Shelach: Tzitzis, Indigo, and the Plague of the Firstborns

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Can you tell which of these are dyed with indigo? Didn't think so.

Shelach: Tzitzis, Indigo, and the Plague of the Firstborn

Parashas Shelach concludes with the topic of tzitzis, and the discussion of tzitzis concludes with a reminder of Yetzias Mitzrayim (the Exodus from Egypt): 

Hashem said to Moshe, saying: Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them that they shall make themselves tzitzis on the corners of their garments, throughout their generations. And they shall place upon the tzitzis of each corner a thread of techeiles. It shall constitute tzitzis for you, that you may see it and remember all the mitzvos of Hashem and do them, and not explore after your heart and after your eyes after which you stray. So that you may remember and do all My mitzvos and be holy to your God. I am Hashem, your God, Who has taken you out from the land of Egypt to be a God unto you; I am Hashem, your God. (Bamidbar 15:37-41) 

This reference to Yetzias Mitzrayim in and of itself isn’t particularly noteworthy. The Torah mentions Yetzias Mitzrayim dozens of times in connection with other mitzvos. The question here is: What does Yetzias Mitzrayim have to do with tzitzis in particular? With other mitzvos – such as Pesach, matzah, maror, Shabbos, the laws about how we treat our slaves, or how we treat Egyptian converts, or how we relate to the “stranger” in our midst – the thematic relationship is either explicitly spelled out in the pesukim or it is obvious. But in the case of tzitzis, the connection is not at all apparent. 

Rashi [1], citing a Gemara in Bava Metzia 61b, addresses this question explicitly: 

Why was Yetzias Mitzrayim stated [here]? [In order to say:] “I am the One Who discerned in Egypt [the difference] between the drop [of sperm] that became a firstborn and the drop that did not become a firstborn. [So too,] I am the One Who will discern and exact punishment from one who attaches [a thread dyed with] indigo [2] on his garment and says it is techeiles.” 

The mitzvah of tzitzis has two basic components: lavan (the white fringes) and techeiles (the thread of blue). The lavan can be made from wool, linen, or from whatever kind of material the garment is made of. The techeiles is made from wool dyed a specific shade of blue using a substance secreted by a marine creature known as the chilazon. Rashi [3] explains why a person would be inclined to use indigo as a substitute for properly made techeiles: 

Indigo is a color that resembles techeiles, but the Torah specified “a thread of techeiles”; techeiles is very expensive, since it is dyed with the secretion of the chilazon which only comes up from the sea once every 70 years. 

Rashi only cited the part of the Gemara that focused on techeiles. The original statement asks the same question with regards to two other mitzvos which are also inexplicably juxtaposed with Yetzias Mitzrayim, and offers a similar answer to address all three cases: 

Why did the Merciful One need to write about Yetzias Mitzrayim in conjunction with [the prohibition against charging] interest [4], and in conjunction with [the mitzvah of] tzitzis, and in conjunction with [the prohibition against using unjust] weights [5]? 

[The answer is:] The Holy One, Blessed is He, said: “I am the One Who discerned in Egypt [the difference] between the drop [of sperm] that became a firstborn and the drop that did not become a firstborn. [So too,] I am the One Who will exact punishment from one who attributes [ownership of] his money to a non-Jew and lends it to a Jew with interest [6], and [I am the One Who will exact punishment] from one who buries his weights in salt [thereby changing the weight in a manner undetectable to the eye], and [I am the One Who will exact punishment] from one who attaches [a thread dyed with] indigo on his garment and says it is techeiles. 

On a superficial level, this Gemara’s message is clear: even though a human being cannot visually detect the difference between indigo and techeiles, or the difference between accurate weights and weights that have been tampered with, or the difference between money that belongs to a non-Jew and money that belongs to a Jew – Hashem can discern the difference. And just as He used His “Divine discernment” to mete out punishment to the firstborns in Egypt in a manner that would have been impossible for a human judge to do, so too, He will exact retribution from those who violate halacha by making recourse to these loopholes. 

The Maharsha [7] is unsatisfied with this elementary understanding. He is bothered by the fact that in the cases of unjust weights and improper charging of interest the wrongdoer is actually defrauding his fellow Jew or causing him to sin, but in the case of indigo he’s just cheating himself out of his own mitzvah. It would be fine if the point of this Gemara were to reinforce the idea that Hashem will punish a person for committing an interpersonal transgression even if the victim is unaware of the crime. However, if the point of this Gemara is to teach us that a person who cuts corners [8] in his personal mitzvah observance will be punished for his failure to fulfill that mitzvah, then what makes the indigo case different than any private violation of halacha? As the Maharsha puts it: “Why, then, didn’t the Torah mention Yetzias Mitzrayim in conjunction with every positive and negative commandment?” The case of indigo and techeiles must be teaching us something more. 

This leads the Maharsha to a startling conclusion: 

It is for this reason that it was necessary to say that a person transgresses from the time he attaches [the indigo], for he will be punished for the very thought of transgressing the mitzvah of tzitzis [in this manner]. 

The Maharsha maintains that our Gemara can’t simply be teaching us that a person will be held accountable for failing to use valid techeiles. Rather, the Gemara is teaching us that in addition to failing to fulfill the mitzvah of tzitzis, there is a separate transgression in the very act of attaching indigo to one’s tzitzis with the intention of substituting it for authentic techeiles. 

How the Maharsha’s explanation makes sense in a halachic framework is beyond the scope of this article. Instead we will attempt to understand the mentality that this halacha is intended to address. What, exactly, is the underlying flaw in this person’s thinking? What is the nature of this separate transgression in the very thought of circumventing the techeiles requirement by using indigo? 

It is natural to attempt to answer this question by examining this person’s motive. We can understand the motive for utilizing this loophole in the laws of charging interest, as well as the motive for using unjust weights and measures: namely, to make an easy profit. But in the case of the person who substitutes indigo for techeiles, there are a number of possible motives: 

• He, too, wants to save money on techeiles by purchasing the less costly knock-off brand; it’s that same classical techeiles appearance at less than half the cost! 
• His view of mitzvos is utilitarian; his reasoning is: “My tzitzis need a thread of blue for a specific philosophical reason, so as long as it looks the same, what difference does it make what the dye is made of?” [9] 
• His identity is tied to the self-image of religiosity rather than conformity to the actual halacha; therefore, the only thing that matters is his ability to look in the mirror and content himself with the fact that he’s wearing the right looking “religious uniform.” 
• Alternatively, he only cares about appearing religious in the eyes of others; as long as other people perceive him as someone who follows halacha, that’s all that matters. 
• Like many disenfranchised Orthodox Jews who resent the minutiae and technical demands of halacha, he rationalizes his transgression, saying: “C’mon. Does God really care what my techeiles is made of? It looks exactly the same to me.” 

This list of motives is not intended to be exhaustive, but is sufficient to illustrate a common denominator: the attribution of greater importance to appearances than to reality. No matter how the indigo-user rationalizes his behavior, it all boils down to the notion that “if it looks the same, then it is the same.” 

We can now understand the nature of the transgression mentioned by the Maharsha. Substituting indigo for techeiles will certainly invalidate a person’s tzitzis. Beyond this, however, such an individual is committing a transgression of the mind [10] by ascribing more reality to human perception than to what is actually real. The same goes for the one who relies on a loophole to charge interest and to the one who uses unjust weights: in addition to their breach of justice and the loss they cause their fellow Jew, they have also warped their own sense of reality by reinforcing the notion that appearances are all that matters. 

This, I believe, is why the Gemara’s statement emphasizes Hashem’s ability to discern and punish the Egyptian firstborns. The firstborns in Egypt held positions of leadership. People could readily identify who was and wasn’t a firstborn based on their societal distinction. But as Chazal teach, the plague of the firstborn didn’t only target the individuals who held the societal role of firstborn. Every firstborn was killed, even those who weren’t identifiable as such. Rashi [11] provides an example of this in his commentary on the pasuk: “there was no household in which there was no dead person” (Shemos 12:30): 

Some Egyptian women were unfaithful to their husbands and bore children from unmarried men. Thus they would have many firstborn; sometimes one woman would have five, each one the firstborn of his father. 

Despite the fact that these bastard firstborns were excluded from the hierarchical prominence of their firstborn status, this didn’t protect them from death. Hashem’s smiting of real firstborns over merely perceived firstborns shattered the primacy of human perception over actual reality. 

This, according to Rashi, is the thematic association we are to make between Yetzias Mitzrayim and tzitzis. In his final comment on the parashah of tzitzis he underscores this theme yet again: 

[The thread of blue] is called “pesil techeiles” because of the bereavement [suffered by the Egyptians] over the loss of their firstborns. The Aramaic translation of [the Hebrew word for] “bereavement” (sheekool) is teechla [a word similar to techeiles], and they were stricken at night, and techeiles is similar to the color of the sky as it darkens towards the evening. 

In other words, when a person sees the techeiles in his tzitzis, he is supposed to associate to the plague of the firstborn based on the name “techeiles” which alludes to Egypt’s “bereavement” over the loss of their firstborns, the shade of blue which alludes to the color of the sky close to the time that the plague occurred, and to Hashem’s ability to discriminate between firstborn and non-firstborn, as reflected in the halacha prohibiting the use of indigo. 

As “drushy” (i.e. homiletical and “loose” in their interpretive style) as these explanations may sound, they clearly convey Rashi’s answer to our original question about the thematic connection between Yetzias Mitzrayim and tzitzis. 

Let us conclude on another homiletical point. My chavrusa suggested that perhaps this idea can be extended to one of the other functions of tzitzis: “so that you may remember and do all My mitzvos and be holy to your God.” When it comes to the observance of Hashem’s mitzvos and the ongoing quest to become kedoshim (holy), what matters is our adherence to halacha – not the appearance of religiosity in the eyes of human beings. 

Footnotes:

[1] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Sefer Bamidbar 15:41 

[2] The term used in halacha here is kala ilan (קלא אילן), which I have only ever seen translated as “indigo.” 

[3] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Talmud Bavli: Bava Metzia 61b, d”h kala ilan 

[4] It is prohibited for a Jew to charge interest from another Jew. The source-pesukim mention Yetzias Mitzrayim: “Do not take from him interest and increase; and you shall fear your God, and let your brother live with you. Do not give him your money for interest, and do not give your food for increase. I am Hashem, your God, Who took you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan, to be a God unto you” (Vayikra 25:36-38). 

[5] It is prohibited to use unjust weights and measures. The source-pesukim mention Yetzias Mitzrayim: “You shall not commit a perversion in justice in measures of length, weight, or volume. You shall have correct scales, correct weights, correct dry measures, and correct liquid measures – I am Hashem, your God, Who brought you forth from the land of Egypt” (ibid. 19:35-36). 

[6] Without getting into the intricacies of the halacha, this refers to some “loophole” which would allow a Jew to effectively charge interest from another Jew without technically violating the prohibition against charging interest. 

[7] Rav Shmuel Eidels (Maharsha), Chidushei Halachos d”h she’toleh kala ilan 

[8] Genuinely not intended as a tzitzis pun. 

[9] This is reminiscent of Korach’s view in the famous midrash about the tallis made entirely of techeiles. Korach’s argument boils down to: “As long as it achieves its philosophical objective, what difference does it make how we get there? This insistence on conformity with the technical halacha is bogus!” 

[10 The fact that this is a transgression of the mind is why he violates it based purely on his intent. The very moment he plans to substitute indigo for techeiles, he has already evidenced the underlying flaw at the root of this transgression, even if he never actually wears the garment. 

[11] Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Yitzchak (Rashi), Commentary on Shemos 12:30 citing Mechilta 13:33