Here's an article I cranked out over Taanis Esther and Purim day which offers insight into Esther's character via a set of bizarre midrashim about her observance of hilchos niddah with Achashveirosh.
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Megilas Esther: How Esther Stayed Religious
“Every day Mordechai would walk back and forth before the courtyard of the women’s house to know Esther’s wellbeing and what was to be done to her” (Esther 2:11). According to the pshat, Mordechai was checking on her general welfare and keeping tabs on her fate. Chazal, however, teach that Mordechai was “inquiring about her bloodstains and her niddah (menstrual status)” (Esther Rabbah 2:11 [6:8]). Similarly, when the Megilah tells us that “Esther followed Mordechai’s directive as she had when she was raised with him” (2:20), Chazal explain: “she would show her menstrual blood to the Sages [for halachic rulings]” (Megilah 13b). The question is: Why posit that Mordechai and Esther were preoccupied with the laws of niddah? What are Chazal trying to teach us?
The Gemara continues with an even more unbelievable statement – one which is predicated on Chazal’s assumption that Mordechai and Esther were husband and wife (13a) rather than adoptive father and daughter. The Gemara states: “[Esther] would get up from the lap of Achashveirosh (i.e. from having sexual relations with him), immerse herself in a mikveh, and sit in the lap of Mordechai (i.e. return to having sexual relations with him)” (13b). This is problematic on at least three levels. First and foremost, there is no halachic need – and, seemingly, no halachic purpose – to keeping the laws of niddah in a forbidden sexual relationship with a non-Jew. A second problem, raised by R’ Chalayo (13th century), has to do with the logistics: Mordechai didn’t have direct access to Esther while she was married to Achashveirosh, as evidenced by the fact that the two of them were forced to communicate by messenger during the Haman crisis (see Esther 4:5,7,9,10,12,13). If so, how was it even possible for them to continue sleeping together? R’ Chalayo identifies a third problem: Why would Mordechai and Esther risk their lives and the lives of the entire Jewish people for the sake of these trysts? Surely the king had eyes and ears everywhere in Shushan. Considering his earlier response to Vashti’s “betrayal” and his subsequent rage at Haman’s perceived attempt to rape the queen, we can guess how Achashveirosh would react if he learned that his wife were having an affair with Mordechai, the Jew. How, then, can we make sense of this midrash? [1]
R’ Chalayo offers an explanation which resolves these problems and showcases Esther’s stellar character:
It is possible for me to explain the words of the midrash [as follows:] because Esther was living among the uncircumcised [gentiles,] and eating the [non-kosher] royal food, she was unable to keep Torah and mitzvos properly. This is the meaning of the immersion [mentioned in the midrash,] that “she immersed [in a mikveh and returned to] the lap of Mordechai” – namely, this was Esther’s best immersion to fulfill the Torah and the mitzvos to the extent that was possible for her. The proof is: “and Esther obeyed the directive of Mordechai,” which they say [means:] “she would show her menstrual blood to the Sages.” How good and how pleasant is this explanation!
On a simple level, the midrash conveys the idea that Esther kept Torah and mitzvos as best as she could under the circumstances. Chazal’s statement that she immersed in a mikveh and went back to Mordechai after sleeping with Achashveirosh isn’t meant to be taken literally. Rather, it means that she didn’t abandon the halachos of niddah despite being married to a non-Jew. Instead, she maintained allegiance to the teachings of Mordechai and the Sages. The Manos Levi (2:11) and the Torah Temimah (ibid. footnote 27) explain what this means in practical terms: although she wasn’t able to avoid relations with Achashveirosh, she strove to only sleep with him while in a state of purity, which is why she continued to pose halachic questions to the Sages about her bloodstains.
Esther’s decision exemplifies the Torah value of kedushah (loosely translated as “sanctity,” “holiness,” or “separateness”). Kedushah means “transcendence of physicality.” For non-physical existences (God, angels, souls), to be kadosh is to be non-physical. For physical creatures, such as ourselves, being kadosh means resisting the temptation to let our physicality overpower our tzelem Elokim (non-physical, truth-seeking intellect). Instead, we must rise above our animalistic nature and strive for the opposite kind of life: a life of mind over matter.
Chazal teach us the principle of: “kadeish atzmecha b’mutar lach” or “sanctify yourself within what is permitted to you” (Yevamos 20a). This means that it is not enough to merely restrict ourselves within the parameters of halacha but “let loose” and indulge whenever we have the right to do so. Rather, we should strive to uphold the value of kedushah beyond what halacha demands and aspire to fulfill the objectives inherent in the spirit of the law even when we are not restrained by the letter of the law.
Based on this concept, I coined the phrase: “kadeish atzmecha b’assur lach” (“sanctify yourself within what is prohibited to you”), which I explained in my article on this topic as follows:
[This means that] even when a person violates halacha, they should still practice kedushah to the extent possible. In other words, just because the transgressor knows they are going to violate halacha doesn't mean that they should just say, "To hell with it," and go on to act in a totally unrestrained manner. Instead, they should still exercise restraint and self-control within that violation of halacha - and, if feasible, should try to act in accordance with the objectives of the Torah, even though his or her actions are not in line with halacha itself.
We have examples in Tanach of tzadikim working out ingenious ways to keep halacha when the odds are against them, such as Daniel, who devised a strategy to avoid eating non-kosher food in the royal palace by surviving off legumes. We have examples of tzadikim risking their lives rather than violate the core principles of Torah, such as Chananya, Mishael, and Azaryah, who consigned themselves to the flames rather than submit to the idolatrous ideology of Nevuchadnetzar. We even have examples of tzadikim who were tempted to violate halacha but overcame their struggles, such as Yosef who had to force himself away from the wife of Potiphar.
Esther is in a category of her own. Here we have a tzadekes who was forced to marry a hedonistic, profligate, non-Jewish king who was the antithesis of kedushah. She was essentially cut off from her people and her heritage – a people who, themselves, were in the darkness of exile and had lost their way. She was made queen of the world and granted access to “up to half of the kingdom.” It would have been all too easy for her to succumb to the allure of her position and eagerly cast off her Jewish heritage. It would have been equally easy for her to become discouraged by the compromises she was forced to make, and to abandon Judaism as being impossible to uphold. Instead, she persevered in her observance of Torah and mitzvos, committing herself to the values and ideals of Judaism even if she wasn’t able to keep all its laws.
Despite the strange surface-level meaning of these midrashim, we see that they were written to convey an underappreciated aspect of Esther’s righteousness: that she didn’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good in her service of Hashem, even while she was in her personal exile within a national exile. And neither should we.
[1] Eitz Yosef on Esther Rabbah 2:11 [6:8] explains the textual basis for Chazal’s interpretation:
This is inferred from the statement that “he would walk back and forth before the courtyard of the women’s house,” for it would have been sufficient to say, “and each and every day Mordechai would inquire about Esther’s welfare.” Since it said, “the women’s house,” it seems he was speaking about “the way of women” (i.e. menstruation) and that the statement “before the courtyard of the women’s house” is a euphemism for matters of niddah and bloodstains.
Maharzu (ibid.) notes that Chazal described female anatomy in architectural terms, which is why it’s not farfetched to assume that “before the courtyard of the women’s house” would be read euphemistically by those familiar with Rabbinic jargon.
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