Kol ha'Seridim: November 2022

Monday, November 28, 2022

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah content for the month of Kislev has been sponsored by Serena and Paul Koppel, who want to be makir tov and express gratitude.

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt, "impressionist painting of a woman's beautiful and haunting green eyes"

Vayeitzei: The Eyes of Leah in the Eyes of Three Schools of Commentary

The Torah introduces Leah by way of comparison to her sister: "Lavan had two daughters: the name of the older was Leah and the name of the younger was Rachel. And the eyes of Leah were rakos (lit. soft), but Rachel was beautiful of form and beautiful of appearance” (Bereishis 29:17-18). The two basic questions are: What does “rakos” mean, and why does the Torah tell us this?

The commentators here can be divided into three camps: (1) “minimalist pshat” commentators who answer the first question but not the second, (2) “maximalist pshat” commentators, who extrapolate answers to the second question from their answer to the first question, (3) “midrashic” commentators who use the text as a springboard to fill in other details about Leah’s character and backstory. Here is a summary of all the explanations I’ve read.

“Minimalist pshat” explanations include: her eyes were weak (Ibn Ezra); Leah’s eyes were physically beautiful (Onkelos); they were beautiful because they radiated joy (R’ Yosef Kara); she had beautiful pale eyes, and the rest of her was ALSO beautiful (Rashbam); her eyes were her ONLY beautiful feature (R’ Avraham ben ha’Rambam); she was beautiful in all respects EXCEPT for her eyes because she wept frequently (Radak); Leah wasn’t as beautiful as Rachel, but the Torah conveys this euphemistically by praising her beautiful eyes (R’ Hirsch).

“Maximalist pshat” explanations include: Leah’s eyes were beautiful but sensitive to the wind, making her unfit for shepherding (Bechor Shor); similarly, her eyes were overly sensitive to the sun (Ramban); Leah’s eyes were runny because of some disease which Yaakov was concerned might affect her progeny (Ralbag); likewise, the condition of Leah’s eyes made Yaakov think she would go blind (Abravanel); Leah’s eyes indicated that she was emotionally sensitive – not in a bad way, but in a way that made Yaakov more attracted to Rachel (Shadal).

The midrashic interpretation of Chazal is paraphrased by Rashi: “[Leah's eyes were] tender because she cried, thinking that she was destined for the lot of Eisav, because everyone used to say: ‘Rivkah has two sons and Lavan has two daughters: the elder [will marry] the elder, and the younger the younger.’” Chazal tell us that Leah would cry and pray, saying: “May it be [God’s] will that I not fall into the lot of that evildoer” (Bereishis Rabbah 70:15) and that she cried out in prayer “until her eyelashes fell out” (Bava Basra 123a).

Of the three approaches, the second and third are likely to find more favor in people’s eyes than the first. The maximalist pashtanim answer both questions by making reasonable inferences from the text. The midrashic commentators take homiletical liberties to provide a behind-the-scenes glimpse into Leah’s thoughts and feelings, reinforcing her righteous character. Both approaches deepen our understanding of the story in satisfactory ways.

But what are we to make of the “minimalist pshat” approaches? They seem to raise more problems than they solve. Indeed, ibn Kaspi – a staunch member of the minimalist camp – is led by his reading to ask a brazen question:

It should not surprise us that the Giver of the Torah didn't explain for us the reason for Leah's inferiority and Rachel's beauty, for there is no artist like our God. However, what is surprising – based on our principles, and the principles of every pious individual – is how Yaakov Avinu chose maidens [based on] beauty.

Ibn Kaspi’s commentary follows in the footsteps of R’ Yosef Kara, minimalist pashtan par excellence, who writes: “the prophetic text was written complete, with its solution and everything it needs … lacking nothing in its place [to be fully understood], and there is thus no need to bring proof from another place nor from midrash” (I Shmuel 1:17). This is the minimalist pshat method: to read the text as conservatively as possible, and unflinchingly face whatever questions may arise. This approach is difficult and treacherous, which is why it is far less popular than the other two approaches. Nevertheless, it is part of our mesorah, and should not be dismissed or undervalued.

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Friday, November 25, 2022

Toldos: Does God Judge Our Prayers Based on Our Parents?

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Artwork: DALL-E responding to the prompt, "Van Gogh painting of Biblical Isaac in light and Rebecca in darkness"

Toldos: Does God Judge Our Prayers Based on Our Parents?

“Yitzchak entreated Hashem on behalf of his wife because she was barren” (Bereishis 25:21). Although the pasuk makes it sound like Yitzchak was the only one who prayed, Rashi (ibid.) clarifies that he was joined in tefilah (prayer) by Rivkah: “he stood in one corner and prayed while she stood in another corner and prayed” (B.R. 63:5). Why, then, does the pasuk go on to say: “Hashem answered him, and Rivka conceived.” Shouldn’t it have said “them”? The Gemara answers by deriving a principle: “the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik (a righteous offspring of a righteous parent) cannot be compared to the tefilah of a tzadik ben rasha (a righteous offspring of an evil parent)” (Yevamos 64a). Yitzchak and Rivkah were both tzadikim, but the pasuk tells us that Hashem responded to Yitzchak because his father was the righteous Avraham Avinu, whereas Rivkah’s was the wicked Besuel.

This is problematic. Why should parentage have an impact on whether one’s tefilah is answered? To the contrary – David ha’Melech teaches us that “Hashem is close to all who call Him, to all who call Him in truth” (Tehilim 145:18). Chazal teach us that “the Merciful One desires the heart” (Sanhedrin 106b) If Yitzchak and Rivka were both tzadikim and both engaged in sincere tefilah, why should the righteousness or wickedness of their respective fathers matter?

This principle shows up in halacha as well. The Shulchan Aruch (OC 53) lists the criteria that are taken into consideration when appointing a shatz – that is, the “official” shaliach tzibur (communal representative), who leads the congregational prayers. Some of these criteria pertain to the candidate’s perfection: his righteousness, his wisdom, his humility. Other criteria are based on perceptions: his reputation, his voice, his appearance. The Bach (OC 53:3) infers from our Gemara that if two people are equally fit to serve as the shatz, it is preferable to appoint the one who has yichus (a superior family pedigree) over the one who lacks yichus. The Taz (OC 53:3) disagrees and maintains that in a tiebreaker situation, we should appoint the shatz from an inferior family because, all things being equal, “it is better to draw near this person from an undistinguished family in order to bring this offspring closer to the shechinah (Divine presence),” as it is stated: “peace, peace to the far and the near” (Yeshayahu 57:11).

In order to make sense of the Gemara in Yevamos and explain the disagreement between the Bach and the Taz, I feel that it is necessary to make a daring move. When the Gemara says, “the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik cannot be compared to that of a tzadik ben rasha,” it is NOT speaking about the “likelihood” of the tefilah being answered. “Hashem is close to all who call Him, to all who call Him in truth,” full stop. Rather, the tefilah of a tzadik ben tzadik is superior for extrinsic reasons, because of how it is perceived. Indeed, when the Gemara asserts the superiority of Yitzchak’s tefilah, Rashi there does NOT say: “therefore, Hashem answered him [instead of Rivkah]” but rather, “therefore, the pasuk ascribes [the answering] to him.” In other words, the tefilos of Yitzchak and Rivkah were equally effective, but the Torah assigns the credit to Yitzchak. If the Torah had said, “Hashem answered her,” we would focus on Rivkah alone, as we do when we read about Chanah’s tefilah. If it had said, “Hashem answered them,” we’d focus on their plight as a couple. But when the Torah says, “Hashem answered him,” it frames the answering of Yitzchak’s tefilah as a furtherance of the legacy of righteousness initiated by his righteous father Avraham.

Likewise, the yichus of the shatz has no bearing on the likelihood of his tefilah being answered. Rather, the disagreement is about which middah of Ha’Kadosh Baruch Hu we seek to reflect via our appointment of this candidate as shatz. According to the Bach, we appoint a tzadik ben tzadik to highlight Hashem’s support of righteous legacies: “Hashem is good, forever is His kindness, and His faithfulness is from generation to generation” (Tehilim 100:5). According to the Taz, we convey the idea that Hashem seeks “peace, peace for the far and the near” (Yeshayahu 57:11) by appointing someone from a “distant” family and drawing him close to the shechinah.

Regardless of whether this explanation is correct, I believe its methodology is sound. When faced with a perplexing midrash about tefilah, we should not discard our fundamental understanding of how tefilah works in order to explain it.

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Friday, November 18, 2022

Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

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Artwork: DALL-E's response to the prompt: "abstract oil painting of Biblical Abraham sitting on his servant's hand"

Chayei Sarah: The Pshat of “Place Your Hand Under My Thigh”

When Avraham Avinu charges Eliezer to find a wife for Yitzchak, he begins by saying: “Place now your hand under my thigh, and I will have you swear by Hashem, God of heaven and God of earth, that you not take a wife for my son from the daughters of the Canaanites” (Bereishis 24:2). Similarly, when Yaakov is about to die, he tells Yosef: “Please – if I have found favor in your eyes, please place your hand under my thigh and do kindness and truth with me – please do not bury me in Egypt” (ibid. 47:29). The question is: What is the significance of this gesture?

Rashi (ibid. 24:2), citing Chazal’s drashah (Midrash Rabbah ibid.), maintains that “place your hand under my thigh” means “grab hold of the place of my bris milah.” He explains: “one who swears an oath needs to take a mitzvah object in hand, such as a Torah scroll or tefillin, and milah was the first mitzvah for [Avraham], and came to him through pain, and was beloved to him.” According to Rashi, the conduct of Avraham and Yaakov serves as a precedent for the halachic requirement to hold a mitzvah object when making certain types of oaths (see Talmud Bavli Shavuos 38b and Rashi’s commentary there). Rashi does not qualify his comments, nor does he cite any alternative views.

The majority of other Rishonim either oppose or qualify Rashi’s interpretation. The leader of the opposition is Ibn Ezra (Bereishis 24:2) who objects to the notion that Avraham swore by milah, and then offers his own take:

[The Sages] said that [the phrase “place your hand under my thigh”] refers to milah, but if this were so, he would have sworn by his milah and not by Hashem. The more likely explanation to me is that it was customary in those days for a person to place his hand under the thigh of the person who had mastery over him, meaning: “If you are under my dominion, place your hand under my thigh,” and the master would sit on the hand, [as if the servant were] saying: “Behold! My hand is under your dominion to do your will.” This custom is still followed in India today.

Ibn Ezra’s view is cited and endorsed by a number of other Rishonim, including Rashbam (ibid.), Bechor Shor (ibid.), Radak (ibid.), Chizkuni (ibid.), Rabbeinu Bachya (ibid.), Tur (peirush ha’aroch ibid.), Ralbag (ibid.), and Ibn Kaspi (ibid.). Other major commentators highlight the difficulties with Rashi. Abravanel (ibid. question #4) rejects Rashi’s approach as “extremely improbable, for a person cannot take an oath on any mitzvah [object,] like maakeh, sukkah, or lulav, and especially not on milah, which would be disgraceful.” The Rosh (Shavuos 6:1) finds the plain reading of Chazal’s drashah to be so halachically problematic that he relegates it to a mere asmachta (textual allusion) rather than a legitimate halachic source – unlike Rashi, who takes the drashah at its halachic face value.

In sum, Rashi is the minority position among the mainstream commentators who comment on this pasuk. Even those who cite both opinions characterize Rashi’s as “the midrashic approach” and Ibn Ezra’s as “pshat.”

I do not find this to be problematic. However, there are those who find this conclusion to be deeply troublesome. A number of prominent rabbis, among them the Roshei Yeshiva of Beth Medrash Govoha (of Lakewood, NJ), have recently signed a ban on a popular edition of Chumash entitled Pshuto shel Mikra (LNN, 11/15/22). The ban alleges (among other things) that this Chumash constitutes “a stumbling block for the masses” because it presents other traditional commentaries as pshat instead of regarding Rashi as the definitive pshat.

My thoughts on this ban cannot be shared in the space of a 1-page article. Moreover, as of this morning, I have only read 24 pages of the 76-page Kuntress Vayivinu ba’Mikra which explicates the many reasons for the ban. Suffice it to say, as someone who favors the non-Rashi pshat commentators among the Rishonim, I am as disturbed by this ban as its promulgators are disturbed by the Chumash Pshuto shel Mikra. I can’t help but wonder what all the Rishonim cited above would say about this treatment of their Torah.

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Friday, November 11, 2022

Vayeira: Don’t Deviate from the Minhag: XTREME Edition

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Artwork: Divine Visitation, by Victor Adame Minguez; flavor text on the card reads:
"The angels appreciated the offer, but declined to eat any birdseed."

Vayeira: Don’t Deviate from the Minhag: XTREME Edition

Parashas Vayeira opens with Avraham Avinu’s visitation by “three men” (Bereishis 18:2). While some take this description at face value (Ralbag and Bechor Shor) and others maintain that this entire episode took place in a prophetic vision (Rambam and Radak), the majority of commentators – including the Sages of the Talmud – understand these “men” to be angels (see the AlHaTorah Parashah Topics for all the views and sources).

Avraham receives his guests graciously and hastens to perform the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim. After preparing a lavish feast, the Torah tells us that “[Avraham] stood over them beneath the tree and they ate” (18:8). This poses a problem for the mainstream view: if, indeed, these were non-physical angels, how could they eat?

R’ Tanchum bar Chanilai (Bava Metzia 86b) addresses this question by deriving a lesson from their conduct: “a person should never deviate from the minhag, for when Moshe ascended on high [to receive the Torah], he didn’t eat food, [and] when the ministering angels descended below, they ate food.” Sensing that R’ Tanchum sidestepped the real issue, the Gemara asks: “But is it really possible to think that they ate bread?!” The Gemara answers: “Rather, say that they appeared as though they ate and drank.”

What are we to make of this midrashic statement? One approach is to attempt to explain the mechanics of how, exactly, these angels “appeared to eat.” For example, Midrash Rabbah (48:14) states that they “removed portions of food one at a time.” The Daas Zekeinim maintain that they incinerated the food, and that the term “vayocheilu” ought to be translated as “they consumed [with fire]” rather than “they ate.” Tanna d’Vei Eliyahu Rabbah (12) simply refuses to accept our Gemara’s conclusion, declaring:

Anyone who says that the ministering angels didn't eat with Avraham has said nothing! Rather, due to the righteousness of that tzadik and as a reward for his toil on their behalf, Ha'Kadosh Baruch Hu opened their mouths and they ate. Thus, it was stated: "he stood over them under the tree and they ate."

But there is an alternative approach one can take here. Instead of assuming that the midrash is describing these events as they actually happened, one can read R’ Tanchum’s midrash homiletically – that he is teaching us a lesson which has nothing to do with the pshat. Indeed, this is the approach taken by Midrash Seichel Tov (18:8):

They appeared as though they ate, removing the food bit by bit. Why go this far? So [we can] learn derech eretz (proper interpersonal conduct), to conduct oneself in the city in accordance with the customs of its citizens. Behold! Moshe ascended on high and didn’t eat or drink, and went for 40 days and 40 nights without eating and drinking, and these [angels] who came to the human realm made themselves appear to eat and drink in order to beautify the character of Avraham, and so as not to withhold reward from its rightful recipients.

Reading the midrash in this manner obviates the need to engage in abstruse angelological acrobatics to work out how the angels appeared to eat. Moreover, this reading sidesteps the problematic claim that the reason why Moshe Rabbeinu abstained from eating and drinking for 40 days was because he didn’t want to deviate from the minhag of the angels (as opposed to a more metaphysically intrinsic reason, related to Mosaic prophecy).

Why would R’Tanchum express this derech eretz lesson in such dramatic terms? Perhaps he did so the sake of the rhetorical impact. Many of us experience tremendous resistance when asked to change our own conduct to conform to the norms of others. R’ Tanchum framed his teaching this way to speak directly to this resistance: “Even if conforming to the minhag goes against your grain – even if it goes against your very nature – you still must not deviate. Moshe was a physical being – and yet, he abstained from eating and drinking to uphold the custom. The angels were non-physical beings – and yet, they ate so as not to upset their host. And even if you literally can’t bring yourself to adapt the minhag, then at least do a convincing job of pretending to conform.”

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Friday, November 4, 2022

Lech Lecha: Is Circumcision "Mutilation"?

This week's Torah content has been sponsored by my friend and colleague, Rabbi Dr. Elie Feder. Rabbi Feder recently published a book called Gematria Refigured: A New Look at How the Torah Conveys Ideas Through Numbers (2022, Mosaica Press). The approach to gematria he presents in this book is neither fluffy nor fanciful, but rational. If you're interested in some sample chapters, click here. If you have a social media platform and are interested in promoting or reviewing Rabbi Feder's book, let me know and I'll put the two of you in touch. The book is available for purchase at Mosaica Press.

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Artwork: "Abstract Painting of Circumcision," by DALL-E

Lech Lecha: Is Circumcision "Mutilation"?

Most Jews would answer, “No! Of course not!” In truth, this is a machlokess. Sefer ha’Chinuch (Mitzvah #2) writes:

It is known to those who understand that the perfection of man’s [bodily] form requires the removal of the foreskin, which is excess to it. The reason for this mitzvah is that Hashem desired to establish a sign in the bodies of the people He singled out to be called by His name (i.e. Israel) in order to differentiate them from the other nations in the form of their bodies, just like they are differentiated from them in the form of their souls, whose source (i.e. the knowledge we comprehend) and preparedness are not equal. He established this differentiation on the male organ, which is the cause of the preservation of the species, in addition to the fact that it contains a perfection of the bodily form, as we explained. Hashem desired His chosen nation to perfect their anatomy, and He wanted this perfection to come about through human agency – rather than creating man perfect from birth – to allude to him that just as the perfection of his bodily form is through his own agency, so too it is within his power to perfect the form of his soul through proper actions.

Rambam disagrees. He begins his discourse on the reasons for circumcision (Moreh ha’Nevuchim 3:49) by expressly rejecting the Sefer ha’Chinuch’s premise, and then goes on to provide the first of his two explanations:

Some people believe that circumcision is to remove a defect in man’s bodily form, but everyone can easily reply, “How can products of nature be deficient so as to require external completion, especially since the use of the foreskin to that organ is evident?” This commandment has not been prescribed as a remedy to a deficient physical creation, but as a means for perfecting man’s moral shortcomings. The bodily injury (nezek gufani) caused to that organ is exactly that which is desired; it does not interrupt any vital function, nor does it destroy the power of reproduction. Circumcision simply counteracts excessive lust; for there is no doubt that circumcision weakens the power of sexual excitement, and can lessen the natural enjoyment … This is, as I believe, the best reason for the commandment concerning circumcision.

Now if we’re honest, we’ll concede that both Sefer ha’Chinuch and Rambam make factually problematic claims. Modern science sides with Rambam against the Sefer ha’Chinuch: since the foreskin has biological functions, it is therefore not “extra.” However, there is no definitive evidence for Rambam’s claim that circumcision decreases lust or enjoyment. Nevertheless, the ideas reflected in their explanations are true. Circumcision does differentiate us in our bodies, which alludes to the difference in our souls (i.e. our minds), as Sefer ha’Chinuch explained. Likewise, the act of diminishing the male sexual organ symbolically conveys Judaism’s stance on the relationship between body and soul, as the Rambam writes: “indulgence in excessive bodily pleasure deteriorates the soul, and the development of the soul demands a curtailment of bodily indulgences” (Intro to the Mishnah).

Does the Rambam’s view lend support to those who protest circumcision, framing it as a form of genital mutilation? No! To the contrary – such protests vindicate the Rambam’s view, insofar as they underscore the difference between Torah and non-Torah value systems.

sTo “mutilate” means “to injure, disfigure, or make imperfect by removing or irreparably damaging parts” (www.dictionary.com), but whether a particular act constitutes mutilation is entirely dependent on one’s value system. A society that values physical appearances will regard cosmetic plastic surgery as an act of beautification rather than mutilation, even though the surgeon physically injures the body. A society that values athletic competition will cheer when football players repeatedly collide against each other, inflicting severe brain injury and irreparable bodily harm. So too, a society that fundamentally regards human beings as animals and values the pursuit of pleasure above all will strenuously object to a procedure designed to reduce sexual pleasure. The same mother who forcibly imposes female beauty standards on her infant daughter by piercing her ears will condemn circumcision as a form of infant abuse.

Thus, the very fact that “non-Jews protest against chukim” (Yoma 67b) like milah ought to be a matter of pride – not shame. Those steeped in materialism will not be able to fathom mitzvos which serve non-materialistic ends.

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Wednesday, November 2, 2022

Beur Tefilah: Who is the “Aleinu” in Sim Shalom?

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Beur Tefilah: Who is the “Aleinu” in Sim Shalom?

Sim Shalom, the final berachah of the amidah, opens with the sentence: “Establish peace, goodness and blessing, favor and kindness and mercy aleinu (upon us) ve’al kol Yisarel amecha (and upon all Israel, Your people).” The question is: to whom does “aleinu” refer? Ordinarily we might read this word as a collective reference to the Jewish people, but if that were the case here, the next phrase, “ve’al kol Yisarel amecha,” would be redundant.

It is tempting to answer that “aleinu” refers to the congregation or group of people with whom one is davening. However, R’ Yitzchak Eliyahu Landau (in his Siddur Dober Shalom commentary, published in Siddur Otzar ha’Tefilos) rejects this interpretation, arguing that an individual davening alone ought to then change the word from aleinu (upon us) to alai (upon me). He answers that since peace requires harmony between at least two parties, we ask Hashem to establish peace aleinu, “between me and that which opposes me,” whatever that opposition may be.

I, on the other hand, prefer to answer that “aleinu” refers to mankind as a whole. We ask Hashem to “establish peace upon us [human beings in general,] and upon all Israel, Your people, [in specific].” This accords with the position of R’ Chanina, deputy of the kohanim, who said: “daven for the peace of the government, because were it not for people’s fear of it, each man would swallow his fellow alive” (Avos 3:2). Rabbeinu Yonah there (ibid.) writes:

This means to say that a person should daven for the peace of the entire world and feel pain over the pain of others. Such is the way of the tzadikim, as David said: “But as for me, when they (i.e. my enemies and oppressors) were ill, my clothing was sackcloth, and I afflicted myself with fasting; may my prayer return upon my own bosom” (Tehilim 35:13), for a person should not make his supplications and requests for his own needs alone, but should daven that all humanity should be in a state of peace. And with the peace of the government, there will be peace for the world.

Rav Hirsch endorses this approach in his commentary on the next sentence in Sim Shalom: “Bless us, our Father, all as one with the light of Your countenance, for through the light of Your countenance you have given us, etc.:”

Once this light will enlighten us all equally, once we will all be of one mind in the recognition of God and of what is pleasing in His sight, then the peaceful harmony of life will be a natural outgrowth of this unity of conviction and endeavor. For through this enlightenment all of us are given the Divine Law of life to aid us in the acquisition of understanding, the love of selfless devotion to shape our conviction, and loyalty to duty as the character trait to motivate our conduct. In this manner blessing, compassion, life and peace will come to all men.

Ralbag (Bereishis 1:3; Bamidbar 6:25; Mishlei 16:15) maintains that “light of Your countenance” means knowledge. Rambam (Moreh 3:11) explains that since all interpersonal conflicts are caused by ignorance, therefore, peace can only come about through knowledge, and this will be the cause of world peace at the time of Moshiach:

Just as a blind man, because of absence of sight, does not cease stumbling, being wounded, and wounding others, because he has nobody to guide him on his way, so too, the various sects of men – each according to the extent of his ignorance – does to himself and to others great evils from which individuals of the species suffer. If there were knowledge, whose relation to the human form is like that of the faculty of sight to the eye, they would refrain from doing any harm to themselves and to others. For the knowledge of truth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual harms … The prophet points out what will be the cause of this change [in the Messianic era], for he says that hatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men will then have a true knowledge of God. “They will neither injure nor destroy in all of My holy mountain; for the earth will be as filled with knowledge of Hashem as water covers the seabed” (Yeshayahu 11:9).

This interpretation of Sim Shalom flows from the penultimate statement in the previous berachah of Modim: “and all living beings will thank You, Selah, and they will praise Your Name in truth.” That is, when all human beings thank and praise Hashem, then He will establish peace upon all mankind, and will bless His people Israel with peace.

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