzudas Tzion). And the Torah says: "Do not go after the majority for evil" (Shemos 23:2). 

But if their actions aren't too corrupt, you shouldn't separate from them ... 

Did you figure it out? That's right. Although these three Rishonim differ in their interpretation Hillel's statement, they are unanimous in their rejection of "absolute achdus," "unconditional achdus," and "achdus irrespective of our differences." 

Achdus Yisrael is beneficial for society and brings glory to God, but only when that achdus is harmonious with His ratzon. Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar expressed this point when he said: "Any congregation which is for the sake of heaven will ultimately prevail, but one which isn't for the sake of heaven will ultimately not prevail" (Avos 4:11). No matter how this mishnah, it is clear that he is not advocating unconditional achdus.

Artwork: False Peace, by Zina Saunders

To my mind, one of the best depictions of the good type of achdus Yisrael is the Rosh ha'Shanah edition of the third brachah of the shemoneh esreh:

You are kadosh (transcendent) and Your Name is kadosh, and kedoshim praise You every day, forever. And so, too, O Hashem, our God, instill Your awe upon all Your works, and Your dread upon all that You have created. Let all works fear You and all creatures prostrate themselves before You. Let them all become a single society, to do Your will wholeheartedly. For as we know, Hashem, our God, that the dominion is Yours, might is in Your hand and strength is in Your right hand, and Your Name inspires awe over all that You have created. 

The natural question is: How can this achdus be achieved?  On the surface, it would seem that this is an unanswerable question. The question of how to achieve peace has plagued every society since the dawn of mankind. The problem is so multifaceted and daunting that it doesn't even seem worthwhile to ask the question.

Thankfully, Judaism provides a clear answer to this question. How can true achdus be achieved? Through knowledge. I can't express this point any better than the Rambam in the Moreh ha'Nevuchim 3:11, so I'll just quote him in full (with my own paragraph breaks):

All the great evils which men cause to each other because of certain intentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles, are likewise due to non-existence, because they originate in ignorance, which is absence of wisdom. 

A blind man, for example, who has no guide, stumbles constantly, because he cannot see, and causes injury and harm to himself and others. In the same manner, various classes of men, each man in proportion to his ignorance, bring great evils upon themselves and upon other individual members of the species. 

If men possessed wisdom, which stands in the same relation to the form of man as the sight to the eye, they would not cause any injury to themselves or to others: for the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual injuries. 

This state of society is promised to us by the prophet in the words: “The wolf will live with the sheep [and the leopard will lie down with the kid; and a calf, a lion whelp, and a fatling together, and a young child will lead them.] A cow bear will graze and their young will lie down together; [and a lion, like cattle, will eat hay.] A suckling child will play by a viper’s mouth; [and a newly weaned child will stretch his hand toward an adder’s lair” (Yeshaya 11:6-8). 

The prophet also points out what will be the cause of this change, for he says that hatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will then have a true knowledge of God. “They will neither injure nor destroy in all of My holy mountain; for the earth will be as filled with knowledge of Hashem as water covering the sea bed” (ibid. 11:9). Note it.

The key to achdus Yisrael is knowledge: knowledge of ourselves, knowledge of Torah, knowledge of the world - all in the framework of knowledge of Hashem. "But let him that glorify himself glory in this: understanding and knowing Me, that I am Hashem, Who does kindness, justice, and righteousness on the earth, for in these is My desire – the word of Hashem" (Yirmiyahu 9:23).

Of course, the Rambam does not mean to suggest that all we need to do is learn Torah 24/7 and everything will automatically take care of itself. People are complicated, and the problems we make for ourselves and for each other are equally complicated. Rather, the Rambam is saying that since ignorance is the root of all problems bein adam l'chaveiro, then all efforts to solve those problems must be based upon, guided by, and move towards knowledge. 

There is one last point I'd like to raise in this post - and this is where it gets tricky. The quest for knowledge must, of necessity, involve disagreement. It must also involve opposition to falsehood - opposition in in mind, in speech, and in action. In an ideal world, this would take place in the spirit of mutual respect and truth-seeking, untainted by ego and other negative emotions. The mishnah in Avos 5:17 points to the disagreements of Hillel and Shammai as the paradigm of "good disagreement" (a.k.a. "machlokes l'shem shamayim" or "disagreement for the sake of heaven").

Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world. Our world is filled with people who are intellectually and emotionally immature. We, ourselves, are intellectually and emotionally immature in comparison to others - and even the greatest thinkers are prone to bouts of immaturity. This makes things a lot more contentious and difficult. "Machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim" ("disagreement not for the sake of heaven") prevails, and threatens to disrupt "the good achdus" at every step of the way.

How are we to conduct ourselves in a world divided by machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim? Generally speaking, there are only two directions in which we, as members of Jewish society, can move in seeking a solution: either we can move towards knowledge, or away from it.

There is a trend among those who promote "unconditional achdus" to point out all of the ugliness that is generated by machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim. On this score, they are correct: it can get quite ugly, and cause many problems. 

The mistake, however, is the solution that "unconditional achdus" proponents tend to adopt: they tend to believe that shalom can only be achieved by uncritically embracing and/or tolerating all beliefs and opinions as equally valid. Their approach is founded on a lack of basic epistemological yesodos and an erroneous understanding of concepts like shivim panim l'Torah and eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim chayim. They fail to realize that this approach leads away from knowledge, down the road of ignorance, and - according to the Rambam cited above - to increased harm and suffering.

It would behoove us to remember the example set by Korach and his assembly, in their rebellion against Moshe Rabbeinu. Their machlokes with Moshe is identified by the mishnah in Avos as a machlokes she'lo l'shem shamayim - and yet, we do not see Moshe tolerating their views as "equal." The same is true of all the neviim and chachamim throughout Tanach. No matter how steeped in falsehood their society was, they never abandoned their commitment to defending knowledge and truth against the voices of ignorance and falsehood. Ahavas Yisrael they had, but not to the point where it compromised their ahavas Hashem, which is inextricably bound up with their ahavas ha'emes. 

The endeavor to treat all opinions as equally valid will, at best, only achieve a superficial and short-lived achdus - one which will erode the true foundations of true achdus. The only way to secure long-term achdus Yisrael is through the continual and communal pursuit of knowledge. If only we could overlook our differences to the point where we could all engage in an honest and open pursuit of knowledge without validating all opinions. It is possible to treat others with respect, compassion, and genuine empathy without compromising one's commitment to truth-seeking.

I sincerely hope and pray that we all live to see the true achdus in the fulfillment of Tzfania's prophecy: "For then I will change the nations [to speak] a pure language, so that they all will proclaim the Name of Hashem, to worship Him with a unified resolve" (Tzfania 3:9).

Mishlei 21:8 - The Purity of Actions

משלי כא:ח

הֲפַכְפַּךְ דֶּרֶךְ אִישׁ וָזָר וְזַךְ יָשָׁר:

Mishlei 21:8
A man's path may be inconsistent and strange, but his action pure and upright.

Notes on Translation
Most of the commentaries attempt to translate this pasuk in accordance with the typical Mishleic structure of "Bad person + bad quality/consequence, and good person + good quality/effect." Here are some examples of alternative translations which follow this approach:

• Rashi: "A man who is strange [in that he turns away from mitzvos] - his path is changeable; but a man who is pure [and follows mitzvos] is upright [in his path]." 
• Saadia Gaon: "[You might encounter] a man whose path is inconsistent, and [consequently it will become] strange to him; but the pure one - his action is upright." 
• Metzudas David: "[If] a person is inconsistent [in his actions, sometimes] the human path [will be with him] and [sometimes he will be] estranged [from the human path], but the [path of the] pure man [will always be] upright."

The difficulty with these translations is that they require quite a bit of shoehorning, as is evident in the number of bracketed words and phrases.

In order to avoid this, I sought to read the pasuk in the most literal and straightforward manner possible. This necessitated deviating from the typical Mishleic structure. If you take the pasuk at face value, it is making a general statement about man: "A man's derech is inconsistent and strange, and/but his action is pure and upright." That is what led me to my final translation. Subsequently I saw that Rabbeinu Yonah translates the pasuk in a similarly generalized manner, though he takes a different approach in his interpretation.

Major Questions / Difficulties

1. What does the pasuk mean by the terms "inconsistent," "strange," "pure," and "upright"?
2. What is the meaning of "derech" ("way" or "path") in this context?
3. How can a person's actions be pure and upright if his path is inconsistent and strange? 
4. Why do we need to know this? What point is Shlomo ha'Melech trying to get across?

Artwork: Edgewalker, by Ben Thompson

Four Sentence Summary of the Main Idea

This pasuk comes to refute two common misconceptions: (1) that if a person’s derech (i.e. personality, philosophy, way of living, etc.) is inconsistent and strange, then his actions cannot be pure and upright, and (2) that, conversely, if a person’s actions are pure and upright, then his derech cannot possibly be inconsistent and strange. In other words, we are psychologically prone to feeling that good actions are somehow “tainted” if they come from an individual whose derech we consider to be inconsistent, strange, or otherwise defective. From the standpoint of a person’s overall perfection and personal development, this may be true, in a certain sense – but in the cause-and-effect, Mishleic framework of actions and consequences, it is false: a person’s actions will produce its effects on the world, regardless of the derech from which it came. Likewise, we must guard against the corresponding pair of misconceptions which are implied by the pasuk: (3) that if a person’s derech is pure and upright, then his actions cannot be inconsistent and strange, and (4) that if a person’s actions are inconsistent and strange, then his derech cannot be pure and upright. 

On Aging: With (and Without) Torah

Originally posted in May, 2009

Artwork: Touch of the Eternal, by Christopher Moeller

On Aging: With (and Without) Torah

In the 10th derashah (sermon) of Derashos ha'Ran, the Ran cites a mishnah in Kinnim 3:6:

Rebbi Shimon ben Akashya says: Elderly unlearned men, as long as they continue to age, their daas become even more agitated (mitarefes), as it is stated: "He removes the speech of the capable and takes away the reasoning of the elderly" (Iyov 12:20). But Torah-elders are not like that; rather, as long as they continue to age, their daas become even more settled (misyasheves), as it is stated: "In the aged is wisdom and in length of days, understanding" (ibid. 12:12). 

There are two major questions on this mishnah: 

1. What is meant by the opposite terms "yishuv ha'daas" and "tiruf ha'daas"? The term "daas" has many meanings - what does it mean here? What are "yishuv" (settling) and "tiruf" (agitation) in relation to daas, in this context?
   
2. What is the difference between the unlearned elders and the Torah-elders? Why does the daas of an unlearned elder become more agitated as he ages, whereas the daas of a Torah elder becomes more settled? 

Here is the Ran's explanation of the mishnah: 

This does not mean that as long as the Torah-elders continue to age the more their wisdom increases, for it is possible that this won't happen. Since the intellect is dependent upon the physical faculties [e.g. senses, imagination, memory - all of which function through the brain, which is a physical organ], it is possible that when these men become exceedingly old, and these faculties weaken, the intellect will also become weakened ...

Rather, when the mishnah said, "their daas become even more settled," its meaning is as follows. In their youth, the Torah-elders gave up their addictions to the pleasures of the physical world and chose the path of the Good; therefore, as they continue to age, their daas become more settled. This means that they became more reconciled with themselves and their daas became at ease with the decision of their youth. In other words, even though they decided in their youth to abandon their addictions to the pleasures of the physical world and its excesses, it is impossible that they were not occasionally drawn to them. Even though their intellect opposed this, and prevented them from being seduced by the physical pleasures, it is impossible that they did not desire them to some degree. Therefore, their daas was not completely settled [in their youth, for they were caught between two opposing forces.

But the more they continue to age, these more these desires weaken. Their imaginative faculty sees that everything it once fantasized about in the matters of the physical world was pointless, transient, and utterly finite. At that point, it is no longer necessary for their intellect to oppose the imaginative faculty and to dissent. Therefore, their daas is settled, for they clearly see that they had chosen the Good and resolved to follow it, and everything they had forfeited in the matters of the physical world was worthless, and that there is no cause for feeling anxiety over its forfeiture.

The opposite befalls the unlearned elders. In their youth they were seduced by their addictions to the pleasures of the physical world; their daas was at ease and reconciled with this, and they didn't care about their intellect's opposition. But as they continue to age, the physical world withdraws from them and they withdraw from it. They see that everything they once desired and chose in their youth was but nothingness, vanity, and "that they only inherited falsehood" (cf. Yirmiyahu 16:19). Because of this, their daas is not settled with the decision of their youth. Nevertheless, since "they did not learn righteousness" (cf. Yishaya 26:10), and they had become habituated and sunken in their bad habits, their intellect lacks the ability to turn completely away from the path which they have taken until now. Therefore, as they continue to age, they will be caught between two paths, and "the path will not be theirs" (cf. Iyov 23:10).

This is what the Rabbis of blessed memory intended by the expression "their daas is agitated (mitarefes)," as in the expression, "a ship that is mitarefes" (Taanis 19a). This expression refers to a ship in the middle of the ocean with oppressive waves thrusting the ship from one side to the other, and its sailors are unable to guide it on a single path; instead, the wind pushes, sometimes to one side and sometimes to the opposite. Likewise are those who are seduced by their addictions to the physical pleasures of this world, as they continue to age: for in their youth their daas was settled, but in their old age, their daas is agitated. 

We can now answer both of our questions. According to the Ran, yishuv ha'daas means "peaceful state of mind." Daas, in this context, does not refer to the intellect - which the Ran repeatedly calls "seichel."  Rather, "daas" refers to what we commonly refer to as one's "state of mind." Yishuv ha'daas is a state of mind in which one feels at ease, due to the absence of conflict between one's intellect and one's inner psychological forces. Likewise, tiruf ha'daas means "troubled state of mind." As the Ran explains, the expression "tiruf" refers to a state of being pushed and pulled between two opposing forces. Tiruf ha'daas is a conflicted state of mind in which one feels agitated, frustrated, and unsettled, due to the clash between one's intellect and one's inner psychological forces.

Thus, the meaning of the mishnah is as follows: The Torah-elders, in their youth, decided to trade the life of physical and psychological pleasure for the life of chochmah. However, the draw towards physical and psychological pleasure was still present and continued to generate conflict and anxiety, leaving them in a state of partial tiruf ha'daas. But as they become older, and their instinctual forces weaken, their intellect - which they had nourished since youth - sees that they chose correctly, and that everything they gave up was nothingness and vanity. Thus, in their old age, they will no longer be in a state of conflict. They will have achieved yishuv ha'daas; their minds will be at ease. Thus, they will now be free to invest all of their energy into the inherently pleasurable pursuit of chochmah, and their wisdom and understanding will increase.

The unlearned elders, on the other hand, chose to embrace their addictions of the life of pleasure in their youth. The Ran states that they were able to achieve a great measure of yishuv ha'daas in their youth by ignoring the dissenting voice of their intellect, but this yishuv ha'daas was destined to be short-lived. As they age, they too realize that the life of pleasure was vain and futile, and that they should have spent their life in pursuit of something lasting and permanent - but by the time they reach old age, it is too late for them. They will spend their final years in a state of tiruf ha'daas, torn between their insatiable longing for the now unattainable pleasures of their youth, and the opposite longing for something real and lasting (i.e. chochmah), which they are also unable to attain.

Parashas Shelach: Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah

I hope this will be the first of my regular "divrei Torah" blog posts for the Summer 2015 blogging season. Enjoy!

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Image Courtesy of The Brick Testament

Parashas Shelach: Shabbos, Avodah Zarah, and Skilah

In the penultimate section of this week's parashah we find the incident of the Mekoshesh Eitzim ("the gatherer of wood," as the phrase is conventionally translated). Here is the short story in its entirety:

The Children of Israel were in the Wilderness and they found a man gathering wood on the Sabbath day. Those who found him gathering wood brought him to Moshe and Aharon, and to the entire assembly. They placed him in custody, for it had not been clarified what should be done to him.

Hashem said to Moshe: "This man shall be put to death; the entire assembly shall pelt him with stones outside of the camp."

The entire assembly removed him to the outside of the camp; they pelted him with stones and he died, as Hashem had commanded Moshe (Bamidbar 15:32-36).

Perhaps the most basic question we can ask is: What are we supposed to learn from this story? 

One thing is for certain: the story is here to teach us the penalty for Shabbos desecration. According to Sifrei (Shelach 57), Bnei Yisrael knew that Shabbos desecration was liable for the death penalty, but they didn't know which of the four death penalties to administer: skilah (stoning), sreifah (burning), hereg (decapitation), or chenek (strangulation). Indeed, according to the pshat (straightforward meaning) of the pesukim, there there wouldn't have been much - if any - need for the Torah to report this incident had Moshe Rabbeinu and Bnei Yisrael known which death penalty to administer. 

This raises a difficulty: Why didn't Hashem inform Moshe and Bnei Yisrael of the precise specific penalty for Shabbos desecration? They had already been told, "Six days shall work be done, but on the seventh day is an ultimate, holy cessation [from melachah]; whoever does melachah shall surely be put to death" (Shemos 31:15). Why wasn't the particular death penalty taught at the same time? What could possibly be gained by delaying the release of this critical information?

The Baalei Tosafos (bottom of Bava Basra 119a) provide some much needed insight into this matter. They explain that according to Torah she'baal Peh (the Oral Torah), any time Torah she'bi'Chsav (the Written Torah) uses the generic phrase "he shall surely be put to death" (mos yumas), we are to interpret this as referring to chenek (death by strangulation). Why, then, was Moshe even in doubt? He should have ruled that the mekoshesh eitzim should be put to death by chenek, and there would be no need to ask Hashem for clarification.

The Baalei Tosafos answer as follows:

Moshe theorized that [the mekoshesh eitzim] should receive the ruling of skilah (death by stoning), like an oveid avodah zarah (worshiper of idolatry), for in all places we find that the mitzvah of [keeping] Shabbos is compared to [the mitzvah of refraining from] avodah zarah - that is, the one who publicly desecrates Shabbos is equated to the one who worships avodah zarah.

They are referring to the halachic principle codified by the Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos 30:15:

Shabbos and avodah zarah – each of them is equal in weight to all of the other mitzvos of the Torah. Shabbos is the eternal sign between Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu and us. Therefore, if a person transgresses any of the other mitzvos, he is included among the wicked Israelites – but one who publicly desecrates Shabbos is considered to be like an oveid avodah zarah, and both of them are treated like non-Jews in all matters.

As we see from the conclusion of the mekoshesh story, Moshe's theory was correct: the violation of Shabbos is not liable for the least-severe death penalty of chenek, as it would seem from the initial presentation of the halachos in Torah she'bi'Chsav and Torah she'baal Peh. Instead, Shabbos desecration is liable for skilah - the most severe punishment of them all - due to the relationship between avodah zarah and the public desecration of Shabbos.

In light of this Tosafos, perhaps we can resolve our difficulty. Why didn't Hashem inform Moshe and Bnei Yisrael of the precise specific penalty for Shabbos desecration? Apparently, because it was necessary for Moshe to arrive at this conclusion on his own based on the relationship between Shabbos and avodah zarah. And since it was necessary for Moshe to confirm his theory by consulting Hashem, thereby putting the death sentence of the desecrator on hold, the whole incident of the mekoshesh took on the character of a "breaking news story" and garnered a tremendous amount of publicity. Not only was this the first time anyone had violated Shabbos, but the entire nation was forced to wait with bated breath for the fate of the transgressor to be decreed by the Almighty, Himself. And when that ruling was finally handed down, Moshe Rabbeinu (with an emphasis on "Rabbeinu") almost certainly used this as an opportunity to draw attention to the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.

Thus, not only did this divinely orchestrated publicity stunt underscore the severity of Shabbos desecration in the eyes of the entire nation, but it also brought awareness to the important principle that Shabbos-desecration and avodah zarah are conceptually linked, and are equal in their severity.

In case you don't buy this theory, it just so happens that another Rishon (early medieval authority) arrived at the same conclusion - albeit through an entirely different route. I am speaking of the Ralbag, who also learns that the story of the mekoshesh eitzim was placed in our parashah to highlight the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah.

The Ralbag arrives at his conclusion not from an analysis of the event itself, but from the placement of this story within the parashah. The topic which appears right before the story of the mekoshesh is - you guessed it - avodah zarah! In these preceding pesukim the Torah presents the laws of korbanos (sacrifices) to atone for unintentional public avodah zarah and for individual worship of avodah zarah. The pesukim immediately before the story of the mekoshesh teach the penalty for intentional worship of avodah zarah:

A person who shall act high-handedly, whether native or proselyte, he blasphemed Hashem - that person shall be cut off from among his people, for he scorned the word of Hashem and broke His commandment; that person will surely be cut off, his sin is upon him (ibid. 15:30-31)

The Ralbag (commentary on Bamidbar 15:32) provides the following explanation of this juxtaposition:

It seems as though [the topic] of Shabbos desecration was juxtaposed to the topic of avodah zarah on account of the similarity between them. One who desecrates Shabbos is, in a certain sense, denying the entire Torah, for the root upon which the Torah is built is conviction in the creation of the universe, for this [conviction] establishes two major premises for us: (1) that Hashem Exists, and (2) that He brought the universe into being. When we believe this, this will bring us to believe in what the Torah has commanded. The mitzvah of Shabbos comes to teach us regarding these two fundamental principles.

According to the Ralbag, the observance of Shabbos serves as a public affirmation of Hashem's Existence and His creation of the universe. Thus, the intentional desecration of Shabbos is tantamount to a renunciation of these principles - and all the more so when this desecration takes place in public. 

I think this also addresses a point which I have heard expressed from time to time. People sometimes feel that it is WAY too harsh to administer the death penalty for the violation of Shabbos. "Really? Picking up sticks on Saturday is punishable by death?! That's crazy!" The Ralbag's explanation reminds us that unlike other capital offenses, for which the action itself is inherently harmful, the desecration of Shabbos is destructive because of what it represents. Just as (lehavdil) someone who burns the American flag is making a political/philosophical statement against the foundational principles of the entire nation, so too, a person who intentionally violates Shabbos is effectively denouncing the fundamental principles upon which the Torah is based. 

There is a lot more to write about the connection between Shabbos and avodah zarah, but that shall have to wait until another time, in another blog post. For now, let us content ourselves with the lessons learned from the story of the mekoshesh eitzim, and be thankful that his death was not in vain.

Punishing Children for their Fathers' Sins

Artwork: Pillory of the Sleepless, by Marc Simonetti

Punishing Children for their Parents' Sins

The second of the Aseres ha'Dibros (Ten Commandments) includes a problematic statement: 

You shall not recognize the gods of others in My presence. You shall not make yourself a carved image or any likeness of that which is in the heavens above or on the earth below or in the water beneath the earth. You shall not prostrate yourself to them nor worship them, for I am Hashem, your God - a jealous God, Who visits the sin of fathers upon children to the third and fourth generations, for My enemies; but Who shows kindness for thousands [of generations] to those who love Me, and observe My commandments (Shemos 20:3-6).

The question is clear: How is it fair for Hashem to punish children for the sin of their fathers? This would appear to be a major injustice! Moreover, there are many pesukim (verses) throughout Tanach which support this point: 

"In those days it will no longer be said, 'The fathers ate sour grapes, and the teeth of sons are set on edge.' Rather, every man will die for his own sin, and the man who eats the sour grapes, his own teeth will be set on edge." (Yirmiyahu 31:28-29)

"The soul that sins, it shall die! A son shall not bear the iniquity of [his] father and a father shall not bear the iniquity of [his] son; the righteousness of the righteous person shall be upon him and the wickedness of the wicked person shall be upon him." (Yechezkel 18:20) 

"Vindicating an evil person and condemning a righteous person - both are abominations of Hashem." (Mishlei 17:15)

Targum Onkelos (ibid.) addresses this problem by translating our pasuk as follows:

You shall not bow down to them nor serve them, for I am Hashem, your God - a jealous God, Who visits the liability of fathers upon rebellious children, upon the third generation and upon the fourth generation, for My enemies, when the children continue to sin [as did] their fathers. 

By clarifying that pasuk is referring specifically to those children who follow in the sinful ways of their fathers, Onkelos's translation bypasses the problem of God punishing innocent children for sins they didn't commit. 

Onkelos's translation follows Chazal's interpretation, as stated in the Gemara (Berachos 7a; see also Sanhedrin 27b and Makkos 24a):

It is written: "He visits the sin of fathers upon their children" (Shemos 34:7), and it is written: "Children shall not die for the sins of their fathers" (Devarim 24:16). These two pesukim contradict each other! 

But [this contradiction] may be answered: it is not a difficulty - the [first pasuk] refers to a case in which [the children] hold on to the actions of their fathers, whereas the [second pasuk] refers to cases in which they do not hold on to the actions of their fathers. 

Ibn Ezra takes a similar approach. He interprets the pasuk not as "[God] visits the sin of fathers upon children" but rather as "[God] remembers the sin of fathers [when dealing with their] children." He explains:

Hashem will prolong [His anger] towards a rasha (evildoer), for perhaps he will repent from his sin, or perhaps he will have a son who is better than he. But if that son follows in the ways of his father, and likewise if the third and fourth generation [follow after the ways of their fathers], then Hashem will not prolong His anger for the fourth generation; if there are four generations of those who hate Hashem, then He will annihilate the memory of all of them. For Hashem will remember what the father did, and what his son did, and what his grandson did, and He will not be tolerant of the fourth generation. 

Like Onkelos, Ibn Ezra learns that the pasuk is not talking about innocent children, but specifically those children who follow in the sinful ways of their fathers. The other meforshim (commentators) deal with this problem in a similar manner.

The Ralbag, on the other hand, takes an approach which differs radically from the mainstream meforshim. Rather than textually sidestepping the problem by reading an unstated qualification into the pasuk, the Ralbag takes the pasuk at face value. He understands the pasuk to be saying that Hashem does punish children - even innocent children - for the sins of their fathers. Thus, Ralbag is faced with the full brunt of the question: How can this be? How is this in line with justice? Here is the Ralbag's explanation (ibid.) in full:

There is a major difficulty with this statement, namely: How is it possible that Hashem (may He be exalted) will punish the children of a sinner, when they do not partake of the guilt of their father's sin?

We will resolve this difficulty in the following manner: Hashem punishes those who violate His words, either through hashgachah derech tochachah (rebuke through divine providence), or by removing hashgachah so that [the sinner] receives the natural raos (harms) which were set to befall him according to the laws of nature. In both cases, the ra that befalls the offspring [of the sinner] would not have befallen them were it not for the sin of their father. 

For example: when our forefathers rebelled [against God], they became liable for the punishment of being exiled among the nations, and the nations would inherit their land. This exile extended to their offspring after them, in that they were born into exile, and it would be impossible for them to escape this ra unless they were able to do so within the laws of nature, or by reaching a level of perfection which would be sufficient for Hashem to miraculously bring them out from the lands to which they had been scattered. 

It is in this sense that the prophet said, "Our fathers sinned and are no more, but we suffer their sins" (Eichah 5:7). In other words, if our fathers had not sinned, we would still be in the Land, and we wouldn't have gone out from there unless we engaged in despicable actions which would make us liable for this type of punishment. However, once we find ourselves in exile due to the sin of our fathers, then [merely] refraining from such despicable actions will not suffice to enable us to return from there. Instead, we need to acquire the degree of perfection necessary to cling to Hashem in a manner that will cause Him to bring us out from this exile through miraculous hashgachah. In this manner, there is no injustice if the punishment of a father befalls his children, for it comes about incidentally [and not directly].

According to the Ralbag, it would only be unjust for Hashem to directly punish a child for the sin of his father, but if the father receives punishment, and that punishment incidentally (or indirectly) affects the child, this would not constitute an injustice. That is just how the world works. This is true for divinely orchestrated hashgachic "rebuke" punishments, as well as the natural punishments within the laws of nature. 

Elsewhere (commentary on Sefer Yehoshua, Chapter 7) Ralbag reiterates his explanation and provides a helpful mashal (example) to bolster his point:

... Hashem does not directly punish children for the sins of their fathers, for this would be unjust. However, it is possible - without injustice - for some punishment to incidentally extend to children on account of their father's sin, and this would not constitute an injustice at all.

For example, if a person sinned against the government and was fined as a penalty, this punishment would also affect his children, since they would be poor and would not inherit the possessions of their father which they would have originally inherited ... In this same manner it may happen that Hashem will visit the punishment of fathers unto children, but not in a direct manner.

While most of us would feel sympathetic towards the children of the man in this example, we understand that this is how the world works. Human beings were endowed with free will and placed in a physical world of cause-and-effect. In such a world, it would be impossible to shield every individual from being affected in any negative way by every other person's actions. Likewise, it would be impossible for each and every person to be born into exactly the same circumstances as every other person on earth, with no relative advantages or disadvantages. The only time that could have happened was in Gan Eden, but those days are long gone. 

Understandably, this explanation might not sit well with everyone. Some people will object, saying, "But shouldn't Hashem just work it out so that this type of thing doesn't even happen? Wouldn't that be more in line with justice?" 

Perhaps the best way to respond to this is by citing the words of the navi (prophet): "For My thoughts are not your thoughts, and your ways are not My ways – says Hashem" (Yeshayahu 55:8). The Rambam expands upon this in his definition of the purpose of Sefer Iyov: 

But the term "hashgachah" (supervision) as applied to Him is not the same concept as our [human form of] supervision, nor is His "hanhagah" (management) of His creations the same concept as our management of what we manage. The two concepts are not even comprised in one and the same definition – as is thought by those who are confused – and there is nothing in common between the two except in name alone. 

In the same way, our actions do not resemble His actions, and the two are not comprised in one and the same definition. Just as natural acts differ from those of craftsmanship, so do the Divine hanhagah, hashgachah, and kavanah (purpose) in these natural phenomena differ from our management, supervision, and intention of what we manage, supervise, and intend. 

This is the objective of the entire Book of Iyov as a whole, namely, the establishing of this foundational concept, and the drawing of attention to the inference to be drawn from natural phenomena, so that you should not err and seek to affirm in your imagination that His yediah (knowledge) is like our knowledge, or that His kavanah, hashgachah, and hanhagah are like our purpose, supervision, and management.

The Rambam is not merely rehashing the oft-repeated statement, "God's ways are mysterious and are beyond human comprehension." Rather, he is saying that God's management and supervision of His universe is completely different than the way we manage and supervise things in our world. He is informing us that understanding this critical point is the gateway to knowledge of the ways of Hashem. To the extent that we judge Hashem's actions by comparing them to our own actions, the true understanding of His ways will be withheld. And to the extent that we open our minds to ideas of hashgachah which are counter-intuitive - and clash with the way we would like to view things - we will come to know and appreciate how the True Judge governs His world.

Thus, when faced with an explanation like the Ralbag's which seems to go against our notion of how God should manage, supervise, and implement justice in His world, perhaps we ought to take a step back and ask ourselves, "Am I making the mistake of looking at God's hashgachah through the lens of human hashgachah?" This doesn't mean that we should ignore our questions and problems. It means that the answer to our question might lie in examining the root of our problem, and opening ourselves up to the possibility that "His thoughts are not our thoughts, nor are His ways our ways."

If we stubbornly try to fit Hashem's actions into our preconceived ideas about how justice ought to be implemented, we will remain developmentally stunted in our understanding. It is precisely by challenging our own intuitive notions of Divine justice that we will gain insight into the beauty and beneficence of Hashem's ways.

Torah as Melachah (Craft)

Originally posted in July of 2012. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Torah as Melachah (Craft)

Every communal korban minchah (flour-offering) must be brought in the form of matzah (unleavened bread). There is only one exception to this rule: the shtei ha'lechem (Two Loaves) on the Chag ha'Shavuos, which consists of two loaves of lechem chamtetz (leavened bread). What is the reason for this anomaly? 

The Ralbag's answer (see Vayikra 23) sheds light on the nature of entire Torah-regimen:

The Torah commands us on the Chag ha’Shavuos to bring a minchah-offering of chametz. The idea is as follows: the Chag ha’Shavuos is – as we explained in Parshas Yisro – a commemoration of Matan Torah (the giving of the Torah), which is a wondrous expression of Hashem’s kindness to us, in that He brought us close to His service and caused us to inherit eternal life. In addition to this, there are material goods which emanate from Torah, such as the inheritance of the Land and the material goods which are bestowed upon us through hashgachah pratis (divine providence). 

Before man’s actions and concepts are perfected through the Torah-regimen, his actions and concepts are deficient – just like matzah-bread, which lacks the perfection of leavening. But afterwards, man’s actions and concepts become perfected, like chametz-bread, which has the greatest degree of perfection. 

For this reason, Hashem commanded us to eat matzah with the meat of the pesach-offering, and He commanded us to bring a minchah-offering of chametz on the day of Matan Torah. In order to firmly establish this intention in us, the Torah singled out the minchah-offering of the Chag ha’Shavuos to be chametz, in contrast to other minchah-offerings, in order to open our eyes to understand the truth of this intention. 

This serves the additional purpose of elucidating the essence and character of the Torah. The Torah is not in the class of "natural phenomena," but rather, it perfects us – in the same manner that many of the melachos ("crafts" or "arts") assist nature and perfect it (e.g. agriculture and other such arts). The same is true with Torah: man’s natural capacity to acquire human perfections is actualized through the Torah-regimen by those who practice it in a perfect manner. Moreover, just as the melachos which perfect nature are enacted by free choice, the same is true with the Torah-regimen. 

For these reasons, the perfection attained by means of Torah is compared to the perfection attained by means of melachah, as alluded to by the fact that the minchah-offering on the day of Matan Torah must be made from chametz-bread.

In order to better understand and appreciate the full import of the Ralbag's explanation, it would behoove us to review the Ralbag's definition of Torah, as expressed in the first paragraph of his introduction to Torah:

Blessed and exalted be the Rock, Who, with His Understanding, His Wisdom, and His Knowledge, gives existence to all existing things – the existence of which manifests a chochmah (wisdom) and chaninah (beneficence) that none but He can completely apprehend. Praised be the Creator, Who, out of His desire to benefit these existences and to bring them from deficient existence to complete existence, directed His hashgachah (providence) upon these lowly existences, developing them stage by stage until He reached the existence of man. In addition to directing His hashgachah on man’s existence in the wondrous design of his anatomy, his abilities, and the faculties by which his [physical] existence is preserved, He did not refrain from directing His hashgachah on man by guiding him on the path to true perfection – man’s ultimate state of existence, for the sake of which this lowly material existence was endowed with tzurah (design) to the extent that it is. He did this by giving us the divine Torah, which is a nimus (regimen) that brings those who practice it properly to the true success.

The Ralbag views Torah as a stage in the unfolding of the same hashgachah that brought all other existences from the state of deficient (potential) existence to complete (actual) existence. He even goes so far as to compare the Torah-regimen to the biological processes which govern our physical existence and development. Just as Hashem created the systems of biological laws which enable us to sustain our physical bodies, so too, He created the system of Torah laws which bring us to "complete existence," "true perfection," and "true success" - namely, perfection as a tzelem Elokim. But unlike the natural laws which govern our physical development, the laws of the Torah must be enacted through knowledge and free choice. This is where the mashal of melachah comes into the picture. 

According to the Ralbag, the Torah is designed to bring about human perfection in the same manner as the other forms of melachah - specifically, those melachos which "assist nature and perfect it." Fruits, vegetables, and grains occur in nature and grow without human intervention. The job of the farmer is to cooperate with the processes of nature and to facilitate the emergence of its products in a more perfected and complete manner. Likewise, Hashem designed the human body with the capacity to heal itself. The job of the doctor is to assist the body to heal itself with maximal efficiency. 

The same is true in the case of Torah. Man is capable of perfecting himself without Torah. It is even possible for human beings to reach great heights of perfection without Torah, as we see in the cases of Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, Moshe, Aharon, Miriam, and a small number of others. That small number testifies to the extreme difficulty of reaching perfection without Torah, which is why (or one of the reasons why) Hashem gave the Torah to us and obligated us to keep it. Without Torah, we really wouldn't stand a chance. 

There are many tremendous implications of the Ralbag's statement that the Torah "is not in the class of natural phenomena, but rather, it perfects us – in the same manner that many of the melachos assist nature and perfect it," but in this post, I'd only like to focus on one of those implications: the need for excellence in Torah-craftsmanship. 

The laws of Torah are not like the laws which govern the development of an embryo or the growth of a plant. In contrast to the laws of nature, which produce results consistently and "automatically" (not in the sense that they operate independently of Hashem, but in the sense that their operation is not contingent on the application of human skill and human judgment), the Torah-regimen varies widely in its "products" and its rate of success. In some cases, the Torah-regimen will produce Rebbi Akivas, Rambams, and Rav Soloveitchiks. In other cases, the Torah will produce amei ha'aretz (ignoramuses) and "stam baalei batim" ("ordinary laymen"). And in other cases, the Torah will - in spite of itself - yield Korachs, Yeravam ben Navats, and other reshaim (wicked people). 

Why does the Torah produce such a variety of results? There are many reasons, no doubt. But to a large extent, the results of the Torah-regimen are dependent on the level of "craftsmanship" of the Torah practitioner. The Ralbag acknowledges this by explicitly qualifying his statements about the perfection achieved through Torah. In both of the aforementioned excerpts, the Ralbag says that the Torah achieves its purpose only for those "who practice it properly" or "those who practice it in a perfect manner." Yes, it is true that some people are more likely to "succeed" in Torah than others, whether by virtue of their innate dispositions, their upbringing, or their environmental circumstances - but most of those factors are largely outside of our control. What we can control and work on is developing our own proficiency in "Torah-craftsmanship" - or, if you prefer, "the skilled practice of the Torah-regimen."

There are many ways to view Torah. Chazal, themselves, compared Torah to many different things: water, wine, fire, etc. It would be a mistake to assume that these analogies were intended as absolute definitions. Rather, each analogy illuminates different dimensions of the infinitely deep and multifaceted Torah-regimen. I think that the Ralbag's comparison of Torah to melachah should be taken in that spirit. Personally I have found that the Ralbag's comparison of the Torah-regimen to craft has enriched my practice of Torah immeasurably, and I hope it does the same for you.

Yom ha'Kippurim 5775: What is Kaparah?

Originally posted in March of 2012. Click here for a printer-friendly version of this blog post.

Yom ha'Kippurim 5775: What is Kaparah?

Introduction

Every year - usually around Rosh ha'Shanah and Yom ha'Kippurim - I find myself bothered by the question: "What is kaparah?" According to the Radak, the word "kaparah" in this context refers to the removal of sin (see the Sefer ha'Shorashim, כ.פ.ר.). But what, exactly, does this mean? Does it refer to some mystical notion of "erasing our sins" from Hashem's "record"? Does kaparah pertain to the state of our souls in Olam ha'Ba? Is kaparah a type of hashgachah that somehow aids us in Olam ha'Zeh? We have an obligation and responsibility to engage in certain actions which are said to effectuate kaparah, and yet, we often speak of kaparah as though it must be "granted" to us - as though our role in obtaining kaparah is passive. How does that work? And what is the relationship between kaparah and teshuvah? If a person does complete teshuvah, why does he still require kaparah? What more is there left for him to do?

Needless to say, this is a massive topic, and it would be unrealistic to expect any theory to answer all questions and to remove all doubts. That being said, our objective in this post will be to propose one theory of kaparah based on several sources in the Ralbag and the Rambam. If this theory makes sense here then perhaps we will be able to apply it to other instances of the term kaparah throughout the Torah system.

Semichah al ha'Korban

Our journey begins with the first instance of the term kaparah in Sefer Vayikra, which occurs within the first several pesukim:

He called to Moshe, and Hashem spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting, saying: Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them: When a man among you brings a sacrifice to Hashem: from animals - from the cattle or from the flock shall you bring your sacrifice. If one's offering is a burnt-sacrifice from the cattle, he shall sacrifice an unblemished male; he shall bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, voluntarily, before Hashem. He shall lean his hands upon the head of the burnt-sacrifice; and he shall attain favor through it, to provide kaparah (atonement) for him. He shall slaughter the bull before Hashem; the sons of Aharon, the Kohanim, shall bring the blood and throw the blood on the Altar, all around - which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting (Vayikra 1:1-5).

The pesukim imply that the act of semichah is a component of the kaparah that is attained through the korban. This implication is confirmed by Torah she'baal Peh. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Maaseh ha'Korbanos 3:12 (based on a Gemara in Yoma 5a):

We slaughter the animal in the same location as the semichah, and the shechitah (slaughtering) takes place immediately after the semichah. If one did semichah in another location or delayed [between the semichah and the shechitah], his shechitah is still valid. Semichah is an incremental aspect of the mitzvah. Therefore, if one did not do semichah, his korban still effectuates kaparah, and does not jeopardize his fulfillment of the mitzvah. Nevertheless, it is considered as if his korban did not effectuate kaparah.

This is a strange halacha. Apparently, if a person does not do semichah, his korban still fulfills the halachic requirements of kaparah - and yet, his kaparah is considered to be lacking in another sense (see Ritva on Yoma 5a). In what sense is it considered as if he did not achieve kaparah? And why not? What makes semichah such an integral part of the kaparah process?

Ralbag's Explanation

The Ralbag answers this question. In doing so, he provides a fundamental insight into the purpose of korbanos and lays the groundwork for a theory of kaparah. In his commentary on the parashah the Ralbag writes:

"He shall lean his hands upon the head of the burnt-sacrifice" (1:4) Since this semichah is a sort of kaparah-device in the same manner as the burnt-sacrifice itself provides kaparah, the sinner therefore confesses his avonos (iniquities) at the time of semichah. We learn this from what was said in Parshas Acharei Mos: “Aharon shall lean his two hands upon the head of the living he-goat and confess upon it all the avonos of the Children of Israel, [and all their rebellious sins among all their sins, and place them upon the head of the he-goat, and send it with a designated man to the desert]” (Vayikra 16:21). The semichah was for this very reason: to demonstrate [that it is] as if he removed those avonos from himself and transferred them to the head of that animal, in order to reassure him in his heart that his avonos have already been removed. This provides a tremendous benefit, for if a person does not think that his sins are removed when he does teshuvah to Hashem (exalted is He), then a person who committed terrible sins will think that he is utterly doomed, and he will continue to sin even more, for he thinks that there is no benefit in doing teshuvah to Hashem, since he is already doomed by his sins [in his own mind]. This is the general benefit in all of the korbanos which are brought for sins; they will not bring kaparah without teshuvah.

Ralbag elaborates on this in the toeles section of his commentary:

[This parashah] guides men towards perfection by teaching that when they sin, they should return in teshuvah to Hashem (exalted is He) and He will provide kaparah of their avonos for them. The reason for this is that “there is no righteous person on earth who does only good and does not sin” (Koheles 7:20). If those who committed certain sins believed that their avon would be a permanent stain before Hashem (exalted is He), they would continue to sin, since they would believe that they are already doomed on account of their sin, and they would miss out on the benefits of guarding against sinning in the future. If, however, they know that by doing teshuvah from their evil path and returning to the paths of Hashem (exalted is He) that He will remove their avonos for them, then they will be careful not to sin in the future, and they will do teshuvah to Hashem so that He will have mercy on them and provide kaparah for their sin. Hashem wanted teshuvah to be accompanied by the bringing of a korban in order to reassure the sinner that his sin has already received kaparah. The reason for this is that to the masses it is inconceivable that a man can be wicked and subsequently be cleansed of his wickedness through doing teshuvah in his heart, without any action whatsoever. It is for this reason that Hashem (exalted is He) commanded us to do these korbanos in the revered sanctuary, which houses His shechinah, through the kohen who is set aside for avodas Hashem – in order to complete the kaparah for the sinner along with teshuvah. For this reason there is a mitzvah [for the sinner] to lean with his two hands on the head of his korban and to confess all of his iniquities upon it, in order that his heart may be reassured that it is as if those sins have been removed from him and placed onto the head of that animal. By doing the korbanos in this manner in the order specified in the Torah, man is guided along the path of perfection to avodas Hashem and is distanced from following his yetzer ha’ra (bad inclination).

Ralbag's explanation can be summarized as follows. Kaparah cannot occur without teshuvah. However, even teshuvah is insufficient, for the sinner will still feel that his avon is "a permanent stain before God," and that he is forever tainted by his avonos. This line of thinking is dangerous, for unless a person believes that teshuvah can completely eradicate his avonos, he is prone to give up on teshuvah altogether and to persist in, or increase, his avonos. 

To overcome this psychological roadblock, Hashem commands the sinner to complete his teshuvah process by engaging in symbolic actions - actions which appeal to the imagination and speak to the psyche in its own terms - in order to "reassure his heart" that his avonos have been completely removed, and that no trace of them remains. These symbolic actions include the bringing of a korban in the Beis ha'Mikdash, performing semichah on that korban, and verbalizing a vidui (confession) on that korban - as if one is transferring one's avonos to the head of the animal - whereupon the animal will immediately undergo shechitah (slaughtering) and hakravah (being offered) on the mizbach kaparah (altar of atonement).

This is the manner in which teshuvah, combined with the bringing of a korban - complete with semichah, vidui, and shechitah - effectuates full kaparah (i.e. complete removal of the avon). Full kaparah cannot occur until one has completely abandoned the avon, not only in one's actions, but even from one's psyche. This psychological dimension of the kaparah is difficult to achieve through teshuvah alone. Man requires an symbolic action to impress upon his psyche that his slate is clean and his sin has been erased.

I believe that this is meaning of the halacha that if one fails to do semichah, his korban still effectuates halachic kaparah, but "it is considered as if his korban did not effectuate kaparah." In other words, the korban itself received the requisite "processing" in Mikdash to satisfy the requirements for kaparah, but the gavra - the individual who sinned - will not receive full kaparah since his psyche did not undergo the catharsis which the semichah was designed to facilitate.

Rambam's Explanation

The Rambam seems to agree with this idea as well. In the taamei ha'mitzvos section of the Moreh ha'Nevuchim, the Rambam divides all 613 mitzvos into fourteen categories and attempts to identify the reasons and/or benefits for each and every mitzvah. The first category is that of yesodei ha'Torah: mitzvos which are designed to teach and strengthen our conviction in the foundational principles of Torah. The Rambam (3:36) concludes his exposition on this category by discussing the mitzvah of teshuvah:

It is obvious that teshuvah is likewise included in this category; that is to say, it is one of the doctrines which are indispensable in maintaining the existence of Torah adherents, for it is impossible for any man not to err and sin – either because he mistakenly adopts a wrongful doctrine or character trait, or else he is overcome by desire or anger – and if man were convinced that he could never make his crooked ways straight, he would forever continue in his errors, and maybe even increase his disobedience if he believed there was no alternative. But with the belief in teshuvah, he will come back to the good and will return to an even more perfected state – even more perfected than he was before he sinned. For this reason, [the Torah commands us] in many actions which strengthen our belief in this very beneficial principle [of teshuvah]: for example, the confessions, and the korbanos for sins committed unknowingly – and in some cases even for sins committed intentionally – and the fasts. The general principle behind teshuvah from any sin is the complete removal of sin, and this is the purpose of this doctrine. 

The Rambam is clearly talking about the same phenomenon as the Ralbag, namely, the sinner's feeling that he is "doomed by his sins." Like the Ralbag, the Rambam maintains that the institutions of vidui and the korbanos are designed to strengthen one's conviction in the efficacy of teshuvah. Moreover, the Rambam implies that the sinner is prone to fall into this type of despair both before and after he engages in teshuvah. We see this from the fact that taaniyos (fast days) and chatzotzros (the sounding of the trumpets, which accompany every taanis) are designed to stimulate and initiate teshuvah whereas vidui and korban occur at the very end of the teshuvah process - and yet, the Rambam states that the purpose of all of these mitzvos is "to strengthen our belief" in the efficacy of teshuvah.

Does the Rambam agree with the Ralbag's idea that the Torah commands us in symbolic actions which are designed to speak to the psyche in its own language? It seems so. In his explanation of the reasons behind the korbanos, the Rambam (3:46) writes:

But the intent behind the burning of these chataos (sin-offerings) is that the memory of the sin [for which the offering is brought] has already been erased and no longer exists, just as the body that is being burnt no longer exists, and no trace will be left of that [sinful] action, just as no trace is left of this chatas, which is utterly destroyed by fire ... And since the seir ha’mishtaleach (the goat that is "cast off" of the Azazel cliff on Yom ha’Kippurim) served as the ultimate kaparah for all major transgressions, more than any other communal-chatas, therefore we do not slaughter it or burn it or bringing it to the altar at all; rather, we remove it as far as possible and cast it off to a desolate, uninhabited land. There is no man who will doubt the fact that sins are not actually an entity that can be transferred from the back of one being onto another. Rather, these are all symbolic actions which impart an impression to the soul in order to arouse it to teshuvah – as if to say, “We have cleansed ourselves from all of our previous deeds, and we have cast them behind our backs and rejected them with the utmost degree of rejection.”

Here the Rambam explicitly acknowledges the symbolic character of these korbanos which are intended to produce a psychological affect (התפעלות - in both the Qafih and Ibn Tibbon translations) on the sinner to spur him to do teshuvah and to strengthen his belief in its efficacy. Although the Rambam does not discuss the specific reason for semichah on korbanos, it is reasonable to interpret it in the same vein as the other aspects of the korban-chatas which he spelled out in the excerpts cited here.

Conclusion

As we stated at the outset, there still remain numerous questions that have yet to be answered. For instance, the Rambam devotes the bulk of Hilchos Teshuvah, Perek 1 to explaining how and when kaparah is attained for various types of transgressions. This hierarchy begs for an explanation. Likewise, our tefilos are filled with requests for Hashem to grant us kaparah. What do all of these requests mean? And what does it mean to ask Hashem for kaparah anyway?

With Hashem's help, we will take up these questions in the future. In the meantime, I hope this explanation provides a true and beneficial insight into the phenomenon of kaparah.

Rambam's Three Groups

Originally Posted in August, 2008

I've been meaning to post the Rambam's discussion of the "three groups" (from his introduction to Chelek) for quite some time. I guess I've refrained, because I didn't want to post the text without offering some insight into it. I recently realized, however, that this is irrational, and that I should definitely post the text even if I have nothing to say about it at the moment.

Rambam: Introduction to Perek Chelek

People can be divided into three groups, based on the way they relate to the words of Chazal (i.e. the Wise Men of the Talmud).

The First Group

The first group includes the majority of people I have met and whose books I have seen and about whom I have heard. These people understand the words of Chazal according to their literal meanings without explaining them at all. To them, all impossible things are believed to be necessary. This is due to their stupidity in matters of science and their inexperience with other branches of knowledge. They lack sufficient perfection to be awakened to such wisdom on their own and they have found no one to awaken them. Consequently, they think that the only meaning in the wise words of Chazal is what they, themselves, understand – namely, the literal meaning. They think this, even though the literal meanings contain statements so bizarre that if you were to tell them to an average person, and certainly to an intelligent individual, he would be astounded and exclaim, “How is it possible that there should be anyone in the world who would imagine such things and think that they are true, much less find value in them?”

The unfortunate people in this group (may God have mercy on their stupidity) exalt Chazal in their own minds, but in reality, they degrade them to the utmost extent without realizing it. As God Lives, this group destroys the beauty of Torah and darkens its brilliance. These people render the Torah of Hashem the opposite of its intended purpose, for Hashem said about the wisdom of His Torah, “[for it is your wisdom and discernment in the eyes of the nations, who shall hear all these decrees and who shall say,] ‘Surely a wise and discerning people is this great nation!’” (Devarim 4:6). But this group expound from the literal meanings of the words of Chazal notions which, if heard by the gentiles, would cause them to say, “Surely a stupid and disgraceful people is this pathetic nation!”

Many of the men who do this are public speakers who attempt to convey ideas to the people which they, themselves, do not understand. If only they would shut up, since they do not understand – “If only you would be utterly silent, that would be your wisdom” (Iyov 13:5). Or if only they had it in them to say, “We do not know what Chazal intended with these words, nor do we know how to interpret them.” Instead, they think they understand, and they set themselves up as authorities to convey to the people their own understanding - not what Chazal actually said; and they expound to the masses the midrashim in Berachos and Perek Chelek and the like, word for word according to their literal meanings.

The Second Group

The second group is also numerous. It consists of individuals who, having read or heard the words of Chazal, understand them according to their simple literal sense and believe that Chazal intended nothing more than what may be learned from their literal interpretation. Consequently, they will degrade them, disparage them, and consider things to be ridiculous which are not actually ridiculous, and they will inevitably mock the words of Chazal. They imagine that their own intelligence is of a higher order than that of Chazal, and that Chazal were simpletons who suffered from inferior intelligence were incapable of attaining genuine wisdom. Most of those who have stumbled into this error are involved with medicine or astrology. They regard themselves as cultivated men, scientists, critics, and philosophers. They are more foolish than the first group and more naïve.

This is an accursed group which attempts to tarnish men of established greatness whose wisdom has been demonstrated to those who are competent in wisdom. If these fools had worked at wisdom hard enough to know how to write accurately about theology and similar subjects both for the masses and for the educated, and if they understood the practical aspects of philosophy, then they would be in a position to understand whether the Sages were in fact wise or not, and the real meaning of their teachings would be clear to them.

The Third Group

There is a third group. Its members are so few in number that it is hardly appropriate to call them a group, except in the sense in which one speaks of the Sun as a group, of which it is the only member. This group consists of men to whom the greatness of Chazal is clear. They recognize the superiority of Chazal's intelligence from their words, which point to exceedingly profound truths. Even though this third group is few and scattered, their books teach the perfection which was achieved by their authors and the high level of truth which they had attained. The members of this group understand that Chazal clearly knew impossibility of that which is impossible and the necessity of that which is necessarily true. They know that Chazal did not speak nonsense, and it is clear to them that the words of Chazal contain both a surface-meaning and a hidden meaning. Thus, whenever Chazal spoke of things that seem impossible, they were employing the style of riddle and parable which is the method of truly great thinkers. For example, the greatest of our wise men (Solomon) began his book by saying: “To understand an analogy and a metaphor, the words of the wise and their riddles” (Mishlei 1:6).

All students of rhetoric know the real purpose of a riddle is its hidden meaning and not its surface-meaning, as in: “Let me now put forth a riddle to you” (Shoftim 14:12). Since the words of the Sages all deal with metaphysical matters which are the ultimate objective, they must be expressed in riddles and analogies. How can we complain if they formulate their wisdom in analogies and employ such figures of speech as used by the masses, especially when we note that the wisest of all men did precisely that, under the guidance of the Prophetic Spirit? I am referring to Solomon in Proverbs, the Song of Songs, and parts of Ecclesiastes.

It is often difficult for us to interpret words and to educe their true meaning from the form in which they are contained so that their real inner meaning conforms to reason and is in line with truth. This is the case even with the Holy Scriptures. Chazal, themselves, interpreted Scriptural passages in such a way as to educe their inner meaning from literal sense, correctly considering these passages to be figures of speech, just as we do. Examples are their explanations of the following passages: “he smote the two alter-hearths of Moab; he went down also and slew a lion in the midst of a pit” (Shmuel II 23:20); “Oh, that one would give me water to drink of the well of Bethlehem” (ibid. 23:15). The entire narrative of which these passages are a part was interpreted metaphorically. Similarly, the whole Book of Job was considered by many of Chazal to be properly understood only in metaphorical terms. The dead bones of Ezekiel (Chapter 37) were also considered by one of the rabbis to make sense only in metaphoric terms. Similar treatment was given to other passages of this sort.

Advice to the Reader

Now if you, reader, belong to either of the first two groups, pay no attention to my words nor to anything else in this section. You will not like it. On the contrary, it will irritate you, and you will hate it. How could a person who is accustomed to eating large amounts of harmful food find simple food in small quantities appealing, even though the latter is good for him? On the contrary, he will actually find them irritating, and he will hate them. Do you not recall the reaction of the people who were accustomed to eating onions garlic, fish, and the like? They said: “Now our soul is dried away; there is nothing at all; we have naught save this manna to look to” (Bamidbar 11:6).

But if you belong to the third group, when you encounter a statement of Chazal which seems to conflict with reason, you will pause, consider it, and realize that this utterance must be a riddle or a parable. You will sleep on it, trying anxiously to grasp its logic and its expression, so that you may find its genuine intellectual intention and lay hold of a genuine concept, as Scripture says: “To find out words of delight, and that which was written uprightly, even words of truth” (Koheles 12:10).

If you consider my book in this spirit, with the help of God, it may be useful to you.